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ABSTRACT 
 
 During his 2003 State of the Union Address, President Bush announced his 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and asked Congress, over the next five years, 
to authorize the appropriation of $15 billion to provide treatment, prevention and care to 
people infected and affected by HIV/AIDS, mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa. Given the 
existing pattern of neglect and indifference in U.S.-Africa relations and the Bush 
campaign’s statement in 2000 dismissing Africa from his foreign policy priorities, what 
then justifies his administration’s undertaking of this massive foreign policy change?  
My dissertation offers insight into the role played by private US pharmaceutical 
companies in continuity and change in US HIV/AIDS foreign policy toward Africa. As 
global nonstate actors, these institutions were instrumental in shaping the perception 
about neoliberal international norms in the practice of the global public health welfare 
provision. PEPFAR represents a stark contrast to the Clinton Executive Order 13155 that 
attempted to reinstate the now defunct welfare state model and offers the conservative 
alternative that establishes the market monopoly over social issues. As a result, the 
provision of extraordinary resources to fight HIV/AIDS in resource-constrained countries, 
mostly in Africa, blocked the possibility of implementing two provisos in the Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, namely, the 
compulsory licensing and the parallel importation. By the same token, it allowed the
  xiv 
Bush administration to counter the claim of African governments to sovereignly regulate 
the antiretroviral patented HIV/AIDS drugs in the global market. In fact, the compulsory 
licensing and the parallel importation provisos received support at the national level from  
the Clinton administration through President Clinton’s Executive Order 13155 in May 
2000 marking a radical US HIV/AIDS policy change and, at the international level, 
through the 2001 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.  
This qualitative case study uses process-tracing methods to uncover the 
implementation of a privatization agenda in US foreign policy toward Africa. Data for 
analysis are essentially collected from a thorough examination of primary documents, 
including presidential speeches, memos, directives, executive orders, and Congressional 
hearings. Secondly, the literature and secondary documents are reviewed and analyzed, 
most being reports from governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations. To 
supplement this process, in-depth interviews were conducted with key policy officials, 
corporate lobbyists, and human rights activists. The findings are compared with and 
contrasted to the case of US foreign policy toward HIV/AIDS in Uganda, one key US 
partner in Africa among other PEPFAR focus countries.  
 
Key words: US foreign policy, HIV/AIDS, public health crisis, welfare provision, 
compassionate conservatism, privatization 
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CHAPTER ONE: HIV/AIDS IN AFRICA AND US FOREIGN POLICY 
Introduction 
President George W. Bush surprised his audience and the rest of the world during 
his State of the Union Address on January 28, 2003 when he announced the creation of 
the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) to help African HIV/AIDS 
patients access the drug market. He requested that the US Congress authorize an 
unprecedented $15 billion that would be spent in the next five years to help African 
countries tackle the HIV/AIDS public health pandemic (Lyman and Morrison 2006). As 
he put it, “I ask the Congress to commit $15 billion over the next five years, including 
nearly $10 billion in new money, to turn the tide against AIDS in the most afflicted 
nations of Africa and the Caribbean.” Of that money, the administration hoped to spend 
$4 billion on bilateral programs in HIV/AIDS research and tuberculosis (TB) projects in 
100 non-focus countries; $1 billion would contribute to the multilateral Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (GFATM), and the remaining $10 billion were 
 allocated to 15 focus countries of which 12 are found in Africa.1 This initiative, which 
was fully funded that year by the US Congress, has emerged as one of the most popular 
                                                
1 White House Fact Sheet, “The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief,” at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030129-1.html (accessed January 15, 
2013). 
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and widely acclaimed foreign policy legacies of the controversial Bush presidency 
(Stein 2008; Moss 2009; Hindman and Schroedel 2011; Thomas 2001; Sachs 2005). 
Scholars and policy analysts were nonetheless surprised by the Bush 
administration’s launching of PEPFAR. At the onset of Bush’s presidency, they had 
predicted the further marginalization of Africa in US foreign policy given the realist 
tendencies of the Bush White House inner circle. As one scholar surmised, “It is highly 
unlikely that a Bush White House will undertake high-level public relations initiatives, 
such as the 1994 While House Conference on Africa or a presidential visit to the 
continent,” in spite of Clinton’s historic trips to Africa in 1998 and 2000 that heralded 
rising US interests in that continent (Schraeder 2001:390). In fact, the Bush campaign 
team during the 2000 presidential election had ridiculed the Clinton administration’s 
humanitarian foreign policy toward Africa (Dumbuya 2009:1).  
Indeed, during a presidential debate with Democratic candidate Al Gore at Wake 
Forest University in North Carolina on October 11, 2000, then Texas Governor George 
W. Bush established a hierarchy of regional foreign policy priorities should he be elected 
the next American presidency. In his words, 
Africa’s important (…) but there’s got to be priorities. And the Middle East is a 
priority for a lot of reasons as is Europe and the Far East, and our own 
hemisphere. Those are my four top priorities should I be the president. It’s not to 
say we won’t be engaged [in Africa], and working hard to get other nations to 
come together to prevent atrocity [like in Rwanda] (…). But we can’t be all things 
to all people in the world. I am worried about over-committing our military 
around the world. I want to be judicious in its use. I don’t think nation-building 
missions are worthwhile. For him, Africa did not “fit into the national strategic 
interests, as far as I (Bush) can see them” and therefore would not figure among 
his foreign policy priorities (quoted in Schraeder 2011:308). Moreover, 
throughout the 1990s, after the Cold War was over, most Republicans in Congress 
advocated for a reduction in US foreign aid to Africa, if not its total suppression, 
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given the absence of Cold War geopolitical “strategic interests.” This 
administration’s decision to increase foreign assistance to Africa is rather 
perplexing, especially in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 2002 
economic recession, and most importantly, the ongoing war on terror in 
Afghanistan and the impending invasion of Iraq.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to explain President Bush’s surprising foreign 
policy move and to make sense of his administration’s HIV/AIDS foreign policy toward 
Africa. To answer this foreign policy puzzle, this dissertation argues that the Bush 
administration chose to pursue an aggressive neoliberal agenda that gave priority to 
private businesses and nongovernmental organizations in implementing the president’s 
social welfare policies. Existing theories explaining the creation of PEPFAR followed a 
contingent or contextual expediency perspective such as the personal beliefs of the 
president, the bureaucratic constraints of policy-making, or the competition of interests in 
domestic politics. Such explanations are ancillary to the grand scheme of advancing 
public welfare through a market model of production and distribution of social goods.  As 
a result, this dissertation propounds that neoliberalism, a powerful driving force in US 
foreign policy since the 1970s, can better explain the origins of President Bush’s policy 
preferences and the creation of PEPFAR. This theory also illuminates the important, 
powerful role that private US pharmaceutical companies have played in continuity and 
change in US HIV/AIDS foreign policy toward Africa. They contributed to the 
development of the official US response to the HIV/AIDS global public health crisis, 
shaping the timing and content of PEPFAR policy. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds in five parts. The first part provides a brief 
overview of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in context, with part two providing a general 
overview of the PEPFAR initiative as a US response to this global health crisis. The third 
part describes the context surrounding the Bush administration’s decision to create this 
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global public health policy. Part four outlines the research questions and underscores the 
study’s rationale. A final section provides a brief overview of the remaining chapters. 
Understanding the Context of the HIV/AIDS Pandemic 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus, or HIV, is the pathogen agent that causes 
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). It attacks and weakens the immune 
system to the point of annihilating its capacity to resist other infections. AIDS, on the 
other hand, represents the last stage of HIV infection, depleting the immune system to the 
extent that the body can no longer defend itself against opportunistic diseases 
(Congressional Research Service, February 22, 2011).  
In the mere 20 years since it was first discovered in the United States in 1981, 
HIV/AIDS had achieved a pandemic status. That is, it no longer affected a specific 
country or region, but the entire world. By the end of 2002, an estimated 42 million 
individuals were infected by and lived with HIV/AIDS around the world of whom more 
than 75 percent lived in Africa and the Caribbean (H.R. 1298, Sec. 2, §3 (A)). The United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) listed it in 2000 as the number one killer in Africa, 
killing 10 times more people than all the armed conflicts in the continent since its initial 
eruption. As the United Nations (UN) Secretary General noted, “[b]etween 1999 and 
2000 more people died of AIDS in Africa than in all the wars on the continent. [And] the 
spread of AIDS in Africa most likely outpaced the spread in any other region in the world. 
Although the average HIV prevalence rate among adult population (15-49 years) in 
almost all African countries exceeds 2 percent, it is more than 5 percent in 21 countries” 
(quoted in Stillwaggon 2006:4).  
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As far as public health is concerned, HIV/AIDS constitutes the most difficult 
health problem confronting sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of malaria. Africa, 
with an HIV/AIDS infection rate at 8.8 percent (see Table 1), came to be seen as the 
epicenter of the pandemic.2 Fisher and Rigamonti (2005:2) remark that as of December 
2003, 
[M]ore than twenty million people worldwide had died from AIDS […]. There 
was an almost exponential growth of the epidemic in the early 1990s, particularly 
in Africa, which accounts for two-thirds of the people living with HIV/AIDS, 
while comprising only about eleven percent of the world’s population. 
 
On July 20, 2000, a UNAIDS Press Release stated that the pandemic had reversed the 
social, economic, and political development of the past three decades. HIV/AIDS was 
aggressively eating up the development achievements and jeopardized the continents’ 
future. As Former UN Secretary General Special Envoy for HIV/AIDS in Africa Lewis 
(2006:45) warned, “[E]very goal [among the Millennium Development Goals] is put in  
jeopardy by AIDS.” And Dixon, McDonald, and Roberts (2001:383) note, “despite the 
very large number of premature deaths from AIDS in recent years, it is only recently that 
estimates of life expectancy have begun to decline. For some countries in the AIDS-belt 
estimates are suggesting that life expectancy is now less than 40 years” (US Bureau of 
Census, 1998). As a matter of fact, HIV/AIDS has reduced life expectancy in many 
African countries to an average of 46.7 years, and in some countries, to lower than 40 
years. “Without AIDS, life expectancy in the year 2010 in Zimbabwe would be 70 years, 
                                                
2 Prevalence measures the number or rate of the sexually active adult population aged between 15 
and 49 years that are living with HIV infection in a specified time period. While Africa 
represented eight times higher that of the rest of the world at 1.1 percent, the prevalence rates 
distribution represented 2.3 percent in the Caribbean, 0.2 percent in North Africa and the Middle 
East, South and Southeast Asia represented 0.56 percent, and 0.6 percent were in North America 
(UNAIDS 2003). 
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in Botswana 66 years, and in Zambia 60 years” (Worldwatch Issue Alert of October 31, 
2000 quoted by IIPI 2000:5).3 
Table 1. Regional HIV/AIDS Statistics and Features (End of 2000) 
  Adults & 
children 
 living with 
HIV/AIDS 
Adults & 
children  
newly 
infected  
with 
HIV  
Adult  
prevalence 
 rate* 
% of 
HIV-
positive
 adults 
who 
are  
women 
Main 
mode(s) of 
 transmission 
for those  
living with 
HIV/AIDS** 
Sub-Saharan Africa 25.3 million 3.8 
million 
8.8% 55% Hetero 
North Africa & 
Middle East 
400,000 80,000 0.2% 40% Hetero, IDU 
South and South-
East Asia 
5.8 million 780,000 0.56% 35% Hetero, IDU 
East Asia & Pacific 640,000 130,000 0.07% 13% IDU, Hetero, 
MSM 
Latin America 1.4 million 150,000 0.5 % 25% MSM, IDU, 
Hetero 
Caribbean 390,000 60,000 2.3% 35% Hetero, 
MSM 
Eastern Europe & 
Central Asia 
700,000 250,000 0.35% 25% IDU 
Western Europe 540,000 30,000 0.24% 25% MSM, IDU 
North America 920,000 45,000 0.6% 20% MSM, IDU, 
Hetero 
Australia & New 
Zealand 
15,000 500 0.13% 10% MSM 
TOTAL 36.1 million 5.3 
million 
1.1% 47%   
 
 
(*) The proportion of adults (15 to 49 years of age) living with HIV/AIDS in 2000, using 
2000 population numbers; (**) Hetero (heterosexual transmission), IDU (transmission 
through injecting drug use), MSM (sexual transmission among men who have sex with 
men)  
(Source: Adapted from UNAIDS report, 2000). 
                                                
3 UNAIDS Press Release on July 20, 2000. “UNAIDS Calls on G8 for Massive Increase in 
Resources to Fight AIDS,” available at http://www.thebody.com/content/art661.html. Last 
consultation January 4, 2015. 
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HIV/AIDS affects people in their prime. Those who would normally be working 
to support their families or serve their nations are diminished in their capacity to work to 
the extent that they become dependent on their families and incur expenses that they 
cannot sustain. In fact, the impacts of HIV/AIDS and related diseases on human security, 
socioeconomic development, and state capabilities cannot be overstated. It endangers 
national economic security. As one scholar remarks, the consequences of the epidemic, 
predicted since the early 1990s, are “now being seen in falling life expectancies, 
increasing numbers of orphans, and terrible tolls on households, learning, teaching, health 
systems, agriculture and business sectors across the board” (Dietrich 2005:271). The 
HIV/AIDS pandemic has come to represent one of the greatest moral, social, political, 
economic, and scientific challenges of our time. As such, the HIV/AIDS pandemic is 
seen as one of the most serious threats to global collective security and economic 
development, as well as to human rights in Africa (De Cock et al. 2002; De Waal 2003a).  
Perceiving the urgency of the HIV/AIDS global situation to demand immediate 
action, the United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan challenged the international 
community in the face of the threat posed by the HIV/AIDS pandemic to end the 
conspiracy of silence, stigma and shame and work to terminate this epidemic’s onslaught. 
In July 2001, he proposed the creation of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, 
and Malaria (GFTAM), a multilateral initiative launched in January 2002 to circumvent 
UN bureaucratic sluggishness. In addition, the international community included among 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) the halting and reversing of the spread of 
HIV/AIDS among the eight MDGs.  
  
8 
Overview of the PEPFAR Initiative  
Against the above international backdrop, President Bush announced the PEPFAR 
initiative in his January 2003 State of the Union Address. Four months later on May 27, 
2003, he signed into law Public Law 108-25, “The United States Leadership against 
HV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003.”  PEPFAR initially was a five-year 
bilateral initiative of the US government, committed to scaling up programs for 
treatment, prevention, and care of HIV/AIDS patients, mostly in Africa (Bush 2003a). 
From the moment of its authorization, PEPFAR has come to be regarded as a bold 
foreign policy move on the part of the US government. Its goals are to increase access to 
antiretroviral treatment for 2 million people, to prevent 7 million new HIV infections, and 
to provide care to 10 million people among those infected or affected by HIV/AIDS (also 
summarized as the “2-7-10” goals). When authorizing the appropriation of $15 billion for 
fiscal years 2004-2008, Congress required the executive to (a) establish the Office of the 
Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) in the State Department, (b) develop a comprehensive 
integrated 5-year strategy for a coordinated US government response to the global 
HIV/AIDS crisis, (c) emend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to define eligibility for 
US HIV/AIDS assistance, and (d) develop mandated goals, benchmarks, and metrics for 
program evaluation.  
The OGAC was effectively established in the State Department as an ambassador-
level position. President Bush appointed Randy Tobias, former CEO of the US private 
pharmaceutical company Elli Lily & Co., to be the first PEPFAR Ambassador (2004-
2006). Ambassador Mark Dybul succeeded Tobias (2006-2009). While the PEPFAR 
Global Coordinator reports directly to the Secretary of State, his office is comprised of a 
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small permanent staff that receives technical expertise and support from implementing 
agencies of the federal US government. The OGAC provides evaluation of progress made 
by PEPFAR programs and monitors results in the fight against HIV/AIDS. The OGAC’s 
roles are threefold: (a) the coordination of and collaboration among different US federal 
agencies involved in the implementation of HIV/AIDS activities for achieving the “2-7-
20” goals in focus countries; (b) the oversight of the funding supply chain from the US 
government to the implementing agencies of partner nations; and (c) bilateral partnership 
with host countries in order to harmonize national policies with US strategy to combat the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic.  
PEPFAR was conceptualized as a comprehensive, integrated five-year strategy to 
harmonize US global policy to combat HIV/AIDS. Ambassador Tobias developed and 
introduced his 5-year strategy to Congress on February 23, 2004, or “9 months after the 
act had been signed into law. [This comprehensive plan] stressed that the strategy should 
be viewed as a work in progress, something that could change in response to changes in 
the HIV/AIDS pandemic and the knowledge and tools available” (IOM 2007:67-68). It 
focused on four principles including a rapid expansion of services, identification of new 
partners and building capacity for sustainable and effective responses to HIV/AIDS, bold 
leadership and sound policy environment for combating HIV/AIDS and mitigating its 
consequences, and implementing a strong information system that would foster best 
practices. Also, his message underscored the collaboration and cooperation among a wide 
range of partners. This approach assigned priorities for allocating resources to relevant 
agencies of the executive branch, which included the Departments of State, Defense, 
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Commerce, Labor, Health and Human Services, and especially the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, National Institutes of Health, US Food and Drug 
Administration, USAID, and Peace Corps. 
PEPFAR also amends parts of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to define 
eligibility and formulas for US HIV/AIDS assistance. Accordingly, the President should 
provide an appropriate level of assistance through nongovernmental and faith-based 
organizations in countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean, and other developing 
countries in areas affected by the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Although the US had supported 
multilateral efforts through the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, 
PEPFAR favored a strategic bilateral approach that emphasized a rapid scale-up and 
rollout of interventions in a limited number of countries. Yet, the “2-7-10” treatment, 
prevention, and care goals of PEPFAR reflected the contemporary World Health 
Organization (WHO)’s “3 by 5” program that aimed to distribute antiretroviral (ARV) 
treatment to 3 million people in 50 developing countries by the end of 2005.  
Deeming that focus should be put on delivering measurable results, the choice and 
strategy of the Bush administration sought to concentrate efforts on 15 specific focus 
countries, which collectively were estimated to concentrate and account for more than 
half of all global HIV infections (Ingram 2010:610). Twelve of these countries are 
located in Africa and included Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia; two others are 
found in the Caribbean: Haiti and Guyana; and one added a year later – Vietnam – is 
located in Asia (IOM 2007:4). It was also PEPFAR’s ambition to achieve the following: 
to provide ARV treatment to 2 million people in the next five years, a significant increase 
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from the 50,000 who could afford the expensive treatment in the early 2000s; to 
prevent 7 million new infections, given the rate of up to 2.5 million yearly occurrence of 
new infections; and to provide care for 10 million patients from AIDS and those directly 
affected by the pandemic, including orphans and vulnerable children.4  
As for developing mandated goals, benchmarks, and measurable results, in 
September 2008, OGAC announced that PEPFAR’s “2-7-10” goals had been met. 
Observers contend, however, that monitoring and evaluation of PEPFAR results can be 
contentious due to the overlap of PEPFAR with other programs such as the Global Fund, 
WHO, the World Bank MAP, and other donors and host country initiatives, given that 
they all seek credit for successes with their stakeholders (Fischer et al. 2009). The actual 
disbursement on global HIV/AIDS programs for the next five fiscal years (2004-2008) 
exceeded the requested $15 billion to reach a total of $18.1 billion (Salaam-Blyther 2012) 
(see Table 2). Most of the money was provided through governmental agencies such as 
USAID, CDC, or the Department of Defense. First, to scale up the treatment of 2 million 
people, 55% of the total budget was apportioned for the therapeutic medical care of 
individuals infected with HIV. Of this amount, three-quarters was allocated for the 
purchase and distribution of antiretroviral (ARV) pharmaceuticals while the rest of the 
amount was spent on related care. Second, Congress earmarked another 20% of 
PEPFAR’s total budget for prevention programs.  
                                                
4 US Leadership Against AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Act of 2003 (Public Law 108-25). 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_cong_public_laws&docid=f:pub
l025.108.pdf; See also Jennifer Kates, José-Antonio Izazola, and Eric Lief, Financing the 
response to AIDS in low- and middle-income countries: International assistance from the G8, 
European Commission and other donor Governments, 2007. Washington DC: Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2008. http://www.kff.org/hivaids/upload/7347_04-2.pdf. 
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Table 2. Global HIV/AIDS Requests and Funding FY2004-2008 (Current US$ Millions) 
 FY 2004 
Actual 
FY 2005 
Actual 
FY 2006 
Actual 
FY 2007 
Actual 
FY 2008 
Actual 
Bilateral request 1,835.0 2,095.0 2,729.0 3,642.0 4,958.5 
Actual funding 1,643.0 2,263.4 2,653.7 3,699.2 4,958.5 
Global Fund 
request 
200.0 200.0 300.0 300.0 300.0 
Global Fund actual 
fund 
546.6 347.2 544.5 724.0 840.3 
Total Request 2,035.0 2,295.0 3,029.0 3,942.0 5,258.5 
Total Fund 2,189.6 2,610.6 3,198.2 4,423.2 5,868.1 
 
Besides funding programs aimed at preventing 7 million new infections, at least 
one-third of the budget was reserved for education programs on abstinence-until-
marriage. Third, of the remaining 25%, Congress required that 15% be spent on palliative 
care of 10 million individuals with HIV/AIDS, while the remaining 10% went to assist 
orphans and vulnerable children (OVCs) affected by HIV/AIDS. Yet, half the money 
designated for OVCs was to be distributed through non-profit, nongovernmental 
organizations, including faith-based organizations implementing programs at the 
community level (IOM 2007:67).  
To this day, the PEPFAR initiative represents the US global health response and 
commitment in addressing the HIV/AIDS pandemic. It is regarded as the largest global 
health initiative in history initiated by one nation to address a single disease; the “largest 
commitment by any nation to combat a single disease in human history” (White House 
2007); or simply “the greatest global health commitment in history” (Frist, 2008) (OGAC 
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2005:11; Ingram 2010:613). Indeed, “[t]he US commitment to PEPFAR underpinned a 
dramatic increase in international assistance for the response to HIV/AIDS in low and 
middle-income countries from 2002-2007” (Fischer et al. 2009:16). The policy provoked 
different reactions, both hopeful and suspicious, among observers of US foreign policy 
toward Africa. By expanding the US HIV/AIDS global policy efforts and by dedicating 
unprecedented levels of resources to treatment and care of HIV-infected people, the 
PEPFAR initiative sought to overcome the established prevention strategy that dominated 
the US HIV/AIDS global policy prior to the Bush administration. While the policy 
dramatically expanded resources to meet the various aspects –economic, social, and 
ethical – of the challenges posed by the HIV/AIDS pandemic, “activist groups [hoped 
this US response would] be a stepping stone to a larger and more equi global health 
agenda (MSF, 2009; Ooms et al., 2008),” as Ingram (2010:607) puts it.  
Context of the Bush Administration’s Decision to Launch PEPFAR 
It is a well-established assumption among Africanist scholars that Africa is a 
backwater in official US foreign policy-making circles, since it represents little strategic 
significance to US foreign policy. US foreign policy toward Africa is characterized by 
neglect and indifference and this region has remained one of least concern within the 
global foreign policy hierarchy despite old ties reaching as far back as 1789. As US 
presidents and the Congress traditionally have devoted less attention to Africa, most of 
US foreign policy initiatives are delegated to bureaucrats and political appointees, an 
attitude reinforced by the perception that Africa falls primarily under the responsibility of 
Europe due to its colonial ties and other historical reasons (Clough 1992; Schraeder 
1994).  
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 Until the onset of the Cold War, the US government pursued a “hands off” 
foreign policy approach toward Africa. Only the redefinition of vital interests in terms of 
containing communism’s spread wherever it appeared after the Second World War and 
concerns about newly independent African states’ vulnerability to communism in the 
early 1960s led the US to monitor situations and intervene on the continent, using both 
South Africa and Zaire as proxy outposts (Schraeder 1994; Skinner 1998; Rothchild and 
Keller 2006; Keller 2006). The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s resulted in “a 
certain degree of US retrenchment from the African continent from 1989 to 2001,” 
subsequently bringing the continent back into the traditional realm of policy neglect and 
bureaucratic routine (Schraeder 2011:302-303). Behrman (2004:71) summarizes this in 
the following statement, 
As the iron curtain lifted, ushering in the new post-Cold War era, Africa seemed 
to lose [even] its geostrategic relevance. It was deemed a poor continent in which 
the United States had no major economic partners. It represented a small export 
market. There were major military flashpoints that threatened to spill over into 
other regions. There were no nuclear weapons on the continent. No Southern 
African country presented a particular military threat – to U.S. interests, at any 
rate. There was no major domestic constituency driving U.S. engagement in the 
continent. 
 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the US HIV/AIDS official policy attitude toward 
Africa remained lukewarm as focus was mostly put on the disease’s domestic aspect. 
However, HIV/AIDS gained a new salience in policy-making circles in 2000, a year 
which achieved symbolic status both in US domestic politics, owing to the presidential 
election to be held in November of the same year, and in international politics, because of 
a global movement focusing on Africa and demanding a reassessment of development 
policies. The disease was strongly associated with the condition of poverty and solutions 
revolving around debt cancellation, increases in foreign aid, and the promotion of free 
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trade, which also began to be linked to the issue of public health and HIV/AIDS. As a 
matter of fact, HIV/AIDS did not just become a foreign policy priority issue overnight. 
The conditions were ripe for the pandemic to acquire a greater international significance 
given the human, social, economic, and political consequences it entailed. Fukuyama 
(2012:53) argues that whilst “social forces and conditions do not simply ‘determine’ 
ideologies, as Karl Marx once maintained… ideas do not become powerful unless they 
speak to the concerns of large numbers of ordinary people.” For many policy analysts, 
HIV/AIDS was identified as the culprit sabotaging international development efforts 
(Lewis 2006:17; Sachs 2005:188).  
Most developing countries and human rights organizations accused the US 
government of choosing to protect the commercial interests of US pharmaceutical 
companies rather than urging the poor’s human right to life in developing countries. In 
fact, at the heart of the HIV/AIDS global crisis was the issue of prohibitive costs of 
antiretroviral (ARV) drugs that had created a discrepancy in access to treatment between 
patients living in wealthy developed countries and those living in resource-constrained 
countries. Aware of the salience that the HIV/AIDS crisis had acquired in domestic and 
global politics and experiencing increasing pressure on his administration, President 
Clinton reversed his policy supporting US pharmaceutical companies. In a presidential 
election year, he issued Executive Order 13155 on May 10, 2000, a policy change that 
was monumental, although never implemented because of the change in administration. 
This new policy urged African governments to enact responsible public health policies 
for their citizens – even if that meant overriding the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement.  
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In the international community, the year 2000 was also meaningful in that it 
prompted assessments of Western development policies toward Africa, in an attempt to 
explain the HIV/AIDS global crisis. Many international organizations, including the 
United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC) and the UN General Assembly (UNGA), 
the World Bank, UNAIDS, and WHO and its 2000 Commission on Macroeconomic and 
Health, produced an impressive body of literature relating HIV/AIDS to human security, 
the human rights, and global security.5 They identified HIV/AIDS among the culprits that 
sabotaged international development efforts (Lewis 2006:17; Sachs 2005:188). Shortly 
after the July 2000 13th International AIDS Conference in Durban, South Africa, the 
UNSC passed Resolution 1308 expressing deep concerns about the HIV/AIDS pandemic 
and calling for action to curb the threat posed to the world’s security by the illness 
(Dietrich 2007:281).  
Research Questions and Rationale of the Study 
Given the history of US HIV/AIDS foreign policy during the 1980s and 1990s, 
the traditional neglect of Africa in US foreign policy, and the Republicans’ decade-long 
battle in Congress to shrink – or abolish altogether – the foreign assistance programs, 
(now that the Cold War’s strategic interest in such projects was waning during the 
1990s), and finally, the context of the 2002 economic recession following the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, the creation of PEPFAR and the magnitude of its foreign aid increase 
                                                
5 National Intelligence Council, “The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for 
the United States” (2000), available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Report6-
3.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2014); PACHA, No Time To Spare, September 2000; Médecins Sans 
Frontières, “Statement by MSF on TRIPS and Affordable Medicines,” at 
http://www.msfaccess.org/about-us/media-room/press-releases/statement-m%C3%A9decins-
sans-fronti%C3%A8res-msf-trips-and-affordable-0; (last view Oct. 22, 2014); International Crisis 
Group, HIV/AIDS as a Security Threat (2001), available at 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/HIVAIDS%20as%20a%20Security%20Issue.pdf    
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encountered disbelief. Existing patterns of neglect and indifference in US foreign 
policy toward Africa, the traumas of the terrorist attacks in September 2001, the ongoing 
war in Afghanistan and the impending war in Iraq, and the global economic outlook in 
the beginning of the new Millennium, were all factors that led observers of US Africa 
foreign policy to expect less from the Bush realist administration. 
The creation of PEPFAR remains puzzling for the above reasons alone, not to 
mention the nature of American domestic politics wherein policy-makers reveal profound 
differences in regards to the very goals, values, and frameworks from which they 
interpret and make political decisions. Since, after all, one of the main features of US 
policy-making is competition for power between the executive and the legislative 
branches of the government, and the conflict of interests existing between Democrats and 
Republicans in Congress, the bipartisan support that PEPFAR received is rather 
unconventional (Hill 2003; Russell 2004; Dietrich 2005). All of the above only buttresses 
the extreme surprise and bewilderment caused by the Bush administration’s creation of a 
foreign policy that focuses attention and resources on a region of little strategic interest.  
Hence, this exponential increase of foreign assistance to meet the challenges of 
the HIV/AIDS public health in Africa requires further explanation. Especially, given the 
complexity of the HIV/AIDS phenomenon in Africa and the challenges it poses to the 
global public health apparatus – the political, epistemological, and ethical dimensions 
pertaining to the HIV/AIDS debate in the international system –the Bush administration’s 
foreign policy innovation with regard to HIV/AIDS requires further understanding. This 
dissertation seeks to provide that explanation.  
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This dissertation analyzes the power and influence of the private sector, 
namely, the US private pharmaceutical companies, in the development, continuity and 
change of the US HIV/AIDS foreign policy toward Africa. To do so, it aims at answering 
the following questions:  
(1) What might best explain the creation of PEPFAR in 2003 in 
contradiction to the US’s traditional neglect of Africa, a continent 
ranking low in terms of US foreign policy priorities?   
(2) Given the emergencies of the moment in the context of post-9/11 
terrorist attacks, the 2002 economic recession, and especially the build 
up to the war in Iraq, which required parsimonious use of public 
resources, what justifies this astronomical increase of US foreign aid to 
deal with HIV/AIDS global public health crisis, especially as the US’s 
foreign policy priority in Africa?  
(3) And finally, why did Congress lend bipartisan support to this policy 
initiative favoring Africa? 
 
President Bush gives the rationale for requesting these funds. As he explained 
during his speech, AIDS can be prevented thanks to antiretroviral (ARV) drugs 
availability. Even the lives of HIV/AIDS patients in resource-constrained countries can 
be extended for many years if they have access to ARV treatment. HIV/AIDS patients in 
poor countries in Africa with limited access to treatment should also benefit from these 
life-saving drugs because generic versions have allowed the cost to be lowered. As the 
president put it in his speech, 
[…] the cost of those drugs has dropped from $12,000 a year to under $300 a 
year, which places a tremendous possibility within our grasp.” Yet, “on the 
continent of Africa, nearly 30 million people have the AIDS virus, including 3 
million children under the age of 15. There are whole countries in Africa where 
more than one-third of the adult population carries the infection. More than 4 
million require immediate drug treatment. Yet across that continent, only 50,000 
AIDS victims – only 50,000 – are receiving the medicine they need (…). [T]o 
meet a severe and urgent crisis abroad, tonight I propose the Emergency Plan for 
AIDS Relief, a work of mercy beyond all current international efforts to help the 
people of Africa. This comprehensive plan will prevent 7 million new AIDS 
infections, treat at least 2 million people with life-extending drugs and provide 
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humane care for millions of people suffering from AIDS and for children 
orphaned by AIDS. (Bush 2003, emphasis added). 
 
It is important to note, however, that the change in US HIV/AIDS foreign policy toward 
Africa in 2003 was an ad hoc policy, contingent both on US domestic politics and 
international pressures. Many in the US policy-making establishment continued to claim, 
for instance, that the HIV/AIDS pandemic was only one expression of many African 
problems. For African governments supported by international nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), the HIV/AIDS global health crisis stemmed from the impacts of 
Western distorted trade policies, that is, from the monopolistic pricing of US patented 
antiretroviral (ARV) drugs on the global market. While the former sought protection of 
the patent regime, which they claimed constituted the lifeblood for R&D-based 
pharmaceutical industry’s investment, innovation and economic profitability, the latter 
pressured for change in US HIV/AIDS and trade policies to allow the developing 
countries greater access to medical treatment.  
This dissertation has both theoretical and practical policy relevance. It will add to 
existing literature on continuity and change in post-Cold War US Africa foreign policy 
by refuting the assumption that US foreign policy neglect and indifference towards Africa 
result from a lack of strategic stakes, and that the presence or absence of a rival contender 
or a threat to “perceived US interest” determines US policy behavior toward Africa. This 
work will also make a methodological contribution in assuming that processes in foreign 
policy decision-making do not evolve in the formal logic of predictability since the 
interpretation of the situation is bounded and in dependence on the nature of the interest 
involved. That is, policy issues are best solved by a sequence of structured individual 
existential initiatives in response to different situations like the process illustrated in the 
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common dialogical strategy of a player solving a crossword puzzle or playing a game 
of chess against a rival, not by logical moves (Heelan 2004). Hence, it becomes crucial to 
identify the causal mechanisms that explain specific policies developments, but also to 
make bounded theoretical generalizations.  
Finally, the practical policy relevance of this work is tied to prominent debates 
around Africa’s poverty, the social welfare infrastructure, political leadership, and moral 
and cultural values. It proposes a reevaluation of the role that both state and non-state 
actors should play in providing for the public good, especially when confronted by 
humanitarian challenges like HIV/AIDS and poverty in Africa. In fact, at the beginning 
of the new millennium, the HIV/AIDS global crisis posed a collective action dilemma. 
Given the waning capabilities of national governments in the post-Cold War 
environment, let alone the failed state in Africa and the private sector vying for more 
power and autonomy (Rothkopf 2012; Rosenberg 2005; Collier and Collier 1991; 
Ikenberry 1994; Pierson 2000), this dissertation will provide new intellectual grounds for 
devising a cosmopolitan welfare ethics.  
Chapter Summaries and Organization 
The remainder of this dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter II assesses 
competing theories and analyzes the neglected role of private US pharmaceutical 
companies in the continuity and change of US HIV/AIDS foreign policy toward Africa. 
While existing theories (compassionate conservatism, Bush’s reelection in 2004, the 
Christian evangelical right, and bureaucratic politics) are necessary in explaining both the 
context and the institutional constraints in the making of PEPFAR, they do not 
sufficiently account for PEPFAR’s size, structure, and especially timing. This chapter 
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thus propounds the privatization theory, which regards the neoliberalism agenda in 
repealing state interventionism and advocates market solutions and private initiatives in 
advancing human welfare. As a result, this chapter considers PEPFAR as being 
illustrative of the pursuit and implementation of the Bush administration’s neoliberal 
ideas giving priority to business corporations and nonprofit organizations, either religious 
or nonreligious, instead of pursuing the traditional interventionism of the welfare state. 
 Chapter III surveys continuity and change in US HIV/AIDS foreign policy toward 
Africa prior to the creation of PEPFAR. Both Presidents Reagan (1981-1988) and Bush 
Senior (1989-1992) dominated the first HIV/AIDS decades and their administrations paid 
very little attention to the international dimension of HIV/AIDS. This neglect reflected 
the low domestic policy attention they paid to the disease given their moral and economic 
conservative beliefs. While the Clinton administration was forced to change its foreign 
policy indifference toward Africa, in the aftermath of the Rwanda genocide, the global 
HIV/AIDS crisis had matured at the turning of the New Millennium. The pandemic came 
to be seen as a chronic disease in most developed countries thanks to the development of 
the Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy (HAART) but remained the number one killer 
in developing countries. Protests, mobilizations, and pressure against the TRIPS led the 
Clinton administration to change its staunch support of US pharmaceutical companies by 
enacting Executive Order 13155, which was never implemented given the change in 
administration through George W. Bush’s election. 
 Chapter IV identifies determinants of and analyzes the decision-making process 
leading to PEPFAR’s creation. Using the neoliberalism theory of privatization, it 
uncovers the motivations of policy makers and the different sources of preference and 
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influence existing at both domestic and international levels. It also explains, 
comprehensively, the rationale, timing, and substance of this Bush administration’s US 
HIV/AIDS foreign policy toward Africa. Although President Bush’s political motivations 
compelled him to listen to other constituencies, the powerful influence of the private 
sector and US pharmaceutical companies, instrumentally, structurally, and normatively, 
outweighed all other interest groups. As a result, PEPFAR appears to be a repeal, in 
subtle ways, of the Clinton administration’s legacy – Executive Order 13155 – and a 
neoliberal business model for the provision of social welfare.  
Chapter V examines the implementation of PEPFAR in Uganda. Taking into 
account the evolution of US foreign policy toward Africa’s Great Lakes region, it raises 
important questions about the Ugandan success story in the fight against HIV/AIDS, 
widely promoted in the literature of the US HIV/AIDS global policy.  
Finally, Chapter VI summarizes the learning process about this research and 
suggests new directions for further research on US HIV/AIDS foreign policy toward 
Africa.
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CHAPTER TWO: COMPETING THEORIES AND THE ROLE OF US 
PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES IN THE MAKING OF PEPFAR 
Introduction 
 
Some degree of scholarly attention has been paid to the question of why the Bush 
conservative administration picked a liberal foreign policy issue and decided to heavily 
invest in combating HIV/AIDS in Africa. Moens (2004), Dumbuya (2009) and Laurent 
(2004), for instance, concur with the idea that analytical attention should focus on the 
compassionate conservatism beliefs of President Bush that informed his humanitarian 
concerns for victims of HIV/AIDS in poor countries. Others like Russell (2004) and 
Dietrich (2007) consider the Bush administration’s adoption of the HIV/AIDS global 
health crisis to be motivated by presidential politics as a measure both to aid re-election 
in 2004 and deflect attention from the war in Iraq. Yet, a third line of argument 
propounds the prominence achieved by the Christian evangelical right, a natural 
constituency of the Bush administration, which also had the ear of the president from the 
very beginning of the term. Arguably, the religious right brought the issue of HIV/AIDS 
to the foreign policy attention of the president (Burkhalter 2004; Lancaster 2007). 
Finally, there is also the opinion that maintains that President Bush’s agenda to reform 
the government bureaucracy, especially with regard to the delivery of foreign aid, 
contributed to the shaping of PEPFAR. As a result, he created the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation of which PEPFAR was the logical offshoot (Olasky 2000; Bush 2010).
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The goal of this chapter is to reevaluate these positions; to highlight the 
strength and limitations of each; and also to fill the theoretical gap by integrating the 
overlooked role of the neoliberal privatization agenda in US foreign policy and the 
influence of private US pharmaceutical companies. The neoliberal privatization agenda in 
US post-Cold War foreign policy has the potential to better explain the development of 
US foreign policy toward HIV/AIDS in Africa. Neglect in considering the influence of 
private pharmaceutical corporations in explaining US foreign policy continuity and 
change toward HIV/AIDS in Africa may have a direct bearing on policy relevance.  
From the emergence of HIV/AIDS in the US in the early 1980s, during the 
development of the palliative antiretroviral treatment in the mid-1990s, and all the way to 
the Bush administration’s decision to create PEPFAR in 2003, US pharmaceutical 
companies have been intimately and instrumentally associated with shaping perception of 
the disease, the domestic and international policy-making environment, and the 
acceptable policy solutions adopted by the US government. Yet, in spite of these 
powerful actors’ roles and influence, existing literature tends to overlook, obscure, and 
even obfuscate them when considering the evolution of US foreign policy toward 
HIV/AIDS in Africa. 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into four parts. The first reviews and 
analyzes the classic explanations of PEPFAR. The second propounds a neoliberal 
privatization theory of US post-Cold War foreign policy. The third discusses why 
PEPFAR is a good case study that demonstrates the role of privatization in US foreign 
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policy toward HIV/AIDS in Africa. Finally, the fourth discusses some methodological 
issues with regard to gathering qualitative data in the process of writing this dissertation.  
Classical Explanations of PEPFAR 
 President Bush’s adherence to compassionate conservatism. PEPFAR has 
been regarded as the outcome of President Bush’s altruism imbued with his 
compassionate conservatism beliefs. Arguably, his Christian values and humanitarian 
concerns compelled him to act on behalf of the victims of HIV/AIDS in countries with 
limited economic resources. Proponents of this view consider that the compassionate 
conservative doctrine encompasses the core religious beliefs and philosophical 
perspective that shaped President Bush’s worldview and forestructure, i.e., the set of 
common descriptive categories, praxes that mediate applications of these categories, and 
particular hypotheses about the subject matter at hand – which permits a particular 
understanding of any given situation.1 That is, compassionate conservatism constitutes 
the lens through which he interpreted the issues of the world and accordingly formed his 
domestic and international welfare policy preferences (DiLulio 2002; Laurent 2004; 
Dumbuya 2009).  
 Although he became a strong critic of the Bush administration after resigning 
from his position as the first appointed director of the newly created Office of Faith-
Based and Community Initiative (OFBCI) at the White House, DiLulio believes that 
altruistic and humanitarian concerns inspired and motivated President Bush’s Africa 
                                                
1 I borrow this concept from hermeneutics the branch of philosophy that deals with interpretation. 
Forestructure, in this context, refers to “antecedently developed, already entrenched, cognitive 
systems, or merely heuristic structures awaiting testing and deployment” through which an image, 
representation or worldview is created and a relationship established. See Patrick Heelan 
(1984:79). 
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HIV/AIDS initiative. He gives a personal testimony about President Bush’s personality 
and dubs the Bush administration the  “Mayberry Machiavellis” for its groupthink 
mentality decision-making style; that is, a disheartening substitution of political 
calculations in place of policy substance and discussion. However, he still maintains that 
President Bush is “a godly man, a moral leader, and a highly admirable person of 
enormous personal decency who truly feels deeply for others and loves this country with 
a passion” (quoted by Moens 2004:2).  
Both McAdams (2011) and Moens (2004) also corroborate this view as they claim 
that beyond fiscal conservatism, the religious beliefs and moral commitment to the poor 
informed President Bush’s foreign policy toward HIV/AIDS. Thus, Moens (2004:2) 
clarifies that,  
In both domestic and foreign policy, President Bush believes ardently in several 
key values and pursues them consistently. […] Compassionate conservatism is 
not a political ploy or campaign spin but contains the key principles he [President 
Bush] sought in Texas [as Governor] and pursues in the White House. The term 
includes values of personal responsibility and traditional family, faith-based 
communities helping the needy and the quest to rebuild American society and 
culture that respects faith and favors life. […] He knows from personal experience 
that simple, honest ideals are what matter the most. Neither policy expertise nor 
intellectual insight can compete with the moral compass. 
 
This is substantiated through different policy documents. In his Remarks on Senate 
Action on Jobs-and-Growth and AIDS Relief Legislations on May 16, 2003, President 
Bush insisted, “We’ve got a HIV/AIDS initiative that will help – say to the world that the 
US is a compassionate country – we care deeply about the suffering that takes place in 
the world.” Further, he added, “I will sign it and take it with me as a symbol of the great 
depth of compassion that our country holds for those who suffer.” And on the signing day 
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of the US Leadership Against HIV/AIDS on May 27, 2003, President Bush remarked, 
“Our nation sets forth a great mission of rescue.” Furthermore, he brought the policy back 
into the long tradition of the US foreign service by stating, “The identity of the US is to 
sacrifice in the cause of freedom, and we’ve got a long tradition of being generous in the 
service of humanity. We are the Nation of the Marshall Plan, the Berlin airlift, and the 
Peace Corps and we are a nation of the Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief.” And he would 
later on write in his memoir that the global public health crisis triggered by the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic represented a moral opportunity for the United States, which is “too 
wealthy a nation and too compassionate a nation,” to take a vital step to help those less 
fortunate. To this moral appeal, President Bush concludes, “I couldn’t stand the idea of 
innocent people dying while the international community delayed. I decided it was time 
for America to launch a global AIDS initiative of our own. We would control the funds. 
We would move fast. And we would insist on results” (Bush 2010:337). 
However, to most traditional conservatives, government should not interfere with 
private lives, especially as guarantor of redistributive justice or provider of universal 
health care. To correct such an attitude like the one displayed by presidents Reagan and 
Bush Senior, President G. W. Bush combined his conservative background with a liberal 
ideal of compassion. He recognized the role and mission of the government in supporting 
the poor’s social welfare, but he differed from the Democrats’ in regards to how welfare 
programs should be provided. Compassionate conservatism, Olasky (2000:xi) explains, is 
“a conservatism [an economic theory] that cares about them [the poor], and makes a 
concerted effort to help them bring lasting change in their lives.” While still Governor of 
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Texas, he wrote a preface to Olasky’s Compassionate Conservatism (2000) in which 
he summarized the United States’ paradox: many citizens remain extremely poor in spite 
of their nation’s great wealth. By endorsing the main thesis of the book, that the welfare 
state interventionism harms the poor more than it helps them, Bush revealed his belief in 
compassionate conservatism.  
 The concept of compassionate conservatism became one of the favorite themes of 
G.W. Bush during his 2000 presidential campaign. The theme of “compassion” recurs 
throughout most of George W. Bush’s presidential speeches and policy memos on the 
provision of social welfare support to the poor. The rhetoric of compassion in his 
inaugural speech on January 20, 2001, as Woodward (2002) remarks, was long compared 
to that of the principles of conservatism. Again in his 2006 State of the Union Address, 
President Bush argued, 
We show compassion abroad because Americans believe in the God-given dignity 
and worth of a villager with HIV/AIDS or an infant with malaria or a refugee 
fleeing genocide or a young girl sold into slavery. We also show compassion 
abroad because regions overwhelmed by poverty, corruption, and despair are 
sources of terrorism and organized crime and human trafficking and the drug 
trade. 
 
Furthermore, he notes in his memoir that his National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice 
made it clear to him from their very first meeting, when he had decided he was going to 
run for presidency, that the humanitarian crisis of HIV/AIDS stood out in Africa above 
all other problems. In his words, 
As Condi made clear in our first discussion, one problem in Africa stood out 
above all others: the humanitarian crisis of HIV/AIDS. The statistics were 
horrifying. Some ten million people in sub-Saharan Africa had died. In some 
countries, one out of every four adults carried HIV. The total number infected was 
expected to exceed one hundred million by 2010. The United Nations projected 
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that AIDS could be the worst epidemic since the bubonic plague of the Middle 
Ages. (Bush 2010:335 emphasis added). 
 
Up to 10 million of people had died of AIDS-related disease in Africa between 1981 and 
2001 and the spread of the disease was not abating as attested by new HIV infections. 
Moved by compassion, President Bush came to frame the HIV/AIDS crisis in Africa in 
humanitarian terms. He also appealed to the American people’s compassion to help meet 
the social and medical needs of those affected by the disease.  
A compassionate government has the duty to intervene without substituting itself 
for private initiatives, charity agencies, or faith-based organizations that have proved 
efficient over the years in the history of US welfare provision. A compassionate 
government is a government that creates an environment within which local armies of 
compassion – churches, synagogues, mosques, and private charities – can rally and 
thrive. Because welfare provision is more than handing “big checks” to the poor, as 
Democrats do, private organizations offer services that also involve an important aspect 
of changing the lives of those being helped. Besides, as a compassionate conservative, 
President Bush assumes compassion is not a prerogative of the Democrats. Thinking like 
that is simply misleading. In addition, while describing the misperception about the 
difference between welfare provision by liberals and conservatives, Olasky (2000:4) 
notes, 
Conservative politicians have been complaining for years about a spendthrift 
modern welfare state – but they have been stating the problem backward. The 
major flaw of the modern welfare state is not that it is extravagant, but that it is 
too stingy. It gives the needy bread and tells them to be content with that alone 
[…]. I hoped to see welfare transformed from government monopoly to faith-
based diversity. The government of a pluralistic society is inherently incapable of 
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tending to spiritual needs. So the more effective provision of social services 
will ultimately depend on their return to private and especially to religious 
institutions. 
 
Instead, compassion constitutes a basic American value shared by both liberals and 
conservatives. For Republicans, the compassionate conservative doctrine represents the 
best way of providing welfare benefits to those most in need without hurtfully impacting 
them like the liberal big government. As a result, compassionate conservatism advocates 
a return to the “early American model of compassion,” which involved less government 
and more private initiatives in the provision of welfare. This conservative approach has 
proved more efficient in assisting the needy.2  
Traditional conservatives seek limitation of the government in social welfare 
provision whereas compassionate conservatives embrace social liberal ideals but enact 
them through private agencies. But if the welfare state of the past was more harmful than 
it intended by spending too much money on building large bureaucracies to serve these 
poor, a compassionate government offers to utilize the resources available through the 
                                                
2 The welfare state has not always been the best way of dealing with public and collective danger 
posed by diseases. For instance, in “The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century,” Michel 
Foucault investigates the relationship between public and private provision of health care in 
Europe and observes that the problematization of “noso-politics”; that is, the politics of disease, 
in the 18th century did not coincide with a uniform trend of state intervention in the practice of 
medicine. Instead, it correlates with the emergence at a multitude of sites in the social body (in 
the domestic society) of health and disease as problems requiring some form or other of collective 
control measures. As a result, the control, organization, and initiative as a politics of diseases, 
“should not be located only in the apparatuses of the state.” A number of distinct health policies 
as well as various methods for taking charge of medical problems were located and disseminated 
across different social bodies such as religious groups, charity and benevolent associations, 
ranging from parish bureaus to philanthropic societies. Yet, these institutions of the civil society 
operated as organs of the surveillance of one class over others considered to be a source of 
collective danger and having less power and ability to defend themselves (Rabinow 2010:273-
275). 
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private sector to ensure better implementation of welfare policies.3 A legislator 
opposing a welfare spending bill is seen to be cold-hearted and uncaring while a 
compassionate legislator is one who votes for those such bills although the means of 
administering it will vary from those of the Democrats (Olasky 2000:2). Hence the 
compassionate side of conservatism seeks to involve civil society organizations including 
families, churches, and other faith-based organizations that can help bring about change 
in a person’s character. The government should provide support for this change so that 
individuals can own responsibility for their welfare.  
While the idea of socialism has always been appalling to most Americans, it is in 
the nature of US democracy to encourage and invigorate private initiatives. This view has 
dominated the American conservative political landscape and has been a part of the 
American political culture’s resistance to communism and socialized medicine. 
Increasingly, both Democrats and Republicans, as Nisbet (2004:42 quoted by Tanner 
2007:23) argues, claim to share a common dislike of big government – especially a 
centralized government that would decide policies regarding the organization of society 
in matters of economic production and the distribution of goods and services, social 
policies overseeing public welfare, and other regulations affecting citizens’ political and 
intellectual lives. Hence, politicians on both sides of the political spectrum have come to 
adopt the notion of compassionate conservatism, at least in its application.  
Conservatives wish to put the full responsibility of a person’s misfortunes and 
social condition on individual freedom and choices. Tanner (2007:13) explains the 
                                                
3 I shall return to this idea with more details in the second part of this chapter as I analyze the 
privatization theory, an alternative from which President Bush operated in his foreign aid system 
transformation and the creation of PEPFAR. 
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concept of conservatism in the United States as an often-confusing notion. He notes 
that conservatism in the US is, 
[A] sometimes uneasy mixture of two important strains of thought. On the one 
hand is a profound classically liberal or libertarian tradition that takes its cue from 
John Stuart Mill’s admonition: ‘[T]he only part of the conduct of anyone for 
which he is amenable to society is that which concerns others. In the part that 
merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, 
over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.’ On the other hand 
[conservatism] is a strong belief in the traditions and institutions of society. 
Rather than Mill, it is more attuned to Edmund Burke’s wisdom: ‘We owe an 
implicit reverence to all the institutions of our ancestors.’ 
 
Conservatism is both absolute self-ownership of the individual and reverence and loyalty 
to tradition. Thorsen (2009:6) explains libertarianism as “an uncompromising concern of 
individual and commercial liberty above everything else, coupled with a corresponding 
de-emphasizing of other traditional liberal goals such as democracy and distributive 
justice.” In that sense, economic conservative, libertarianism, and neoliberalism are all 
synonymous. They involve, as Hackworth (2012: Kindle Locations 68-73) observes, an 
overwhelming emphasis on the individual: 
[First] Individuals are responsible and best able to provide for themselves, solve 
problems alone, and decide what is best for them. Individuals are responsible for 
their own failures and successes and should be rewarded and punished 
accordingly. Second, it consists of an almost religious belief that the market (and 
the vehicle of property) is the best way to promote an individual’s choice. And 
third, it consists of an almost equally religious belief that the state will inhibit 
both the market and individual choice.  
 
Conservatives are, therefore, skeptical of state power and its ability to interfere with and 
infringe on individual freedoms. They see the government as something of a necessary 
evil. Tenants of this view agree with Robert Nozick (1974) who claims that individuals 
own themselves fully and are responsible for their individual condition, and share F.A. 
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Hayek’s concern “that central government planning and its outgrowth into the welfare 
state will ultimately and inevitably lead to the eclipse of liberty” (Tanner 2007:10).4  
President Bush derived his social welfare preferences from both his religious 
values and experience, and from his conservative business background. He had come to 
believe that taking responsibility for one’s action and changing one’s behavior was a 
crucial component in correcting and reversing the social problem of HIV/AIDS in poor 
countries. He admits to being a heavy drinker prior to the age of 40, a condition severely 
impacting his business ventures. During that time in his life, he lacked focus and 
seriousness. Presumably, the resultant stress even told on his marriage. He claimed later 
on that his conversion at age 40 made his life better, easier to understand, and clearer 
(Andersen 2002). David Frum, President Bush’s speechwriter for his first White House 
years, quotes President Bush as saying that religion helped him overcome his alcoholism 
problem. An evangelical born-again Christian, President Bush liked to affirm that Jesus 
was his favorite thinker because he saved his heart. Bush gave up his heavy drinking, 
smoking, and chewing tobacco, moral triumphs which he attributes to his decision to 
follow Christ. To a group of representatives hailing from various Protestant 
congregations, he said, “You know, I have had a problem with alcohol. Right now, I 
ought to be in a bar in Texas instead of finding myself in the Oval Office. There is only 
                                                
4 It is important to note here how these conservative views are similar to classical liberalism that 
concurs with the belief that the state has to be minimal, “a night-watchman state.” With the 
exception of law enforcement, force armed, and other non-excludable goods, everything else is 
expected to be left to the dealing of the civil society – organizations and corporations that citizens 
choose freely to be a part of (See Thorsen 2009). 
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one reason why I’m in the Oval Office and not in a bar: I found faith. I found God. I’m 
here because of the power of prayer” (quoted by Frum 2003:283)5. 
On the conservative end, President Bush received most of his conservative 
welfare ideas from such influential authors as Murray and D’Souza. And like most 
conservatives, President Bush believed that poverty does not stem from social 
inequalities institutionalized in the current system, but rather from individual 
responsibility and the absence of moral values. To address issues related to poverty, 
conservatives propose social programs that rely less on the government than on private 
initiatives, local communities such as the family, church, or faith-based communities, and 
the market (Laurent 2004:40). Olasky’s influence on President Bush’s welfare policy 
remains uncontested. While Bush read these three major conservative thinkers, it is the 
concept of “compassionate conservatism” that most gained his favor, becoming the 
dominant idea that persuaded him concerning the best manner to tackle the poverty 
issue.6 As Laurent (2004:40) observes, 
                                                
5 PBS has produced a documentary called “God in America” and compiled a dossier on the faith 
of American presidents and how their religious beliefs impacted their leadership style. Available 
at http://www.pbs.org/godinamerica/god-in-the-white-house/. 
 
6 All three authors represent the conservative view of social welfare provision. In Losing Ground: 
American Social Policy 1950-1980, Charles Murray (1984) argues that social welfare provision 
tends to accrue poverty rather than eradicate it. It creates incentives for the poor’s dependency on 
the government. Instead of graduating from government assistance, the poor develop shortsighted 
behavior that favors the immediate handouts that cannot be conducive to liberation from poverty. 
Likewise, Dinesh D’Souza’s The Virtue of Prosperity (2000) questions the meaning of inequality 
and the value of techno-capitalism. D’Souza is regarded as an established conservative political 
commentator who served for one year as a Reagan White House aide. He also contends that rich 
people are better providers of social welfare, drivers of economic growth, and contributors to 
charity causes. In short, the rich create new resources for society to prosper and, therefore, can 
help solve many social problems of the poor and advance the welfare of the nation as a whole. 
Olasky’s Tragedy of American Compassion (1992) is another verdict against the welfare state in 
which the author acknowledges both religion and the orthodoxy of Milton Friedman’s economic 
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The books by Charles Murray and Dinesh D’Souza were among the favorite 
reading matter of George W. Bush. But the thinker who has most delighted and 
persuaded him, and whose ideas became one of his favorite themes during the 
2000 presidential campaign, is Marvin Olasky, the author of The Tragedy of 
American Compassion. 
 
Kutchins (2001:14) confirms this perspective and claims that Olasky was the originator 
of this blend of conservative political philosophy and liberal ideals. As such, Olasky 
holds a moral copyright for the “compassionate conservatism” concept, which he 
franchised to President Bush for political marketing. For Republicans who advocate a 
compassionate conservatism approach, conservatism should not equate with opposition to 
welfare spending. Though compassionate conservatives hold the view that conservative 
principles are the real engine of social progress through individual change, not 
government welfare spending as liberals tend to prefer, their understanding of poverty is 
that it results from poor individual decisions, choices, and the responsibility of the poor 
who, also demonstrate some form of moral deficiency.  
Where liberal government’s social welfare programs are seen as a drain on 
business, compassionate conservatives see business opportunities for new markets 
wherein social entrepreneurs can turn administrative costs into potentially large profits. 
This transpired through the Bush agenda to reform the USAID and transform the whole 
US foreign aid system. As he explained, Bush wanted to move away from the 
                                                                                                                                            
neoliberalism as key inspiration. For Olasky, Americans have a consistent tradition of how to 
overcome poverty, not by promoting the welfare state but by allowing the church and other 
charity organizations to do the job of helping the poor. Prior to the development of the welfare 
state in the 20th century and before the social welfare interventionism of the government since the 
New Deal, religious organizations were better able than the government to take care of the poor 
in the US. 
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paternalistic legacy of the Cold War era and inaugurate a new model where trade, not 
aid, is the best solution for addressing Africa’s social ills (Bush 2010:349).  
But, if we can claim that the President Emergency Plan for HIV/AIDS Relief was 
motivated by President Bush’s humanitarian concerns, the compassionate conservatism 
doctrine cannot explain the substance, structure, and timing of the PEPFAR policy. Given 
that the HIV/AIDS global public health crisis was ongoing prior to his coming to power 
in 2001, some important questions remain unanswered by this compassionate 
conservatism argument. Why didn’t it occur to him that PEPFAR could be created just as 
speedily as the White House Office of Faith-Based Organizations and Community 
Initiatives? Was compassion for those suffering from the scourges of HIV/AIDS in 
Africa really the motivating factor in the decision to initiate PEPFAR? And should 
altruism be the major factor, could it be enough to warrant the shift in existing patterns of 
US foreign policy neglect and indifference toward Africa? Answers to these questions 
remain unsatisfactory when considering the compassionate conservatism doctrine alone. 
As presidential candidate, when Bush was asked about his future foreign policy priority 
toward Africa, the HIV/AIDS humanitarian crisis was at its highest peak in Africa. Yet, it 
did not occur to him then that this issue could become his foreign policy priority.  
Like most Conservatives, President Bush believed that the Democrats failed in 
their welfare policies because they did not focus on the moral dimension and spiritual 
transformation of the beneficiaries of their social welfare programs. As has been his 
policy stance while Governor of Texas, he consequently proposed the privatization of the 
welfare programs at the federal level after taking office at the White House in 2001. As 
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Jennifer Petersen (1998) notes, “As governor, Bush has supported an increased role for 
private agencies -- both for-profit and non-profit -- in administering welfare benefits to 
the needy, a move which has at times pitted the governor's politics against federal 
policy.”7 Since his election victory in November 2000, President Bush had a clear idea 
about what role the government and private charity should respectively play in the 
provision of social welfare. It became apparent that his welfare agenda aimed at 
privatizing and outsourcing government’s social welfare programs since social problems 
are the business of the civil society, families, churches, and charities, not of a 
paternalistic government as the Democrats insist.  
It is no coincidence that among his first Executive Orders – on January 29, 2001, 
only nine days after he took office – President Bush signed Executive Order 13199 
establishing the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiative (FBCI). 
Besides, President Bush’s Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB), Sean O’Keefe, “ordered federal agencies to prepare annual inventories of their 
                                                
7 In her article in CNN All Politics (August 30, 1998), Jennifer Petersen notes that Bush has 
applied his anti-big government policy stance by redesigning the state’s welfare programs. He 
indeed launched his reelection campaign as Governor of Texas on the promise to champion “Tax 
values” – limited government, local control and individual responsibility.” Backed by Rep. Bill 
Archer (R-Houston) and Texas Sen. Phil Gramm Bush proposed a plan to privatize the food 
stamp programs, which he submitted for federal approval in 1997. The Clinton administration 
rejected the plan, arguing that “needy families should not have to rely on profit-king companies 
for decisions on Medicaid and food stamp eligibility and benefits. Bush met personally with the 
president's chief of staff, Erskine Bowles, to dispute the decision as he appealed to Congress to 
save the plan.” The plan aimed to contract out the administration of the combined programs -- 
integrate and automate eligibility assessment, enrollment, service referrals and client data for the 
state's cash assistance, food stamp and Medicaid programs – to private high-tech firms. The 
contractors would have been responsible for redesigning and running the program, from 
application to delivery. Available online at 
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/08/12/bush.privatization/. 
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services, and to identify which ones should be considered ‘inherently governmental 
function’ [implying the rest] could be privatized” (Stevenson 2003:83). 
Obviously, the agenda to privatize the social welfare and to involve families and 
faith-based organizations in administering care to those besieged by social problems 
weighed more heavily on his mind than simple giving charity toward African HIV/AIDS 
patients. He wanted the market, not African governments, to be the most prominent 
player in the provision of social welfare in the fight against HIV/AIDS. Presidents come 
to power with their own agenda but the development of events in the international 
environment can force them to adopt a different policy attitude. For instance, prior to his 
Washington trip to take the oath of office, newly elected President Woodrow Wilson 
wrote to a Princeton colleague professor saying, “it would be the irony of fate if my 
administration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs” (Ikenberry et al. 2009:10). 
However, he came to be regarded as one of the most internationalist American presidents. 
The compassionate conservatism rhetoric appealed to American public opinion. It 
reinforced the image of America as a generous nation, a savior nation established through 
“Manifest Destiny,” and pleaded for such neoliberal ideals as individual freedom and 
responsibility, development spurred and informed by a tradition of private property, and a 
compassionate concern for universal human welfare. Because US presidents share the 
conviction that America is an extraordinary nation, in the flourishing of its political 
institutions, economic organizations, and individual freedoms a unique example to the 
rest of humanity, PEPFAR was simply calibrated on the US’s self-interest, measured in 
economic, ideological, and institutional terms. In this sense, President Bush’s public 
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health policy approach may be different from his predecessor’s, yet it remained in line 
with the continuation of traditional US neoliberal ideology; that is, its claim was to 
exhibit US global leadership while it maintained a neoliberal preference for privatization. 
PEPFAR pursued the US agenda of shunning the welfare state model around the world 
and promoting the neoliberal market model of welfare provision.  
The presidential politics argument. The second strand of argument considers 
presidential politics functioning in both the desire to win re-election in 2004 and the 
expedience in deflecting attention from the war in Iraq. These motivating factors led to 
the adoption of social programs that rallied support around a unifying issue within and 
without the US (Russell 2004; Dietrich 2007). In other words, under the pretense of 
humanitarian pursuits and the promotion of human dignity in Africa, the Bush 
administration’s Africa HIV/AIDS policy camouflaged politically self-interested 
calculations, using the rhetoric of compassionate conservatism to hijack a liberal issue 
and provide social benefits to African victims of HIV/AIDS. While deflecting attention 
from the controversial unilateral military policy to invade Iraq, this move to create 
PEPFAR also allowed for wooing the gay constituency and poaching voters from among 
African-American and Hispanic groups that traditionally belonged to the Democratic 
Party in time for Bush’s reelection in the 2004 electoral cycle (Dietrich 2007; Russell 
2004). Bearing in mind the contested 2000 presidential election and the thin margin by 
which President Bush won crucial Florida votes, the administration needed to come up 
with a galvanizing strategic effect to lure voters from the opposing party across the 
political divide. This leads to consideration of the argument that the creation of PEPFAR 
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was a political ploy to garner influence in both the domestic and international arenas, 
and to showcase US global leadership in support of the war on terror agenda – given the 
controversial war in Iraq and the rise of China in Africa. 
President Bush’s first few months in office were largely unremarkable until after 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Although he scored early legislative successes on domestic 
issues in his first term – the No Child Left Behind educational reform, two rounds of tax 
cuts and the launch of a significant Medicare drug plan – the flaws of his administration’s 
relief effort in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, and the abuse of detainees at the US-
run Abu Ghraib prison deteriorated the public’s already significantly lowered confidence 
in President Bush. With the exception of PEPFAR, George W. Bush’s entire presidency 
has been harshly criticized and his foreign policy seen as a failure. As Gerston (2010:3) 
remarks concerning President Bush’s first term, the US nation was drowning in red ink, 
thanks to the combination of recently passed mammoth tax cuts and expansive wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq; debt soared from $5.7 to $8 trillion. By the end of his second term 
in 2008, a Pew survey conducted among 1,489 adults in Dec. 3-7, 2008, observed how 
“the American public paints a harshly negative picture of Bush’s tenure (…). Among the 
few bright spots for Bush in the Global Attitudes Surveys were the African nations that 
had benefited from administration programs to boost economic growth and reduce the 
spread of AIDS.” Nearly two-thirds (64%) say his administration will be remembered 
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more for its failures than its accomplishments, and a plurality (34%) says Bush will go 
down in history as a poor president” (PewResearch, December 18, 2008).8  
Numerous constituencies in the US with vested interests in HIV/AIDS were 
involved in trying to shift the government policy position on the issue. These included the 
gay, Latinos, and White Christian evangelical right constituencies as well as the 
Congressional Black Caucus. Because the HIV/AIDS issue had gained accrued salience 
beyond partisan politics, adopting the issue became politically interesting for the Bush 
administration, since the president could rally potential voters from non-traditional 
Republican electorate. By giving in to domestic pressures and international demands to 
change the US HIV/AIDS foreign policy, the change in US foreign policy toward 
HIV/AIDS in Africa was intended to reap political dividends. 
As a matter of fact, in November 2000, the returns for both Democrat and 
Republican presidential candidates, Al Gore and G.W. Bush, were only separated by a 
margin of a few hundred votes. As President Bush’s electoral victory was mired in 
controversy, given that the final victory was decided on razor-thin margins by a court 
ruling, it was crucial for the next election cycle to enlarge the voting pool beyond 
traditional constituencies.9 Aware that a few percentage points’ difference in a single 
demographic category can prove decisive, ethnic minorities including the Latinos, 
Asians, and African Americans have become fertile territory for Republican recruitment 
because they are “more culturally conservative and religious than traditional Democrats” 
                                                
8 The Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan “fact tank” based in Washington DC that provides 
information on the issues, attitudes, and trends shaping America and the world.  
http://www.people-press.org/2008/12/18/bush-and-public-opinion/  
 
9 http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/future/landmark_bush.html  
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(Weiss 2001:37). Even faith-based privatization was itself “a political strategy 
intended to fragment the opposition and to win support from culturally conservative 
Democrats” (idem). 
Besides framing the HIV/AIDS crisis in humanitarian terms, the Bush 
administration also regarded the HIV/AIDS issue as a security problem. In foreign policy 
discourse, policy makers related it to global discontent against the Bush administration 
and global terrorism. HIV/AIDS had simply become a legitimate foreign policy issue in 
the post-9/11 global environment, as US foreign policy malcontents were easy recruiting 
targets of terrorist organizations, especially in failed states and poor countries. Scholars 
observed that post-9/11 US-Africa foreign policy became linked to “national security” 
because fostering hopelessness, poverty, and disease made people easy prey for 
recruitment by terrorist extremists. As Donald and Keller (2006:1-2) note, “Security can 
no longer be presented in geostrategic terms alone. Rather, a conceptual stretching should 
include aspects of human security, that is, personal wellbeing [in which] poverty, 
diseases, environment, development, economics, are all part of what makes the human 
security a crucial issue. State security depends on human security (whether citizens feel 
secure and protected).” 
Senior members of the Bush administration, including Secretary of State Colin 
Powell also began to refer to HIV/AIDS as a real security threat. As the destructive 
power of these new emerging infectious diseases came under the spotlight of US foreign 
policy, Radelet (2003:113) remarks that Secretary of State Colin Powell called the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic  
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[A] national security problem, recalling the Clinton administration’s decision to 
classify the pandemic as a security threat. In September 2002, the National 
Intelligence Council reported that the virus was on pace to spread quickly in 
several countries of enormous strategic importance to the United States, including 
China, Russia, and India. In the same month, the administration released its 
National Security Strategy, which gave remarkable prominence to HIV/AIDS. 
 
As HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases were integrated in the 2002 National Security 
Strategy of the United States as deserving governmental priority in the wake of 9/11 
terrorist attacks, the Bush administration embedded HIV/AIDS in all four functions of 
foreign policy.  
Fidler (2005) identifies the correlation between HIV/AIDS and the four basic 
functions of traditional foreign policy, which respectively serve to ensure a nation’s 
security from external threats, thus achieving national security as a function of foreign 
policy; contribute to a country’s economic welfare and power by promoting international 
trade and investment; support economic and political development conducive to the 
stability of a country; and lastly, promote human dignity.10 As such, HIV/AIDS 
constituted an opportunity to pursue strategic interests abroad, which include national 
                                                
10 It is important to understand how the US has traditionally measured its vital foreign policy 
interests. Kraxberger (2005:49) proposes the concept of “geopolitical code” to assess a region’s 
strategic significance in US foreign policy. He notes, foreign policy strategic significance “can be 
assessed […] through analysis of the geographic deployment of government resources abroad, 
including military personnel and assets, diplomatic missions, and foreign aid… Within 
geopolitical codes, foreign areas and countries are arranged in a loose hierarchy of significance; 
some places are deemed to be of vital national interest while others are of small or 
inconsequential importance (italics added for emphasis). By defining strategic interest as that for 
which countries go to war, scholars agree that US strategic interests boil down to economic 
(investment and trade volume and security), security (military capabilities to annihilate physical 
threat from outside), and moral interests. Ohaegbulam (1999) clusters these strategic interests into 
national security, economic gains, the containment of perceived communist and Soviet 
expansionism – at least until the end of the Cold War – and moral idealism and the promotion of 
a New World order. 
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security, symbolic power status as a global leader, economic interests, and the 
promotion of human rights norms (Fidler 2005; Hunt 2003).  
As US policy makers came to establish a nexus between statehood and terrorism, 
many scholars and policy makers pursued the idea of initiating a massive foreign aid 
package – a Marshall Plan for Africa – to help boost Africa’s economic development lest 
the continent turn into a terrorist safe haven due to the continuation of growing poverty. 
Since poverty may lead to further instability in failed states and was then becoming the 
groundswell for terrorism recruit, a Marshall Plan for Africa was urgently required. 
Rothberg (2002:139) notes, for instance, “[N]othing less than a new Marshall Plan [was] 
needed to mobilize people, money, and ideas for the crucial efforts in (…) the DRC, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan.”  
The Bush administration linked HIV/AIDS in Africa to Africa’s chronic poverty 
and the failures of development policies. It insisted the pandemic predisposed the 
continent to the vulnerability of terrorist activities.11 The Marshall Plan provided massive 
foreign aid to Europe after the Second World War to help with Europe’s reconstruction, 
but also expanded the West’s liberal order to include countries in the democratic and free 
trade exchange framework that were vulnerable to Communist influence. The Marshall 
Plan combined both neoliberal principles – the democratic and free trade ideals of the US 
– with strategic containment policy to limit the power and influence of the USSR, its 
chief rival after the Second World War. As the analogy indicates, President Bush 
believed foreign aid could be used both to advance the interest of the US and to promote 
the welfare of the recipients. As a result, the HIV/AIDS public health crisis presented the 
                                                
11 www.presidencyproject.ucsb.edu/ws 
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US with the opportunity to showcase its humanitarian concern toward those less 
fortunate than Americans, although the story does not end there.  
Scholars advocate that the focus of US foreign policy concern in Africa ought to 
overcome those post-Cold War humanitarian needs perspectives. As Lyman and Dorff 
(2007:199-200) put it, 
Africa plays an increasingly significant role in supplying energy, preventing the 
spread of terrorism, and halting the devastation of HIV/AIDS, [its] growing 
importance is reflected in the intensifying competition with China and other 
countries for both access to African resources and influence in the region… In 
sum, it is not valid to treat Africa more as an object of charity than as a diverse 
continent with partners the Unites States can work with to advance shared 
objectives. 
 
Furthermore, these authors proposed that Africa ceases to be reduced to a mere 
humanitarian case because of the vital strategic interests it represents to the US. Africa 
now plays an important role as an alternative supply of energy, a vehicle for the 
containment of terrorism, and ground zero in the fight against HIV/AIDS. More 
specifically, the continent of Africa is instrumental for US economic and trade 
opportunities as it was predicted that up to 25% of US oil imports would come from such 
African countries like Nigeria and Angola by 2015 (Lyman and Dorff 2007:201). Those 
who downplay Africa’s economic importance to US trade interests should not forget the 
continent’s growth potential, since US trade with China and South East Asia in the 1960s 
and 1970s was also a pittance with an unlikely growth prediction (Chege 2001:232). 
Boasting 40 out of 185 member states of the World Trade Organization (WTO), Africa 
represents, in fact, a growing importance not only in the trade negotiation block, but also 
in global cooperation.  
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There is a growing recognition that global inequality and the gap between rich 
and poor nations exacerbate terrorism and threaten US interests abroad. This perception 
led to global protests against the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the 
WTO. Foreign aid allows the US to project soft power to accompany its military power. 
In the spirit of the US foreign aid system reforms initiated under President Bush Senior, 
and in the context of the New Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) after the 
assessment of foreign aid provision effectiveness between 1960 and 2000, President 
Bush’s agenda was to reshape the purpose and structure of US foreign aid after coming to 
office. For Bush, the existing structure of “the foreign aid [was] designed during the Cold 
War to support anticommunist governments, to maintain friendly regimes in power and 
not to improve the lives of the ordinary people. [As this paternalistic model of] our 
foreign assistance programs in Africa had a lousy track record, [consisting of writing] a 
check and [telling] the recipient how to spend it,” the changes that occurred in the world 
with the collapse of Communism compelled the US to update its programs and apply a 
new approach (Bush 2010: 350).  
Bush remarked that Africa had received $14 billion in Foreign Aid until 2001, yet 
economic growth was flat, even worse than in the 1970s. He goes on to conclude that free 
trade, not aid, is the engine of development.  
Free and fair trade benefits the United States by creating new buyers for our 
products, along with more choices and better prices for our consumers. Trade is 
also the surest way to help people in the developing world grow their economies 
and lift themselves out of poverty. According to one study, the benefits of trade 
are forty times more effective in reducing poverty than foreign aid. (Bush 
2010:350). 
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In March 2002, President Bush proposed the creation of a Millennium Challenge 
Account (MCA) through which his administration sought to increase foreign aid by 50% 
over a period of three years. The fund provided $5 billion per year “to a select group of 
countries that are ruling justly, investing in their people, and establishing economic 
freedom. In September [2002], Bush released his National Security Strategy, which gave 
rare prominence to development and aid alongside defense and diplomacy. Then came 
his 2003 State of the Union address, in which he called for $10 billion in new funding 
($15 billion total) over the next five years to combat HIV/AIDS in Africa and the 
Caribbean” (Radelet 2003:104). Not to mention President Bush’s 2004 budget that 
included two smaller initiatives including $200 million to fight famine and a $100 million 
fund for complex emergencies. Radelet explains that this foreign aid increase under the 
Bush conservative administration was partly a result of political expedience and partly 
carried out in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In the first instance, President Bush 
needed to make such compelling announcements at international summits in March 2002 
at the UN International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico 
and in June 2002 at the G-8 Summit at Kananaskis in Alberta, Canada. 
For President Bush, provision of foreign aid should be determined by the needs of 
individuals, not to maintain an obsolete Cold War paternalistic system or dictatorships 
that squandered American taxpayers’ resources. In June 2002, at the 28th Kananaskis G-8 
Summit, he mentioned his intention to reform the US foreign aid industry to French 
President Jacques Chirac; a reform that would take a new approach to aid provision based 
on the needs of the recipients and the results of the implementing agencies. Hence, in the 
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spirit of the MCA, this would be “a stark departure from the G-8’s tradition of 
measuring generosity by the percentage of GDP a nation spent on foreign aid” (Bush 
2010:349). 
However, the compassionate conservative, security, and national strategic interest 
theories, though compelling, do not provide sufficient grounds for explaining the 
magnitude of foreign aid increase through PEPFAR, let alone the timing of the policy 
creation during a time of economic recession. Garten (2005:40) remarks that, 
The president came into office facing a projected $5 trillion budget surplus over 
the next decade. Today, the ten-year projection is for a more than $2 trillion 
deficit, and that is before spending on any of the new initiatives planned for the 
second term is taken into account. President Bush has said he will make his tax 
cuts permanent, adding another $2 trillion to the deficit over the next decade. He 
also wants to privatize part of Social Security in a way that could add another $1 
trillion to $2 trillion in transition costs.  
 
It is, therefore, difficult to prove that PEPFAR was simply the result of the Bush 
administration’s interpretation of security threat posed by poverty discontents and 
desperate HIV/AIDS sufferers in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In response to 
this argument, President Bush admits that poverty in Africa exists and that there was a 
need to reform and restructure the US foreign aid system, but he rejects the charge that 
his Africa-HIV/AIDS policies was a political ploy to divert attention from his hard power 
militarism in Iraq and Afghanistan as preposterous (Bush 2010:339). Indeed, his 2002 
MTCI policy and his National Security Strategy document show that his administration’s 
concern and growing awareness about HIV/AIDS were anterior to the war in Iraq.  
Actually, the international pressure and African government-negotiated policies 
realized through international organizations, including the UN, WHO, and WTO, pushed 
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the US to adapt its HIV/AIDS global policy to the flexibilities of the TRIPS 
Agreement allowed by the Doha Declaration. Since the presidency of Ronald Reagan in 
the 1980s, the Republican approach to the fight against HIV/AIDS had linked the spread 
of the disease to both the individual moral sexual conduct of HIV/AIDS patients and to 
the development achievement, economic growth, technological infrastructure, and 
capacity to fund research and development for more innovative treatment. Likewise, the 
Bush administration underscored the moral responsibility of African HIV/AIDS patients 
and established private organizations – the pharmaceutical companies that sought to 
attract private investment in R&D, the religious and charity organizations, and families – 
as the primary providers of the care while maintaining prevention, not treatment, as the 
official US policy before 2003. According to Weiss (2001:36), President Bush 
proclaimed in 2001,  
It is one of the great goals of my administration to invigorate the spirit of 
involvement and citizenship. We will encourage faith-based and community 
programs without changing their mission. We will help all in their work to change 
hearts while keeping a commitment to pluralism.  
 
As a result, President Bush and his administration continued to push for a healthcare 
policy that removed responsibility from the government to bring it back into the hands of 
individuals, families, faith-based communities, and private organizations.  
Although the presidential politics argument seems plausible since incumbent 
presidents begin in their first term to prepare for reelection, the desire for reelection can 
account for the policy timing but may fail to account for the size and the structure of the 
PEPFAR programs. PEPFAR is regarded not only as a breakthrough US HIV/AIDS 
foreign policy toward Africa, innovating in its way of bringing together the private and 
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the public sectors in working toward a common goal, but also in rallying American 
voters around one nonpartisan issue, the common good of HIV/AIDS patients. The most 
rational decision with regard to the issue of HIV/AIDS was to consider political 
calculations with available information, the costs and benefits of paying heed to the 
demands of different HIV/AIDS stakeholders. Thus, not only for political reasons but 
also for ideological convictions, the move to support these constituencies – those with 
entrenched interest in HIV/AIDS, including both not-for-profit and for-profit 
organizations – was a major determinant of the president’s policy preference, because it 
permitted President Bush to reorient the traditional welfare provision from government to 
the private sector.  
The domestic politics and the Christian evangelical right. A third strand of 
argument contends that the Christian evangelical right, as the most trusted constituency 
of the Bush administration, possessed a competitive advantage in US domestic politics. 
Because President Bush was one of them, and because the evangelical vote had 
significantly determined the outcome of the 2000 presidential election, their ideology 
infused most of President Bush’s policy proposals, behavior, and public rhetoric (Guth 
2004). The evangelical Christians, indeed, constitute one of the Republican party’s most 
powerful interest groups; they had the president’s ear in the political debate on 
HIV/AIDS in Africa and also impacted the Bush administration’s policy leading to the 
signing of the Sudan Peace Act in 2002. In a similar vein, they hoped to advance the 
cause of African HIV/AIDS victims by causing the administration to adopt a human 
rights approach and develop a comprehensive policy that would protect vulnerable 
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populations (children and women) (see Table 3) from further contamination and 
provide health care and treatment to AIDS patients (Hertzke 2004; Behrman 2004). 
Those working with this “religious right” paradigm regard evangelical Christians 
as the possible force adding new impetus to the HIV/AIDS cause, achieving new salience 
and prominence for it among the Bush administration’s other foreign policy priorities. 
Burkhalter (2004) regards evangelical Christians’ shift in perception regarding HIV 
transmission as fundamental in the Bush administration’s changing policy attitude. The 
prevailing understanding of HIV/AIDS among US conservatives was to regard the 
epidemic as a divine punishment on homosexual sinners. Burkhalter (2004:8-9) could, 
thus, conclude that the vital turning point in American AIDS policy occurred when 
conservative Christians espoused the cause.  
Thanks to recent activism by conservative political and religious groups, AIDS 
has finally started to gain foreign policy attention commensurate with its 
substantive importance. Prodded by its conservative evangelical base, the Bush 
administration has pushed AIDS to the forefront of its international agenda, 
backing record increases in US assistance for AIDS treatment abroad and 
beginning to address issues such as sex trafficking and the dangers of HIV 
transmission from unsafe injections and blood transfusions. 
 
In June 2002, President Bush followed up Senator Jesse Helms’ promise to help prevent 
infection from mother to child during pregnancy and child delivery. He launched the 
International Prevention of Mother-to-Child Initiative (PMTCI), pledging $500 million 
over a period of five years to purchase medicine and train local health-care workers in the 
most heavily affected African and Caribbean countries. Yet, while he also broadened his 
religious base by co-opting other mainstream Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish leaders 
who shared his conservative moral outlook, he appointed openly gay individuals to key 
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policy positions in his administration to help in the fight against HIV/AIDS, while he 
simultaneously avoided anti-gay pronouncements in his speeches. Guth notes,12  
One-third of Bush’s votes came from evangelical traditionalists, reflecting their 
large numbers, strong GOP preferences, and high turnout. Indeed, the entire 
evangelical community (about 25 percent of the public) supplied almost 40 
percent of Bush’s votes. Add mainline and Catholic traditionalists, throw in the 
Mormons, and the total for theological conservatives rises to 60 percent. (And 
Bush got a few more traditionalist votes from minorities, such as Hispanic 
Pentecostals, Orthodox Jews, and some Muslims. 
 
Berggren and Rae (2006) believe that one can only understand President Bush’s policies 
– like the foreign policies of Woodrow Wilson and Jimmy Carter – if they account for the 
impact of religion on his personal beliefs. They also claim that all three presidents have in 
common a similar leadership style that drew heavily on their evangelical faith. However, 
the crucial determinant in sparking the 2003 change in US foreign policy toward 
HIV/AIDS in Africa was the rise of the religious right in American politics during the 
Bush administration. As Epstein (2005) remarks, 
Jerry Falwell called AIDS God’s judgment on promiscuity, and former Senator 
Jesse Helms, a longtime congressional ally of the evangelicals, told The New York 
Times in 1995 that AIDS funding should be reduced because homosexuals 
contract the disease through their “deliberate, disgusting, revolting conduct.” 
When lawmakers moved to amend the Americans with Disabilities Act to protect 
people with HIV from discrimination, some evangelical Christians lobbied against 
them. In a 2001 poll, only 7 percent of American evangelicals said they would 
contribute to a Christian organization that helped AIDS orphans.13 
 
Subsequently, the high HIV prevalence in Africa was explained mostly through 
heterosexual contact. This shift allowed conservative Christians to shoulder the struggle 
                                                
12 http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/2004/04/23/april-23-2004-james-l-guth-on-george-
w-bush-and-religious-politics/11405/  
 
13 Available online at: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2005/apr/28/god-and-the-fight-
against-aids/ Last access, June 23, 2015. 
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against HIV/AIDS while it also helped galvanize the AIDS policy of the United States. 
They succeeded in bringing Congress and the White House hearings on some neglected 
issues involving HIV transmission such as the consequences of unsafe needle exchange 
and poor health care infrastructure surrounding blood transfusion in Africa. Senator Jesse 
Helms’s “mea culpa” at a meeting convened in February 2002 in Washington D.C. by 
Franklin Graham, son of Billy Graham and founder of evangelical charity organization 
Samaritan’s Purse, began to transform evangelical opinion about access to HIV/AIDS 
treatment in Africa. The conference title was “Prescription for Hope”; it attracted more 
than 800 Christian leaders ranging from American evangelical Protestants and Catholic 
conservatives to overseas missionaries advocating access to treatment for those sick and 
dying from HIV/AIDS in Africa.  
During the conference, Senator Helms stated his shame for having done so little to 
help the victims of AIDS, a politician whose voting record on opposing government 
financing of HIV/AIDS programs was well known. In the days following, he published 
an op-ed in The Washington Post in which he promised to secure $500 million to help 
prevent mother-to-child transmission of the disease. He also publicized the fact that in 
Africa the disease was transmitted through heterosexual relations, dispelling evangelical 
opposition to government assistance for HIV/AIDS victims.14 These efforts resonated 
                                                
14 Regarding the Republican Party, most public officials have identified their views of HIV/AIDS 
with key morally conservative figures such as Rev. Jerry Falwell who correlated AIDS with 
moral decay and homosexual depravity. Behrman (2004:27) argues that as early as 1983, this 
pastor proclaimed in a sermon how “AIDS is God’s punishment… The scripture is clear; we do 
reap it in our flesh when we violate the laws of God.” Given that “the subpopulations suffering in 
the United States were not part of Reagan’s constituency, AIDS was sexuality and death: not the 
stuff that politicians are wont to gravitate toward.” 
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with most of the Republican evangelical constituency, which began lobbying the 
administration to increase its foreign aid to African victims of AIDS. Indeed, the “rise of 
the evangelical movement and the Christian right and its increasing engagement in 
national politics and public policy” is an important factor that “has begun to change in 
American politics that could affect aid purposes in the future” (Lancaster 2007:107). 
According to this domestic politics approach, political actors in democratic 
societies are any citizens, groups, or organizations – not only elected officials – who also 
control bureaucratic appointees. All these actors in any form of organized group act to 
influence policy outcomes. They lobby or pressure the government to enact policies in 
favor of their preferred policies. As Falkner (2008:158) observes, continuity or change is 
attributed, in the traditional pluralist perspective, to the “shifts in the relative influence of 
domestic interest groups and bureaucratic units within the institutional setup.” Others 
claim that the rise of the religious right in American politics echoes in some respects a 
common theme in the history of the United States (Campbell and Putnam 2012). Religion 
is certainly present throughout US politics in spite of the constitutional demarcation that 
mandates the separation of church and state. It should be noted, however, that President 
Bush was neither the first nor the only US president to incorporate the influence of 
religion into his governing style.15  
                                                
15 For instance, March and Olsen (1989) contend that personal character is shaped by cultural 
environment and that the existing institutions, including religion, play an important role in 
defining values, norms, interests, identities, and beliefs. Because “the US was founded on the 
proclamation of ‘unalienable’ rights, and human rights ever since have had a peculiar resonance 
in the American tradition,” as Forsythe (1990:435) suggests, it has shown a consistent moral 
commitment to human rights. From the drought in Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Sudan to 
alleviating famine in Somalia or providing resources in cases of natural catastrophes, the US 
foreign policy in Africa has consistently sought to address these social problems. As a result, both 
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McCartney (2004) and Judis (2005) relate this historical evangelical influence 
on US foreign policy to such concepts as “Manifest Destiny” or “Special Providence” 
that have enjoyed a special place in the US self-perception. As totalitarianism was so 
contrary to American values and posed a threat to international peace and the national 
security of the United States, during the Cold War the Truman Doctrine offered to stop 
totalitarian regimes and to support all free people who were resisting multiple subjugation 
attempts by armed minorities or outside pressures. Most American presidents have 
pursued grandiose humanitarian and moral goals in their foreign policy. The belief in 
promoting the human rights and freedom can be traced in twentieth century US 
presidencies from Woodrow Wilson and Harry Truman to Ronald Reagan, George W.H. 
Bush, and Bill Clinton. All these presidents regarded the United States as a savior nation 
with universal moral objectives (Ikenberry 2009).  
Religion has always played a role in US politics in spite of the political imperative 
to demarcate state from religion and keep established religion at bay. James Guth (2004) 
laments, however, a dearth of research in the political science literature on the role of 
religion in foreign policy. Nonetheless, as he observes, a pool of research does exist, 
carried out mostly by sociologists such as Weber (1919) and Derber and Magrass (2008); 
by diplomats like Carter (2005) and Albright (2006); and by religion scholars like Urban 
(2006) and March (2007). Political scientists are only beginning to produce works on the 
influence that religion played in US foreign policy specifically during the Bush 
                                                                                                                                            
personal experience and US political culture contributed towards shaping President Bush’s 
HIV/AIDS policy preferences and direct involvement in the creation of PEPFAR to address the 
global public health crisis affecting Africa.  
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administration. 
However, the Christian evangelical right argument alone can neither explain the 
policy’s timing – why the Bush administration chose to initiate the PEPFAR policy at this 
specific point in time – nor the policy’s substance and structure. Critics of this approach 
argue that the FBCI was an assault on the general welfare system, eroding the collective 
spirit so vital to a genuine democracy and replacing the postwar government safety net 
with a system of charity that transformed the political right into the major dispenser of 
arbitrary altruism (Willis 2001; Press 2001; Waldman 2001). As only “one-third of its 
AIDS-prevention funding [was directed] toward programs urging abstinence before 
marriage” while the bulk of the fund went to purchase antiretroviral drugs, the religious 
constituency argument also cannot account for the policy’s substance (Burkhalter 
2004:12). If only one-third of the total budget earmarked for prevention programs was 
allocated to ideological programs – the ABC where A stands for Abstinence, B for being 
faithful in marriage, and C for Condom use in case the two previous strategies failed – it 
is hard to explain the entirety of PEPFAR’s initiatives based on the religious right theory 
alone.  
Finally, if the faith-based welfare organizations are better equipped than the 
state’s to address social issues, it is clear that the privatization model has its positives; 
nonetheless it reduces citizens with civic obligations and moral rights to mere clients of 
arbitrary philanthropy, mere objects of charity. The privatization model also divorces 
poverty from its historical and structural underpinnings while it enshrines the moral 
character of the victims as the main culprit for their social misfortunes. It should be noted 
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that both poverty and HIV/AIDS in Africa are the result of many historical and 
institutional factors, not only of individual decisions. To that extent, the emphasis put on 
privatization surreptitiously succeeds in shifting the embeddedness of causal histories and 
the structural injustices away from the state’s responsibility, a displacement that 
subordinates the state obligation and citizens’ welfare rights to the arbitrariness of private 
philanthropy. 
A Brief Overview of US Foreign Policy Toward Africa 
Conventional wisdom in the literature on US foreign policy toward Africa treats 
Africa as the ‘stepchild’ and ‘backwater’ in the hierarchy of U.S. foreign policy priorities. 
Scholars of US foreign policy toward Africa argue that the lack of consensus “within the 
policy-making establishment over Africa’s importance to U.S. national security 
interests,” has bolstered the marginalization of the African region in the post-Cold War 
era, which is left at “the bottom of foreign policy concerns” (Schraeder 1994:2-3; Moss 
1995:195). The assumption that Africa is lacking in strategic significance for U.S. 
national interests in comparison with other regions is well entrenched among Africanist 
scholars (Pham 2005; Schraeder 2006). As Pham (2005:19) explains, “Most foreign 
policy realists wrote the continent [of Africa] off as little more than a source of trouble, 
albeit one that could be safely ignored because it rarely if ever impinged on America’s 
strategic national interest.” Others also corroborate this view such as Nicolas Van de 
Walle (2009) who suggests that belief in the absence of core vital interests in Africa has 
been a longtime staple within foreign policy circles. Thus, a stranger to in-depth 
presidential attention, Africa has remained the province of bureaucratic routines unless a 
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crisis erupts to pull the President back into the foreign policy-making process. In case 
the crisis drags on, Congress also becomes directly involved while the domestic interest 
groups compete to impact the congressional process (Schraeder 1994a; Clark 1998; 
Cohen 2000). 
For many, the absence of vital interests did not allow the U.S. to be adept at 
forming a coherent African policy after the Cold War’s ending. Resultantly, Africa’s 
political neglect persists – with some degree of variation – regardless of which president 
occupies the White House, or the nature of his party affiliation. This is a direct result of 
the ingrained perception that Africa’s strategic worth is unconstructive to the United 
States’ vital interests. While these interests have yet to be explained, the history of the 
U.S. relations toward Africa is significantly marked by the persistence of neglect and 
indifference, which reached the lowest point in history in the mid-1990s. For instance, 
some scholars remark that despite ambitious rhetoric and overarching discourse on 
democracy promotion and human rights protection, President Clinton’s Africa foreign 
policy was characterized by timidity and retrenchment (Rosenblum 2002; Alden 2000; 
Ottaway 2001; Van de Walle 2009). Therefore, one can question whether the perception 
of the US interests in Africa changed during the Bush administration or if US interests do 
change over time. If so, what explains the US foreign policy’s variation and selective 
engagement toward Africa? To address the above question, it is important to understand 
how foreign policy is conceptualized and how US policy makers have defined American 
vital interests in Africa.  
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By foreign policy, we refer to how state entities use their sovereign power to 
influence the behavior of other sovereign states to attain or achieve their own interests. 
The concept of interest has many definitions. For the sake of this analysis, focus will 
centralize on Merriam Webster’s definition that emphasizes ‘interest’ as “a concern for 
one’s own advantage or well-being,” in other words, the advantage or benefit a person or 
group derives from the selfish pursuit of one’s welfare. Snow and Brown (2000:6) frame 
political ‘interests’ as strategic, that is, “those interests for which a state would go to war; 
that cannot be voluntarily forfeited without altering the state’s identity: they are 
properties of states alone. Domestically, they subordinate interests of individuals and 
groups to those of the state and, internationally, they are too important that states prefer 
legal anarchy to a global authority” (emphasis added). They conclude, “The need for 
foreign policy arises because all states have interests – conditions that are important to 
their well-being or, in some cases, even their existence – and because the interests of 
different states sometimes conflict. When conflicts of interest arise (situations where two 
or more states cannot simultaneously pursue their interests), foreign policy attempts to 
resolve those disagreements” (idem).  
To avoid confusing the goals of foreign policy and the means of achieving these 
goals, it is equally important that we agree on what justifies states’ international behavior. 
While the liberal tradition claims that international promotion of American values, such 
as democracy, human rights, and free trade, has an overwhelming importance in the 
foreign policy decision-making process, scholars with a conservative bent suggest that 
material strategic interests – such as oil, natural resources and security – are the only 
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important factors that determine US behavior abroad. Bock and Berkowitz (1966), 
however, contend that US strategic interests encompass the decisions and actions that the 
government deems of greater importance in protecting domestic core values against 
external threats. For Leffer (2004:123), the very concept of national strategic interests is 
attractive, due to “its synthetic qualities [which] stem from the fact that it is not a specific 
interpretation that focuses on a particular variable as much as a comprehensive 
framework that relates variables to one another and allows diverse interpretations in 
particular periods and contexts.”  
The notion of strategic interests has, thus, allowed for the reconciliation of liberals 
and conservatives in the U.S. foreign policy tradition. Kraxberger (2005:49) proposes the 
concept of “geopolitical code” to measure a region’s strategic significance. A geopolitical 
code, he argues,  
can be assessed […] through analysis of the geographic deployment of government 
resources abroad, including military personnel and assets, diplomatic missions, and 
foreign aid… Within geopolitical codes, foreign areas and countries are arranged in a 
loose hierarchy of significance; some places are deemed to be of vital national 
interest while others are of small or inconsequential importance (italics added for 
emphasis).  
By defining ‘strategic interest’ as that for which countries go to war, scholars and policy 
analysts tend to clusters strategic interests into national security, economic gains, moral 
idealism, the containment of perceived communist and Soviet expansionism – at least 
until the end of the Cold War – and the promotion of a New World order (Ohaegbulam 
1999). Yet, any objective analysis of the broad sweep of US–Africa relations indicates 
that two sets of interests, security and economics, have competed for pre-eminence in US 
foreign policy toward Africa, as Schraeder (2011:304) contends. Before and during the 
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Cold War, policy makers abandoned their interest in African policy in favor of 
Europe’s, afterwards using U.S. ambassadors to aggressively serve as diplomatic 
advocates for the facilitation of U.S. business abroad. In the words of former Assistant 
Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, “The time has passed when Africa 
could be carved into spheres of influence, or when outside powers could view whole 
groups of states as their private domain […] We must accept free and fair competition, 
equality between all actors” (Schraeder 2000:404-406). Where does Africa fall on the 
spectrum of US strategic interests or, more specifically, how do US policy makers frame 
the strategic significance of Africa in terms of U.S. foreign policy? 
The neglect of Africa in the history of U.S. foreign policy can be explained 
through the history of the politics of the US and Africa being geographically removed 
and separated by an ocean. The US developed an isolationist attitude in the years 
immediately following the formation of the new Republic. In his 1796 farewell speech, 
President Washington cautioned his fellow Americans about getting entangled with 
European politics.  
The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in extending our 
commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. 
So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect 
good faith. Here let us stop. Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us 
have none; or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent 
controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, 
therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the 
ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions 
of her friendships or enmities.16  
 
                                                
16  “Washington's Farewell Address 1796,” Available at the website of the Yale Law School 
Avalon Project, 2008, accessed on October 19, 2013. 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp  
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This strategic posture grew out of the need to shield the young Republic from violent 
happenings on the world stage and avoid being entangled in European conflicts and wars. 
In one sense, it aimed at protecting the new republic’s integrity from the depredations of 
European power politics, as European states were more powerful than the U.S. until the 
mid-twentieth century and “fought according to the rules of amoral power politics, which 
elevated state interests and survival above everything else” (Dobson and Marsh 2006:6). 
An established geopolitical tacit agreement among Western powers permitted the US to 
leave Africa to European colonial powers until the end of the Second World War, and 
granted the U.S. the right to intervene in the Western hemisphere to restore order and 
protect its own economic interests, according to the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 and the 
later belief in a Manifest Destiny. Hence, the attitude of most US policy makers in the 
early part of the 20th century – even until the end of the Cold War – consisted of treating 
Africa as a “chasse gardée” (or the sphere of influence) of Europe.   
Obviously, this policy attitude contributed to the continued neglect of Africa in 
U.S. foreign policy while enforcing the belief that Africa is strategically insignificant to 
the U.S. The U.S. concern for Europe’s economic recovery led the adoption of 
“enlightened self-interest,” which saw Europe’s access to Africa’s resources functioning 
as an adjuvant to the Marshall Plan. During the entirety of the Cold War, the U.S. 
deferred the task of intervention to former European colonial powers, which were seen as 
custodians of Western interests in Africa until the end of the Cold War. This is not to 
claim that Africa’s policies among Western allies were at any time monolithic even 
though conflicts rarely surfaced in public and remained at a manageable level. However, 
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the U.S. always sided with its European allies in case of difficult choices between 
African nationalist interests or Europe and her postcolonial interests after the 
independence in the 1960s (Marcum 1972; Jackson 1984; Clough 1992).  
Between 1945 and 1960, the U.S. reversed its decolonization commitment signed 
in The Atlantic Treaty by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill in the fall of 
1941.17 It also reviewed its definition of Africa’s strategic significance after the Second 
World War and reorganized its strategic interests in Africa around four priorities, 
including the containment of communism wherever it erupted, protection of U.S. 
shipping lanes, access to Africa’s minerals, and the promotion of American values, 
especially human rights (Moss 1995:193-194). After the independence obtained in the 
early 1960s, determinants of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa boiled down to concerns 
about the vulnerability of newly independent African states to the lures of communism.  
During the 1960s, despite rhetorical support for decolonization, self-determination 
and development, “The United States, which hoped to replace the imperial powers as the 
dominant external force in Africa, bridged the decolonization and Cold War processes. 
                                                
17 An illustration of this reversal can be seen in the U.S. shift from supporting colonial 
nations’ independence and self-government to what Assistant Secretary of State for Near East, 
South Asian and African Affairs, Henry A. Byroads called an ‘enlightened self-interest’ in 
dealing with the colonial question. In an address to the World Affairs Council of North California 
at Asilomar, on October 31, 1953, entitled: “The World’s Colonies and Ex-Colonies: A Challenge 
to America,” he argued that the U.S. should continue to support European colonial powers who 
happen to be “our allies” and who share “many common interests with us. In his words, “We 
cannot blindly disregard their side of the colonial question without injury to our own security” 
nor can we “forget the importance of these interests to the European economy which we have 
contributed so much to support.” A premature independence – he argued – could lead to a power 
vacuum and invite internal disorder and external (Soviet) intervention (Baptiste 2005).  
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Wavering between its European allies and moderate nationalists, the United States 
strove to keep both radical nationalism and communism at bay.” (Schmidt 2013:7). 
Africa was supposed to continue playing the role it had maintained under Europe’s 
colonial rule, which consisted of supplying strategic resources to preserve America’s 
economic and industrial supremacy. Herbst (1992:4) cites a 1961 memo by African 
experts at the Policy Planning Council to the Kennedy administration that describes the 
perception of Africa in the eyes of U.S. policy makers – concludes that if African 
countries try to industrialize, “scarce resources will tend to be misdirected into parallel 
and overlapping investments; and the possibility of attracting foreign capital from abroad 
will be reduced.” In the 1970s, the Church Commission detailed the pattern of covert 
operations and assassinations of democratically elected foreign leaders, including 
Congolese Prime Minister Lumumba. Congress opposed the inchoate self-proclaimed 
morality of U.S. foreign policy and legislated that respect for human rights should be 
incorporated into foreign policy (Forsythe 1990:440-439, note 16).  
In the 1980s, realists contested the idea that moral ideals and human rights should 
drive U.S. foreign policy. Kennan (1985), for instance, argues that decision makers hurl 
such semantic challenges to their foreign counterparts in order to derive political benefits 
from establishing themselves in domestic American opinion so positively by contrast. 
Instead, the U.S. should unapologetically and without moral pretension recognize its 
national interest is the legitimate motivator of its foreign policy. Besides, “Where 
measures taken by foreign governments affect adversely American interests rather than 
just American moral sensibilities, protests and retaliation are obviously in order; but then 
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they should be carried forward frankly for what they are, and not allowed to 
masquerade under the mantle of moral principle” So, why bother with moral standards 
when “there are no internationally accepted standards of morality to which the U.S. 
government could appeal if it wished to act in the name of moral principles?” (1985:207-
211).  
Africanist scholars believed that once freed from anticommunist conceptual and 
ideological frameworks, the end of the Cold War would, finally, push U.S. policy makers 
to consider African realities as central to the policy-making process. Meernick et al. 
(1998:64) writes, for instance, “[w]ith the passing of the Cold War, security-driven goals 
have become less critical and ideological goals more important.” Given the changes that 
were occurring in the international environment, scholars refuted the material strategic 
interests argument that characterized the Cold War guiding principles of U.S. foreign 
policy. While ensuring America’s economic and physical security lies at the heart of U.S. 
foreign policy, the self-interest approach does not tell the whole story of U.S. foreign 
policy because U.S. ideals were also a crucial part of the U.S. identity and played an 
important role to begin with in sparking the Cold War (Kegley and Wittkopt 1987:78).  
Paradoxically, the 1990s were characterized by further retrenchment and came to 
be known as the lowest decade in U.S. involvement in Africa since the Cold War. That 
situation lasted throughout the first eight months of the Bush administration (Schraeder 
2011:301-3; Clough 1992:15). In fact, as Schraeder (1994a: 251-252) notes, the post-
Cold War tendency within the U.S. policy-making establishment consisted in ignoring 
Africa in favor of other regions of greater concern, an attitude justified by the fact that 
  
66 
Africa’s strategic significance was synonymous with geopolitical competition with the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War – that is, vying for political allegiance of African 
states in the United Nations voting system and access to the continent’s natural resources. 
As US Policy makers lacked an “overarching policy framework for coping effectively 
with the continent’s long-term problems of conflict, disease, and poverty,” Africa receded 
to its traditional area of policy neglect (Rothchild 2001:179).  
Attitudes, speeches, and actions of officials during the 1990s tended to confirm 
the notion that strategic economic resources and security threats interests have been the 
primary driving force behind U.S. foreign policy. Clinton former Secretary of State, 
Madeleine Albright (1998:50) notes that U.S. foreign policy has not changed for more 
than 200 years. Summarizing its goals, she contends that U.S. foreign policy aims at 
“ensuring the continued security, prosperity, and freedom of our people.” In his 1995 
State of the Union Address, President Bill Clinton warned the American people against 
the temptation to believe that all security issues were becoming domestic, with the 
exception of trade. As he concludes, “[W]e can’t be strong at home in the new 
international environment unless we are strong abroad.” And other U.S. post-Cold War 
policy makers – like North Carolina conservative senator Jesse Helms – went as far as to 
suggest terminating U.S. foreign assistance altogether in the absence of strategic interest, 
and to dissolve the federal agency in charge of foreign aid (Schraeder 2011:302-303).  
After the Cold War raised hopes concerning a U.S.-Africa foreign policy focused 
on African realities, Herbst (1992:15) observed the irony “that just as the Cold War is 
ending and political calculations are receding in the determination of aid policy [as] 
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whole new issues threaten to distract American policy-makers from the central 
problem of promoting growth and education.” Trying to predict the likely source of threat 
to U.S. economic and security interests, scholars argued that the rivalry and competition 
would come from former allies such as France, Germany, and Japan. The U.S. “will still 
be uncomfor with any nation rising to disproportionate power in Asia or Europe” As 
(Garten 1992:220). More recently, scholars have called on policy makers to abandon such 
moralism in foreign policy and go beyond humanitarian categories to conceptualize 
Africa in more realist terms. The focus of U.S. foreign policy concern in Africa, Lyman 
and Dorff argue, ought to overcome the post-Cold War humanitarian needs perspective 
because of Africa’s growing importance to the U.S. and the rest of the world. As they 
write,  
“Africa plays an increasingly significant role in supplying energy, preventing the 
spread of terrorism, and halting the devastation of HIV/AIDS, [its] growing 
importance is reflected in the intensifying competition with China and other 
countries for both access to African resources and influence in the region… In 
sum, it is not valid to treat Africa more as an object of charity than as a diverse 
continent with partners the Unites States can work with to advance shared 
objectives.” (2007:199-200).  
 
Neoliberalism and Privatization in US Foreign Policy 
The task of policy analysis consists in determining the hermeneutical framework 
or philosophical underpinning from which the decision makers operate and the ideology 
that shaped public attitudes toward the issue of interest. Kotz (2002) is right to affirm that 
neoliberalism has dominated economic policy-making for quite some time. Neoliberal 
resurgence in US foreign policy during the 1990s, he argues, resulted from changes in the 
competitive structures of world capitalism that altered the political posture of business, 
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turning it from a supporter of state-regulated capitalism into its opponent. As an 
economic theory and a policy stance, neoliberalism sought to revive classical liberalism 
when the state regulatory and interventionist measures since the Great Depression were 
no longer accep beliefs for tenants of American capitalism in the 1970s. To neoliberals, 
the unregulated capitalism system – that is, the free market economic system – is the best 
way to achieve democracy and collective welfare. Kotz (2002:64-79) argues, “the 
optimal economic performance as related to efficiency, economic growth, innovation and 
technical progress, and distributional justice requires a minimal state whose functions are 
reduced to defining property rights, enforcing contracts and regulating the money 
supply.”  
Most neoliberalism policy recommendations have been concerned with the 
abolition of state’s welfare interventionism and the promotion of the privatization 
ideology. It is noteworthy to underscore two important facts that propelled the neoliberal 
agenda in US foreign policy. The first is the demise of the notion of state sovereignty in 
the age of globalization; the second was democratic rhetoric and the promotion of human 
rights. While international relations until the end of the Cold War traditionally focused on 
the state as the basic unit of analysis, post-Cold War foreign policy analysis cannot 
overlook the reality of globalization. A state-centric approach that would simply ignore 
how the international environment has changed may either miss the point or grossly 
undervalue “an important part of what is shaping today’s world and will shape 
tomorrow’s” (Rothkopt 2012:30). Globalization has offered a new international context 
and ideological framework for foreign policy, as transnational actors – such as 
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international organizations (IOs), international nongovernmental organizations 
(INGOs), the international financial institutions (IFIs), multinational corporations 
(MNCs), and international banks – challenged the notion of state sovereignty. A gradual 
shift occurred in foreign policy whereby the U.S. focused less and less on dealing with 
governments as de jure international actors than on consolidating civil society. Indeed, 
even at the domestic level, non-state actors – such as nongovernmental organizations, 
churches, community-based and faith-based organizations, and individual citizens – 
increasingly play an undeniably significant role both in the provision of welfare and the 
definition of international issues.  
Hence, the focus is put less and less on state attributes and more on human 
security and individual freedoms. The democracy and human rights promotion agenda is 
a part of the neoliberal rhetoric, becoming central to global perspective in the Cold War’s 
aftermath. American neoliberal ideals, i.e., democracy, liberalization, and human rights – 
became the major determinants of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa (Hilgers 2011, 2013). 
U.S. foreign behavior sought to reward those states that performed well by adopting and 
implementing neoliberal ideals with foreign aid. Meanwhile, assistance to former 
strategically important nations under the Cold War simply dwindled. Ideas and ideals, 
indeed, matter in shaping and justifying foreign policy. They also shape identities and 
preferences; steer actions of both state and non-state actors; and create the framework for 
interpretation. As a result, ideals and material interests cannot be separated since 
ideologies always underpin both the creation of symbolic meanings and also the 
justification of action.  
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No other institution embodies so well these two sides of the same coin in 
American foreign policy than multinational corporations. Indeed, from the beginning they 
have played an important role in shaping American politics. While writing the US 
Constitution, James Madison expressed concern about factions of men who by intrigue, 
corruption or other means could “betray the interests of the people.” Indeed, the early 
debate whether to create a central Bank, and whether the Bank should be private or public, 
demonstrated the sharp business cleavage between U.S. domestic and foreign politics. 
Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton advocated for the creation of a private 
bank – given his mercantile relations with Great Britain – against the views of Secretary 
of State Thomas Jefferson, whose economic ties and allegiance lay with the Southern 
cotton growers. While he preferred that the nation honor its international obligations like 
the treaty signed with France during the War of Independence, President George 
Washington warned in his 1796 farewell speech that combinations and associations were 
likely to rise and “direct, control, counteract, or awe the regular deliberation and action of 
the constituted authorities” (Davidson 2009:24).  
Most U.S. presidents and statesmen have alerted American opinion to how 
corporations aggregate power into the hands of a few private individuals, jeopardizing the 
welfare of the American democracy. Interestingly, the political and economic welfare of 
the U.S., as well as its military power, have gone hand in hand with the MNCs. Not only 
were corporations initially understood to be “creatures of the state, figments of the legal 
imagination of the public sector” and were not initially seen as “part of the society of 
individuals that the U.S. Bill of Rights or its British forbearers were meant to protect,” 
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but they have also come to play an important role in preserving the belief in private 
property rights so dear to American democracy (Rothkopf 2012:182). And yet, 
corporations have acquired the status of “artificial persons” and are treated as individual 
persons who share the same privilege granted by the First (free speech), Fourth (privacy), 
Fifth (double jeopardy), and Fourteenth (due process) Amendments. Regarding historical 
perspectives, President Lincoln wrote to Col. William F. Elkins in 1864,  
I see in the near future a crisis approaching that unnerves me and causes me to 
tremble for the safety of my country… corporations have been enthroned and an 
era of corruption in high places will follow, and the money power of the country 
will endeavor to prolong its reign by working upon the prejudices of the people 
until all wealth is aggregated in a few hands and the Republic is destroyed (quoted 
by Shah 2002, electronic version).18  
Shortly after, however, MNCs acquired the status of a natural person under the U.S. 
Constitution according to the Supreme Court’s ruling in 1886, granting them the same 
rights and protection extended to persons by the Bill of Rights, including the right to free 
speech, and the right to use their wealth to influence the government in their interest.  
In subsequent years, other presidents and statesmen have referred to the conflict 
of interests between the state’s public welfare and the MNCs’ private interests (Rothkopf 
2012:181-2). Testifying before Congress in 1915, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis 
Brandeis compared MNCs to Frankenstein monsters created by the state, “Through their 
size, corporations… have become an institution which has brought such a concentration 
of economic power that so-called private corporations are sometimes able to dominate the 
state. Such is the Frankenstein monster which states have created through corporation 
laws” (Davidson 2009:14). Later on, President Franklin Roosevelt lamented the risk that 
                                                
18 Anup Shah, “The Rise of Corporations,” Global Issues, 2002, available at 
http://www.globalissues.org/issue/50/corporations (consulted December 10, 2013) 
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corporations posed to the state and how they had come to dominate and control the 
government to the extent that it resembled an oligarchy more than a democracy. In his 
words, “The liberty of a democracy is not safe if the people tolerate the growth of private 
power to a point where it becomes stronger than their democratic state itself. That, in its 
essence, is fascism – ownership of government by an individual, by a group” (ibid).  
As recent as 2010, however, in Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission, 
the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the ban that prevented corporations from using their 
own money to support candidates for public office. Dissenting voices like that of Justice 
John Paul Stevens argued, “The Court’s ruling threatens to undermine the integrity of 
elected institutions around the nation,” (quoted by Krista Gesaman in the Newsweek Jan. 
22, 2010). While this landmark case allowing corporations and unions to spend limitless 
amounts of money on presidential and congressional political campaigns may result in 
foreign businesses emerging as the real winners, President Obama has recognized that the 
decision gives “a green light to a new stampede of special interest money in our politics.” 
Yet, because corporations are conceptualized as legal ‘persons’ according to the U.S. law, 
pro-business lobbies viewed the decision as honoring the First Amendment right to free 
speech.  
Multinational corporations are not to be regarded as mere interest groups. In 
American society, they have acquired the status of “artificial individuals,” existing as 
something halfway between the state and its citizens. They are the perfect embodiment of 
the idea of a civil society crucial for the flourishing of liberal democracy. As Davidson 
(2009: 24-7) observes, “individuals with similar interests and goals […] have learned that 
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it is advantageous to come together and… pool their financial resources and, if 
available, their voting numbers” to influence the government and shape policies to their 
benefit since “Any political system of much size or scope is likely to contain within it a 
population sufficiently diverse to provoke the formation of factions, each pursuing its 
own interest.” For this reason, Greider (1992) regards the U.S. policy-making structure as 
a coalition of government elite working hand in hand with a few wealthy businessmen to 
enact and implement laws that will advance their economic interests. In the same vein, 
Bueno de Mesquita (2002:4) suggests that because leaders are “motivated by their own 
well-being and not by the welfare of the state,” they would rather provide exceptional 
opportunities to their cronies to get rich while expecting the support and resources in 
return that they need to maintain themselves in office.  
This old tension, which Alexis de Tocqueville recognized in the nineteenth 
century, is characteristic of the U.S. political identity. Observing the American 
democracy, he acknowledged the difficult business of conducting foreign policy in a 
democracy since the masses in their idealism, ignorance and passion may lead foreign 
policy making astray when, in fact, the pursuit of power should be the guiding principle. 
Countering U.S. democratic ideals, Tocqueville (2006:188) suggests that the primacy of 
the elite’s corporate interests constitutes the core of U.S. foreign policy. He argues that, 
“All the nations that have exercised the influence upon the destinies of the world by 
conceiving, following up, and executing vast designs – from the Romans to the English – 
have been governed by aristocratic institutions.” Yet, the interests of MNCs, at some 
point in American history, coincided with the definition of national interest as epitomized 
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in the expression “what is good for General Motors (GM) is good for America.” MNCs 
represented the long arm of the US government’s foreign policy by competing for 
economic advantages abroad. As a result, the real question in U.S. domestic politics has 
been how to balance the public interest of the Republic with the private claims and power 
of corporations.  
The pluralism of American society stresses competition among nongovernmental 
actors to make their views heard by the government and to get their favored policies 
enacted. While U.S. politics is described as a marketplace with more or less perfect 
competition among different actors and interest groups, scholars agree that the business 
community as an interest group enjoys a comparative advantage in lobbying to change 
foreign policy, given its economic resources that provide more political clout (Gibbs 
1991). The democratic pluralism in U.S. politics, Davidson (2009:24) claims, is more 
about interest groups than individuals. In fact, “Any political system of much size or 
scope is likely to contain within it a population sufficiently diverse to provoke the 
formation of factions, each pursuing its own interest.” While MNCs have contributed to 
keeping alive the belief in liberalism and exceptionalism so engrained in American 
collective thought, they are not only active interest groups, but also have become 
international actors in their own right. They have the capacity to lobby the government 
and steer policies; they also have grown in power to the extent of challenging the very 
power of the government they are supposed to lobby.  
Hart (2004:48) contends, however, that although they might fit the definition of 
an interest group, understood as “organized group that promotes a common political or 
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policy goal,” MNCs are not just interest groups in the traditional sense. Unlike most 
interest groups that are usually voluntary associations of citizens trying to influence 
public policy for the common good, MNCs are hierarchically organized and can easily 
overlook the pursuit of the common good since their primary goal is seeking to maximize 
profits. Brown (2012:19) concurs with this view and adds the fact that MNCs’ structural 
capacity to organize gives them more political clout and leverage to lobby the 
government more than other interest groups. Not to mention their social capital, 
intellectual and economic resources, and the multiple venues through which they can 
access and influence the decision making process.  
Even as an interest group, MNCs’ influence is unmatched by nonbusiness interest 
groups in the way they affect the foreign policy-making process. They not only possess 
tremendous resources and capacities to create, shape, and impact political preferences but 
also are regarded as full-fledged international actors. These behemoth firms are seen as 
taking over the nation state since some of them possess resources exceeding those of 
nation states themselves. Hence, they cannot be regarded as interest groups given that 
they present significant ontological, structural, and methodological differences in the way 
they organize themselves to influence policy. As Shah (2002) suggests, 51 of the largest 
100 economies of the world are corporations while 49 are countries. Using their 
economic power, corporations are undermining the national sovereignty of states and 
challenging the Westphalian nation-state system, weakening sovereignty and traditional 
borders. Although not all agree with this point, some argue that MNCs should be treated, 
in their own right, as independent international actors (Nicholson 2002).  
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In the post-Cold War era, a subtle shift has occurred thanks to the dominant 
belief in neoliberalism and the redefinition of the state’s function in international 
relations. In fact, many concur today that the public power of the state needs to be limited 
to allow the private sector to flourish. This evolution in international politics and the 
change brought about by the globalization phenomenon have led to focusing democratic 
transformations in foreign policy on the role of civil society, not the state per se, in 
following in the American model’s footsteps. Thus, international regimes and foreign 
policy are becoming more and more dominated by private nongovernmental 
organizations in a reflection, if not a continuation, of U.S. domestic politics (Haass 2013; 
Donald and Brown 2000; Bull 1977). Multinational corporations have, indeed, had a 
privileged position granting them access to the government and the power to constrain its 
regulatory role in favor of the free market.  
The Private Corporations’ Influence on US Foreign Policy Toward HIV/AIDS 
A fundamental assumption of this dissertation regards the creation of PEPFAR as 
a logical outcome of the evolution of the patent regime and the Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement that protected US pharmaceutical 
companies’ economic interests, thus limiting African AIDS patients’ access to ARV 
drugs treatment. The repercussions of the crisis on Africa’s development were 
devastating. President Clinton’s Executive Order 13155 attempted to shift the neoliberal 
market approach bringing the public health responsibility into the hands of official 
governments. The 4th World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference held in Doha in 
November 2001 confirmed this need to prioritize public health interests over the private 
  
77 
economic interest of pharmaceutical companies. Yet, in the view of conservatives, 
allowing the compulsory licensing and parallel importation of generic drugs provisos of 
the TRIPS Agreement undermined the interest of the US pharmaceutical R&D-based 
industry. As a result, the Bush administration chose a third way solution that increased 
the provision of foreign aid to allow African HIV/AIDS patients greater access to ARV 
drugs treatment. By sending foreign funds to African governments to purchase American 
products, this neoliberal market solution would preclude the implementation of President 
Clinton’s Executive Order 13155  – and thus expand the job market for US goods and 
services through PEPFAR. Without the evolution of the crisis in the international patent 
regime and the US trade policy that regulated access to antiretroviral (ARV) drug 
therapy, the Bush administration’s creation of PEPFAR would not have been possible.  
A neoliberal policy approach to the welfare provision offers a comparative 
advantage in organizing the complex phenomenon of the international HIV/AIDS crisis 
and in explaining the rationale, timing, and substance of the PEPFAR policy. The 
creation of PEPFAR was the net result of the interplay between these ideological, 
political, and economic interests represented by the different, competing demands of 
various stakeholders and actors. This converged in the clash of interests between African 
governments, the developing countries’ generic producers, and the US R&D-based 
pharmaceutical industry that respectively sought to provide the public health welfare for a 
greater cost, the breaking up of the market monopoly by patent holders, and the control of 
international treaties to maintain existing international IP regimes liberalizing the global 
market of ARV drugs and HIV/AIDS-related technology. The dominance of the 
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pharmaceutical industry’s worldview on eradicating the HIV/AIDS global crisis 
through the neoliberal market approach – incentives for investment in R&D in order to 
promote the society’s welfare as a whole through economic growth and medical 
technology – came to be challenged in international organizations by African 
governments and the global civil society leading to the Clinton policy change through 
Executive Order 13155.  
Although in its early days the Bush administration promised to abide by the same 
Clinton HIV/AIDS policy, thus allowing African governments to either purchase cheap 
generic drugs to meet their public health needs or issue compulsory licensing to produce 
their own drugs, PEPFAR overturns this position by providing financial resources to 
avoid the conflict of interests between US pharmaceutical companies and African 
governments’ demand for greater access to treatment. As a matter of fact, the generic 
producers would acquire a greater market competitive advantage given the saturation of 
the HIV/AIDS drug market in the West and the expansion of the market in developing 
countries where more than two-thirds of HIV/AIDS patients are found. This protracted 
conflict continued to fuel the debate over the benefits of the TRIPS Agreement and IP 
patent regime in developing countries.  
The HIV/AIDS crisis during the first two years of the Bush administration 
reflected an ideological divide between Republicans and Democrats on the best way to 
provide for public health welfare. In spite of the strong pro-market foreign policies shared 
by both parties, the Clinton Democratic administration responded flexibly to the demands 
of human rights interest groups that had the ear of the Democrats. It relaxed its pro-
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market policies by adopting Executive Order 13155. The Bush Republican 
administration, on the contrary, maintained strong conservative ties with business interest 
groups leaning more toward market-oriented solutions. As the crisis had evolved along 
the lines of IP patent regime and Trade-Related Aspects of IP Rights, private R&D-based 
pharmaceutical companies in the US tirelessly lobbied the government to protect the 
patent regime, thus denying developing countries the possibility of using the flexibility 
provisions to develop generic products under the compulsory licensing proviso or 
importing them from competitive prices around the world under parallel importing 
measures. Instead, President Bush chose to increase US foreign aid to the developing 
countries and to transform the foreign aid delivery system so as to provide support to US 
private corporations and nongovernmental organizations. By using these private entities 
instead of traditional government-to-government bilateral channels, he applied a 
neoliberal privatization model to reflect what he called a results-based approach simply 
because in his conservative belief, government agencies were obsolete and 
underperformed. This is how much the private business power had influenced ways of 
thinking concerning what the state can achieve according to the neoliberal world order. 
A definition and measurement of business power, though a contested area, is 
necessary in order to understand how the US pharmaceutical industry has exerted 
influence on the making of HIV/AIDS foreign policy. Borrowing a definition from social 
psychology literature, power is understood as the “potential to influence others in 
psychologically meaningful ways” through the giving or withholding of rewards and/or 
punishments (French & Raven 1959; Fiske, 1993; Keltner et al., 2003)” (Guinote and 
  
80 
Viscio 2010:2). These authors explain the three components of power entailed in this 
definition. First, they refer to power as one’s “potential” to influence others; second, the 
psychologically “meaningful” influence includes, but is not limited to effecting how 
people feel, think, or behave; and third, power may be exerted by means of “soft” 
influence tactics (e.g., rewards, charisma, knowledge) and/or “hard” tactics (e.g., physical 
punishment). A dictionary definition of influence clarifies the word as “the capacity to 
have an effect on the character, development, or behavior of someone or something”; and 
“the power to shape policy or ensure favorable treatment from someone, especially 
through status, contacts, or wealth.” Using these definitions, how should we measure the 
power and influence that US pharmaceutical companies exerted on the Bush 
administration’s HIV/AIDS foreign policy decision-making process?  
Fuchs (2007) suggests a three-dimensional scale for measuring the power of 
business on political processes. First, he introduces the instrumental dimension of power 
as the availability of resources (soft power) that can be used to buy political influence. 
Because it is in the nature of things that individuals or groups “have a basic need to 
control their own outcomes and be effective in their relationship with the environment in 
attempts to secure basic resources and valued outcomes,” as Guinote and Vescio (2010:3) 
note, the power of US private corporations, in this case of pharmaceutical companies, 
served to advance the notion that private profit incentives were more important than the 
sovereignty of the nation state to regulate markets. In fact, incentives are necessary to 
invest and produce innovative drugs that will advance the social welfare of all, including 
the victims of HIV/AIDS. In other words, this is the understanding that the self-interest of 
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US private pharmaceutical companies determined the conditions for the public welfare 
of HIV/AIDS patients even in poor countries. This belief combines availability of 
resources for investment into R&D for private pharmaceutical companies with 
availability of both medical and financial resources in developing countries to access new 
medicines.  
Second, Fuchs refers to the structural dimension of power, which concerns the 
relationship between US pharmaceutical MNCs and the structures of US government. 
This is the area wherein the business interest group offers to meliorate the general public 
welfare by producing goods, creating new jobs, bringing in foreign direct investment 
(FDI), promoting technological innovation, and advancing economic growth. The focus 
here is on the instrumental influence of US pharmaceutical companies. For instance, they 
are able to utilize and profit from the privileged status of US global technological 
competitiveness and the prestige of US leadership in innovative medicine. The US Trade 
Representative has acted to promote the interest of US pharmaceutical companies in 
international forums and to secure these interests through international treaties.  
Third, Fuchs claims power also entails a normative dimension that consists in the 
capacity of US pharmaceutical companies to generate and disseminate new ideas – the 
framework for development, for instance – but also to initiate new modes of thinking 
(i.e., neoliberalism vs. welfare state). As a result, new international regimes and 
institutions (i.e., the TRIPS Agreement) are negotiated and enacted to constrain the 
behavior of states in the international environment (McFarland 2004; Falkner 2010). 
Given this triple dimension of power – instrumental, structural, and normative –to 
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influence the US foreign policy, the power of the business on the behavior of states is 
undeniable. In fact, there is a recognized tendency of the US government to depend on 
the business community, a model that is more and more exported and adopted abroad 
under the neoliberal global order. The dependency of states on producing public welfare 
involves this triple dimension of power; the influence of US pharmaceutical companies as 
states demand economic resources, social and political organizations, and normative and 
ideological beliefs to advance their own participation in the public welfare provision.  
That is, US private pharmaceutical companies exert instrumental power through 
their economic resources, i.e., through contributions to political campaigns or capital 
investment or capital flight. They also exert structural influence through interlocking 
government and business communities – that is, through the revolving door that impacts 
the government, as the business sector provides the government with the staff to key 
advisory and decision-making positions and vice versa, a system that allows both 
politicians and corporate leaders to align their preferences and implement joint strategies 
with their governments (Dumhoff 1996; Hart 2004). Besides, the private sector offers job 
creations while it supports charity organizations or contribution to foundations, 
universities, or research institutions. Finally, the normative influence of the business 
industry is felt through production of knowledge, collaboration with academic institutions 
or think tanks, and by controlling the policy image that filters into the media, public 
opinion over certain issues, and the definition of any situation prevailing among policy 
makers.  
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Scholars contend, however, that the unity and strategy of the business interest 
should not be taken for granted. This is, instead, not a matter of theoretical conjecture but 
of empirical study (Falkner 2010). Foreign policy scholars may agree that change in 
international environment brought in a set of new nonstate actors including NGOs and 
MNCs, but Neo-pluralists like to emphasize both the political agency of specific firms 
and the potential for conflict within the business community (Gibbs 1991). There are 
countervailing forces in the global environment that compete with and limit the business 
industry’s power, preventing a monopolistic control of power. For instance, a multitude 
of nonstate nonbusiness actors, including human rights advocacy groups, 
environmentalists, and health workers have emerged to challenge the moral authority and 
political legitimacy of business actors in the public policy-making process. Also, even if 
MNCs are eroding the Westphalian system of sovereign states in times of globalization, 
the very survival instinct of states constitutes a countervailing force whereby the latter 
attempt to retain their “status as loci of authority not only in core state functions such as 
security, but also remain powerful gate keepers and providers in other policy areas that 
are more open to the influence of non-state actors” (Falkner 2010:5). 
The business sector is not always unified regarding the political strategy to 
achieve specific interests. The business conflict theory does not focus on the business 
industry as a monolithic unit in competition with equally powerful interested groups. 
Instead, it considers that there are as many inherent conflicts, rifts, and cleavages within 
any given industry as there are conflicts across industries. That is, the dynamics of 
conflict of interest within the HIV/AIDS industry – pharmaceutical drug producers, civil 
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society and human rights activists, governments – reverberates on foreign policy-
making. As Falkner (2008:160) puts it, the “fragmentation of the business community 
and the ability of sectoral or individual corporate interests to form alliance with state 
actors are seen as central determinants of corporate influence in foreign policy.” 
Although structural constraints still play an important role in the foreign policy-making 
process, and while challenges stemming from other nonbusiness nonstate actors in the 
global environment are non-negligible, a source of influence in domestic politics, it just 
so happens that the post-Cold War neoliberal environment has given more prominence in 
the privatization of policy (Davidson 2009).  
The global market dynamics played a crucial role in shaping the IP global 
governance standards, which are a strategy to improve firms’ market opportunities. 
Roemer-Mahler (2013:131) argues that the US pharmaceutical industry lobby group 
PhRMA (1999) acknowledges that Indian patent system and generic competitiveness was 
the direct motivation for US efforts to enshrine the TRIPS Agreement in the Uruguay 
Round negotiations. If we accept the definition of the situation as a conflict opposing 
African governments (as flag bearers for all developing countries) against US 
pharmaceutical multinational companies, which had introduced a court lawsuit against 
South Africa for overlooking the TRIPS Agreement for the sake of public health, then it 
is easy to place PEPFAR in continuity with the US foreign policy toward HIV/AIDS in 
Africa, and to understand this innovative policy as a solution provided for the global 
crisis in the public health sector in most developing countries where interests of private 
companies were given precedence over the needs of HIV/AIDS patients in poor 
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countries. After the international image of the US was tarnished and the definition of 
the HIV/AIDS issue started to slip out of the control of US pharmaceutical companies, 
the US urgently needed to salvage its public stance on this crucial problem that was 
provoked by the monopoly held by US anti-AIDS drugs patent holders who restricted the 
market to rich buyers only through the international IP regime.19 
As Ellen ’t Hoen (2009:1) notes, “a patent is the right granted to an inventor by as 
State, or by a regional office acting for several States, which allows the inventor to 
exclude anyone else from commercially exploiting his invention for a limited period, 
generally 20 years.” Many scholars regard this gap in access to treatment as an 
aggravating factor of the HIV/AIDS crisis in Africa. Fisher and Rigamonti (2005:2) 
contend, for instance, that the “uneven spread of the pandemic [was] aggravated by the 
fact that in those regions of the world where the burden is highest, the coverage of 
antiretroviral treatment is the lowest.” Ellen ’t Hoen (2009:xv) also observes, “the high 
cost of AIDS medicines has focused attention on the relationship between patent 
protection and high drug prices.” Concerns were raised about the effects of the TRIPS as 
the developing countries experienced difficulties in accessing the new medicines. As part 
of the multilateral trade agreements, the TRIPS require protecting both the rights of 
Intellectual Property (IP) owners, and, in the case of HIV/AIDS treatment, those of 
                                                
19 In 1998, a number of US Representatives wrote a letter to the US Trade Representative under 
the Clinton Administration, Ms. Charlene Barshefsky, to urge the US government to take steps to 
force South Africa to rescind its decision, as it overlooked the WTO framework for the protection 
of the patent over HIV/AIDS drugs. As they remark in their letter with regard to South African 
public health reform, “The new law contains at least two egregious provisions. First it permits the 
parallel importation of patented products and second, it allows for the administrative 
expropriation of patented technology [compulsory licensing]” See Fisher and Rigamonti 
(2005:35). 
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private US pharmaceutical companies. The TRIPS Agreement also impose global 
minimum standards for the protection of IP rights and harmonization of patent terms for 
at least 20 years before generic formats can enter the market competition. As Sell 
(2003:9) notes, 
States are required to provide adequate and effective enforcement mechanisms 
both internally and at the border. The Agreement makes the WTO’s dispute 
settlement mechanism available to address conflicts arising under TRIPS, and 
significantly provides for the possibility of cross-sectoral retaliation for states that 
fail to abide by WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body’s (DSB) rulings. Infractions in 
intellectual property can lead to sanctions on goods. The WTO is empowered to 
monitor compliance to ensure that defendants carry out their obligations within a 
reasonable time period. If the defendants fait to comply, the WTO will authorize 
the complainant to impose retaliatory trade sanctions if requested to do so. 
 
Pharmaceutical companies in the US were very active in shaping and influencing the US 
government policy toward the global market management of HIV/AIDS pharmaceutical 
products and medical technology. These business interests coincided with US foreign 
trade interests and clashed with African governments faced with a severe public health 
crisis caused by HIV/AIDS. While the former intend to protect their drive for free market 
for greater incentives by investing in R&D to discover new innovative treatments, the 
latter’s insistence on sovereign use of their political power in addressing the public health 
crisis affecting their citizens led to a conflict of interests and differing interpretations of 
the HIV/AIDS global crisis. On the one hand, the American interpretation of the situation 
– the crisis in Africa’s public health sector caused by the virulence of the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic – used historical analogies and stereotypes of Africa’s cultural habits and 
sexual stereotypes to divert attention from the gap in access to treatment.  
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The three dimensions or aspects in which US pharmaceutical companies were 
able to leave their imprint – instrumental, structural, and normative – also reflect US 
strategic interests related to economic, political and ideological pursuits of US foreign 
relations as spelled out in the Bush administration’s document The United States National 
Security Strategy of 2002. The normative or ideological level involved removing the 
responsibility of social welfare provision – or the task of dealing with HIV/AIDS care – 
from the government and putting it into the private sector and the realm of the civil 
society – family, faith-based organizations, and community neighborhood as the primary 
providers of care and welfare. The family culture, religious faith, and business 
background within which President Bush was raised and socialized informed his personal 
beliefs and fore-structure, which simply refers to “antecedently developed, already 
entrenched, cognitive systems, or merely heuristic structures awaiting testing and 
deployment” through which an image is created and a relationship established (Heelan 
1984:79). Thus, an enduring image of Africa as a developmental failure, mired in chronic 
poverty, combined with the critical statistical evidence of HIV/AIDS infections as 
compared to the rest of the world allowed President Bush to apply his compassionate 
conservative approach to promote his idea of development through privatizing the 
welfare system and adopting of free trade policies in opposition to the traditional 
Democratic practice of governmental interventionism. 
The structural or political level implies the interdependence of the American 
society with multinational corporations as the expression of freedom, democracy, and 
entrepreneurship characteristic of US values. Thus, President Bush brought to his office 
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the agenda to reform the federal government, to overcome the bureaucratic turf war, 
and to measure government performance by results. In a pluralistic society, the decision 
maker has to hear and accede to the claims and demands of different constituencies and 
interest groups. Scholars and analysts of US foreign policy decision-making like to 
emphasize the importance of domestic politics and the nature of American society as key 
independent variables of foreign policy. Thus, as Falkner (2008:158) notes, continuity 
and change in US foreign policy is attributed, in the traditional pluralist perspective, to 
the “shifts in the relative influence of domestic interest groups and bureaucratic units 
within the institutional setup.” 
The economic level was crucial since it represents the struggle between African 
nations and US trade interests, materialized in the global crisis around the IP governance 
regime and TRIPS Agreement. Gilpin (1975) and Casper (2011) have shown how the 
organization of the international environment reflects the interests and strategy of 
powerful states. Thus, by institutionalizing its global trade preferences into the 
multilateral agreement on the basis of intellectual property rights and the management of 
pharmaceutical products and other knowledge-based industries, the US was simply 
protecting its own economic interests. The developing countries, along with human rights 
NGOs, challenged the Intellectual Property (IP) patent regime and the trade aspects of IP 
rights policy that permit production and access to certain pharmaceutical goods and 
services. As the crisis intensified upon the advent of the New Millennium, the US 
government under the Clinton administration made a strategic move, which consisted of 
abandoning its staunch support of US pharmaceutical companies’ intellectual property 
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rights and promoting human rights goals instead. Before leaving office, President 
Clinton tried to resolve this problem by issuing Executive Order 13155 allowing African 
governments to overlook the TRIPS Agreement for the sake of public health welfare 
without fear of US economic sanctions. Some critics contend that even this shift did not 
imply that President Clinton abandoned the strategic national interests of the US, but 
simply meant that the interests of the state are not necessarily material and that material 
interests do not always trump humanitarian interests (Katzenstein 1996; Abdelal et al. 
2010; Casper 2011). 
At the normative level, Ikenberry (2009:5) argues, “The Bush administration did 
herald a remarkable turn in American foreign policy: a conservative president – perhaps 
the most conservative in the postwar era – who campaigns for office seeking a return to a 
realist philosophy of foreign policy but who, in the course of events, invoked liberal 
internationalist ideas to justify a controversial war and an expansive global agenda.” 
President Bush neither brought to office a delineated HIV/AIDS global health policy nor 
did his administration think of the HIV/AIDS global crisis as reason enough to give 
Africa prominence as a region of foreign policy priority. Instead, given Bush’s White 
House inner circle’s realist tendencies, policy analysts expected to see Africa further 
marginalized. Second, the political ploy argument, whether to divert attention from Iraq 
or to promote development, seems contingent on the 9/11 security concerns of the United 
States. However, the post-9/11 economy of foreign policy decision makers’ attention and 
public resources would, instead, decrease rather than increase Africa’s strategic 
significance in US foreign policy. While the issue’s impact on domestic electoral politics 
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seems a more plausible reason for adoption, a strong move as an incumbent president 
in this first term began to prepare for reelection, it is likelier that the role of business in 
American politics, both domestic and international, was the strongest determinant in the 
development of the PEPFAR policy.  
PEPFAR as a Paradigm of Neoliberal Welfare Privatization 
The privatization theory of the welfare provision, simply put, is a theory that 
advocates the shift in the production and distribution of goods and services from public to 
private sector. As Starr (1989:22-26) explains, this is a part of the neoliberal rhetoric on 
what constitutes a good society. Neoliberal inspiration derives from the laissez-faire 
individualism and free-market capitalism, an economic theory that promises that greater 
prosperity in society will ensue from less governmental interference with personal 
choices, private property rights, and market forces. This neoliberal economic theory of a 
good society is reinforced by its justification by social conservatism which looks for a 
decrease of government overreach following a return of power to the private sector in 
family, churches, voluntary organizations, and other forms of associations in civil 
society. Hence, greater reliance on the private sector and communities in the provision of 
social welfare is more efficient than the “nanny government” of the welfare state. 
Thus, the idea and theory of privatization is grounded in economic, social, and 
political warrants; first, the laissez-faire individualism and free-market economics, 
second, the return of power to smaller communities; and third, the political strategy of 
diverting social demands from government, and by the same token, reducing government 
overload. There are, however, different forms of privatization that need to be spelled out. 
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Privatization can mean the cessation of public programs and government engagement 
in their production and distribution of goods and services; it can mean the transfer of 
public assets to a private ownership; it can also be synonymous with transfer of 
expenditures from public funding to private funding – that is, the financing of private 
services instead of direct government service production and distribution (Table 3).    
Table 3. Privatization Influence at Different Levels of the Policy-making Process 
Privatization 
influence 
Factors determining the policy process  
 
At the individual 
level of policy 
process 
 
The presidential belief in Compassionate Conservatism as 
a strategy to implement the privatization of welfare 
provision 
• A humanitarian crisis - President Bush avoids the 
language of “human rights” but uses, instead, the 
concept of “human dignity” to divert care from state 
obligation to religious charity. 
• His proposed medical Marshall Plan for Africa seeks 
revisions in the foreign aid delivery system, 
incorporating private and nongovernmental actors  
At the state 
(institutional) level 
 
Convergence of domestic politics and bureaucratic 
structures 
• Competition (public-private) for access to government 
funds to provide welfare: creation of the White House 
office of Faith-Based Organizations and Community 
Initiatives 
• Circumvent the traditional bilateral government-to-
government channel of aid provision and use Agencies, 
NGOs, and CSOs for aid delivery. 
At the international 
level 
Regimes and international organizations: 
• The Bush administration’s mistrust of the UN, and 
the Global Fund  
• Global competition between US R&D-based 
companies and generic producers (India, Brazil, 
Thailand, South Africa); the US commitment to 
protect the “patent” regime that ensures US 
neoliberal order and economic interests 
Other superpower involvement such as: 
• The growing presence of China in foreign aid 
provision in Africa 
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The U.S. domestic political structure and pluralist model has become the most 
dominant one to be found in global politics, offering multinational corporations as the 
factor for democratic and economic takeoff. This has led scholars to consider MNCs not 
only as having a major influence on the American foreign policy but also as being 
instrumental in the spread of the very neoliberal rules present in the post-Cold War 
globalized world (Page and Jacobs 2005). This evolution in international politics and the 
change wrought by the globalization phenomenon brought focus on democratic 
transformations to the role of the civil society, not the state per se, following in the 
footsteps of the American domestic society model. Thus, international regimes and the 
foreign policy of the US are becoming more and more dominated by private 
nongovernmental organizations as a reflection, if not a continuation of U.S. domestic 
politics (Haass 2013; Donald and Brown 2000; Bull 1977).  
Obviously, President Bush had the desire to reform the US government’s bureaucratic 
structure, especially in regard to the delivery system of US foreign aid. While this goal 
led to the creation of the Office of the Faith-based and Community Initiatives at the 
White House in the domestic realm, in the international realm it arguably transformed the 
foreign aid organizational system from a paternalistic model into a neoliberal model of 
aid provision, which was expressed through the creation of the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC).20 PEPFAR was just that, a logical offshoot of the MCC and an 
                                                
20 The creation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) was the Bush administration’s 
approach to providing foreign aid to African countries under new conditionalities. Unlike the 
structural adjustment programs of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund that were 
decried for their perverse impacts on social welfare in most developing countries, the MCC 
adopts new incentives defined as good governance to qualify for aid donation. In an op-ed in the 
New York Times on the first anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President Bush notes, 
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experiment in the implementation of the “Chari Choice” model in the international 
realm  (Olasky 2000; Bush 2010). Hence, many conclude that the recent policy activism 
– PEPFAR, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the AFRICOM – suggests 
that the U.S. will likely get involved in Africa when strategic interests that are taken for 
granted are being challenged by a rival power, in this case, the growing influence of and 
competition with China as well as the threat posed by global terrorism. 
This agenda to reform US welfare assistance can explain why the Bush 
administration needed to create a new policy PEPFAR, and a new agency, the Office of 
the Global AIDS Coordinator, to manage the programs. However, PEPFAR is still a 
federal government program and one does not simply shun existing big government 
systems or bureaucracies only to create new ones that will grow to repeat the same old 
mistakes. Instead, the creation of PEPFAR was thought of as a remedy for existing 
bureaucratic inefficiency. To that extent, the choice of former Eli Lilly, a pharmaceutical 
company CEO with a background in business, to run this newly created institution proves 
that President Bush wanted to bring new insights from the private sector into the 
administration’s daily business. 
                                                                                                                                            
“Through the Millennium Challenge Account, the United States will deliver greater development 
assistance to poor nations that govern justly, invest in their people and encourage economic 
freedom. And we will continue to lead the world in efforts to reduce the terrible toll of AIDS and 
other infectious diseases” (The National Security Strategy of 2002, p.vi). Governing justly is, of 
course, a euphemism for adopting the neoliberal approach that favors privatization of public 
services, deregulation of trade, and liberalization of the market.  President Bush, “Securing 
Freedom’s Triumph” New York Times, Issue of September 11, 2002, A 33, available at, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/11/opinion/securing-freedom-s-triumph.html (last view, 
August 1, 2015). 
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The speed with which President Bush established, through Executive Order 
13199, the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives which expands 
and implements the “Chari Choice Welfare Reform Act of 1996” shows that the issue of 
how to reform the government was one of the Bush administration’s paramount priorities 
(Olasky 1995; Moens 2004:2; Laurent 2004:40).21 This was the first step in the 
implementation of the compassionate conservative approach to the welfare provision. 
Weiss (2001) affirms that the institutionalization of the OFBCI at the White House was a 
strategy of the Bush Republican administration to expand the “Chari Choice,” a provision 
of welfare reform law sponsored by Republicans in Congress during the Clinton 
administration that allowed religious charities to compete with other nonprofit providers 
for grants from the Department of Housing and Urban Development for the provision of 
social services.  
The “Charity Choice” represents section 104 of the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) or simply P.L. 104-193. The 
law provides that states can operate their welfare programs through contracting out with 
charity, religious, or private organizations (Stevenson 2003:89). As Republicans 
controlled Congress in the second term of President Clinton, such Senators as John 
Ashcroft, Dan Coats, Rick Santorum and Congressmen Steve Largent, JC Watts, and Jim 
                                                
21 Mark Chaves (1999) conducted a scholarly research on the likelihood of religious 
congregations to take advantage of government monies for social services. To some extent, the 
research was supported and funded by the US private pharmaceutical companies funds such as 
the Lilly Endowment and the Nonprofit Sector Research Fund of the Aspen Institute. The 
findings conclude that support of the “Charity Choice” for welfare provision is likely to come 
from African Americans and conservative evangelicals, given the entanglement of race and 
religion in the US history. As such, it is diverted from political leaders and outsourced to religious 
leaders. 
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Talent sponsored this law. The debate leading to this reform was fevered, according to 
Olasky (2000). While the “charity choice” and President Bush’s FBCI assume that 
religious groups and faith-based organizations do a better job in the provision of social 
services than many secular agencies, the concept allowed for decreasing reliance on the 
government to take social action and enabled the president to present the traditional 
message of values in a nontraditional, caring, non-judgmental fashion (Ebaugh, Chafetz, 
and Pipes 2006; Leonard 1999:A1; Neal 1999: A14; Mink 2001:6).  
The law allowed religious charities to compete with other nonprofit providers for 
grants from the Department of Housing and Urban Development to provide social 
services. This way, conservatives believed that individuals would own responsibility for 
their health and not become dependent on the government. As Weiss (2001:37) contends, 
the objective in expanding the Charity Choice was for the Bush administration to reduce 
dependence of the poor on the government. The Bush institutionalization of the Office of 
Faith-Based Organization and Community Initiatives at the White House was the “Third 
Stage” of reform of the US welfare system, after the first and second stages that began 
respectively with Democratic predecessors Lyndon B. Johnson’s Economic Opportunity 
Act of 1964 and Bill Clinton’s Charity Choice reform, in the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.  
Research Methodology 
A sound analysis of the PEPFAR policy cannot overlook a number of important 
variables, including the decision makers’ action and its underlying ideology, the values 
and political philosophy operative in the decision-making process, and the processes 
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leading to the policy of interest. For that reason, a method and methodology are crucial 
as parts of the research. Method simply refers to a set of procedures and scientific 
techniques for the collection and analysis of data while methodology concerns the 
underlying philosophical assumptions that guide the research process and provide it with 
an overall sense of vision and guidance (Strauss and Corbin 2008).  In other words, 
because PEPFAR is regarded as a decision made by President George W. Bush, it is 
important to understand not only the framework and personal beliefs that shaped Bush’s 
interpretation of world events but also the bureaucratic culture and institutional structures 
within which he made that decision.  
The framing of the issue or definition of the situation always contributes greatly 
to the decision-making process and the shaping of policy outcomes. Thus framing refers 
to what Schraeder (1994) calls the interplay between the nature of events occurring on the 
continent of Africa and the part of the bureaucratic establishment (President, Congress, or 
bureaucracies) involved in the policy making process; or what Baumgartner and Jones 
(2009) term as the interplay between “policy image” and “policy venue” or the decision 
making unit. This is what determines the policy substance. All these scholars agree that 
“the way in which a given problem and set of solutions are conceptualized” and the “set 
of actors or institutions that make decisions concerning a particular set of issues” are 
crucial in the adoption policy preference (Walt et al. 2008:3011-312). 
This brings to mind two questions: What definition of the situation did the Bush 
administration use to understand the global HIV/AIDS crisis? Was the administration 
condoning or repealing existing U.S. HIV/AIDS foreign policy toward Africa, and why? 
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This dissertation is a qualitative case study that uses process-tracing method for data 
collection and analysis (George and Bennett 2005; Mahoney 2010; Collier 2011). The 
choice of case study process-tracing method is motivated by the deviant nature of the 
phenomenon under investigation. While process-tracing analysis suggests “the passage of 
time plus continuous changes in relationships – including the conditions underlying 
change and its consequences,” as Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (2002:55) recall, it also 
allows explaining the operations “by which various initial conditions are translated into 
outcomes”; that is, “by going back in time and identifying the key events, processes, or 
decisions that link the hypothesized causes with the outcomes,” process-tracing explains 
the outcome of interest using a theory from the onset to solve the problem of establishing 
a terminus a quo without which the process tracing would go on ad infinitum (George & 
McKeown 1985:35; Faletti 2006).  
Mahoney (2000) sets the starting point at contingent events that trigger path-
dependency processes while Collier and Collier (1991) suggest establishing it at moments 
of critical junctures. Not all historical critical opportunities, however, have translated into 
markers or starting points of particular processes. Since PEPFAR deviates from the 
historical neglect and indifference of US foreign policy toward Africa and fails to fit into 
existing theories of foreign aid provision, process-tracing can play a heuristic function by 
generating new hypotheses on the basis of sequences of observed events. For instance, 
PEPFAR did not occur in the first or second year of the Bush administration but in the 
third year of his first term. Does the timing of the policy creation have political 
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significance at all? Why was the policy created in the aftermath of the 4th Ministerial 
Conference of the WTO at Doha or after the 9/11 terrorist attacks?  
Unlike too abstract general theories or what Carl Hampel calls “covering laws” 
that look only at regularities and correlations between the start and finish of a 
phenomenon, George and Bennett (2005:7-8) suggest another comparative advantage of 
the process tracing method is that of a nuanced middle-range theory, which can 
contribute more to theory testing while providing policy-makers with more contingent 
and specific generalizations. In other words, process tracing can help address aspects of 
multiple causalities; that is, the issues of equifinality and endogeneity in causal 
relationships. The former is concerned with the plurality of causes when the combination 
of different independent variables cause variation in the outcome of interest and the latter 
refers to the fact that it is difficult to retrace history to verify the direction of causation 
beyond simple correlations, since covariance is not causation (George and Mckeown 
1985:23; Mahoney & Terrie 2008). 
As a fundamental tool of qualitative analysis, process tracing is also sui for 
identifying causal mechanisms. George and Bennett (2005:137) define causal 
mechanisms as, “ultimate unobservable physical, social, or psychological processes 
through which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or 
conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities. In so doing, the 
causal agent changes the affected entity’s characteristics, capacities, or propensities in 
ways that persist until subsequent causal mechanisms act upon it.” Process tracing, thus, 
allows examining “histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources 
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to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact 
evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case” (George & 
McKeown 1985:35).  
This work relies primarily on archival resources. Most documents relative to 
PEPFAR creation, Congressional hearings, and academic analyses are now available to 
the public through public and electronic libraries such as the Library of Congress and the 
online National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Nonetheless, document 
analysis is not enough because official policy documents do not reveal the hidden agenda 
and motivations of actors. On the other hand, while they offer the official side of the 
story, some primary documents are often designated “limited access” and it may take 
years before classified documents get released. However, a good number of these 
documents including Presidential State of the Union Addresses, Executive Orders, 
speeches, directives, memos as well as congressional letters to the Bush administration 
and transcripts from hearings of the House and Senate Committees and Subcommittees 
are freely accessible through the Internet and governmental libraries.  
To understand the context and public opinion around the issue of HIV/AIDS 
leading to the creation of the PEPFAR policy, this dissertation makes an extensive us of 
secondary documents. It sifts through memoirs, academic books and articles, and NGOs’ 
archives and analyzes articles from the New York Times and the leading British weekly 
peer-reviewed medical journal, The Lancet, during the period between 2001 and 2004. 
Other secondary sources related to the implementation of PEPFAR come from annual 
reports by US government agencies, including the OGAC, US Accountability Office 
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(GAO), USAID, the CDC, and Institute of Medicine (IOM). Other international 
organizations (IOs) such as the United Nations, the World Health Organization, the 
World Bank, or Think Tank and Research Foundations whose libraries on HIV/AIDS 
policy contain also useful information about PEPFAR. More specifically, the University 
of California at San Francisco (UCSF) has created an online database on HIV/AIDS 
treatment, prevention, and care policy that contains extensive statistics, regional 
information, and useful analysis of PEPFAR. Avert.org as well as actupny.org are two 
other important online databanks that provide structured reports and information about 
the contexts surrounding the creation, progress, and implementation of the PEPFAR 
policy. 
To compensate for the difficulty of accessing first hand resources and deciphering 
the primary motivation of policy actors, in-depth elite-interviews have been conducted 
with key policy-makers, human rights activists and corporate lobbyists. These interviews 
constitute an important source of data, especially since the goal of this study is to identify 
implicit and explicit influences in the making of the policy. Because there is a natural 
tendency among policy officials to harmonize their rhetoric based on their shared culture 
and ideological paradigm, in order to conceal their real political motivations, or for the 
sake of consistency – this research concurs with Gibbs (1991:6) that “in most cases we 
can only infer motivations from circumstantial evidences” and, thus, this dissertation 
employs supplementary official sources to attend to marginal voices from activists and 
non-governmental organizations. These will provide a relevant alternative source of 
information in the analysis of implied motivations or hidden interests.  
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I conducted focus interviews with key policy officials from the Bush 
administration. Former second PEPFAR Coordinator and now Director of the Global 
Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, Ambassador Mark Dybul, has 
provided an insider view of the policy making process. Former ONAP director Dr. Joe 
O’Neil, Andrew Natios, former USAID director under the Bush administration, and staff 
members of the PEPFAR task force and the US Committee on Foreign Relations have 
provided invaluable insights about influences within and outside the Bush administration 
during the creation of PEPFAR. While it is expected that official discourse is going to 
remain consonant with what has been written in memoirs and official documents, I 
requested an interview with President Bush himself but this was not possible given his 
busy schedule. His office apologized and delegated Dr. Doyin Oluwole, the executive 
director of the cancer and AIDS policy at the George W. Bush Presidential Center to 
handle my interview on behalf of the president. Other interviews have been conducted 
with staff members from the Senate subcommittee on Africa Affairs and from the House 
subcommittee on Africa, global health, human rights and international organizations, 
some of whom preferred to talk on condition of anonymity. John DiLulio, the first 
director of the Faith-Based Organization and Community Initiative at the White House 
has been contacted at the University of Pennsylvania, where he teaches in the Political 
Science Department.  
I traveled to Toronto to meet with Stephen Lewis, former UN Secretary General 
HIV/AIDS Special Envoy to Africa and Canadian Ambassador to the UN, and with Dr. 
James Orbinski, former MSF director and 1999 Nobel Prize laureate, currently professor 
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in global health at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, Wilfrid Laurier 
University in Waterloo, Canada. Other interviews could only be conducted by phone 
given the difficulty of traveling expenses and visas processes. Yet, appointments for these 
subsequent interviews are being secured, including one with former UNAIDS director 
Peter Piot, currently director of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. 
Given the role played by the global civil society, non-governmental organizations, and 
human rights activists in changing US HIV/AIDS attitude toward Africa and in 
challenging the pharmaceutical companies’ monopoly over the ARV drug market, this 
work relies also on archival research in NGOs libraries, often available online, including 
Doctors Without Borders (known by its French acronym MSF) who conducted a 
successful “Access Campaign” to turn around global perception of HIV/AIDS medicines 
from a market-oriented approach to the human rights framework for universal ARV 
treatment. The Yale AIDS Network campaign was crucial in changing the US 
pharmaceutical companies’ patent monopoly attitude toward generic production of 
essential medicines in developing countries.  
It remains crucial to understand how US pharmaceutical private companies 
exerted power and influence to lobby the Bush administration’s decision-making process 
at every stage from the designing to the implementation of the PEPFAR policy. The 
present dissertation not only enquires about donations these firms made to the cause of 
HIV/AIDS between 2000 and 2003 but also about the extent to which their political 
action committees (PAC) contributed to the Bush electoral campaigns in 2000 and 2004. 
The consumer project on technology (www.cptech.org) and Public Citizen’s Congress 
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Watch are two invaluable sources of information that compile documents related to 
pharmaceutical companies’ political donations and their relationships to US government. 
Obviously, US pharmaceutical companies were instrumental in the development of this 
US official HIV/AIDS policy response under the Bush administration. Adelman and 
Norris (2004) make the argument that the private sector assistance to the developing 
world, especially the pharmaceutical industry’s philanthropy, by far surpasses the US 
government official development assistance (ODA). 
The aim is of this dissertation is to make sense of the President’s Emergency Plan 
for HIV/AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), a conservative administration’s global public health 
initiative to provide social welfare to African HIV/AIDS patients against the backdrop of 
the US pattern of neglect and indifference toward Africa. The rationale in undertaking the 
study of PEFAR arises not only because PEPFAR has been acclaimed as one of the few 
foreign policy successes of the controversial Bush presidency (Stein 2008; Moss 2009; 
Hindman and Schroedel 2011; Thomas 2001; Sachs 2005) but also because HIV/AIDS is 
seen as one of the most serious threats to global collective security, Africa’s economic 
development, and human rights (De Cock et al. 2002, Rushton 2010; Gow 2002: 66; 
Fauci 2001; De Waal 2003a; Sagala 2010; Walensky and Kuritzkes 2010). While it 
constitutes an impediment to individual life, liberty, productive capacity, and the pursuit 
of happiness, HIV/AIDS has been identified as an area that deserves special attention and 
requires urgent action. As MacKeller (2005:303) remarks, one of the Key Findings of the 
WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and Health gives a special status to HIV/AIDS, 
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which termed the epidemic as a “distinct and unparalleled catastrophe” that requires 
“special consideration.” 
 The devastating effect of HIV/AIDS in Africa predicted since the early 1990s, 
Dietrich (2005:271) observes, “is now being seen in falling life expectancies, increasing 
numbers of orphans, and terrible tolls on households, learning, teaching, health systems, 
agriculture and business sectors across the board.” Because AIDS affects people in their 
prime who should be working to support their families or serve their nation, it endangers 
both individual and national economic security. HIV/AIDS’s impact on development 
prospects public health, political stability, and state capabilities cannot be overstated. The 
pandemic constitutes one of the greatest moral, social, political, economic, and scientific 
challenges of our time. Given these political, ethical, and epistemological dimensions 
pertaining to HIV/AIDS, it is crucial to develop a better understanding of the Bush policy 
to address the complex phenomenon of HIV/AIDS and the public health crisis in Africa.  
One major limitation of this study is that no interviews were conducted with the 
pharmaceutical companies representatives. Instead, all information on this constituency’s 
position is derived from archival research and document analysis. I did attempt an 
interview with Abbott Vice President on Global Affairs. He refused to address my 
questions and insisted instead that I watch a propaganda video about the company’s 
philanthropy work in enriching rice production in India and other parts of the developing 
world. This Abbott senior official inaccurately claimed that his company has never been 
involved in developing HIV/AIDS antiretroviral drugs although the company used to 
own the patent for protease inhibitor Kaletra (lopinavir/ritonavir). Ethical issues have 
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tainted the corporate behavior of some US pharmaceutical companies. Lobbying the 
government thus is a psychologically surreptitious act and no one is eager to reveal the 
techniques and strategies used. 
 Finally, the practical policy relevance of this work is tied to prominent debates 
centered around Africa’s poverty, the social welfare infrastructure, political leadership, 
and moral and cultural values. It proposes a reevaluation of the role that both state and 
non-state actors should play in the provision of the public good, especially in the face of 
humanitarian challenges like HIV/AIDS and poverty in Africa. At the beginning of the 
new millennium, the HIV/AIDS global crisis posed a collective action dilemma. The 
waning sovereignty and capabilities of national governments in the post-Cold War 
environment, let alone the private sector vying for more power and autonomy in African 
failed state, means that it is urgent to devise a new welfare model (Rothkopf 2012; 
Rosenberg 2005).
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CHAPTER THREE: HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND EVOLUTION OF US HIV/AIDS 
FOREIGN POLICY FROM REAGAN TO CLINTON 1981-2001 
 Introduction 
 
This aim of this chapter is to provide the contextual and historical background for 
the Bush administration’s creation of PEPFAR in 2003. To that end, it surveys the 
evolution of US HIV/AIDS policy under the administrations of Presidents Reagan, Bush 
Senior, and Clinton from 1981-2001. Beginning with the emergence of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic in the US in the early 1980s, the chapter highlights why and how different 
administrations adopted different attitudes and policy outcomes based on the framing of 
the issue and entrenched ideological beliefs and interests. For instance, while the Reagan 
and Bush Senior conservative administrations paid very little attention to the international 
dimension of HIV/AIDS, not only because of the Cold War context, but also because of 
their conservative beliefs, the Clinton post-Cold War administration focused attention on 
multilateral efforts and staunchly pursued a global market liberalization agenda. The 
representation of HIV/AIDS epidemic thus shifted from the initial conservative sexual 
moral framing of the Reagan administration, to a public health issue under Bush Senior, 
and a security threat during the Clinton administration.  
 The remainder of this chapter is divided into three sections. The first section 
highlights the origins of the HIV/AIDS disease and the early US response by the Reagan
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 administration. The second section traces the gradual change in policy attitude and its 
possible causes during the Bush Senior one-term administration. And the third section 
focuses on the post-Cold War Clinton administration facing the globalization challenges 
and delegating most of the responsibility in the fight against HIV/AIDS to multilateral 
organizations such as the UNAIDS, which it helped create in 1996.  
The Reagan Administration 1981-1989 
 Origins and evolution of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The HIV/AIDS epidemic 
emergence coincided with the advent of the Reagan conservative administration. The 
perception of the epidemic at the domestic level played an important role in how the 
epidemic was handled in foreign policy. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) – which is one of the Department of Health and Human Services federal agencies 
responsible for tracking the emergence of new epidemics and the incidence of diseases – 
reported in its Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) issue of June 5, 1981 the 
five first cases of a rare lung infection, Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia, marking the first 
official reporting of what would become HIV/AIDS. Only one year later, on July 8, 1982, 
the Public Health Service (PHS) reported a cumulative number of 452 cases of AIDS and 
177 AIDS-related deaths and by February 1983, the threshold of the 1,000th case was 
crossed. The cumulative number of patients with HIV/AIDS amounted to 19,000 cases by 
the end of 1985. In Surgeon General C. Everett Koop’s (1987:4-5) words, “[i]t now takes 
about a year for the number of victims to double. Today, the total number of AIDS 
victims is close to 36,000. Over a half of them have already died of the disease and the 
rest probably will.” At the beginning of the 1990s, Behrman (2004:25) announced that, 
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“There were almost 115,000 diagnosed cases, and more than 70,000 deaths” in the 
US alone” and, by the mid-1990s, “roughly 500,000 diagnosed cases had accrued, and 
more than 300,000 Americans had died of AIDS.” In 2000, HIV/AIDS was considered 
the fourth largest killer, after heart disease, strokes, and acute lower respiratory infections 
(Dixon, McDonald and Roberts 2001:381).  
The demographics of the disease also seemed to have determined the official 
policy attitude. Because, in the US, gay men and heroin injecting drug users (IDUs) 
constituted the highest HIV infection rates, it was logical to infer “an association between 
some aspect of homosexual lifestyle or disease acquired through sexual contact… in this 
population” (CDC 1981:250-252 italics added). CDC scientists named the epidemic 
“Gay-Related Immunodeficiency Disease,” or simply GRID. On December 31, 1984, the 
CDC published a list of patient characteristics showing that gay and bisexual men still 
represented the highest prevalence rates of 72.8% in the total AIDS population in the US; 
immediately followed the IDUs who made another 17.3%; Haitians represented 3.5%; 
and persons with hemophilia made 0.6% of the total AIDS population, sharing in the 
stigma and blame of this new illness (Lauritsen 1993:14; CDC report of January 6, 1985, 
Siplon 2002:6).  
Although more cases were emerging of the disease affecting other members of 
society besides the gay community, the blurring of the lines between sexual orientation, 
race, gender, age, political partisanship, and religious affiliation caused public opinion to 
shift; due to protests and advocacy organized by the gay community out of fear of stigma 
and being unfairly associated with the epidemic’s inception, the CDC changed the name 
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GRID to AIDS in September 1982 (Barnett and Whiteside 2006:30). The Ryan White 
event also served as a catalyst in changing the American perception of HIV/AIDS. The 
story of a teenager with hemophilia from Kokomo, Indiana, expelled from school after 
having been infected with HIV through blood transfusion, had just sent shockwaves 
across the nation. As more and more parents protested against Ryan White’s return to 
school, fearing that he might become a public health liability in contaminating other kids, 
the case gained prominence, forcing the president to take a stand.  
Also, the death of American idol Rock Hudson on October 2, 1985, caused a 
national shockwave, leading to a public discussion about raising awareness of HIV/AIDS. 
As Shilts (1988:588) puts it, “It took a square-jawed, heterosexually perceived actor like 
Rock Hudson to make AIDS something people could talk about.” Another important 
activist group with roots in the gay community was formed in 1987 in New York City – 
the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT-UP). The ACT-UP had chapters in other 
major cities and quickly became involved in discussions and debates on HIV policy 
development. These include “research and pricing of AIDS drug treatments, care of 
AIDS patients, needle exchanges, preventions and education programs, and most recently, 
AIDS in the developing world” (Siplon 2002:8). (See Table 4 for the reflection of the 
distributions of the trends in infection at the end of the year 2000).  
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Table 4. UNAIDS/WHO Regional Statistics and Features, Dec. 2000 
Region Epidemic started 
Adults & 
children 
living with 
HIV/AIDS 
Adults & 
children 
newly 
infected 
with HIV 
Adult 
prevalence 
rate (*) 
% of 
HIV- 
positive 
adults 
who are 
women 
Main 
mode(s) of 
transmission 
(+) for 
adults living 
with 
HIV/AIDS 
SSA late '70s - early '80s 25.3 million 
3.8 
million 8.8% 55% Hetero 
MENA late '80s 400,000 80,000 0.2% 40% Hetero, IDU 
SSEA late '80s 5.8 million 780,000 0.56% 35% Hetero, IDU 
EAP late '80s 640,000 130,000 0.07% 13% IDU, hetero, MSM 
Latin 
America 
late '70s - 
early '80s 1.4 million 150,000 0.5% 25% 
MSM, IDU, 
hetero 
Caribbean late '70s - early '80s 390,000 60,000 2.3% 35% 
Hetero, 
MSM 
EECA early '90s 700,000 250,000 0.35% 25% IDU 
Western 
Europe 
late '70s - 
early '80s 540,000 30,000 0.24% 25% MSM, IDU 
North 
America 
late '70s - 
early '80s 920,000 45,000 0.6% 20% 
MSM, IDU, 
hetero 
Australia 
& New 
Zealand 
late '70s - 
early '80s 15,000 500 0.13% 10% MSM 
TOTAL   36.1 million 5.3 million 1.1% 47%   
• The proportion of adults (15 to 49 years of age) living with HIV/AIDS in 2000, using 
2000 population numbers.  
• + Hetero (heterosexual transmission), IDU (transmission through injecting drug use), 
MSM (sexual transmission among men who have sex with men).  
Source: UNAIDS, 2000 
• SSA=Sub Saharan Africa; SSEA= South & South-East Asia; EAP= East Asia & 
Pacific; EECA= Eastern Europe & Central Asia 
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 The Reagan administration response to the HIV/AIDS problem. 
HIV/AIDS-perceived virulence was beginning to blur the lines between sexual identities, 
races, and political partisanship, and instead of continuously avoiding tackling a social 
problem that looked very much a concern of the Democrats, the government had to do 
something. President Reagan needed an urgent domestic public health policy. The gay 
community had organized as early as January 1982 to push the administration to do 
something. Gay men created a lobby group, the Gay Men Health Crisis (GMHC), to 
educate the government and influence public opinion while protesting the lack of policy 
leadership and advocating for more funds for research on HIV/AIDS. As a result, the 
CDC dropped the formerly created name GRID and on September 24, 1982, used for the 
first time the name Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, or “AIDS” as we know it 
today.  
The Reagan presidency is seen as the most conservative in the US since the end of 
World War II. Liberal interest groups, for instance, fiercely opposed the nomination of C. 
Everett Koop in 1981 as Reagan’s Surgeon General because of his conservative religious 
fundamentalism (Shilts 1988:587). Yet, the Surgeon General’s final report came as a 
surprise to many, even among Conservatives in the administration, and proved to be a 
watershed moment in the history of US HIV/AIDS policy. On May 31, 1987, President 
Reagan made his first major public HIV/AIDS speech at a fund-raising dinner organized 
by the American Foundation for AIDS Research (AmFAR). On June 24, 1987, the 
president issued Executive Order 12601, which established the Presidential Commission 
on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Epidemic. As its task, the Commission 
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had to investigate the AIDS epidemic and advise the president on national policy. The 
president appointed Dr. W. Eugene Mayberry, CEO of Mayo Clinic, as chairperson of the 
commission, an appointment objected to by Jeff Levi, the executive director of the 
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, who considered Mayberry to be a person 
possessing no former experience with the HIV/AIDS disease. As the Kaiser Family 
Foundation (2006:9) reports, “A series of television public service announcements 
(PSAs) were created using celebrities and other personalities, including Meryl Streep and 
Robert de Niro, to deliver messages debunking some of these commonly held myths.” 
The administration promised to return sexuality to its rightful place within a civilized and 
democratic society.  
Until his 1986 State of the Union Address when he instructed US Surgeon 
General to work out a public health policy, President Reagan did not address the issue of 
HIV/AIDS. This tardiness in public policy decision-making – more than five years since 
the epidemic erupted – was a result of the way in which the administration framed the 
issue and understood what the role of the federal government should be in dealing with 
the public health. The Reagan administration’s response to HIV/AIDS, first domestically, 
then abroad, is summarized in the Surgeon General’s words when he stated that the 
government should not decide on behalf of the people, but instead enlighten them by 
providing factual and impartial information so that they can choose for themselves. As 
Surgeon General Koop puts it, “I have absolutely no desire to quarrel with or change the 
US non-statecentric system that has served us well for over 200 years… [Besides] 
Matters of sexual education can only be achieved by the civil society” (Koop 1987:27).  
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President Reagan’s conservative beliefs – a moral condemnation of 
homosexuals’ promiscuous lifestyle – and his political economy regarding any federal 
welfare policies as proof of the intrusiveness of big government to encroach on individual 
freedoms – can explain the administration’s long silence on the HIV/AIDS issue and 
policy neglect until 1987. This policy attitude also shaped the international attitude and 
the absence of HIV/AIDS from the foreign policy agenda during the 1980s. In other 
words, the traditional way in which HIV/AIDS was conceptualized in the US domestic 
experience reverberated through US foreign policy during the Reagan, and later, the Bush 
administrations. Hence, US indifference toward Africa’s HIV/AIDS problem during the 
two-term presidency of Ronald Reagan followed by the one-term presidency of former 
Vice-President George H.W. Bush naturally flowed from their shared beliefs and the 
view among US conservative policy makers that HIV/AIDS pandemic did not fit within 
the strategic interest consisting of defeating the Soviet Union’s evil empire  (Spectar 
2003:507).  
Simply put, because the Reagan administration framed HIV/AIDS as a moral 
issue, not a public health crisis, it could justify its avoidance in developing a domestic 
public health policy until 1987. As one scholar observes, the administration’s strategy 
during the 1980s, “to the extent there was one at all,” was to “avoid the issue of AIDS at 
all costs because the topic had become a political hot potato” (Behrman 2004:12). It was 
also easy for the Reagan administration to stave off the looming explosion of the 
pandemic in Africa because its definition of US national interest was still constrained by 
the Cold War and HIV/AIDS, understood as an individual moral problem and not a 
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public health crisis, could be contained through prevention, sexual education – or 
moral behavioral change (Behrman 2004:24). As a result, the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
neither received the administration’s attention it deserved nor registered on its foreign 
policy agenda.  
Because AIDS was simply affecting marginalized populations and was seen as a 
“lose, lose issue,” advisors to President Reagan created a cordon around him and opposed 
his political engagement with the epidemic. Many observers argue that Reagan was a 
ceremonial president in foreign affairs, unable to put his stamp on foreign policy “in part 
because of the attempt on his life and in part because his administration focused on other 
priorities – the reinvigoration of the economy and of the public confidence in America’s 
future” (Ohaegbulam 1999:221). Others suggest his understanding of international affairs 
was defined by his ideological preoccupation with communism and the Cold War, and his 
perception of American influence as declining in the morass of the Vietnam War and 
under Jimmy Carter’s weak leadership (Tucker 1988; Greenstein 1998).  
Most of the Reagan’s White House staff shared in his conservative beliefs. They 
also dismissed HIV/AIDS as an issue undeserving of public policy attention. They 
showed disinterest, “if not aversion, to the effort, and it was notoriously difficult to create 
any new line item on the budget, particularly in the foreign assistance bucket” and also 
actively sought a rollback of Soviet gains and an increase in US international leadership 
through military buildup (Behrman 2004:17). Most Reagan appointees shared the same 
Republican mindset and made it clear that there would be political consequences if the 
administration involved itself in any AIDS policy. At the White House, the president’s 
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aid Patrick Buchanan commiserated with “[t]he poor homosexuals [who] have 
declared war upon Nature, and now Nature is exacting awful retribution,” while the 
Director of the Moral Majority, Ronald Goldwin claimed, “What I see is a commitment 
to spend our tax dollars on research to allow these diseased homosexuals to go back to 
their perverted practices without any standards of accountability” (Behrman 2004:27). 
These views were not the minority’s perspective. 
US federal bureaus during the 1980s were still insulated from each other and 
bureaucratic rivalry prevailed rather than cooperation and coordination. The Department 
of the Treasury that oversees international finance and economic development, and the 
Department of Commerce that deals with trade policies were not yet as entangled, as they 
are now, with the idea of interdependence in economic globalization. Also, the 
Department of Defense was still caught in the Cold War dichotomous definition of 
security threat, believing that nothing was truly a national security threat besides the 
nuclear menace to the US. And it was simply an aberration for the State Department that 
HIV/AIDS, a public health issue, could get on the diplomacy international agenda as 
concern focused attention on other priorities such as foreign debt, economic development 
and the structural adjustment programs. Besides, “Leaders at State’s Africa Bureau were 
shaken by cables that seemed to forewarn of apocalypse,” as the Soviet Union and its 
pro-Communist acolytes launched a campaign in Africa claiming the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) had created HIV/AIDS to decimate Africans (Behrman 2004:17-18). 
As a result, HIV/AIDS remained confined within the Health and Human Services 
(HHS) and was handled as a medical public health issue. Back then, HHS and its federal 
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agencies – the CDC, National Cancer Institute (NCI), Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) – did not have an international mandate. The federal government acts through its 
agencies; and “The Secretary of HHS is responsible for the health of all Americans and 
must decide which battles to pick when, at any given time, issues around funding for 
AIDS medical care, requests for social services for HIV-infected patients and their 
families” (Siplon 2002:16). The Public Health Services (PHS) encompasses the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) that, in turn, comprise the NCI and the National Institute of 
Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID). The NIH is publically funded to conduct 
research on major diseases. Another important agency of the PHS is the FDA that is 
essentially designed as a regulatory institution to protect consumers and citizens against 
food and drug poisoning. The CDC controls new diseases outbreak and handles various 
public health problems through its many centers, including the Center for Infectious 
Diseases (CID) under which most of AIDS research took place at the national level. Of 
course, with relation to foreign policy, other departments play an important role too, 
mostly the State Department and its USAID agency through which foreign aid money is 
funneled.  
The ensuing HIV/AIDS policy aimed to contain the epidemic through education 
and support for research and the private sector in order to develop a treatment. Congress, 
on the other hand, tried to strike the right balance between public demands and private 
interest. While the executive branch’s policy attention was monopolized by economic 
reforms and the Cold War, the guilt and stigmatization entailed by the epidemic led the 
gay community and the people living with AIDS (PLWAs) to constitute an important 
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lobby to push lawmakers to act on their behalf. As Haitians fought against 
immigration discrimination that identified Haiti as the origination point of AIDS, people 
with hemophilia whose infection was caused by errors in the blood industry sought to 
receive compensation for the many deaths and family disruption that resulted from such 
blood contamination.  
AIDS aroused a lot of passion, fear, controversy and concern in the beginning 
because it was simply seen as an outcome of the gay lifestyle, generating social stigma 
against the people living with HIV. “[G]overnments don’t like spending money on sex 
workers, gay men or drug addicts. Not donor countries, and not scarlet countries either. 
There are no votes in being nice to drug addict,” as Pisani (2008:27) summarizes. 
Because the epidemic entailed guilt among the gay men for being associated with the 
epidemic’s outbreak, they organized to change the mainstream perception concerning 
HIV/AIDS. The Gay lobby, thus, became an important interest group seeking to 
influence the Policy-making process during the 1980s.  
The US policy makers’ entrenched perception that HIV/AIDS was a “gay 
disease” created disbelief that it could also spread through heterosexual contacts and 
encouraged indifference of the Reagan administration to the impacts of HIV/AIDS 
abroad. However, the CDC had dispatched a team of epidemiologists to collect data 
about HIV/AIDS in Africa as early as 1982. The team reported that, “HIV was found in a 
geographic band stretching from West Africa across to the Indian Ocean, the countries 
north of the Sahara and those in the southern cone of the continent remained apparently 
untouched” (UNAIDS/WHO 2003:6). The Reagan administration’s response to the 
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international, like the domestic, dimension of HIV/AIDS came too late and consisted 
of surveillance, control, and containment. Halfan Mahler, then Director-General of WHO 
is quoted saying, “AIDS is not spreading like bush fire in Africa. It is malaria and other 
tropical diseases that are killing millions of children everyday” (Denis and Becker 
2006:32). Already, a 1983 WHO internal memo attested to the belief that AIDS was a 
Western problem and was “being well taken care of by some of the richest countries in 
the world where there is the manpower and the know-how and where most of the patients 
are to be found” (Behrman 2004:14).  
The contribution of pharmaceutical industry to the US HIV/AIDS policy. The 
private US pharmaceutical industry has played a crucial role from the early stage of the 
epidemic eruption, both in the development of the drug for the treatment of AIDS and the 
US official policy attitude toward HIV/AIDS. Because the private sector is enshrined in 
US democracy as an instrument in the pursuit of welfare, the private pharmaceutical 
industry was involved in research and the development of an antiretroviral drug and 
vaccine that would be able to end the AIDS crisis. To take advantage of the measures 
created during the 1980s and exploit them for economic gains, Abbott Laboratory, for 
instance, held the patent monopoly and reaped millions thanks to the first test called 
ELISA – enzyme-like immunosorbent assay – it had developed in 1985 to measure the 
level of HIV antibodies in the blood.1 In 1987, the FDA granted approval to 
                                                
1 Goozner (2004:94-98) discusses the involvement of Abbott Laboratory in HIV/AIDS industry 
and profit making from its AIDS diagnostic tool kit. However, despite the millions it was making, 
“Abbott wasn’t spending a dime to combat the disease.” He goes on to suggest that most of the 
basic research and knowledge on AIDS was produced through academic labs and the NIH. For 
instance, the NIAID launched the National Cooperative Drug Development Grant (NCDDG) and 
spent about $100 million at both nonprofit and private-sector labs to develop drugs to fight HIV.   
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azidothymidine (AZT) as the first antiretroviral treatment of AIDS. AZT compounds 
were synthesized at the Detroit Institute for Cancer Research in 1964 on an NCI grant but 
later abandoned them because they did not appear to have anticancer properties (Angell 
2005:26). Burroughs Wellcome – a private pharmaceutical company, which later merged 
with GlaxoSmithKline – acquired the drug’s patent and claimed it had developed it on its 
own. Burroughs Wellcome sold AZT under the commercial names of Zidovudine or 
Retrovir at a monopolistic price of $10,000 per patient per year. Scientists who had 
worked on AZT development were appalled at this and reacted to the companies’ claims 
by releasing a letter published in the New York Times, showing that all the stages of 
testing whether the drug could suppress a live AIDS virus in clinical and pharmacological 
studies were performed by scientists at the NCI and University (Goozner 2004:103-104).  
The industry lobbied the administration to pass a number of measures and enact 
laws to promote and protect its interests. As one scholar remarks, “From 1960 to 1980, 
prescription drug sales were fairly static as a percent of US gross domestic product, but 
from 1980 to 2000, they tripled” (Angell 2005:3). Although this move toward economic 
liberalization started prior to the Reagan election in 1980, as Reich demonstrates (2007), 
the Reagan administration provided the necessary environment for the new trend to 
become the dominant ideology. Not only did the Reagan administration encourage 
privatization at all levels of society throughout the 1980s but also Congress passed a 
series of laws designed to speed up the process of privatization as a means to innovation 
and economic growth. Besides the executive branch, Congress has always played an 
important role in public policy decision-making process. With regard to the HIV/AIDS 
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policy, members of Congress distributed up to 12 million copies of the Surgeon 
General’s report to their constituents within a year of its release and also adopted a 
number of laws during the 1980s giving priority to US pharmaceutical companies in their 
contribution to the welfare of society, thus de-emphasizing citizens’ reliance on the 
government for public health welfare.  
In 1984, Congress passed the “Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act,” (Public Law No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 codified as amended 21 USC. 
355 [1984]), simply known as the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984. This was an important 
law that favored private US pharmaceutical companies under the Reagan administration. 
Named after Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and Representative Henry Waxman (D-
California), the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 offered to balance incentives for innovation 
by research-based pharmaceutical companies with market opportunities for 
manufacturers of generic drugs. In fact, to compensate for the costs incurred in Research 
and Development (R&D) as well as clinical trials, pharmaceutical companies charge high 
prices for their innovative-patented drugs and seek to secure exclusive market rights. This 
is because exclusivity for the sake of recovering investment costs and the incentive to 
make profit are believed to be the pharmaceutical industry’s lifeblood. By granting 
marketing monopoly rights to patent holders, generic copies were barred from 
competition and could expect entering the market only after the patent had expired. Two 
forms of exclusivity exist in the US, the first that deals with patents is granted by the US 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), and the second concerns exclusivity and is 
granted by the FDA.  
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While the Hatch-Waxman Act intended to “stimulate the foundering industry 
by short-circuiting some of the FDA requirements for bringing generic drugs to market,” 
industry lawyers manipulated it to extend the patent monopoly rights for brand-name 
drugs. As Eurek (2003:2) explains, consumers have always sought alternative cheaper 
generic drugs because brand name drugs’ price tag is often unaffordable. For instance, 
the average cost per prescription for brand-name medicines in 2000 was $65.29 while 
generic drugs’ average cost was only $19.33 – almost $50 cheaper. Hatch-Waxman Act 
of 1984 established a framework within which manufacturers of generic drugs may seek 
market entry before the expiration of the patent of brand-name products, via the 
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) Process (Strongin 2002:10). Within this 
framework, manufacturers of generic drugs are required to simply establish the 
bioequivalence of generic drugs with their brand-name versions without having to repeat 
the long process of new clinical trials that have already been done by the manufacturers 
of brand-name products. Once generic drugs pass the test of equivalence in strength, 
quality, purity, and identity of ingredients and dosage with the brand-name products, they 
can obtain the FDA’s approval and be made available to patients as soon as the 
innovator’s patents expire.  
The Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 allowed some provisions for drug innovators 
who were permitted to delay the FDA approval process of generic drugs under the 
ANDA framework. The generic manufacturers must certify, “In its ANDA that the patent 
in question is invalid or is not infringed by the generic product (known as paragraph IV 
certification) and notify the patent holder of the submission of the ANDA.” If the patent 
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holders feel generic applicant has infringed on their patent right, they have 45 days to 
file a suit, which automatically delays the patent application for 30 months to allow 
litigation of the case. These 30 months are always advantageous to brand name drug 
patent holders, since they provide them with an additional 2 and a half years of market 
monopoly. As Eurek (3003:3) notes, 
According to a recent study conducted by the Federal Trade Commission [FTC], 
one of the most common ways that patent-holding companies are able to further 
delay the market entry of generic drugs is through multiple patent listings in the 
Orange Book, which is the FDA’s official listing of all approved products. The 
FTC study identified several instances in which brand-name companies listed 
related patents in the Orange Book after an ANDA had already been filed by a 
generic manufacturer.  
 
Prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, Congress, in December 1980, had already 
enacted into law a bill sponsored by Senators Birch Bayh (D-Ind) and Robert Dole (R-
Kans) “to encourage commercialization of inventions made by government-funded 
researchers” (Goozner 2004:126). The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, also known as the Patent 
and Trademark Law Amendments Act, allowed small businesses, universities, or non-
profit institutions to own – in preference to the government – the inventions made using 
federal funds and to patent their discoveries, although the research was funded by 
taxpayers’ money. The Bayh-Dole Act enables private entities, “to patent discoveries 
emanating from research sponsored by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the major 
distributor of tax dollars for medical research, and then to grant exclusive licenses to drug 
companies. Until then, taxpayer-financed discoveries were in the public domain, 
available to any company that wanted to use them” (Angell 2005:7 and 17). This 
privatization of knowledge produced by public funds was intended to boost the 
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knowledge-based industry, including the drug industry even when its R&D finds 
major sources in the public-funded academic community, medical schools, and teaching 
hospitals. The Bayh-Dole Act allowed drug companies to outsource their R&D and to 
rely on academia, the NIH, and small biotech start-up companies that conduct the 
research and contract out with big drug companies to market their findings.  
 The Senior Bush Administration 1989-1993. One significant development in 
US HIV/AIDS domestic policy under Bush Senior’s administration, however, was 
Congress’ enactment of the Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency 
(CARE) Act of 1990. Although President Senior Bush reluctantly signed this bill into law, 
the Act was the largest federally funded program to improve availability of care for low-
income and uninsured victims of HIV/AIDS in the US. Actually, this law was not the 
administration’s initiative, as it resulted from intense activism, protests, lobbying, and 
pressure by HIV/AIDS organized groups pushing the government to act in favor of the 
people suffering from AIDS and against the overpricing of first generation antiretroviral 
treatment drug AZT.2 The Ryan White programs were “payer of last resort,” that is, they 
provided funds to the victims of AIDS only when other resources were unavailable. 
The contribution of the private pharmaceutical companies is obvious from the 
legacy of the previous Reagan administration. In fact, while President Bush Senior was 
still Vice President in the Reagan administration, Congress passed one law in 1987, 
                                                
2  See the discussion on the evolution and marketing of AZT by Goozner (2004:103-104) and 
Angell (2005:26). I shall return to this discussion later on in this dissertation. At this point it will 
suffice to mention the position held by both authors, who underscore the fact that AZT 
compounds were synthesized thanks to public funds to the National Cancer Institute although the 
product was later patented by a private pharmaceutical company, Burroughs Wellcome. The 
company claimed it had developed the drug all on its own and sold it at a high monopolistic price 
of $10,000 per patient per year. 
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which favored the pharmaceutical industry. The Prescription Drug Marketing (PDM) 
Act of 1987, which was designed to ensure safety and effectiveness of pharmaceuticals, 
sought to counter the development of counterfeit, adulterated, misbranded, and expired 
prescription drugs. It also aimed to establish safeguards against the “diversion market” as 
prescription drugs prices soared in the US market to unaccep proportions in comparison 
with prices in other developed places such as Canada or countries in Europe. As a result, 
most poor families and uninsured victims of HIV/AIDS were barred from accessing the 
only therapy treatment existing in the 1980s. 
Civil society interest groups like ACT-UP were instrumental in moving the 
government to address pharmaceutical companies pricing monopoly for a greater access 
to AZT drug treatment. In fact, conceived as a health care program to provide resources 
to low-income Americans infected with HIV, the Ryan White CARE Act of 1990 was the 
culmination of decade-long activist pressure, lobbying, and advocacy to push the Bush 
conservative administration to act to provide welfare to those patients requiring treatment. 
The Ryan White CARE Act of 1990 provision of resources for treatment and care of low-
income HIV infected Americans simply responded to these domestic forces demanding 
action from the government. As a result, Congress agreed to scale up resources to address 
both the issues of treatment and prevention and to provide funds for the development of a 
vaccine by looking into the social dimensions of HIV/AIDS, both at the domestic and the 
international levels. 
However, the US HIV/AIDS foreign policy toward Africa under the Bush Senior 
administration did not change that much. Why was this the case? Simply put, as former 
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Vice-President in the Reagan administration, Bush Senior opted to continue 
implementing most policies initiated in the years of the Reagan presidency. Princeton 
Lyman – a former US Ambassador to South Africa and to Nigeria, who then went on to 
serve as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs under the 
Clinton administration – summarized the Bush administration global HIV/AIDS policy in 
these terms: “There wasn’t a lot of attention. It wasn’t a big issue to the domestic 
dimension, but the linchpin of US global AIDS policy through the Bush I years was the 
policy of keeping people out – keep it away from us. So, there was very little US money 
going into it” (quoted by Behrman 2004:31). Since the US laws and regulations since 
1952 restrict the entry of persons afflicted with any dangerous contagious disease into the 
country, Congress required in 1987 that the Department of Health and Human Services 
add HIV/AIDS to the list of diseases significant to public health. In 1993, Congress 
tightened the restriction by enforcing the border control and asking to send back anyone 
with HIV/AIDS or bringing anti-HIV medications with them.3  
Given the understanding of certain historical events in the US and how they had 
shaped US policies, the total indifference of the Bush administration toward Africa and 
the lack of federal HIV/AIDS policy was interpreted as a deliberate policy of genocide 
against undesirable racial minorities.4 Because of the US history of slavery, segregation, 
                                                
3 i.e., the US government imprisoned Haitians men, women, and children at Guantanamo Bay in 
the spirit of this law. See http://www.actupny.org/actions/immigration_atn_alert.html. 
 
4 It is noteworthy to signal here the importance of this shift in the perception of HIV/AIDS in 
American public opinion. Given the US history of racism, the images of lynching, and the legacy 
of eugenic science for family planning and population control, the black community was able to 
exploit the analogy of genocide to stir policy. Horowitz (1997), Fullilove (1999), Reverby (2011), 
Stillwaggon (2006), and others have dealt with the history of US politics of medical research and 
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and structural social injustice, African Americans AIDS patients interpreted the 
Reagan administration policy neglect as genocide, a continuation of eugenic policies and 
war on the poor (Chicago Committee to End Sterilization Abuse (CESA) 1977; 
Rosenfeld, Wolf, and McGrath 1973; Macklin 2004; Hawkins and Emanuel 2008; 
Reverby 2011). Hence, while containment and prevention remained the main policy 
strategies of the US in the fight against HIV/AIDS – especially in later years when up to 
30 million Africans were reported to be HIV infected – preventing access to the available 
treatment was tantamount to a black genocide, at least according to some interpretations 
in the African American community. Also indicative were the prohibitive prices of AZT 
in the US, even years after the drug cocktails were developed and introduced to the 
market in 1996, during the Clinton era, meaning that fewer than 1 percent Africans and 5 
percent Asians had access to these miracle treatments (Burkhalter 2004:9). I will return to 
this point in the next section. 
A recent work by Wellesley University professor Susan Reverby investigates the 
pattern in US Public Health Service (PHS) of treating vulnerable populations as guinea 
pigs or targeting powerless non-white members of society as subjects for medical 
experiments.5 In her conclusion, she indicates how the US medical foreign policy has 
                                                                                                                                            
development at the expense of human lives, especially among the minorities whose lives m of 
lesser value and expendable as experimental guinea pigs. It is obvious that the HIV/AIDS 
domestic and foreign policies are indelibly marked with the history of US politics of race, 
population control, and family planning. This is the context that needs to be spotlighted in order 
to establish the social dimension of a medical problem.  
 
5 Susan Reverby (2011) discusses the evolution of ethical requirements such as informed consent, 
protection of vulnerable subjects, and oversight by institutional review boards as related to 
policies on medical research in the US in the aftermaths of the Tuskegee experiments. In spite of 
the fact that heavy-metals treatment or penicillin had proved to be efficient in treating the syphilis 
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applied different standards of human dignity and rights to human subjects abroad. 
Some historical evidence seems to confirm this pattern of US medical interest that 
utilized non-white human subjects as mere disposables in a slave-like ownership of 
human beings. These include the infamous “Tuskegee experiment” from 1932 to 1972, 
the PHS inoculation of heat-killed and virulent organisms at the New York Sing Sing 
Prison in 1953 for the sake of studying syphilis reinfection, and also the Guatemala case 
in which US researchers inoculated inmates and prostitutes with the syphilis virus 
without prior information or obtaining consent. In the early 1970s, many black women 
were sterilized without their knowledge.  
These instances constitute the lenses through which affected African American 
populations perceived the government’s indifference toward HIV/AIDS, as the pandemic 
continued faring poorly in US foreign policy toward Africa under the Bush 
administration. At that time the issue did not gain the international notice that it achieved 
later on, especially in the early 2000s. In fact, no one in the developing countries 
protested the prohibitive price tag of AZT treatment or the US foreign policy indifference 
toward the HIV/AIDS global crisis during the early years of the 1990s.  
Several reasons explain this: (1) the global market was not as integrated as it 
would become in the years following the end of the Cold War; (2) the awareness about 
global social inequalities in the distribution of goods and services was tolerated based on 
different national policies and the accepting of national sovereignty trumped the 
conception of universal human rights; (3) the social stigma associated with HIV/AIDS 
                                                                                                                                            
disease, US Public Health Service doctors continued using African Americans as guinea pigs for 
over 40 years for the purpose of scientific progress.  
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was morally and sexually induced during the 1980s – not economically or racially 
based – while everyone still waited for the development and availability of treatment; (4) 
AZT treatment was still at an experimental phase and the hope was that if these clinical 
trials were conclusive, the high cost of the treatment would drop as the market expanded 
to all AIDS patients. It is a mantra of the pharmaceutical companies that innovation 
depends on market incentives without which investment in research and development 
(R&D) would simply wither. (5) The shift in the perception of the role of US 
international aid in the absence of the Communist threat and the push in domestic politics 
to suppress USAID altogether precluded the administration from focusing on global 
welfare social policy such as HIV/AIDS in Africa. While US policy makers were 
preoccupied by the Cold War in the 1980s, establishing the new world order became the 
major focus wherein the transition to democracy and economic liberalization became the 
major leitmotiv of US foreign policy during the 1990s.  
Given the long history of U.S. foreign policy toward the Third World, population 
control had become the cornerstone of development policy during the 1970s and 1980s. 
While still a Congressman, Bush Senior had personally championed the cause of 
population control so much so that many came to believe that the Reagan-Bush 
administration HIV/AIDS policy indifference was, in fact, a deliberate omission in order 
to implement population growth control policy in Africa. To address Third World 
poverty issues, Bush had proposed to Congress in 1970 measures to control population 
growth in Africa. He advocated an “urgent need for population control activities to fend 
off the growing Third World crisis… Our strivings for the individual good will become a 
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scourge to the community unless we use our God-given brain power to bring back a 
balance between the birth rate and the death rate” (quoted by Horowitz 1997:546).  
In 1987, two CIA officials, Katherine Hall and her colleague Walter Burrows, 
asked for support to study the booming epidemic on the African continent but were 
rebuffed by colleagues and the hierarchy within the Agency. “[T]he CIA rejected 
requests for personnel and resources to study the epidemic [For a three-year period 
(1987-1990)], arguing it was not an appropriate issue for intelligence agencies” (Gellman 
2000, A1; Spectar 2003:508). One official is reported saying AIDS “will be good, 
because Africa is overpopulated anyway” (Siplon 2002:117; Behrman 2004:67).  
Surprisingly, Hall and Burrows eventually received the go-ahead during the Bush 
presidency in 1990 and were able to produce a classified document, the “Interagency 
Intelligence Memorandum 91-10005” titled, “The Global AIDS Disaster: Implications for 
the 1990s.” Some unclassified portions were given to the State Department in an attempt 
to bring the global health concern to the attention of U.S. policy makers. The document 
predicted that, “The great majority of the new AIDS cases during the 1990s will occur in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, with North America a distant second” with estimates of worldwide 
infections being as high as 45 million. “The AIDS epidemic is at its worst in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. At least 7 million Africans have been infected with HIV. By the mid-1990s the 
total probably would exceed 20 million HIV infections, and beyond the year 2000, 
infections rates will be up to 40 percent for young-adult populations in many urban areas, 
with life expectancy at birth reduced by 15 years or more” (The State Department 1992:v; 
Siplon 2002:118; Behrman 2004:30).  
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However, even in the mid-1980s, the Reagan-Bush administration was “in 
possession of highly classified reports about the potential scale and scope of the 
burgeoning AIDS epidemic [but] the reaction was indifference – that’s the right word” 
(Gellman 2000, A1). The indifference of US policy makers toward the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic in Africa was, thus, reinforced in international politics, by the post-Cold War 
focus on economic liberalization and democratic transition, which agenda President Bill 
Clinton carried out until the activism of a global civil society – alternatively called the 
world social forum – came to challenge the dominant definition of HIV/AIDS, in medical 
and epidemiological terms, replacing it with an encompassing approach that integrates 
social, economic, political, and moral aspects of the HIV/AIDS virus. As a result, new 
nonstate global actors brought a new understanding of the issue back to the attention of 
US foreign policy decision makers, presenting it as a threat to “human security” and the 
ideal object of achieving universal human rights.  
The indifference of U.S. policy makers toward the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa 
was reinforced in international politics mostly because of the end of the Cold War and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. The post-Cold War focus on establishing a New World 
Order with its central claim being economic liberalization and democratic transition, 
which agenda President Bill Clinton will have to carry out in the creation of World Trade 
Organization and the establishment of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights until the activism of a global civil society – alternatively called the world social 
forum – came to challenge the dominant definition of HIV/AIDS, in medical and 
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epidemiological terms, replacing it with an encompassing approach that integrates 
social, economic, political, and moral aspects of the HIV/AIDS.  
 The Clinton administration 1993-2001 
Evolution of the US response to the HIV/AIDS problem. President Clinton had less 
time to spend on the HIV/AIDS issue because his presidency was fraught with political 
opposition in the beginning and sex scandals toward the end. Instead, from the very first, 
he chose to delegate the issue to his bureaucratic minions. Actually, following the so-
called Newt Gingrich revolution in 1994 and the November 1995 government shutdown 
budget, President Clinton looked very much like a one-term president. At the same time, 
North Carolina conservative senator Jesse Helms not only advocated the shrinking of US 
foreign assistance but also battled to get the USAID abolished altogether. This campaign 
became a disincentive to supplying US official funds to fight the global threat of 
HIV/AIDS. As a consequence, as President Clinton became consumed with trying to 
position himself politically, it was challenging to get global HIV/AIDS on his agenda at 
all. Clearly, dealing with HIV/AIDS would not help him recover his political capital at 
home and, therefore, was not a part of his political strategy to recapture momentum 
(Behrman 2004:103-7). The near-impeachment in 1998 put a tremendous constraint on 
the Clinton administration’s Africa HIV/AIDS foreign policy to the extent of paralyzing 
its political will and preventing any serious change. 
Consequently, President Clinton gave only sporadic attention to the magnitude of 
AIDS in Africa, both because of the above-mentioned financial constraints and domestic 
political issues. US HIV/AIDS foreign policy continued focusing on curbing the 
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epidemic’s threat at the domestic level rather than containing its global spread. 
Through the creation in 1993 of the Office of National AIDS Policy (ONAP) for 
domestic policy and the UNAIDS, a United Nations Joint interagency Program he helped 
to create in 1994, President Clinton simply delegated the coordination of global efforts to 
multilateral efforts. The first director of ONAP, Kristine Gebbie resigned after 15 months 
because she could not have access to the president. Sandy Thurman, the third Clinton 
AIDS czar – as the ONAP director came to be known – was still complaining in 1997 
that, despite bureaucratic advocacy to get the president’s attention, “Clinton did not move 
one inch on global AIDS in 1998” (Behrman 2004:223).  
Earlier, President Clinton had established the Presidential Advisory Council on 
HIV/AIDS (PACHA) by Executive Order 12963 on June 16, 1995. Through the HHS 
Secretary, this body was to provide the administration with information, advice, and 
recommendations on programs and policies for prevention, treatment research, and 
services regarding the HIV disease. PACHA produced its final report in September 2000, 
No Time to Spare, in which Richard Holbrooke, then US Ambassador to the United 
Nations, argued, “AIDS is the toughest and biggest of all issues, not just for Africa 
(although) Africa is the epicenter… if you ask what the number one problem is in the 
world today, I would say It is AIDS” (See distribution of global HIV/AIDS prevalence in 
Table 5). The Clinton Administration’s overall HIV/AIDS policy goals were economic 
recovery from the Bush economic recession and debt, and the consolidation of the US 
global power status in the post–Cold War international order. His HIV/AIDS policy 
agenda remained, like that of his predecessors, focused on the domestic dimension.  
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Table 5. Contrasting Africa’s HIV/AIDS Prevalence and Incidence With the Rest of 
the World, Dec. 2000 
 Adults and Children 
living with HIV/AIDS 
Adult and 
Children newly 
infected with 
HIV 
Adult 
prevalence 
Sub-Saharan Africa 25.3 million 3.8 million 8.8% 
North Africa and Middle-
East 
400,000 80,000 0.2% 
Rest of the world 10.4 million 1.4 million 0.4% 
Total 36.1 million 5.3 million 1.1% 
 
(Source: UNAIDS, 2000) 
 
The marginalization of Africa in US foreign policy increased even further as 
policy makers were frustrated with humanitarian efforts in Somalia. About Somalia 
analogy, Holbrooke is quoted (by Chollet and Goldgeier 2002:159) as saying that,  
[T]wo less pleasant memories still hung like dark clouds over the Pentagon. 
Phrases like ‘slippery slope’ and ‘mission creep’ were code for specific events 
that had traumatized the military and the nation; Mogadishu, which hung over our 
deliberations like a dark cloud; and Vietnam, which lay further back, in the inner 
recesses of our minds. 
 
In fact, in December 1992, US troops were sent to Somalia to back the UN mission of 
alleviating the scourge of famine, and eventually to disarm the Shaabab troops of Aidid. 
The “Somalia syndrome” became a limiting factor on President Clinton during the 1990s 
so much so that his administration felt constrained and failed the humanitarian test to 
intervene in Rwanda to stop the 1994 genocide (Macqueen 2002; Potier 2002; Schraeder 
2001:132). This “Somalia syndrome” refers to eighteen US soldiers and twenty-four 
Pakistani peacekeepers who were killed in Mogadishu on October 3, 1993. As a result, 
senior officials saw the region as one of strategic irrelevance – “the perfect place from 
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which to pare down commitments to secure a ‘peace dividend’ for an increasingly 
insular American public” (Behrman 2004:71-73).  
As foreign aid to Africa was shunned, mostly in favor of former Soviet nations in 
Eastern Europe, President Clinton sought to promote trade policy in an effort to liberalize 
the free market during a time of globalization. As a matter of fact, Conservatives in 
Congress championed the idea of abolishing foreign aid, which, in the late 1990s was 
perceived as unnecessary waste and an expression of either paternalistic Cold War 
policies or liberal profligacy with US taxpayers’ money. Many US missions closed down 
in Africa while a bureaucratic downsizing occurred at the Africa Bureau in the State 
Department. North Carolina conservative senator, Jesse Helms, as quoted by Behrman 
(2004:73), epitomized this position when he remarked,  
foreign assistance merely siphoned funds from US taxpayers to inept despots or 
corrupt regimes who would not use funds efficiently or judiciously. The money 
rarely went to those in need… and when it did, it helped make recipients 
dependent on American aid, perpetuating a negative cycle that stood against the 
interests of all involved.  
 
Donald and Keller (2006) summarize the Clinton administration approach to Africa, as 
the Cold War rationale would no longer viably inform U.S. foreign policy. After the 
humanitarian catastrophe in Somali and Rwanda, President Clinton not only created three 
new institutions – namely, the Office of the Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues; 
the Atrocities Prevention Interagency Working Group; and the African Crisis Response 
Initiative designed to build capacity for peacekeeping with US assistance – but also 
launched the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) or The Trade and 
Development Act of 2000. This is a free trade policy that sought to unleash the potential 
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of Africa in ways that would lead to prosperity and peace (see also Scheffer 1998; 
2002). As Susan Rice replaced George Moose as Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs, she sought to accelerate the integration of Africa into the global economy by 
promoting economic development, the democratization process, and conflict prevention 
and resolution.  
However, the major crisis in US-Africa foreign policy during the Clinton 
administration was the battle to access the newly developed drugs that had achieved the 
transformation of HIV/AIDS from a death sentence into a chronic disease. The highly 
active antiretroviral therapy (HAART), or the so-called AIDS “drug cocktails,” was 
introduced at the XI International Conference on AIDS in Vancouver in 1996. It was 
proved that HIV/AIDS mortality rate in the US dropped from 48,000 in 1994 to 16,000 in 
only four years from 1994 to 1998. However, these drug cocktails were patented for at 
least 20 years, which gave their producers market monopoly to charge, as they deemed it 
acceptable to recoup the investment in R&D. Against the demands of African and other 
developing nations to lower the cost of antiretroviral drugs so as to allow them to meet 
the public health needs of their citizens, the Clinton administration championed the 
protection of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) that 
promoted the private interests of US pharmaceutical companies. The US government had, 
indeed, lobbied on behalf of the American business industry for the incorporation of the 
TRIPS negotiated at the creation of World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994. The US 
government took it upon itself to oppose any government that would undermine these 
TRIPS, which came to constitute the incentive backbone of the new global knowledge-
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based economy to promote investment in research and development (R&D), leading 
to more innovation and even greater social welfare. However, as Stephen Lewis 
contends, “it is preposterous to think that so much money is spent on development when 
you know that the money spent on research and development is dwarfed hugely by the 
money spent on marketing” (personal interview with the author, January 18, 2013). 
An illustration of this can be seen in how the US government actively lobbied 
international treaties to oppose and block any agreements that would allow production 
and commercialization of low-cost generic medicines in developing countries (Fidler 
2004:120; Casper 2011; Gellman 2000a; Attaran and Gillespie-White 2001). At the 
WHO meeting in May 1998, the official delegation of the US led by HHS Secretary 
Donna Shalala continued to pressure the Organization not to accept the African position 
represented by South African, Zambian, Botswana and Namibian delegations and which 
voiced opposition to US revised drug strategy protecting private pharmaceutical interests. 
For the African block, public health should have primacy over private commercial 
interests under the WTO trade agreements. In fact, the US government showed hostility 
against the South-African government new law, the Medicines and Related Substances 
Control (MRSC) Act of 1997, which sought to increase access to affordable generic 
substitution of off-patent medicines for public health. The brand-name medicines were 
simply unaffordable at $10,000 to $15,000 per patient per year.  
MRSC Act of 1997 was the legal framework to reform the apartheid-inherited 
healthcare system to meet the needs and challenges of its black population infected with 
and affected by HIV/AIDS. The policy sought to increase access and availability of 
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affordable generic substitution of off-patent medicines for public health use because 
brand-name medicines were unaffordable. “As well as 45 percent of its army, more than 
five million of South Africa’s 39 million people were infected with HIV/AIDS. And yet 
in the face of this crisis, pharmaceutical companies refused to lower prices for patented 
ARVs” (Orbinski 2008:355). Instead, 39 US pharmaceutical companies coalesced and 
launched a lawsuit to force South Africa to repeal its newly reformed public health law. 
They lobbied the European Union and US government to maintain pressure on South 
Africa until it reversed its reform. Vice-President Al Gore and US Trade representative 
Charlene Barshefsky threatened South Africa with sanctions unless it repealed the 
criticisms of and protests against this US policy stance. Actually, the US government 
imposed sanctions on South Africa and Vice-President Al Gore travelled to meet with 
President Mandela in person to signify that the US would not tolerate the legislation. On 
the other hand, European allies like the vice-president of the European Union Leon 
Brittan as well as French President Jacques Chirac raised France's concerns' during a state 
visit while the Swiss president and German chancellor discussed the issue privately with 
Deputy President Mbeki. 
A confidential State Department cable of May 27, 1998 (p.8, emphasis added) to 
some US Embassies in Europe, Africa, and Latin America, and also to other US officials 
including the USTR, USAIDS Coordinator, Secretary of HHS, NIH and the CDC 
Directors – contends that “USG [US government], in consultation with our allies, have 
both the responsibility and opportunity to develop a position on the revised drug strategy 
resolution that will enable health and trade to move together in a compatible manner, not 
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to be used to foster a North-South trade dispute using health as a proxy.” The 
Assistant Secretary of State for legislative affairs, Barbara Larkin, wrote a letter to 
Congress in 1999 in which she affirmed that the US government would defend the 
legitimate interests and rights of US pharmaceutical firms.  
On 5 February this year, Larkin assured Frelinghuysen that 'we are making use of 
the full panoply of leverage in our arsenal to persuade the South African 
government to change its law'. An attached report by the State Department 
confirms that it is acting 'with the full support of pharmaceutical industry 
representatives'. The report, obtained by The Observer goes on to describe how 
the US embassy in Pretoria courted the Swiss and EU member embassies to 
interest them in a 'joint effort' against South Africa. (The Guardian Dec. 18, 
1999).6  
 
 In the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, the US government, under the Clinton 
administration, championed a neoliberal policy approach. “A new Approach to Africa 
was taking shape in U.S. foreign policy decision-making circles,” as Schraeder 
(2000:406) notes, that aggressively looked at facilitating “U.S. private enterprises in all 
regions of the world, including francophone Africa. [Meanwhile], most U.S. 
Ambassadors served as advocates for U.S. business.” The promotion and protection of 
US private corporations abroad – in this case, trade policy to protect US pharmaceutical 
companies – became synonymous with US national interest. In fact, while expectations 
were raised at the end of the Cold War that U.S. policy makers would finally take into 
account African realities, disappointment ensued when most observers remarked further 
recession of interest and presidential attention toward African matters. As Africa came to 
be seen as a neutral terrain where all powers could fairly compete, the deference of the 
US to its traditional European allies (during the Cold War) in matters regarding Africa 
                                                
6 http://www.theguardian.com/uk/1999/dec/19/theobserver.uknews6 
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ended. In the words of Warren Christopher, “The time has passed when Africa could 
be carved into spheres of influence, or when outside powers could view whole groups of 
states as their private domain.” And yet, former Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs, Herman Cohen, corroborates this view when he affirms, “We must accept free 
and fair competition, equality between all actors” in post-Cold War foreign policy Africa 
(quoted by Schraeder 2000:404 and 410).  
Many among the developing countries opposed such HIV/AIDS neoliberal 
policies favoring private business interests over urgent public health imperatives. African 
delegations represented by South Africa, Zambia, Botswana and Namibia unanimously 
argued that under the WHO trade agreements public health should have priority over 
private commercial interests. South Africa had wanted to implement its MRSC Act of 
1997 to reform its health care system after the apartheid era to expand universal coverage 
to its black population. At the 1998 Geneva World Health Assembly discussion, HHS 
Secretary Donna Shalala and Ambassador George Moose refuted the claim from the 
developing countries that “public health should have primacy over commercial interests 
under WTO trade agreements such as the TRIPS. The problem for the US and our allies 
was not with the sentiment of the statement, but rather the linkage of the specific wording 
to the TRIPS Agreement itself, thereby potentially undermining Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPR)” (Department of State cable 1998, § 2, section c). The Clinton 
administration, however, would change its policy stance that supported the private 
interest of US pharmaceutical industry in favor of the common good and the public health 
of the poor. This was the result of international advocacy, negotiations, pressure, and 
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lobbying to bring awareness to the public opinion about the practices of US 
pharmaceutical companies.  
 The Contribution of US Pharmaceutical Companies. The introduction to the 
global market of the Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy (HAART) in 1996 changed 
the landscape of the epidemic. It not only transformed AIDS from a lethal to a chronic 
disease but also reduced significantly the number of deaths among American AIDS 
patients. “And between 1996 and 1997, HIV/AIDS mortality declined 47 percent, falling 
from the leading cause of death among 25-44 year olds in 1995 to the fifth leading cause 
of death in that age group” (The Clinton/Gore administration 1999:4). “The discovery of 
a drug combination capable of controlling the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) was 
one of the great triumphs of biomedical research in the postwar era,” as Goozner 
(2004:85) puts it. To make these drugs not only available but also accessible to patients in 
the developing countries where the scourge of AIDS was so great remained the greatest 
political challenge. The prohibitive costs of the treatment marginalized AIDS patients 
from the developing world while US foreign policy consisted of protecting private 
pharmaceutical business interests in the global market over and against the demands of 
citizens from developing countries by threatening African governments that sought to 
circumvent international trade agreements with economic sanctions.  
Only generic versions of ARV drugs could make access to treatment possible in 
resource-poor settings. Their cheap costs would allow addressing the scale and scope of 
the HIV/AIDS problem in Africa. The South-African case illustrates the conflict between 
African countries’ urgent demand to access generic pharmaceutical drugs due to the 
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public health emergency and the protectionism of US trade interests tied to the strict 
observance by all of the TRIPS Agreement. Executive Order 13155 relaxed this US 
government attitude toward Africa’s urgent need to access HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals. 
While Africa remained the neglected stepchild of US diplomacy between 1993 and 1999, 
this was a major shift in the US-Africa HIV/AIDS policy.7 It was however preceded by 
measures that remained unsatisfactory and forced by international and domestic advocacy, 
political calculations, and global activism.  
Behrman (2004:78) suggests, “[w]hile there would be roughly 1 million 
Americans infected during the decade, the United Sates would come to spend more than 
$10 billion per year on the domestic epidemic. In that same period more than 40 million 
infections would accrue worldwide. The United States would spend little more than $100 
million per year on the global dimension.” In 1999, African governments rejected the 
Clinton administration’s offer of $17 billion in loans through the US Export-Import Bank 
for hospitals and medical equipment and pharmaceuticals in Africa.8 This rejection was 
                                                
7 Among the criticisms the Bush campaign team addressed to the Clinton administration in 2000, 
Robert Zoellick emphasizes the economic policy flaws, which are demonstrated in Clinton’s 
reversal of his staunch support of neoliberal economic principles. He “started with an 
encouraging emphasis on trade, perhaps because he inherited a signed NAFTA deal and a partial 
Uruguay Round agreement that he could not abandon easily. But after 1994, the Clinton 
administration changed its course: it made pledges for free trade, but the reality of its policies did 
not match the rhetoric.” This attitude arguably led to the stalemate at the Seattle WTO round of 
trade negotiations in 1999. Apparently, Washington had the power to shape global economic 
relations for the next 50 years; an opportunity that was squandered by giving in to international 
pressures to return to the welfare state allowing the developing countries to continue regulating 
the market as seen in Executive Order 13155.  https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2000-01-
01/campaign-2000-republican-foreign-policy  
 
8 The Health GAP coalition sent a letter to President Clinton explicitly denouncing the Ex-Im 
Bank proposal as an unacceptable step backwards from the administration’s commitment not to 
interfere with TRIPS-compliant compulsory licensing and parallel importation. This policy 
proposal is actually in consonance with profit-driven agenda of pharmaceutical corporations 
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grounded on three implications. First, new loans would create more burden on 
African governments when existing debt was undermining their ability to purchase drugs 
and provide social welfare; second, all indications showed that the money would be used 
to purchase brand name drugs from US companies and thus ensure the corporate welfare; 
and third, the initiative appeared to be a means to trump African governments’ efforts to 
develop cheap generic treatments or import them from other developing countries’ 
markets (Raghavan 2000). 
As the year 2000 fast approached, the international community was assessing its 
development assistance programs. The year 2000 was also a critical year in the US 
because of the upcoming presidential election. The evaluation of foreign development 
policies – debt, trade, aid led to a strong global advocacy movement for Africa’s 
sovereign debt cancellation and increase in foreign aid. Since most African countries 
stand at the bottom of the UNDP Human Development Index, debt relief became an 
international policy agenda for many UN agencies and nongovernmental organizations. 
As the World Bank (1997a: 202) noted, “Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for 32 of the UN’s 
40 ‘least developed’ member countries. Its foreign debt has trebled from US$84.1 billion 
in 1982 to US$235.4 billion (quoted by Barnett and Whiteside 2006:139).  
On May 10, 2000, President Clinton signed Executive Order 13155 allowing Sub-
Saharan African countries greater “Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals and Medical 
Technologies” despite his administration’s record of consistent neglect of Africa’s 
                                                                                                                                            
rather than with the growing consensus about the consequences of existing economic policies on 
public health and HIV/AIDS in Africa. See 
http://www.iatp.org/files/NGO_Letter_Against_Export-Import_Bank_AIDS_Dru.htm last 
accessed March 6, 2016. 
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HIV/AIDS plight and threat of trade sanctions in case African governments breached 
the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement. For many 
years, the Clinton administration had strongly opposed any African governments that 
attempted to access antiretroviral treatment through the cheap generic drug market for 
their citizens’ treatment. According to the TRIPS Agreement, the generic products were 
meant for local domestic markets, as a way to protect the patent regime on intellectual 
property rights, and consequently the business interest of US pharmaceutical companies. 
As Behrman (2004:113) notes, for most of the 1990s, “it was not deemed particularly 
cost-effective to devote resources to AIDS prevention in the absence of a vaccine.” A 
chart by Jonathan Quick of WHO of how $10,000 could be spent shows that in terms of 
financial cost 9,900 people could be saved from fatal bouts of dehydration or hundreds 
from pneumonia and tuberculosis while only one person could receive anti-AIDS 
treatment for the same amount. President Clinton’s May 2000 Executive Order 13155 
claims,  
In administering sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, the United States 
shall not seek, through negotiation or otherwise, the revocation or revision of any 
intellectual property law or policy of a beneficiary sub-Saharan country, as 
determined by the President, that regulates HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals or medical 
technologies if the law or policy of the country: (1) promotes access to HIV/AIDS 
pharmaceuticals or medical technologies for affected people in that country; and 
(2) provides adequate and effective intellectual property protection consistent 
with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS Agreement) referred to in section 101(d)(15) of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act (19 USC. 3511(d)(15)).  
 
Furthermore, the above-mentioned policy encourages African beneficiary countries to 
implement policies that address the underlying causes of the HIV/AIDS crisis, namely, 
by making “efforts to encourage practices that will prevent further transmission and 
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infection” and by stimulating the “development of the infrastructure necessary to 
deliver adequate health services”; but also to provide “an incentive for public and private 
research on, and development of, vaccines and other medical innovations that will 
combat the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa” (Executive Order 13155, Sec.1, §.b).  
Most HIV/AIDS budget increases went to domestic programs for research, 
vaccine development, MTCT prevention, racial and ethnic minorities care, prevention, 
and treatment. Clinton deferred international efforts to multilateral organization, 
specifically the UNAIDS which his administration helped to establish in 1996. The 
president announced the commitment of $10 million in USAID emergency relief funding 
to provide support for AIDS orphans through community-based efforts. In 1999, the 106th 
Congress authorized resources to support a proposal by Vice-President Al Gore to 
broaden US activities abroad related to HIV/AIDS. On July 19, 1999, the Clinton 
administration launched a new global AIDS initiative called the Leadership and 
Investment in Fighting an Epidemic (LIFE), increasing to $100 million the US spending 
on HIV/AIDS slated to begin in FY 2000. LIFE AIDS initiative had a heavy focus on 
Africa and enhanced “US leadership in this area [while making] more resources available 
to developing countries through such measures as debt relief and concessional loans… 
LIFE funding – approximately one-half of which went to USAID – enabled USAID to 
step up its HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation efforts in 13 countries (12 in sub-
Saharan Africa plus India) (USAID 2001:21 emphasis added). As Kendall (2011:5) 
acknowledges, LIFE “represented the first time agencies other than the United States 
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Agency for International Development (USAID) were included in the US response to 
HIV/AIDS.” 
The crisis in HIV/AIDS and African public health was even more exacerbated by 
limited access to treatment due to certain economic constraints of most people living in 
the developing world. The Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) director, the French 
international organization that was awarded the Peace Nobel Prize in 1999 for its 
involvement in the war against HIV/AIDS in resource-constrained countries, argues,  
Individual pharmaceutical corporations and the industry’s lobby group, PhRMA 
(a group of 100 of the biggest drug companies in the world, with seven lobbyists 
for every congressman in Washington, and hundreds more lobbyist in Europe as 
well), had lobbied Western governments to oppose measures that would make 
HIV drugs cheaper and more available in the poorer regions of the world. PhRMA 
feared that if patented drugs were sold at lower prices in the developing world, 
people in the wealthier countries would demand the same and profits would be 
driven down. In 1999, with global pharmaceutical sales at $337 billion, profits 
were massive. PhRMA companies were among the largest and most profitable of 
all Fortune 500 corporations, positions they had held for nearly thirty years. 
 
The HIV/AIDS global crisis and the demand by the internationalists9 for greater access to 
pharmaceutical products led the Clinton administration to change the US trade policy and 
                                                
9 By this, I mean to refer to international nongovernmental organizations but also to a whole 
current in academic scholarship that has adopted a cosmopolitan approach to basic human rights. 
Where nationalists defend the right of governments to preserve state’s sovereignty and to only 
care for the right and welfare of their national citizens, internationalists, especially after the end 
of the Cold War, make a compelling argument that the duty to care for people transcends one’s 
national boundaries. The collective security impels the duty to intervene wherever human rights 
are put in jeopardy. In his Political Theory and International Relations, Beitz (1999) challenges 
for instance the traditional realist view that moral principles have no room in a world system of 
sovereign and autonomous states. Bringing together the mingly estranged fields of morality and 
international relations, he contends that in a cosmopolitan conception of international morality, 
state boundaries have merely a derivative significance. Unlike political cosmopolitanism, moral 
cosmopolitanism does not necessarily entail global institutions conceived on the analogy of the 
state. Thus, someone like Beitz can extrapolate the morality of the domestic into international 
institutions, concluding that, “international relations [are] coming more and more to resemble 
domestic society” (Beitz 1999:128). (See also Pogge 2002; Lu 2005; Brock 2005; Rawls 2001).  
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adopt a different HIV/AIDS foreign policy stance toward Africa. This change came 
as a result of a conjugation of factors including protests, pressure, negotiations, and 
international advocacy by domestic interest groups, international organizations, 
nongovernmental organizations, and African governments. On June 27, 2000, the Peace 
Corps announced that all its volunteers in Africa would receive training on HIV/AIDS so 
that they could educate the African populations they served on related matters (Copson 
2005:12). In sum, US official contributions to fight HIV/AIDS global crisis, which 
amounted to less than $200 million during the 1990s increased to $450 million by the end 
of the Clinton presidency, of which one-third was to be administered by the World Bank 
and two-thirds through bilateral programs (’t Hoen 2009; Russell 2004:139; Casper 
2001:8; Liew et al. 2006).  
Spectar (2003:509-511) argues that this transformation in US global leadership on 
HIV/AIDS global pandemic during the Clinton-Gore administration proceeded from 
senior officials’ dramatic redefinition of US national interests in light of the new age of 
bio-globalization and ancillary governance dilemmas. Arguably, in the mid-1990s, the 
Clinton administration was confronted with the following factors: (1) data about the 
scope and potential ramifications of HIV infections in Africa and other microbial threats; 
(2) the quickening of the process of globalization, rendering infectious diseases and 
bioterrorism a new security threat to the US; and (3) the administration’s belief that “US 
national interests were affected because infectious diseases are a challenge to health and 
economic productivity, as well as a danger to economic development and political 
stability” (Spectar 2003:509-511). In short, US officials were spurred to action not just 
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because of data availability showing the extent of the pandemic but also because of 
the growing awareness among policy makers of the increasing interconnectedness 
between HIV/AIDS, conflicts in the Third World, and US national interest.  
This growing understanding of interconnections and articulation of national 
interest goals shaped the development of US-Africa HIV/AIDS foreign policy as the 
framework for interpretation by decision makers. The policy change, therefore, was not 
sudden but gradual from 1995 to 2000 as the Clinton administration intentionally 
changed the rhetoric through which the government framed the issue in diplomacy and 
international organizations, thus giving HIV/AIDS issues more international salience. For 
instance, the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs at 
the State Department described the pandemic in 1995 as “one of the most significant 
health and security challenges facing the global community” (Spectar 2003:512). As a 
result, the US provided much needed global governance leadership by calling the world 
to recognize the political and economic security implications of AIDS and scaling up the 
response to this global challenge. By offering a strong global leadership on the issue and 
by integrating the HIV/AIDS pandemic with national security interest and diplomatic 
efforts, President “Clinton placed infectious diseases in his agenda during both his 
African trips, where he promised assistance to fight AIDS and challenged Africans to 
take responsibility” (Specar 2003:513 note 250). Secretary of State Madeleine Albright 
did the same on her visit to Africa while US Ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke, 
and Vice-President Al Gore lobbied the organization to hold a Security Council on the 
HIV/AIDS health crisis.  
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It is less likely that these facts alone provoked the change in the US 
HIV/AIDS foreign policy toward Africa under the Clinton administration. In fact, many 
senior officials in international organizations and the Clinton administration report the 
administration’s lethargy in confronting AIDS in Africa. As Behrman (2004:107) 
observes, Clinton “was looking very much like a one-term president. He was totally 
consumed with whom to reposition himself in order to win [and] Global AIDS was not a 
part of that strategy at all.” Furthermore, “Even during the last two years of his 
presidency, once he had secured his acquittal and scandal had dissipated, Clinton had 
remained inert on the issue [of AIDS]”; thus, “There is a staggering hypocrisy in 
Clinton’s involvement as a shining knight in coming to rescue Africa and elsewhere from 
the pandemic [… He had] tremendous opportunities when he was a president, and chose 
to exercise none of them” (Behrman 2004:225). Donna Shalala, Clinton’s Secretary of 
HHS also claims, “Despite the president’s apparent interest, there would be no direct 
follow-up… You can’t look at this issue and think that we did enough. Not 10 percent of 
what we should have done” (Behrman 2004:76).  
Executive Order 13155 was an outcome of several factors, including domestic and 
international pressure, lobbying, and advocacy than a benevolent deliberate initiative on 
the part of the Clinton administration. The interaction between competing perceptions, 
conflicting interests, domestic context, and international events led to the redefinition of 
the global HIV/AIDS crisis as a human security threat and a human right claim. 
Obviously, the HIV/AIDS global crisis, which reached its peak in the late 1990s, was less 
about the absolute numbers of AIDS patients or high HIV prevalence in Africa than about 
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the perception of discrimination and injustice in access to drug therapies available in 
rich countries yet denied to patients in the developing countries due to their prohibitive 
monopolistic cost. James Orbinski – then MSF Director – describes the context in his 
1999 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, as a situation of injustice existing outside the 
context of war. “[N]ew life-saving ARV drugs were being used to treat 400,000 people, 
99 percent of whom lived in Europe and North America, where mortality dropped by 70 
percent. Less than 1 percent of all ARV drugs were sold in Africa, where two million 
people died of AIDS every single year” (Orbinski 2008:353).  
While compulsory licensing allows “a government to force a drug company to 
license its patent to a local generic producer, which then must pay a royalty to the patent 
holder.” This is a legal procedure under the TRIPS Agreement, as well as parallel 
importation, which provides leeway for “a government to shop the international market 
for the lowest price on a patented drug,” the US government fearing that South Africa’s 
example might set into motion a domino effect among developing countries, thus 
undermining the whole TRIPS Agreement regime (Orbinski 2008:353-355).  
PhRMA feared that if patented drugs were sold at lower prices in the developing 
world, people in the developed countries would demand the same, and profits 
would be driven down. In 1999, with global pharmaceutical sales at $337 billion, 
profits were massive. PhRMA companies were among the largest and most profi 
of all Fortune 500 corporations, position they held for nearly thirty years. 
 
According to the Department of State confidential cable,  
While on the surface this language [primacy of public health over commercial 
interests] seems innocent, in fact, the specific wording could help to undermine 
IPR guaranteed under the WTO Trips Agreement; the second difficult section was 
paragraph 2, section (6) which, in effect, directs WHO to advise member states on 
interpretation of WTO Agreements. This is a problem, in that we believe that 
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trade experts at WTO, not health experts, should be the primary interpreters of 
trade Agreements.” (Department of State cable 1998, § 4, section c).  
 
Given the adamant opposition of the Clinton administration to the South-African 
government attempt to access the generic versions of the Highly Active Antiretroviral 
Therapy (HAART) for public health emergency reasons, thus allowing its citizens a 
chance for treatment, President Clinton’s sudden reversal of existing US trade policy in 
pharmaceuticals through Executive Order 13155 – even at the expense of the TRIPS 
Agreement – without fear of US reprisal or economic sanctions remains puzzling. For 
most of the time he spent in office, President Clinton fiercely promoted trade policies that 
protected US economic interests.  
Arguably, change in both the domestic and international environments played a 
determining role in Clinton’s enactment of Executive Order 13155. In the domestic realm, 
Clinton spent most of his time – from the midterm elections through the end of 1998 – 
trying to survive scandals and to overcome political challenges. In 2000, which was the 
election year in the US, the signing of Executive Order 13155 shortly before leaving the 
office could have been prompted by the international campaign against US trade policies 
as seen in growing protests around the world at WTO and G7 summits. Granting African 
countries the right to use compulsory licensing or parallel importation for a greater access 
to ARV drugs treatment, regardless of the TRIPS Agreement – a measure he himself 
opposed for many years – could strategically serve as a political ploy for the campaign of 
Vice-President Al Gore in the upcoming election.  
While the technological and medical research that led to the manufacturing of the 
HAART or the so-called AIDS “drug cocktails” allowed the US in four years to reduce 
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the HIV/AIDS mortality rate by two thirds: from 48,000 in 1994 to 16,000 in 1998, 
the situation did not abate in Africa. On the contrary, alarming UNAIDS and WHO 
reports between 1995 and 2000 were calling attention to the statistics of growing 
infections on the African continent. The US Trade Representative went on to negotiate 
and secure the patent of this scientific trouvaille. Actually, at the creation of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994, the US had negotiated the TRIPS Agreement, a 
global version of the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, to secure patent and encourage 
investment in R&D for further innovation. As the international context of HIV/AIDS 
global crisis during the 1990s was defined by the growing numbers of infectious diseases 
and the threat of terrorism using biological weapons, the development of a new line of 
drugs to treat patients with AIDS was welcomed as great marker in humanity’s progress. 
However, the treatment’s high price, given the monopoly of the market thanks to patent 
rights, excluded the poor from accessing the benefits of this medical progress. As 
Goozner (2004:92) writes,  
The power of the newest drugs, called protease inhibitors, and the even greater 
power of those now in the pipeline, is such that a diagnosis of HIV infection is not 
just different in degree today than, say, five years ago. It is different in kind. It no 
longer signifies death. It merely signifies illness. Larry Kramer, the radical 
playwright and founder of ACT UP (AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power), the most 
militant of the AIDS activist groups, signaled the next phase of the anti-AIDS 
struggle when he penned a long article complaining about the high price of drugs 
and their lack of affordability in the developing world, where most AIDS 
sufferers lived. 
 
A global civil society formed to denounce US pro-market support and its privileging of 
pharmaceutical companies’ greed for profit over the claim of the poor to fundamental 
rights to health and life. In the words of South-African activist and founder of the 
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Treatment Access Campaign (TAC), Ashmat (2003:xiv), “Just because were are poor, 
just because we are black, just because we live in environment and continents that are far 
from you does not meant that our lives should be valued any less.” In the late 1990s, 
AIDS activists and international Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) such as 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF); Oxfam; Global AIDS Alliance (GAA); Health Global 
Access Project (Health GAP); Bono’s organization Debt, AIDS, Trade, Africa (DATA); 
and other organizations coalesced with TAC to garner media attention and more greatly 
impact lobbying governments to address the global HIV/AIDS crisis. “Specifically, these 
groups demanded the creation of multilateral global AIDS mechanisms, dramatic reform 
of intellectual property laws, and sweeping international debt relief as essential elements 
of effective global AIDS policy” (Global AIDS Action Network 2004:5; McDonnell 
2007:4).  
The AIDS activists and the global civil society that expressed disagreement with 
US trade policy on AIDS medicines besieged the WTO meeting in Seattle, Washington, 
in 1999. In addition, domestic protests ensued at Al Gore’s opening of his Presidential 
campaign, which provoked the Clinton administration’s embarrassment and led to a 
change in its HIV/AIDS global policy. Ralph Nader, himself presidential candidate in 
2000, along with other activists published open letters to the White House demanding 
that it drop its threats against South Africa.10 As Fisher and Rigamonti (2005:8) note, 
“Ralph Nader openly attacked him for engaging in ‘an astonishing array of bullying 
tactics to prevent South Africa from implementing policies, legal under international 
                                                
10 Nader, Ralph, “Al Gore bullies South Africa on U.S.-made AIDS drugs,” Knight 
Ridder/Tribune (April 26, 1999). 
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trade rules, that are designed to expand access to HIV/AIDS drugs.” The campaign 
was successful in that, “Al Gore reversed his position, insisting that he ‘was not afraid to 
stand up to the pharmaceutical industry.’ Soon after, President Clinton issued a statement 
saying that no African country would be sanctioned for using compulsory licensing or 
parallel importation provisions. Also, Congress had reformed the Hatch-Waxman Act of 
1984 only later in 2000 to allow importation of pharmaceuticals for any FDA-approved 
drug from certain countries where the prices are lower, like in Canada. Although the HHS 
Secretary has to guarantee that this “re-importing” practice complies with the PDM Act 
of 1987 and poses no added risk to the public, Americans could now purchase 
prescription drugs abroad and then import them into the US (Angell 2005:18). 
For their part, the PhRMA [a group of 100 of the biggest drug companies in the 
world, with seven lobbyists for every congressman in Washington, and hundreds more 
lobbyists in Europe as well] companies backed a new presidential candidate (Orbinski 
2008:357). The global access campaign and the election year in the US were, thus, key 
catalysts in creating change both in the perception and global awareness of AIDS in 
Africa and the US government’s policy attitude toward the TRIPS Agreement and 
ensuring the right treatment in resource-constrained countries. 
The Executive Order 13155, issued by President Clinton On May 10, 2000, 
altered the unwavering support he previously showed to US pharmaceutical companies in 
favor of public health in sub-Saharan Africa. By allowing countries to use measures such 
as compulsory licensing and parallel importation to either produce or import cheap 
generic AIDS drugs without fear of US retaliation, and by authorizing increase in US 
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spending and official contributions from $200 million during the 1990s to $450 
million – of which one third was to be administered by the World Bank and two-thirds 
through bilateral programs – President Clinton was responding to what the literature has 
termed “a perfect storm” (’t Hoen 2009; Russell 2004:139; Casper 2001:8; Liew et al. 
2006). That is, the Executive Order 13155 stands out as a response to the global civil 
society’s international activism and was conceived as a solution to the problem of 
developing countries’ economic resources constraints and international trade policy to 
access costly ARV drugs in the face of the HIV/AIDS global public health crisis.  
The new global actors representing activist civil society organizations succeeded 
in challenging the official approach to the political economy of the medicalized health-
care approach prevailing in the US and injected into the public awareness the perception 
that access to treatment was a fundamental human right of the poor and that denying it 
would be tantamount to genocide. Of course, the pressure put on presidential candidates 
in an election year, especially given Vice-President Al Gore’s role in intimidating the 
South-African government, was crucial in causing this strategic change. Yet, if the 
presidential election constitutes the domestic catalyst in transforming HIV/AIDS into a 
bipartisan issue and bringing attention to global HIV/AIDS dimension, the TRIPS 
Agreement constitutes the international context within which access to therapy and 
treatment for the poor was determined and how the developing countries were affected by 
this international regime.  
This clash of interpretation set the stage for the confrontation between the North 
and the South, the developed and the developing countries on the right to access anti-
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AIDS treatment to which Africans were barred because of geography, politics, 
economics, and history. That is, different actors used different frameworks to interpret 
the HIV/AIDS global crisis – that of health and access to treatment as a human right of 
all as opposed to the economic prevailing model of the market. This battle is personified 
in the Clinton administration’s support of US pharmaceutical industry in opposition to 
South Africa’s decision to reform its post-apartheid healthcare system (Gagnon2002). 
After the apartheid and the first democratic election that brought Mandela to power, 
South Africa was trying to enact a policy that would allow universal health coverage for 
its black citizens affected by HIV/AIDS. To do so, importation of generic ARV drugs 
was necessary under the TRIPS proviso on compulsory licensing and parallel importing 
to limit the cost (Fidler 2004:120; Dietrich 2007; Casper 2011; Gellman 2000a). 
However, US pharmaceutical firms that controlled patent rights under the World Trade 
Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) opposed South Africa for fear that other developing countries might follow suit 
and upset the US drug market. In fact, the generic drugs could trump brand name 
medicines, in the market, given the price differential.  
UNAIDS issued another Press Release on July 20, 2000 in the aftermath of the 
Durban 13th International AIDS Conference calling on G8 for Massive Increase in 
Resources to Fight AIDS. According to UNAIDS, the pandemic had not only reversed 
the gains of the past three decades made in social, economic, and political development in 
Africa but also was aggressively eating up and jeopardizing the continent’s future. 
“Without AIDS, life expectancy in the year 2010 in Zimbabwe would be 70 years, in 
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Botswana 66 years, and in Zambia 60 years” (Worldwatch Issue Alert of October 31, 
2000 quoted by IIPI 2000:5). With AIDS, these life expectancies are expected to drop 
respectively to 35 years, 33 years, and 30 years in these countries. The World Bank Press 
Release of 14 September 2000 portrays AIDS as the leading cause of death in Africa for 
the last 20 years. The numbers of new infections yearly were not abating. At least 16 
countries had more than one-tenth of their adult population infected with HIV and the 
infections exceeded 20 percent in 7 countries in the Southern cone of the continent (See 
Annex 2).  
The UNAIDS report released in May 2000 prior to the XIIIth International AIDS 
Conference in Durban depicted the situation as to a mortgage of the continent’s future 
and threat to a generation of youthful, productive people. “The devastating effects of 
HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa, predicted since the early 1990s is now being seen in 
falling life expectancies, increasing numbers of orphans, and terrible tolls on households, 
learning, teaching, health systems, agriculture, and business sectors across the board” 
(UNAIDS/00.13E, June 2000, pp. 21-36). 
Conclusion 
 
The evolution of US HIV/AIDS foreign policy with a special focus on Africa has 
been outlined for the purpose of expressing two main goals. The first goal was to show 
that numbers alone and statistical data – however alarming – used to estimate HIV and 
AIDS prevalence in Africa are not enough to command or explain change in US-Africa 
HIV/AIDS policy. While they are not always objective and value-free, they seek to 
portray an image that can steer policy-makers’ course of action. That is, accredited 
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organizations such as WHO, UNAIDS, the World Bank, and others have tried to 
influence the policy making process through their production of knowledge for a purpose, 
which can have political, economic, and ideological repercussions, depending on their 
bureaucratic interests and the stakes of those stakeholders they seek to represent.  
The second goal was to highlight that change in policy always ensues from a 
challenge to the monopoly of the dominant definition of the situation by those with the 
power to control the perception and to set the policy agenda. Once information becomes 
accessible to all, which is often key to maintaining a certain control over a policy image, 
it becomes possible for other stakeholders, interest groups in the civil society, to demand 
an alternative policy – in this case, a global public health and welfare policy against the 
unconditional protection of private economic interests of US pharmaceutical companies. 
Obviously, the US-Africa HIV/AIDS policy developed along the lines of sexual behavior 
given the early interpretation of the disease as a ‘gay plague.’  
With the change in the international environment, the globalization process, and 
its strong focus on economic liberalization and political democratization after the Cold 
War, the US foreign policy toward African continued its emphasis on its vital national 
interest whose definition varies only in rhetoric, not in substance. This historic survey has 
laid the ground for the analysis of PEPFAR, to which I now turn in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONTRIBUTION OF US PRIVATE PHARMACEUTICAL 
COMPANIES TO THE MAKING OF US HIV/AIDS FOREIGN POLICY 
TOWARD AFRICA UNDER THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 
Introduction 
 
Why would a conservative administration choose a liberal policy and focus 
taxpayers’ money on social issues and the public health welfare of citizens of other 
nations, and why would Congress provide bipartisan support to such a policy? Many 
policy observers have questioned President Bush’s motivations in creating PEPFAR. Not 
only did presidential candidate G.W. Bush argue in a 2000 presidential debate with Al 
Gore that Africa would not figure among his foreign policy priorities since the continent 
did not “fit into the national strategic interests, as far as I (Bush) can see them” (quoted in 
Schraeder 2011:308) but also Republicans in Congress advocated the reduction of foreign 
aid to Africa throughout the 1990s, if not for its suppression altogether in the absence of 
Cold War geopolitical strategic interests. While the president relegated Africa to the 
bottom place in the hierarchy of his foreign policy priorities and while officials in his 
administration showed reluctance to admit access to antiretroviral drugs therapy was a 
viable solution to Africa’s crisis in public health, the granting of these unprecedented 
financial resources to combat HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa through PEPFAR is rather 
puzzling.
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Since every new administration inherits leftover crises and unfinished policies, 
as Cooke and Morrison (2009:10) remark, it would have been much easier for the Bush 
administration to simply implement President Clinton’s May 2000 Executive Order 
13155. Actually, this was already an attempt to change the US foreign policy attitude 
toward HIV/AIDS in Africa in response to domestic and international pressures. To 
create a whole new policy structure and to provide extraordinary financial assistance to a 
region of traditional neglect, especially in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and 
in the midst of an economic recession in 2002, was indeed perplexing. The ongoing war 
on terror in Afghanistan and the impending invasion of Iraq that both required 
parsimonious use of public resources and presidential attention only intensify the 
PEPFAR mystery.  
This chapter provides an answer to this puzzle. The remainder of the chapter is 
subdivided into three parts. First, it presents the incrementalism that characterized the 
Bush administration’s HIV/AIDS foreign policy toward Africa prior to PEPFAR. Second, 
it analyzes the sudden policy change and the creation of PEPFAR. And third, it 
underscores the contribution of the private sector in US pharmaceutical companies and 
demonstrates the neoliberal privatization theory at work in the implementation structure 
of PEPFAR.  
The Bush administration’s foreign policy toward HIV/AIDS prior to PEPFAR 
From the moment he took office until the day he announced the creation of 
PEPFAR, President Bush neither showed eagerness to implement the Clinton Executive 
Order 13155 nor commitment to fund the international efforts to fight AIDS in general. 
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During the 2000 presidential campaign, the vision of the Republicans was to “return 
foreign policy to its traditional emphasis on the management of great power relations and 
the realist pursuit of the national interest,” not to care for the welfare of African citizens 
(Ikenberry 2009:6). In an essay published in the January/February 2000 issue of Foreign 
Affairs, entitled “Campaign 2000: Promoting National Interests,” the Bush team National 
Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice criticized the Clinton administration’s foreign policy 
and argued that because of Democrats’ discomfort with the notion of power politics and 
the belief in international law, norms, or multilateral institutions such as the United 
Nations, they ended up trading US national interest for the interests of the international 
community or humanitarian interests.  
In the same issue of Foreign Affairs, Robert Zoellick, a former banker with 
Goldman Sachs who was appointed the Bush administration’s US Trade Representative 
in February 2001 also criticized the Clinton administration’s lack of grand strategy in 
issues of foreign policy. Advocating a modern Republican foreign policy, he developed 
five principles around which this foreign policy would be structured. The first is premised 
on power; the second emphasizes reforms to have an effective U.N. with member states 
aligned behind responsible interests, alliances, and coalitions. The third principle regards 
international agreements not as political therapy but as a means to achieve ends. The 
fourth focuses on America’s promotion of the new spirit of globalization through which 
markets can achieve results beyond the reach of governments and international 
bureaucracies. And finally, the fifth principle of a modern Republican foreign policy is 
the recognition that evil in the world is real and many enemies hold grudges against the 
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US. Hence, the Bush administration dismissed the humanitarianism of the Clinton era, 
which it believed did not fit the strategic national security of the United States.  
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the US official policy attitude toward 
HIV/AIDS in Africa remained lukewarm as focus was mostly put on the disease’s 
domestic dimension. In the international realm, US foreign policy toward HIV/AIDS 
focused mostly on prevention programs. Lyman and Morrison (2006:65) remark, “[o]ver 
the previous fifteen years, the US approach had been almost entirely prevention-
oriented.” Even the Clinton liberal administration did not think treatment in poor 
countries was the best way to approach the pandemic. Instead, after the introduction of 
the Highly Active Antiretroviral Treatment (HAART) to the market in 1996, US foreign 
policy continued supporting, at the global level, prevention programs and thwarted efforts 
by African governments to try to control the monopolistic prices drugs imposed by 
private American drug manufactures and research-based pharmaceutical firms.  
During the two years before the creation of PEPFAR, the Bush administration’s 
HIV/AIDS foreign policy was characterized by incrementalism to the extent that the 
sudden policy change inaugurated by PEPFAR took many by surprise. Baumgartner and 
Jones (2009:9) view incrementalism as a trial and error strategy that can be, “the result of 
a deliberate decisional style as decision makers make limited, reversible changes in the 
status quo because of bounds on their abilities to predict the impact of their decisions”; or 
it can also be “the result of countermobilization. As one group grains political advantage, 
others mobilize to protect themselves.”  
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Although HIV/AIDS had received increased international salience in 2000, 
attributed to increased mobilization by international organizations, domestic 
constituencies as well as African governments were now committing over $1 billion 
annually. White House Chief of Staff, Andy Card, announced on the very first day of the 
Bush administration that the Office of National AIDS Policy would be disbanded along 
with the Office of Race Relations, perhaps because President Bush had won less than 10 
percent of the African American vote (Behrman 2004:247-8). Critics also underscore the 
administration’s unwillingness to promote the use of condoms for ideological reasons; to 
collaborate with governments of recipient countries and to cooperate with existing 
multilateral efforts. While focus was put on increasing spending on expensive ARV drugs 
from US pharmaceutical companies, no efforts were made to improve the public heath 
infrastructure in Africa; “the program was introduced without adequate prior 
consultations with recipient governments”; the “overwhelmingly bilateral approach (…) 
undervalues the integration of US efforts with others and dangerously downgrades fund” 
(Lyman and Morrison 2006:68).  
A succession of major international initiatives also helped bring the HIV/AIDS 
issue to the foreign policy agenda, most notably the June 2001 UN General Assembly 
Special Session on HIV/AIDS that approved of the creation of an independent 
multilateral financing mechanism, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and 
Malaria (hereafter the Global Fund or GFATM). President Bush made these remarks 
following discussions with Nigerian President Obasanjo and UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan, on May 11, 2001, about the launching of the Global Fund.  
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Together we’ve been discussing a strategy to halt the spread of AIDS and 
other infectious diseases across the African continent and across the world… UN 
Secretary General Annan has made this issue an urgent priority… When he 
visited the White House in March, we talked about the pandemic and agreed on 
the goal of creating a Global Fund to fight AIDS.  
 
Not only the UN but also the World Bank expanded its activities through its Africa 
Multi-Sectoral AIDS Program (MAP). Yet, UNAIDS and UN operational agencies (such 
as the UNICEF, WHO, UNDP, etc.) also contributed in giving the pandemic more 
international prominence. Other governments donors like the rising financial 
commitments of the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and 
multinational NGOs like CARE, Oxfam, World Vision, etc. were instrumental too in 
giving the HIV/AIDS pandemic the status it achieved (Lyman and Morrison 2006:64). As 
Secretary of the State Department Colin Powell and Health and Human Services 
Secretary Tommy Thompson went to the White House to discuss the matter, President 
Bush observed in his Remarks prior to Discussions with South African President Thabo 
Mbeki on June 26, 2001 that private donors like the Gate Foundation that donated $100 
million were invited to contribute resources to meet the challenge of AIDS. 
 A number of US federal agencies also had developed an international interest in 
HIV/AIDS. The CDC, NIH, USAID, State Department, Departments of Defense, Labor, 
Commerce, Health and Human Services all contributed to elevating the profile of 
HIV/AIDS in US foreign policy and consolidated the emergent consensus on elements of 
multisectoral comprehensive approach to combat HIV/AIDS. Corporate philanthropy was 
also encouraged. A consortium of US pharmaceutical companies, for instance, had made 
the announcement in May 2000 that they were ready to negotiate 70-90 percent discounts 
  
164 
in the price of AIDS drugs sold in Africa. These included GlaxoWellcome, 
Boehringer-Ingelheim, Bristol Myers Squibb, Merck, and Hoffman-La-Roche. Indeed, in 
the spring of 2001, ARVs prices fell precipitously to the level of production.  
In January 2002, the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan established the new 
multilateral initiative, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria 
(GFTAM). Yet, the Bush administration chose a unilateralist approach instead of fully 
supporting the global multilateral efforts.1 Whereas donor governments pledged up to $21 
billion, of which only 25% was effectively allocated, the Bush administration continued 
to weaken UN agencies and pledged an annual contribution of $500 million, a sum that 
was criticized as “about one-fifth of what [the administration] spends on one cruise 
missile, or the budget of one Hollywood blockbuster” (Russell 2004:139; Casper 2001:8). 
The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s former Special Envoy to HIV/AIDS in Africa, 
Stephen Lewis also remarked that, 
The logical thing that the US could have done was to attach itself to the Global 
Fund and to fund it significantly because it was the most obviously instrument 
internationally to respond to the pandemic and Malaria and Tuberculosis. But the 
United States is the United States. [However], it was inevitable that they would 
insist on doing their own thing. Unless Americans put their own stamp on 
something, they are not interested… It’s a very patriotic nationalistic society. 
(personal interview with the author, January 18, 2013). 
 
In fact, the official policy attitude of the US continued thwarting global efforts to expand 
ARVs treatment to the developing countries. The Bush administration attempted 
                                                
1 Ikenberry (2009:6-9) discusses the Bush administration’s resistance to a wide array of 
international agreements including the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), the Gem Weapons Convention, and other arms control agreements. While 
While this author acknowledges that unilateralism is not a new feature of American foreign 
policy under the Bush administration, as the US has often violated rules, ignored allies, and used 
its military force on its own accord, he agrees that the “new unilateralism” of G.W. Bush was a 
strategic, sweeping orientation, not just an occasional and ad hoc policy decision. 
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incremental changes to address the global HIV/AIDS crisis in Africa between 2001- 
2003. The issue of access to treatment was certainly no priority of its African foreign 
policy until the creation of PEPFAR.  
During a June 29, 2001 Congressional hearing, Bush administration’s USAIDS 
coordinator Andrew Natsios affirmed to the House of Representatives Committee on 
International Relations that the provision of costly anti-AIDS drugs to Africans would be 
a sheer waste of resources. According to this senior foreign policy official, undertaking 
such an action was technically impractical in a continent with obsolete medical 
infrastructure, whose population was illiterate and lacked even the basic notion of how to 
read a watch. Hence, any attempts to administer the complex treatment in tri-therapy 
regimen would encounter not only cultural barriers but also structural difficulties, 
resulting in further complications such as the mutation of the virus or its resistance to 
existing drugs (Fidler 2004:120).  
HIV/AIDS activists, however, tried to attract global attention to the Bush 
administration’s global AIDS policies by disrupting the speech by Human and Health 
Services Secretary of Tommy Thompson at the Barcelona 14th International AIDS 
Conference in July 2002. They were protesting what they saw as the administration’s 
underfunding of both the domestic and global HIV/AIDS programs. While the Bush 
administration had maintained the controversial US neoliberal policy attitude adopted 
throughout the history of HIV/AIDS, which President Clinton tried to change in 2000 for 
political reasons, the incremental change of the years 2001 and 2002 proved 
unsatisfactory.  
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On June 19, 2002, President Bush launched a policy to address the HIV/AIDS 
global crisis in Africa from the mother to child infection prevention perspective. The 
International Prevention of Mother-to-Child Initiative (PMTCI) pledged $500 million 
over a period of five years to purchase AZT medicine and train local health-care workers 
in the most heavily affected African and Caribbean countries. The program was built on 
the Clinton LIFE legacy that would also help build health care infrastructure to facilitate 
delivery of these program activities (Shaffer et al. 2004). Indeed, only six months later, 
President Bush announced the creation of PEPFAR. It was this same International 
Prevention of Mother-to-Child Initiative (PMTCI) program that became the basis for 
expanding the program into PEPFAR. This policy incrementalism demonstrates that 
PEPFAR was formed from gradual revision, adjustment, and improvement of prior 
policies that had failed to harness public consensus.  
The process leading to the creation of PEPFAR 
 Presidential involvement in US foreign policy toward HIV/AIDS in Africa. 
Although presidential beliefs are regarded as an important aid in explaining continuity 
and change in US foreign policy toward Africa, it is obvious that multiple actors were 
involved, at different stages of policy-making, both among the federal bureaucratic 
agencies as well as among the nonstate actors in domestic and international arenas. These 
included faith-based organizations and US pharmaceutical multinational corporations that 
played an important role either in supplying information that shaped official opinion or in 
assisting the White House task force and Congress in the development of a consensual 
policy alternative.  
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The important actors and stakeholders will comprise (1) the President of the 
United States (POTUS) as the legitimate foreign policy agenda setter; (2) the Senate and 
the budget appropriation by Congress to implement his agenda; (3) the bureaucracies and 
federal agencies that, traditionally, provided vital information to help the president with 
the policy-making. However, it appears that knowledge and expertise about the 
HIV/AIDS was located outside the locus of government expertise. Hence, the support of 
(4) nongovernmental institutions, mostly the pharmaceutical industry in the private sector 
was instrumental in the development and implementation phases of the policy. 
Most observers agree that PEPFAR would not have been possible without 
President Bush’s personal commitment. In this capacity he is entitled to decide on behalf 
of the nation concerning foreign policy priorities. In most official speeches he gave, 
President Bush framed the issue either in humanitarian terms or as a security issue. For 
instance, whereas he used the security framework in a joint statement with British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair on February 23, 2001, saying, “we support the idea of a new 
partnership with Africa to address in a systematic way, conflict and disease, especially 
HIV/AIDS and to promote growth and good governance,” his vision when making the 
same kind of statement with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder on March 29, 2001 
was humanitarian.  
Although the influence on the policy-making processes came not only from the 
White House advisors but also from other stakeholders in different bureaucracies, the 
president was PEPFAR’s agenda setter. His policy proposal that departed from existing 
US foreign policies toward HIV/AIDS in Africa was made through his 2003 State of the 
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Union address. With regard to the policy-making process, Gauld (2001:167) suggests 
that, 
Health is arguably one of the more difficult areas of public policy making and 
service provision (Palmer & Short, 1994; Peters & Savoie 1994; Wilson 1989). In 
many areas of public work, say tax collection or immigration services, outputs are 
relatively easy to measure: it is clear what people are doing, why they are doing it, 
and what the impact of their actions are… In health, however, policy makers and 
providers in any country must cope to varying degrees with multiple variables 
including issues of life and death, questions of equality and justice, information 
generation and provision, powerful clashing interests, etc. 
 
Personal involvement of the president suggests HIV/AIDS condition in Africa had 
received enough salience in American policy-making establishments, which made policy 
change highly plausible in spite of high bureaucratic constraints. There has been debate 
over whether President Bush was the man in charge. David Frum rejects the prevailing 
perception that the president was hostage to his Vice-President Dick Cheney or advisors 
like Karl Rove or Andy Card. As he notes, “I could never again take seriously the theory 
that someone else was running the administration – not Cheney, not Rove, not Card” 
(quoted by Burke 2004:109). President Bush argues that his concern for HIV/AIDS and 
Africa was old, a claim which his early initiatives can prove. He reports in his memoir 
that “Condi Rice and spent long hours discussing foreign policy on the back porch of the 
Governor’s Mansion (…). We agreed that Africa would be a serious part of my foreign 
policy” (Bush 2010:335). As Mark Dybul, the second PEPFAR Coordinator, contends, 
President Bush decided to create this policy of his own accord and without the influence 
of anyone else. The president “is a voracious reader [who] knew [a lot] about global HIV 
without technocrats or advocates providing information – although he has acknowledged 
that Condi Rice, the top national security advisor to then-Governor and Presidential 
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candidate Bush, pressed engagement in Africa during the 2000 campaign” (Dybul 
2011, personal communication with the author).  
President Bush’s personality, beliefs and values determined the rationale, timing, 
and substance of PEPFAR. According to social psychology theory of the decision maker, 
that is, personality, intellectual skills, professional affiliation, working theories of 
knowledge, are considered important factors that determine the way in which information 
is processed and decisions are reached. The interpretation of the situation, thus, has been 
the most crucial element of the agenda setting as it is dictated by the perception of 
stimulus-situation that compels a response-action on behalf of the government. Several 
studies do not only refer to President Bush as a dyslexic, as Ron Suskind (2004:149) 
writes, but also that he “did not read reports and memos but delegated and relied on 
aides” for lack of intellectual curiosity. John DiLulio (2002), who served as President 
Bush first director of the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, 
also suggests that, 
Bush’s more practical bent may have led him to tune-out more intellectually 
sophisticated analysis. What Bush really dislikes are academic or other elites who, 
as I heard him phrase it on occasion, are or come off as smart without any heart, 
who look down on average Americans who just believe in this great country and 
its great goodness (…). Thus, the Bush administration is largely bereft of policy 
intellectuals. (quoted by Burke (2004:110). 
 
Deputy Director of Domestic Policy, Jay Lefkowitz, stresses President Bush’s personal 
involvement in the policy formulation from start to finish and argues that this 
commitment showcases the degree to which the HIV/AISD crisis in Africa was an issue 
close to the president’s heart. As Lefkowitz puts it, President Bush’s consistent effort to 
develop this HIV/AIDS emergency policy, as he doggedly lobbied Congress to pass the 
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bill, is clear evidence that he had humanitarian concerns for the victims of HIV/AIDS 
in Africa. It is witness to his earnest dedication to resolve the global HIV/AIDS crisis.2 
His earnest commitment to the plight of HIV/AIDS in Africa and dissatisfaction with 
existing policies – including the one he just made six months earlier, on June 19, 2002, 
the International Prevention of Mother-To-Child Transmission (PMTCT) – encouraged 
him to think bigger and expand US commitment to meet the need of African resource-
constrained nations (Bush 2010).  
Others concur that PEPFAR would not be possible without President Bush’s 
personal commitment. The president was the agenda setter based on his convictions and 
moral values. At the moment when “[l]eaders in international organizations and the US 
government thought treatment was not possible,” the president took the initiative because 
“he felt deeply that it was the right thing to do” (Dybul personal communication with the 
author, Georgetown University, November 27, 2011). Thus, both friends and foes admire 
Bush as a moral leader, a godly man, and a highly admirable person of enormous decency 
who truly feels deeply for others and loves this country with a passion (Laurent 2004; 
McAdams 2011).  
                                                
2 In “AIDS and the President – An Inside Account” in Commentary, January 2009, available at 
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/aids-and-the-president-an-inside-account (last 
consultation July 24, 2013), Jay Lefkowitz argues that President Bush had already delineated his 
foreign policy moral vision in his first inaugural Address in January 2001, using the Good 
Samaritan metaphor and pledging the nation’s goal to show compassion to the poor. However, 
there are lots of controversies about this HIV/AIDS humanitarian policy toward Africa when the 
Bush administration failed to meet other humanitarian goals around the globe. Alex Hindman and 
Jean Reith Schroedel, for instance, discuss the US Justice Department memos under the heading 
“The Torturer’s Manifesto,” available through the New York Times online archives, at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/19/opinion/19sun1.html. The complex character and 
personality of President Bush, pursuing apparently contradictory goals under the same 
humanitarian motive, requires a theory that can disentangle and explain the different motives at 
work in the PEPFAR policies.  
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Framing the situation in humanitarian terms allowed the Bush administration 
to fit HIV/AIDS among its different foreign policy objectives – as defined above by 
Fidler (2005) (see Table 6). By providing the poor with the opportunity for greater access 
to antiretroviral medicines, the Bush administration was able to implement its policy 
preferences that consisted in restructuring the role of the government in social welfare. 
For instance, President Bush acknowledged the important role of pharmaceutical 
companies.3 
We attach particular important to the fight against HIV/AIDS. We want the G7/8 
to intensify their efforts to ease the suffering of millions of people who are 
inflicted by this disease. We consider it to be of particular importance for the 
pharmaceutical industry to take additional measures so that the HIV/AIDS 
patients in affected countries can be supplied with medication at affordable prices. 
 
He not only sought how to “bring the private sector back in” but also how to include 
other nonstate actors, by way of privatization of the government’s service delivery. Thus, 
the framing of the situation by the Bush administration focused the attention of the 
American public on ideals and values within the compassionate conservatism as 
discussed in chapter two. However, the religious images and personal beliefs are 
important variables whose impacts on President Bush’s welfare policy decision-making 
process need further analysis. The president likened the US work of mercy in helping to 
bring hope and life to the dying Africans to Jesus bringing Lazarus back from death to 
life (Bush 2010:334).  
                                                
3 Available online at: 
http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/02/20010226.html; and 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010329-5.html. Last view 
on January 6, 2016. 
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Table 6. Conceptualizing U.S. Response to HIV/AIDS in Africa at Different Levels 
of Analysis 
 
Level of analysis 
 
 
U.S. foreign policy interests 
 
 
Independent variables 
 
Humanitarian  
 
Security  
 
Economic  
 
Individual:  Presidential beliefs 
=> compassionate 
conservatism and the 
welfare provision 
through “mediating 
private institutions” 
Global moral 
leadership; 
concern for 
human dignity, 
government 
subsidies to 
support private 
initiatives 
 
  
National:  Bureaucratic and 
domestic politics => 
Agenda to reform 
bureaucratic system 
and accommodate 
competing interests  
 Foreign aid 
increase to 
foster 
development 
and preempt 
global 
terrorism 
 
Internation
al: 
 
The push for US 
global neoliberal 
agenda => (a) 
privatization with 
the assumption that 
efficiency depends 
on private incentive; 
(b) challenge to and 
competition over IP 
governance regime 
by other actors 
  Change in 
the 
structure 
of foreign 
aid: 
creation of 
MCA => 
promote 
free trade, 
not aid, to 
bring 
about 
economic 
growth 
 
Epstein (2007) suggests this was a strong signal the President wanted to send 
about his foreign policy that was both compassionate and tough. The administration, thus, 
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framed the HIV/AIDS public health issue as – and related the creation of PEPFAR to 
– the US concern for Africa’s development. Both the framing of the issue and the policy 
solution flowed from President Bush’s humanitarian ideals embodied in his 
compassionate conservative doctrine and embedded in the American culture that 
concomitantly seeks the promotion of the values of the human rights, democracy, and 
free trade. These values, for President Bush, are divinely endowed and therefore their 
lack should motivate US foreign policy action. As a result, PEPFAR reflects President 
Bush’s compassionate conservative ideology, which offers a third alternative between the 
Democrats’ liberal welfare programs and the traditional Republicans’ rejection of big 
government. As the major motivating force behind Bush’s humanitarian concern for 
victims of HIV/AIDS in Africa, the compassionate conservatism belief is regarded as the 
core psychological determinants and cognitive framework that the president used to 
interpret the situation and create the PEPFAR policy (Princeton and Dorff 2007; Orbinski 
2008).  
Yet, the policy proposal was not a mere reflection of personal fancy of the 
president since it had to fit in and reflect the very gist of American policy culture and 
national interest. As President Bush acknowledged, time was opportune – and it was only 
morally right for “too wealthy a nation and too compassionate a nation” to not take this 
step and help those who are less fortunate than we are (Bush 2010:340). Contrasting his 
results-based approach to the provision of foreign aid with the paternalistic model of the 
Cold War era – that provided aid to maintain dictators in power for the sake of 
Communism containment – President Bush used the analogy of a medical version of the 
  
174 
Marshall Plan for Africa. In other words, his foreign aid policy would be 
consequential in fighting poverty and the measurement for assessing the goals no longer 
served the US self-interest but was altruistic, seeking to impact lives and serve people.  
 The federal agencies’ influence in the making of PEPFAR. Scholars like to bring 
up the fact that policy-making is ultimately about human beings while state bureaucracies 
and organizations are mere tools of people pursuing their self-interests. It is the task of 
policy-makers to attempt to cope simultaneously with international and domestic 
imperatives. Their framing or representation of the situation becomes very critical in 
deciding whether the issue is worthy of policy attention and what alternative solutions are 
available in attempting to alter the situation. For this reason, scholars concur that “[u]ntil 
this [integration of domestic politics and foreign policy] is accomplished, not only will 
our explanations of foreign policy decisions be incomplete, but our theories may often be 
less useful to policy-makers than we would like (George 1993:7-11; Farnham 2004:441). 
For instance, one important aspect of the PEPFAR policy-making process remains 
the secrecy that shrouded the stage of the policy formulation. Kimone’s (2008:41) study 
of the Nixon administration’s revitalization of the National Security Council identified 
the US’s capabilities, interests, and objectives and how to pursue them effectively. He 
goes on to quote National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger (1973:89) explaining the 
importance of secrecy in foreign policy decision-making process, 
Our reason for keeping the decisions to a small group is when an unpopular 
decision may be fought by brutal means, such as “leaks” to the press [reference to 
the Pentagon Papers] or to Congressional committees. The only way secrecy can 
be kept is to exclude from the making of the decision all those who are 
theoretically charged with carrying it out [federal bureaucratic agencies]. In 
consequence, the relevance of the bureaucracy might continue to send out cables 
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with great intensity, whereby distorting the effort with the best intentions in 
the world. You cannot stop them from doing this because you do not tell them 
what is going on. 
 
President Bush equally justified this secrecy surrounding the laying of the policy 
groundwork as a preventive measure to avoid a bureaucratic turf war since different 
agencies would hamstring the process had they known about the plan. As President Bush 
later put it (2010:340), 
Only a few people knew about the plan. I instructed the team to keep it that way. 
If word leaked out, there would be a turf war among government agencies for 
control of the money. Members of Congress would be tempted to dilute the 
program’s focus by redirecting funds for their own purposes. I didn’t want 
PEPFAR to end up hamstrung by bureaucracy and competing interests. 
 
While a negative connotation of big and inefficient government persisted in the minds of 
most Republicans in the Bush administration, given President Bush’s business 
background it is obvious that consultancy with Business, which in turn outsources most 
of its academic knowledge production to think tanks, universities, and other private 
institutions that maintain close ties with the pharmaceutical industry became the major 
source of information for the Bush administration, thus removing the authority and 
influence from traditional bureaucratic venues.  
The US domestic bureaucratic structure reflects the political polarization between 
Democrats and Republicans, and also the conflict of interests existing in the HIV/AIDS 
domestic and global communities. The Constitution gives leverage to Congress to 
compete with, and balance, the power of the president. Even the staunchly defended 
policies of the executive branch can be overturned, modified, or filibustered. Indeed, 
Congress was very instrumental in the making and shaping PEPFAR’s outcome. The 
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earmarking of the policy was therefore a way that Congress used to accommodate 
different competing interests; to leave its own imprints on the policy; and to distribute the 
benefits and advantages across a spectrum of different actors and agencies. The 
development of a new structure and the earmarking of the budget tried to integrate 
different aspects of the domestic debate around the issue of HIV/AIDS. That is, if federal 
bureaucracies attempt to maintain certain leverage over the provision of information, 
because they possess the expertise and knowledge, different independent individuals, 
foundations, or interest groups in the civil society seek to exert pressure or make an 
impact on the policy decision outcome through Congress. As a result, policy change 
ensued as a result of tug-of-war between the executive and the legislative branches.  
The State Department saw the US involvement with the global HIV/AIDS crisis 
as an opportunity to engage a new kind of diplomacy. The 2002 National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America incorporated the issue of HIV/AIDS among the 
strategic national interest of the US in a way that dispersed the interest – or framed the 
issue – across federal agency bureaus, including the Department of State diplomatic 
interest, the USAID’s development and humanitarian relief mission, the Department of 
Defense with its military and security concerns, and the Department of Health and 
Human Services with its multiple agencies including the research at the National 
Institutes of Health, and surveillance and containment at the CDC.4  
However, domestic constituencies – AIDS activists, gay community, civil society, 
and even the Congressional Black Caucus – were more than aware of the Bush 
administration’s unwillingness to engage the HIV/AIDS and reluctance to include the 
                                                
4 Available online at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf, pp.19-23.  
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issue on its policy agenda. From the moment he took office on January 20, 2001, the 
White House Chief of Staff, Andrew Card, revealed during an interview with USA Today 
on February 7, 2001 the intention of President Bush to close the Clinton administration’s 
Office of National AIDS Policy (ONAP) and the Office of Race Relations, One America, 
created in 1997 to improve race relations – all this a mere three weeks after assuming 
office. Instead of shutting down the ONAP program, the Bush administration recanted the 
idea of removing HIV/AIDS from the policy agenda as this announcement by Andy Card 
was met with a barrage of protests. HIV/AIDS activists overwhelmed the White House 
with phone calls, e-mails, and faxes from activists and legislators, including members of 
Congress – the Congressional Black Caucus that had been involved with the issue of 
HIV/AIDS and race in American and other Democratic Senators and Congressmen such 
as Tom Daschle of South Dakota and Dick Gephardt from Missouri. After Card’s 
interview in US Today, the White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer went out to clarify 
that, “A mistake was made, there is nothing that is closing. That office [ONAP] is open. 
He [Andy Card] made a mistake. It happens” (quoted by Behrman 2004:248).  
Yet, Secretary of State, Colin Powell cancelled last minute to attend the Africa’s 
Summit on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Other Infectious Diseases held in Abuja, 
Nigeria. And in July 2002, at the Barcelona International AIDS Conference, activists to 
protest the Bush administration’s underfunding of domestic and global AIDS programs 
decried and disrupted the speech of Bush’s Human and Health Services Secretary (HHS), 
Tommy Thompson. Although the USAID published an important report in 2001, Leading 
the Way: USAID Responds to HIV/AIDS 1997-2000, claiming the agency’s decades of 
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experience in, knowledge of and expertise about African issues, including dealing 
with HIV/AIDS, the Bush administration completely overlooked input from the agency’s 
administrator in its policy making process. Given President Bush’s business background, 
and the fact that a negative connotation of the big and inefficient government persisted in 
the Republican mind, contracting, consultancy, think tanks, academia, and other private 
institutions became the major source of information, thus removing the authority and 
influence from traditional bureaucratic venues. The Bush administration’s US Agency for 
International Development (USAID) Administrator Andew Natsios was able to testify 
before Congress but maintains that the Bush decision-making establishment consulted 
him on many other issues except the one related to HIV/AIDS policy (Personal 
communication with the author, Georgetown November 30, 2011).  
Farnham (2004:229) remarks that domestic constraints might still be an important 
source of influence but “the role of the decision maker remains critical in reconciling 
competing values [since] politicians are a critical key to aggregation.” President Bush 
was able to concentrate his policy-making structure within the hands of his National 
Security Council with an ad hoc Task Force created to work out policy details. President 
Bush understood the importance of staff work and the value of advisory network for his 
deliberation. He did not micromanage policy making process like Jimmy Carter had 
done.  Burke (2004:108) reports President Bush saying, “I am the kind of person who 
trusts people. And I empower people. I am firm with people. On the other hand, I am a 
decider. I do not agonize. I think. I listen. And I trust my instincts and I trust the advice I 
get. And I am an accessible person.” 
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While it is expected that leaders in modern societies will depend “heavily on 
advisors in departments and bureaucratic structures for expertise and information so vital 
to decision-making processes,” traditional bureaucratic structures have come to be seen 
as the very reason behind government inefficiency. Such theorists like Rourke (2009) and 
Hill (2003) have debated the bureaucratic inertia; they contend that bureaucratic slowness 
may save leaders from rush decisions, path-dependency and increasing return. As J.L. 
Gaddis (1992/1993:55) remarks,  
International Relations [as a discipline] is about individual, conscious entities 
capable of reacting to, and often modifying, the variables and conditions they 
encounter (…). It is no wonder that the effort to devise a molecular approach to 
the study of politics did not work out [because] the simple persistence of values in 
politics ought to be another clue that one is dealing here with objects more 
complicated than billiards boards.” 
 
Hence, President Bush was able to circumvent what he regarded as bureaucratic 
sluggishness and to address the problem at stake through the creation of a new structure. 
Despite the fact that the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy is mediated on 
the policy-making process through structural constraints and political bargaining, it is still 
not enough to articulate the bargaining process in two-level games theory but also to 
understand the context within which policy-makers operate and how this context affects 
their thinking (see also Lamborn 1997; Bennett 1981).  
The president created, instead, an “ad hoc” Task Force at the White House level, 
involving a few select insiders of the Bush administration, to develop the PEPFAR 
policy. The task force was headed by President Bush’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy, 
Josh Bolten, and comprised other senior policy officials. Bolten was Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Policy at the White House from 2001-2003 before serving as Director of the 
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Office of Management and Budget (OMB). His prior experience as Executive 
Director for Legal and Government Affairs at Goldman and Sachs London office from 
1994-1999, before becoming George W. Bush’s Policy campaign director in 2000, and as 
General Counsel to the office of the US Trade Representative for three years under the 
senior Bush presidency, gave him a good knowledge of the business trade laws and 
policies.5 Another important figure was Gary Edson, Deputy National Security Advisor 
and Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs from 2001 to 
2004. Edson served also as the Bush administration’s chief negotiator for all presidential 
summits such as the G-8, US – EU, or US Summits of the Americas.  
Known as “sherpa,” referring to Nepalese guides who help tourist to climb and 
reach the summit of the Himalayan Mountains, Edson’s bureaucratic experience and 
private sector affiliation were notorious. He not only served as Chief of Staff and General 
Council to US Trade Representative during the Bush “41” administration from 1989 to 
1992 but also was the chairman of the board and head of the private equity firm, the 
Engineering Consultant Group, Inc. Other members of the Bush White House inner circle 
                                                
5 It should be noted that the first appointee as US Trade Representative of the Bush 
administration, Robert B. Zoellick, was a former banker at Goldman Sachs. During the 2000 
presidential campaign, Zoellick wrote along with then Bush team National Security Advisor 
Condoleezza Rice against the foreign policy of the Clinton administration that pursued 
humanitarian goals at the expense of US national interest. As Zoellick put it, America should 
promote its geopolitical agenda by linking its economy to regions of key importance. “The 
history of U.S. foreign policy is full of examples of private parties—from missionaries to 
engineers—who forwarded America's belief in the future by helping others face the challenges of 
the day. The very nature of the "new economy"—with its rapidly adapting technologies, fast-
paced change, and innovative spirit—will elevate the role of private parties; they will often 
surpass the government in their ability to resolve inevitable disputes. These parties are not zero-
sum thinkers. The U.S. government should create a climate in which citizens can serve both the 
private and the public good. Prosperity with a purpose is an idea that reaches far beyond U.S. 
borders.” In Foreign Affairs, January/February 2000 special issue on presidential campaign 2000. 
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on the PEPFAR task force include, Kristen Silverberg, Deputy Assistant to the 
President for Domestic Policy and Jay Lefkowitz who served as General Counsel at the 
OMB before becoming Deputy Director of Domestic Policy at the White House. Among 
scientific researchers with HIV/AIDS expertise were Head of the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH), Anthony Fauci, who was later joined by Mark Dybul, a medical doctor and 
key staffer of Fauci’s at the NIH and Dr. Joe O’Neill of the Department of Health and 
Human Services. Because PEPFAR involved a lot of money, then Associate Director of 
the OMB, Robin Cleveland, was delegated to the team in charge of developing the 
PEPFAR policy groundwork.  
Testifying before the House of Representatives Committee on International 
Relations on June 7, 2001, the Bush administration framed the HIV/AIDS crisis in Africa 
according to its agenda and echoed the business framework that sought to divert attention 
from the Intellectual Property rights regime as an impediment to Africa’s access to 
treatment. In fact, Andrew Natsios downplayed the priority and urgency of HIV/AIDS 
arguing that this was only one among Africa’s many problems, and not even the greatest 
health problem. If Africans had been fighting to access antiretroviral drugs, Natsios 
claimed, 
That [the mining business in Botswana] causes a lot of sex workers and that 
 spreads the disease very rapidly in a country that actually has infrastructure. So 
 the biggest problem, if you look at Kofi Annan's budget [the Global Fund 
 estimates $7 to 10 billion needed to meet the global crisis], half the budget is for 
 antiretrovirals. If we had them today, we could not distribute them. We could not 
 administer the program because we do not have the doctors, we do not have the 
 roads, we do not have the cold chain. (emphasis added) 
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For Natsios, provision of costly anti-AIDS drugs was a waste of resources and 
technically impractical on a continent with illiterate patients, few clinic infrastructures, 
and cultural difficulties in respecting a complex treatment and managing a complicated 
drug regimen. “The US government need not spend millions of dollars on anti- retroviral 
drugs for Africa. In the process, he delivered a shocker” (quoted by Fidler 2004:120). 
“Many people in Africa have never seen a clock or a watch their entire lives. And if you 
say, ‘One o’clock in the afternoon,’ they do not know what you are talking about. They 
know morning, they know noon, they know evening, they know the darkness at night” 
(Mutume 2001).6 In spite of the Agency’s longstanding engagement with African issues, 
Natsios declares a “big war over turf” had erupted around the US foreign policy on 
HIV/AIDS involving USAID and the State Department on the one hand, and the USAID 
and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), on the other hand. Secretary 
of HHS Tommy Thompson, a former Governor of Wisconsin and a very senior member 
of the Bush administration “wanted to get HHS into doing international health program in 
the developing world. I don’t want to question what his motivations were. But I told him, 
‘that’s what we do.’ The principle focus of HHS should be domestic, not international. 
We don’t need help in this area.” Eventually, Secretary of State Colin Powell stepped in 
to clarify that, “we are not going to run this through HHS – no, no, no! We are going to 
run the program through the State Department and the AID” (personal interview with 
Natsios, Georgetown University, December 5, 2012).  
                                                
6 http://www.ipsnews.net/2001/06/development-in-fact-and-fiction-us-officials-play-games-with-
aids-in-africa/  
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From his business background, President Bush did not believe that 
humanitarian intervention was necessary in fighting HIV/AIDS abroad; nor did he think 
that provision of foreign aid was the best way to eradicate poverty in Africa. On the 
contrary, the president contends in his memoir,  
Projects like these [encouraging liberalization, market, and promoting the free 
trade] were catalysts for countries to develop markets that foster private-sector 
growth, attract foreign capital, and facilitate trade, which was another cornerstone 
of my development agenda. Free and fair trade benefits the United States by 
creating new buyers for our products, along with more choices and better prices 
for our consumers. Trade is also the surest way to help people in the developing 
world grow their economies and lift themselves out of poverty. According to one 
study, the benefits of trade are forty times more effective in reducing poverty than 
foreign aid. (Bush 2010:350). (my emphasis) 
 
The president came to the White House with a stated intention to reform the big 
government foreign aid system inherited from colonization and the Cold War. For the 
president, “Our foreign assistance programs in Africa had a lousy track record. Most 
were designed during the Cold War to support anticommunist governments. While our 
aid helped keep friendly regimes in power, it didn’t do much to improve the lives of 
ordinary people” (Bush 2010:335). This lousiness manifested not only in the 
ineffectiveness and inefficiency of US foreign aid system but also in the partitioning and 
tug of war among federal programs that lacked coordination and duplicated the work of 
HIV/AIDS at the global level. “When PEPFAR began, six US Government Departments 
and Agencies were active in global HIV,” including USAID that controlled more than 60 
percent of the resources, the Global AIDS Program (GAP) of CDC with offices in 25 
countries and a budget of approximately $150 million, the Department of Defense with a 
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$10 million yearly dedicated to military programs, the Peace Corps volunteers, the 
Department of Labor, and the State Department (Dybul 2011:6).  
President Bush urged Congress to pass the Bill before he left for the G-8 Summit 
in June 2003 in Evian, France, so that he could have something to present to his peers and 
show US leadership in foreign aid (Bush 2010:341). President Bush has also emphasized 
the need to keep control over the funds through bilateral programs instead of working 
through multilateral institutions. “I decided it was time for America to launch a global 
AIDS initiative of our own. We would control the funds. We would move fast. And we 
would insist on results” (Bush 2010:337). Thus, as an instrument of US foreign policy, 
PEPFAR needed to harness a bipartisan support. Foreign aid has always been used to 
pursue a variety of national goals such as diplomacy, development, Humanitarian Relief, 
democracy, market expansion, conflict prevention and resolution, state capacity building, 
etc. (Lancaster 2008:3) 
 Congress’s influence in the making of PEPFAR. Yet, even if the president was 
the agenda setter, he did not decide alone and was in need of information and expertise 
from bureaucrats or experts outside his administration. Also, he would still need approval 
of the Senate and budget appropriation from Congress to be able to implement his agenda. 
As Ripley and Franklin (1991) note, policies are the outcomes of the interaction between 
a variety of governmental and non-governmental actors in the process of affecting 
decision over the issues that matter. The president must be able to convince Congress 
because the US Constitution gives leverage to Congress to balance the power of the 
president. Congress takes each opportunity to overturn presidential initiatives when in 
  
185 
disagreement with the policy, especially those staunchly defended policies of the 
executive branch. Hence, the executive branch continued lobbying Congress during the 
legislative process. As Dybul (2011:9) remarks, “[w]hen Congress was slower to act than 
was desired, President Bush held an event in the East Room of the White House to 
encourage swift action with the leaders of the key Congressional committees from each 
chamber, and a large representation from civil society who could put pressure on them.”  
In the political context of democratic consensus – the act of bringing others to 
agree with the administration’s interpretation of the situation – becomes a crucial 
condition for any given issue to receive public policy attention, support, and resources. 
Secretary of State James Baker (1995) observed, for instance, “in a democracy any 
foreign policy that cannot attract a domestic consensus will have difficulty succeeding” 
(Farnham 2004:444). As such, the role played by Congress in the making of PEPFAR 
cannot be overstated. First, the PEPFAR bill was introduced to the Foreign Relations 
committee where it was met with a favorable vote of 37-8 and submitted to the full body 
of the House of Representatives on March 17, 2003 where it was voted in with an 
astounding vote of 375-41 thanks to the active lobbying of Representatives Henry Hyde 
(R-Il) and Tom Lantos (D-CA). The bill underwent several amendments. “One 
amendment established priorities for the distribution of resources based on factors such as 
the size and demographic characteristics of populations affected by HIV/AIDS, TB, and 
malaria; the needs of that population; and the existing infrastructure or funding levels to 
cure, treat, and prevent HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria” (IOM 2006:63). These amendments 
mostly reflect the ongoing debate in the society about HIV/AIDS. The final policy 
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outcome recommended the President, first to appoint the Global AIDS Coordinator 
whose mission would consist of coordinating and collaborating with civil sector 
organizations “to plan, fund, implement, monitor, and evaluate all programs addressing 
HIV/AIDS” (IOM 2007:64).  
The policy also earmarked the program funds, including 55% of the total budget 
allocations for “therapeutic medical care of individuals infected with HIV, of which such 
amount at least 75% should be expended for the purchase and distribution of 
antiretroviral pharmaceuticals and at least 25% should be expended for related care”; 20 
percent for prevention of 7% new infections, of which such amount at least 33% should 
be expended for abstinence-until-marriage education programs. Of the remaining 25%, 
15% was to be spent on palliative care of 10 million individuals with HIV/AIDA and 
10% for assistance for orphans and vulnerable children (OVCs) affected with HIV/AIDS, 
“of which 50% shall be provided through non-profit, nongovernmental organizations, 
including faith-based organizations, that implement programs on the community level” 
(ibid, 67).  
As early as 2001, the 107th session of the U.S. Congress received two different 
bills dealing with issues related to the global HIV/AIDS crisis. The first bill demanded an 
increase in funding of $200 million for prevention of HIV infection from mother to child 
and was known as the International Infectious Diseases Control Act of 2001 (S.1032). 
The money was to be administered through the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, TB, and 
Malaria. Senators Kerry (D-MA) and Bill Frist (R-TN) introduced the second bill known 
as the U.S. Leadership against HIV/AIDS, TB, and Malaria Act of 2002. While neither of 
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the two bills passed, elements of both were integrated into the P.L. 108-25 of May 27, 
2003. On June 19, 2002, for instance, he announced his new program providing $500 
million for International Mother and Child HIV Prevention initiative. This money aimed 
to provide antiretroviral drugs to 1 million women yearly in 12 African countries and 2 in 
the Caribbean region to prevent infection from mother to child and build health care 
infrastructure to facilitate delivery of these program activities (Shaffer et al. 2004).  
In spite of early assault by conservative advocacy groups and threats by 
Democrats in Congress, a coalition formed in the House led by Representatives Henry 
Hyde (R-Il) and Tom Lantos (D-CA) and in he Senate under the leadership of Bill Frist 
(R-TN), Richard Lugar (R-IN), John Kerry (D-MA), and Joe Biden, (D-DE) who lobbied 
fellow legislators to pass the bill (Lancaster 2008:24). At the Senate level, Democrats 
Richard Durbin (D-IL) and Diane Fiensten (D-CA) threatened to introduce further 
amendments such as the elimination of abstinence funding or an unconditional funding of 
the UN Global Fund. After a session that lasted until 2 a.m., the bill was passed by voice 
vote on May 16, 2003 and with no further changes. Returned then to the House as the 
procedure requires, it received another vote by voice thus authorizing the President prior 
his travel to the G8 Summit in Evian, in France, to sign “Leadership Act P.L. 108-25,” 
into law, making PEPFAR the largest international health initiative in history created to 
combat a specific disease. As Sorrells (2003:1056) suggests, a vote by voice is a White 
House and Congressional Leadership strategy to provide cover to members of Congress 
and avoid record and accountability on both sides of the issue. 
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This bipartisanship about foreign policies reflects the axiom that “politics ends 
at the water’s edge” because the country needs to present a united front to the world and 
speak with one voice since several voices could undermine and weaken the ability of the 
U.S. to succeed abroad (Snow and Brown 2000:3). As the Senate Majority Leader Bill 
Frist (R-TN) put it, passing the bill “might be of some benefit to our President in his 
diplomacy and advocacy as he approaches the other wealthy countries of the world 
(Congressional Record-Senate, 2003: S6479). And Senator Tom Lantos (D-CA) 
summarizes this “soft power” diplomatic approach in his remarks during a hearing on 
PEPFAR before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, on April 24, 2007, “those who 
occasionally complain that we have lost our moral authority better take notice of this [$15 
billion] figure. There is no nation on the planet, which would have made a remotely 
comparable effort. Our groundbreaking legislation, the United States Leadership against 
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act, was comprehensive in both scope and scale.”7  
 The pharmaceutical companies’ influence in the making of PEPFAR. The private 
pharmaceutical companies played an instrumental role in defining the Bush 
administration’s policy attitude toward the global HIV/AIDS crisis. Between the moment 
President Bush took office in January 2001 and the day he announced during his State of 
the Union address in January 2003 that he was changing the US foreign policy toward 
HIV/AIDS in Africa, a chain of contingent events had occurred that can explain the 
contribution of the private pharmaceutical companies in the development of PEPFAR. 
The creation of PEPFAR in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks took account of 
several aspects of the domestic and international environments, including the conclusion 
                                                
7  http://democrats.foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/lantos042407.htm 
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of the 4th Ministerial Conference on TRIPS Agreements and Public Health (hereafter, 
the Doha Declaration) held on November 14, 2001 in Doha, Qatar; the activism of 
different interest groups such as the evangelical Christians, domestic and international 
human rights activists, African governments, and pharmaceutical companies. As a result, 
the policy makers sought to include not only the international pressure to increase access 
to ARV treatment in developing countries but also to comprehensively integrate 
prevention and care advocated by domestic constituencies. The African nations’ claim 
focused on the patent regime and trade rules which they viewed as the main hindrance to 
their public health welfare and access to ARV treatment.  
It is customary to explain the influence on the foreign policy decision-making 
process based on psychological, structural, or epistemic determinants. In a study of the 
source of influence on US government officials in each of the three separate institutional 
arenas – the executive branch, the House and the Senate – regarding the foreign policy 
decision making, Jacobs and Page (2005) conclude that neither public opinion nor the 
epistemic communities in academia, think tanks, and bureaucracies are the strongest 
predictor of officials’ preferences but rather, of business preferences. The business role in 
the making of US foreign policy, however, provides us with a multicausal conceptual 
framework that organizes the messy process and complex reality of US HIV/AIDS 
foreign policy decision-making. The role of business in the making of US foreign policy 
can help articulate better the nexus between domestic forces and the international context 
of this specific US HIV/AIDS foreign policy. That is, it helps clarify the rationale of the 
Bush conservative administration’s undertaking of a liberal public health policy to benefit 
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African HIV/AIDS patients while the history of US-Africa relations predicted further 
neglect and indifference. In fact, the creation of PEPFAR and the increase of foreign aid 
stand in total contradiction to the most fundamental political philosophy of a Republican 
administration. Obviously, the global governance in the production and distribution of 
social goods and services such as health and anti-AIDS pharmaceuticals products pushed 
the Bush administration to uphold and bolster the neoliberal global market framework.  
These events include the terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington DC 
on 9/11, the consequence of which was to traumatize the whole nation and reshaped its 
perception of security. Another event consisted of the Indian generic manufacturer, 
CIPLA’s breakthrough development of Triomune, a generic version of the antiretroviral 
(ARV) drug cocktail combining three basic antiretroviral drugs, stavudine, lamivudine, 
and nevirapine for approximately $300 per patient per year. A third element consisted of 
the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s creation in July 2001 of a multilateral program, 
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (GFATM), to marshal 
resources from wealthy donors around the world to finance access to treatment in 
developing countries. A fourth event concerned the November 2001 World Trade 
Organization Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar on the TRIPS Agreements and 
Public health. And finally, a fifth event was related to the March 2002 UN Summit on 
Financing for Development held in Monterrey, Mexico; and the Barcelona International 
Conference on HIV/AIDS in July 2002. All these international events, along with 
lobbying and advocacy from NGOs and international organizations, increased pressure 
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on the Bush administration to compel the US government to change its foreign policy 
approach toward access to ARV treatment in developing countries.  
Although President Clinton administration’s legacy of HIV/AIDS foreign policy 
toward Africa, embodied in his Executive Order 13155 issued in May 2000, agreed to a 
state-centric approach to the provision of ARV to African patients, President Bush 
overturned this welfare state model of public health since it undermined the neoliberal 
foundation of the international trade system embedded in the TRIPS agreement. In 2000, 
Condoleezza Rice who then went to become President Bush’s national security adviser 
(2001-2005) and Secretary of State (2005-2009), made a remark about the Bush 
administration’s attitude toward international treaties and agreements. In her words, “a 
treaty that does not include China and [which] exempts ‘developing countries from 
standards while penalizing American industry cannot possibly be in America’s national 
interests” (Rice 2000:48 emphasis added). Hence, a global treaty or international policy 
to eradicate the HIV/AIDS pandemic is not sustainable for the Bush conservative 
administration if it undermines the US economic interests embodied in private interests of 
US pharmaceutical companies.  
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) 
constitutes a powerful interest group composed of 100 of the biggest drug companies in 
the world to lobby the US government and Europe on policies related to health and drugs 
in the global market. With seven lobbyists for every congressman in Washington and 
hundreds more lobbyists in Europe, the PhRMA interest group has been deeply entangled 
with the government in the processes of policy making, especially those affecting the 
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pharmaceutical business interest. In the case of the anti-AIDS pharmaceutical 
industry, US pharmaceutical companies became the crucial determinant affecting 
continuity and change in US HIV/AIDS foreign policy toward Africa. Private US 
pharmaceutical companies were, in fact, at the heart of the HIV/AIDS global crisis given 
their role in the making of new ARV drugs, monopolistic control of the market prices, 
and the patent weapon to threaten or punish those who infringe upon their rights. Thus, 
the political economy of HIV/AIDS and the global context of TRIPS Agreement can help 
illuminate the role that pharmaceutical companies in the US played in the development of 
PEPFAR.  
To this end, the Bush administration’s policy sought to implement reform of the 
US foreign aid provision system and, by the same token, an instatement of neoliberal 
business-oriented model of welfare provision. The very design of PEPFAR was a 
conservative subtle repeal of the Clinton HIV/AIDS global policy that permitted African 
countries to overlook, if need be, the TRIPS Agreement for the sake of public health 
welfare provision for their citizens. Actually, the US Trade Representative (USTR) 
Robert Zoellick pledged that the US would not rescind President Clinton Executive Order 
13155 (Behrman 2004:267). Yet, from the very beginning of the US HIV/AIDS foreign 
policy, pharmaceutical companies constituted the most powerful force behind official 
preferences, beliefs, and values. They wield considerable power – financial, 
technological, epistemological, and symbolic – that allowed them to exert a strong 
influence on the Bush administration to adjust its HIV/AIDS foreign policy according to 
US national interests.  
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The global crisis in HIV/AIDS reflected a crisis in the representation of the 
pandemic. While the African countries that claimed the patent regime rendered access to 
anti-HIV treatment impossible given their limited budget and the monopolistic prices that 
US pharmaceutical companies fixed, US policy makers interpreted the African 
HIV/AIDS public health problem as rather a direct result of the continent’s chronic 
poverty and lack of adequate public health infrastructure. The business conflict theory 
can, thus, help uncover the structural interdependency of US politics and business interest 
while also bringing into historical perspective the institutionalization of the intellectual 
property (IP) global governance and the patent regime regulating the production and 
distribution of antiretroviral pharmaceuticals.  
Although the US pharmaceutical economic interest may not exhaust the 
explanation on the creation of this policy, given other nonbusiness influences, organizing 
PEPFAR policy making process around the political economy of HIV/AIDS helps reveal 
the role that private pharmaceutical companies played, and the power they exerted, in the 
continuity and change of US HIV/AIDS foreign policy toward Africa. This political 
economy theory of US HIV/AIDS foreign policy provides us with a framework for 
interpreting both the domestic forces and the global crisis in a dynamic and dialogical 
interaction. Unlike the traditional pluralist theory that focuses on domestic interest groups 
competition and the business community as one interest group among others, a reading of 
the role of private US pharmaceutical companies as MNCs in the time of globalization 
has a theoretical comparative advantage, which consists, first, of distinguishing the 
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business community’s influence from other nonbusiness interest groups’ contribution 
to the shaping of the PEPFAR policy.  
Scholars have underscored the privileged position of the business interest group 
over nonbusiness interest groups since the economic power is fungible (Dahl 1960; 
Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Coen and Grant 2005; Roemer-Mahler 2013). In fact, a 
state’s capabilities, stability, and survival depend on its economic performance. Because 
of its significant ontological, structural, and methodological differences, the business 
interest group is not just like other nonbusiness interest groups. It is hierarchically better 
organized to overcome the collective action dilemma – unlike most nonbusiness interest 
groups that are usually voluntary associations of citizens to influence public policy for 
the common good – and can easily overlook the pursuit of the common good as their 
primary goal is seeking to maximize profits (Hart 2004:48). However, unlike traditional 
pluralist theorists who focus on an egalitarian conception of the distribution of power 
among interest groups, neo-pluralist theorists like to emphasize the fact that the business 
interest group stands in a privileged position as compared to nonbusiness interest groups 
and also that it is not a monolithic unit with coherent interests, as the conflict theory 
advances. 
Thanks to the structural interdependence between the business community and the 
state, the business interest group often trumps other interest groups. The business 
industry, indeed, wields a great amount of power and influence that by far outweighs the 
power of nonbusiness interest groups (Lindblom 1977; Falkner 2010). The remark by 
Arnove (2008:165), thus, acquires more pertinence when he notes,  
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The US, in fact, is not engaged in programs of international good will than 
any other state has been (…). The US foreign policy is designed and implemented 
by narrow groups who derive their power from domestic sources – in our form of 
state capitalism, from their control over the domestic economy, including 
militarized state sector (…). Top advisory and decision-making positions relating 
to international affairs are heavily concentrated in the hands of representatives of 
major corporations, banks, investment firms, the few law firms that cater to 
corporate interests, and the technocratic and policy-oriented intellectuals [in 
academia and think tanks]” 
 
Greidner (1997) and Strange (1996) conclude that while the power and influence of 
MNCs on foreign policy decision-making process have become immeasurable, the 
business influence on the behavior of states has tightened even further. Yet, in the age of 
globalization, businesses are becoming international players in their own respect wherein 
some MNCs carry out foreign policies in global governance (Hall and Biersteker 2002; 
Haufler 2001). On the issue of HIV/AIDS, the influence of US pharmaceutical 
multinational companies that transcends the domestic realm of politics impacts the global 
governance of production and distribution of goods and services through international 
regimes (TRIPS), international organizations (like the WHO), nongovernmental 
organizations (i.e. Médecins Sans Frontières or MSF) or even individual philanthropists 
like Bill Gate and Bono.8 Through these nongovernmental actors, US pharmaceutical 
companies have attempted to constrain the behavior of government to conform to certain 
expected international standards. As a result, states always tend to accord preeminence 
                                                
8 Andrew Natsios regards Jeffrey Sachs as a good publicist who knows how to get on the front 
page of influential newspapers. His propaganda about HIV/AIDS as the most serious threat to 
Africa won over the Harvard University Kennedy School of Governance, against the view that 
food security and agricultural issues were more urgent in Natsios’ view. For Natsios, it is a 
question of tradeoff. Focus and priority should be given to agricultural development, and in case 
of dealing with health issues, malaria, not HIV/AIDS should receive priority. However, this is not 
the opinion that was shared by most people. Besides, Natsios recognizes the power of media and 
the public opinion in the US democracy as in the example of U2 Singer Bono, an outspoken 
advocate for humanitarian issues. 
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and privileges to the business interest group as compared to others such as ideological 
nonbusiness groups.  
Hence, the economic aspect of PEPFAR and the business role in American 
foreign policy can allow us to integrate the different levels of analysis and the multiple 
independent variables that concurred in the development of the Bush administration’s 
response to the African HIV/AIDS crisis. The business approach of US HIV/AIDS 
foreign policy toward Africa also allows for a better articulation of the power of US 
pharmaceutical companies as the most important source of influence in both the domestic 
and the global realms of HIV/AIDS politics. In theory, this approach encompasses the 
compassionate conservatism personal belief of the president, the bureaucratic influence 
on the Bush administration’s HIV/AIDS foreign policy agenda, and the global contingent 
situation that revolved around the business of producing and providing pharmaceutical 
products and medical technology in an effort to address the threat posed by HIV/AIDS to 
the global community public health. The nature of the crisis, therefore, can be interpreted 
as a clash of claims between US pharmaceutical companies, anxious to conserve their 
market competitiveness that was protected by the patent regime and the TRIPS 
Agreement on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the developing countries willing to 
promote their sovereign right to control the public health of their citizens. As a result, US 
policy makers interpreted the African HIV/AIDS crisis in line with the policy image 
propagated by the US pharmaceutical industry. While different stakeholders had different 
incentives and wielded varying degrees of power and influence, the dominant view 
among US policy makers was generated by private US pharmaceutical companies, hence 
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explaining the inception of the Bush administration’s HIV/AIDS foreign policy, and 
its timing and scope, which all depended on the evolution of the global conflict over the 
production and distribution of patented brand-name antiretroviral drugs versus generic 
pharmaceutical products to meet the needs of the public health in resources-constrained 
countries. 
The role of privatization in implementing PEPFAR policy recommendations. 
To be able to meet its goals, Congress required the president: first, to appoint a 
Coordinator whose primary responsibility would consist of harmonizing and overseeing 
all U.S. HIV/AIDS policies and international activities dispersed across different federal 
agencies. Thus, a new and complex implementing structure (Table 7), the Office of U.S. 
Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC), was created to coordinate and administer the policy 
and was placed directly within the Department of State. President Bush appointed 
Randall Tobias, former CEO of Elli Lily & Co., as the first PEPFAR coordinator with the 
mission to provide strategic direction for program, approve activities and work plans, and 
ensure monitoring and evaluation. This choice, however, quickly raised controversy 
within the international AIDS community, given the conflict of interest between the 
pharmaceutical industry and the developing countries’ campaign for greater access to 
treatment. Ironically, although President Bush’s 2003 State of the Union speech 
announcing the creation of PEPFAR mentioned the ARV drugs’ lowering cost as a 
primary incentive for the developing of his global HIV/AIDS foreign policy, the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), a federal agency of the HHS responsible for the 
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protection and promotion of public health approved Tobias’ first decision to remove 
generic drugs from the list of PEPFAR funds (Dietrich 2007).  
Table 7. PEPFAR Policy-making Process 
Definition of the 
Situation 
 
 
Agenda Setting Policy Formulation Implementation 
Framing the issue: 
As a humanitarian 
crisis  
 
 
Issue salience: 
After 9/11, 
A redefinition of US 
national interest  
Policy alternative: 
A neoliberal 
approach to foreign 
aid provision: new 
conditionalities in 
the Monterrey 
Framework  
A new implanting 
structure: OGAC 
 
(1) Interagency 
coordination  
 
(2) Public-Private 
partnership 
 
(3) Harmonization: 
one framework, one 
authority, one 
monitoring and 
evaluation system 
 
Key independent variable: Privatization, US pharmaceutical industry and Faith-based 
organization 
Frame Africa with poverty stereotypes; set the agenda to fit the US interest; formulate a 
policy that sustains “a winning domestic coalition”; implementation (business model) 
 
 
It remains crucial to understand how US pharmaceutical companies exerted power 
and influence on the Bush administration’s decision-making process at every stage from 
the designing to the implementation phases of the PEPFAR policy. They not only 
successfully lobbied the US government to maintain and protect a neoliberal approach to 
the IP governance and market-based solutions to the public health crisis but also shaped 
the very global environment within which official US HIV/AIDS foreign policy position 
– at both the executive and the legislative levels – had to find grounds and means for 
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implementation. That is, the very nature of the problem and the way in which the 
Bush administration framed it reflected the position held by US pharmaceutical 
companies rather than the one held by African governments, the Médecins Sans 
Frontières (MSF) NGO, and other civil society organizations at the global level. Unlike 
Clinton Executive Order 13155, President Bush chose a policy solution that favored 
philanthropic private charity to the regulation of the market by the state in order to access 
pharmaceutical products. While the former is the privileged model of redistribution in the 
private sector, the later would empower African governments to regulate the ARV drugs 
market distortions maintained by monopolistic pricing controlled by patent holders.9  
In the global context of economic globalization, issues of trade, debt, and foreign 
aid provision, the influence of US private pharmaceutical companies was manifest in the 
pressure they exerted on the HIV/AIDS global agenda. While PEPFAR seems to have 
raised Africa at a foreign policy normalcy level, as some scholars such as Cooke and 
Morrison (2009) and Banjo (2010) contend, US private pharmaceutical companies 
shaped the policy makers’ ideological preferences and domestic political constraints, as 
well as international regulatory mechanisms and public opinion. All of these variables are 
reflected in the Bush administration’s relationship to the private property, and how the IP 
regime and the TRIPS Agreement guarantee the interests of the US pharmaceutical 
                                                
9 The US version of the free market has been debated in international forums to expose the 
imbalance of power in regulatory mechanisms and distortions existing in the system. For 
instance, whether it is agriculture, automotive, or the pharmaceutical industry, it is documented 
that the US government has always supplied subsidies to the private sector to bolster its 
competitiveness in the global market. For instance, Brazilian Ambassador to the WTO, Celso 
Amorin pointed out that the US provides “vast amount of subsidies to its pharmaceutical 
corporations to research drugs and so forth, and yet when other developing countries try this, the 
US complains via the WTO about it” (Interview with Amy Goodman, February 15, 2001 
available at Democracy Now, www.democracynow.org/index.pl?issue=20010215).    
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industry against the claims to implement parallel importation and compulsory 
licensing. The evolution of the Clinton Executive Order 13155 in favor of African and 
developing countries, and the Doha Declaration in confirming the priority of the public 
health over private profit appeared to undermine the position of US R&D-based industry.  
While this change in the global environment played a significant role in raising 
HIV/AIDS on the Bush administration’s Africa foreign policy agenda, the policy 
outcome expresses a strategic move that restored the pharmaceutical rights to profit while 
accommodating Africans’ claim to access treatment. US pharmaceutical companies 
claimed they had withdrawn their lawsuit against South Africa because South Africa had 
committed to protect the patents, “AIDS activists celebrated the withdrawal as a direct 
result of their efforts to create negative publicity for the pharmaceutical companies by 
pitching the conflict as one of putting profits before people” (Fisher and Rigamonti 
2005:10). The shift in policy attention resulted from a conjugation of factors in both the 
domestic and international environments, including the role of the US pharmaceutical 
industry, civil society organizations advocacy leading to the Doha Declaration, as well as 
“other forms of grassroots activism and policy work [that] forced the White House to 
express commitment to scaling up the United States government’s response to the crisis” 
(Russell 2004:135; Cohen 2002; Fernandez 2002).  
Bearing in mind the development of the debate whether access to treatment in 
Africa was hindered by the prices of antiretroviral drugs under patent protection in the 
developed world; and aware of the changes occurring in the international perception of 
the crisis in HIV/AIDS and the public health in Africa, the US pharmaceutical industry 
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circulated two reports to contest the view that the patent regime had deleterious 
consequences in the developing world. The reports were meant to influence the upcoming 
November 2001 WTO Summit as well as the policy makers in the White House. If the 
reports failed to change the outcome of the WTO Summit as expressed in the Doha 
Declaration, it remains evident that the views from the report constituted the primary 
source of information for the Bush administration’s policy-makers. As argued earlier, 
USAID Administrator rejected the idea that Africa’s HIV/AIDS problem was about 
access to treatment, just as the reports attest. And yet, the Bush PEPFAR policy creation, 
which came after the WTO Doha Declaration and the Monterrey Summit on Financing 
for Development, is a reflection of neoliberal approach to development that overlooked 
the state-centric approach of the past for a neoliberal private-public partnership model. 
To be able to establish the parallel, it is important to understand how the PhRMA reports 
summarized their findings about the patent system and the limited access to life saving 
drugs in the developing countries. 
Information is very crucial for policy-makers to make the decision that they make. 
Stone (2011:28) reminds, also, that politics is driven by how people interpret information. 
“Because politics is driven by how people interpret information, much political activity is 
an effort to control interpretations.” Since information is the staple for decision-making, 
it becomes the best-kept secret of decision-making. Decision makers need to gather, 
weigh, and eventually act upon the information they possess. In old days, as Kaufman 
(2006:17) notes, “the president [had] to rely on information supplied by US diplomats 
and emissaries who traveled and lived abroad, representing the United States, as well as 
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the representatives of their countries here.” Today, bureaucracies no longer represent 
the only repository of information. It cannot be assumed that the information is always 
coherent, perfect, or exhaustive. The control over the production and the dissemination of 
information related to HIV/AIDS crisis had become an area of conflict among business 
and nonbusiness interest groups. Besides, policy makers “cannot be simply assumed to 
have a fixed and immu preference set, to be blessed with extensive often perfect 
information and foresight and to be self-interested and self-serving utility maximizers 
(Hay and Wincott 1998:954).  
As a result, President Bush and his administration gathered and process the 
information related to the HIV/AIDS less from his federal bureaucratic agencies and 
more through the work of private organizations, think tanks, especially the policy 
document produced by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in collaboration with the 
Milbank Memorial Fund.10 The CFR and Milbank Memorial Fund produced a report in 
2001 presenting the views from different stakeholders in the HIV/AIDS issue including 
the pharmaceutical companies and corporate sector, senior US government 
representatives and members of Congress, think tanks researchers and university 
academics, international institutions and nongovernmental organizations. Those 
stakeholders involved in policy discussion and in shaping the policy perspective 
                                                
10 Kassalow, Jordan S., “Why Health Is Important to U.S. Foreign Policy,” Council on Foreign 
Relations, April 19, 2001. This important document shows the variety of governmental and 
nongovernmental actors who were involved in shaping the Bush administration’s HIV/AIDS 
policy image. A list of members of the government and those from the private sector who were 
interviewed by the CFR provided at the beginning of the document show the overwhelming 
presence of the private sector in the shaping of the official policy framework.  
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overwhelmingly represented the private sector’s view on how to interpret the 
production and provision of public goods and social welfare (see the stakeholders list in 
Annex 1) 
Another study sponsored by the private sector investigated the patent status of 15 
ARV drugs in 53 African countries. The research led by Amir Attaran and Lee Gillespie-
White and entitled, “Do Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs Constrain Access to AIDS 
Treatment in Africa?” concluded that these anti-retroviral drugs are patented only in a 
few African countries (See Table 8).  
Table 8. Overview of AIDS Drugs With Patent in Africa 11 
Generic 
Name 
Brand Name FDA Marketing Firm U.S. Patent 
Holder 
SA 
Pat. 
 
Zidovudine 
(AZT) 
Retrovir 1987 GlaxoSmithKline  Burroughs 
Wellcome 
Yes 
 
Didanosine 
(ddI) 
Videx 1991 Bristol-Myers 
Squibb 
United States Yes 
 
Zalcitabine 
(ddC) 
Hivid 1992 Roche United States No 
 
Stavudine 
(d4T) 
Zerit 1994 Bristol-Myers 
Squibb 
Yale University Yes 
 
Lamivudine 
(3TC) 
Epivir 1995 GlaxoSmithKline IAF Biochem 
Int'l 
Yes 
 
Abacavir 
Sulfate 
Ziagen 1998 GlaxoSmithKline Burroughs 
Wellcome 
Yes 
 
Sequinavir 
Mesylate 
Invirase 1995 Roche Roche Yes 
 
Saquinavir Fortovase 1997 Roche Roche Yes 
 
Ritonavir Norvir 1996 Abbott 
Laboratories 
Abbott 
Laboratories 
No 
Indinavir 
Sulfate 
Crixivan 1996 Merck & Co. Merck & Co. Yes 
Nelfinavir Viracept 1997 Pfizer Pfizer Yes 
                                                
11 Cf. Fisher & Rigamonti (2005:20). 
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Mesylate 
Amprenavir Agenerase 1999 GlaxoSmithKline Vertex Yes 
 
Nevirapine Viramune 1996 Boehringer 
Ingelheim  
Boehringer 
Ingelheim 
Yes 
 
Delavirdine 
Mesylate 
Rescriptor 1997 Pfizer Pfizer Yes 
Efavirenz Sustiva 1998 Bristol-Myers 
Squibb 
Merck & Co. Yes 
 
 
Sources: Consumer Project on Technology (http://www.cptech.org); Amir Attaran & Lee  
Gillespie-White, “Do Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs Constrain Access to AIDS 
Treatment in Africa?,” Journal of American Medical Association, Vol. 286, No.15, 2001, 
pp.1886-1892; U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Orange Book 
(http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/default.htm) 
 
 The final report published on October 17, 2001 in the Journal of American 
Medical Association (JAMA) claims that geographic patent coverage does not appear to 
correlate with antiretroviral treatment. As they argue, 
A variety of de facto barriers are more responsible for impeding access to ARV 
treatment including but not limited to the poverty of African countries, the high 
cost of ARV treatment, national regulatory requirements for medicines, tariffs and 
sales taxes, and above all, a lack of sufficient international financial aid to fund 
ARV treatment. 
 
A second report by the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
(PhRMA) entitled “Facts and Figures on Patenting and Access in Africa” also reached 
the same conclusion that only a few antiretroviral drugs are patented in African countries. 
Hence, the result of this August 2001 PhRMA Survey on patents in Africa found that the 
patent system is not a hindrance to access to treatment in Africa. Tom Bombelles, the 
Director of International Governmental Relations at Merck, presented the findings at the 
American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics on September 30, 2001 and argued that 
patents are not a barrier to access ARV drugs in Africa but, instead, poverty and lack of 
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foreign donors’ commitment are the main culprits. The report contends that patents 
are virtually non-existent for the two of the biggest killers in Africa, namely, Malaria and 
Tuberculosis. Besides, patenting levels are minuscule with regard to drugs treatment for 
opportunistic diseases related with HIV/AIDS that appear to be a huge source of 
suffering and hardship in Africa. Finally, concerning the HAART that are designed to 
stop the progress of HIV/AIDS infection, Africa is a patent desert.  
The last category includes the newest and most innovative drugs our companies 
have developed - drugs used in antiretroviral therapies designed to stop the 
progression of HIV infection. Three of these drugs are ordinarily combined to 
treat those infected with HIV (the so-called triple-therapy cocktail). In roughly 
half of the 52 African countries surveyed, no patents exist related to any of these 
drugs. In the other half of the countries patents cover a minority of the products in 
each of the three categories from which triple-therapy cocktails are drawn. Thus 
even in those African countries where our companies have obtained some patents, 
more than a dozen different combinations of drug cocktails for treatment of HIV 
infection are not subject to patents. According to the latest available data - based 
on company reporting - the patenting level for 16 ARV drugs in 52 Sub Saharan 
African countries does not exceed 18% (150/832). For these drugs, Africa is a 
patent desert.12 
 
Hence, they advocated for increased foreign aid to Africa so that these resource-
constrained countries can afford market prices for ARV treatment. By the turning of the 
new Millennium, foreign aid provision had not been in favor of reports given the worse 
condition of foreign debt incurred by African countries. As the Cato Handbook on Policy 
(2004:696) notes, foreign aid is “an excellent method for transferring money from poor in 
rich countries to rich people in poor countries (…). Today, most researchers agree that 
economic growth depends on market-oriented domestic policies.”  
As Kasper (2001) suggests, 
                                                
12 Available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/africa/phrmasurveytext.html, last consultation 
November 10, 2014 (emphasis added) 
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The decision to drop the South African court case, and some recent 
announcement of price reductions on antiretrovirals can be seen as attempts by the 
pharmaceutical industry to avoid having HIV/AIDS catalyze an international 
movement seeking to address the problems in TRIPS Agreement. The companies 
seem to be increasingly willing to sacrifice the (already marginal) sales generated 
on HIV drugs in Africa in an attempt to forestall the development of a larger 
social movement that might ultimately lead to the TRIPS Agreement being 
significantly altered or even removed from the WTO.13  
 
As the Doha Declaration shows, the international community had come to align its 
sympathy with the developing countries in their fight to access ARV drugs treatment. In 
fact, the European Union, the World Health Organization, and the UN supported the 
South African position (Swarns 2001; Gagnon 2002). Fisher and Rigamonti (2005:15) 
note that Doha Declarations acknowledged that WTO Members with insufficient 
technology to implement the compulsory licensing could use the parallel importation to 
meet their needs. However, they have  
[T]he right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the 
grounds upon which such licenses are granted; […] to determine what constitutes 
a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency (the HIV/AIDS 
crisis is explicitly recognized as a case of emergency or urgency), and [are] free to 
establish [their] own patent exhaustion regime without challenge (and thus free to 
allow parallel imports).  
 
CEO of GlaxoSmithKline Company, Jean-Pierre Garnier led high-level diplomatic 
negotiations, involving UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to broker a deal with South 
Africa’s president Thabo Mbeki. While, the US R&D-based pharmaceutical industry 
came to be presented as the most crucial player in the provision of public health welfare 
and the implementation of a global HIV/AIDS public health policy, the crisis provoked 
                                                
13 Quoted by Anup Shah, Global Issues, available at 
http://www.globalissues.org/article/52/pharmaceutical-corporations-and-medical-research Last 
viewed on November 14.  
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by the anthrax scare in 2001 proved that the US government itself was ready to break 
the patent international agreement in favor of public health protection. Both the US and 
Canada were ready to extract a whopping 80% discount for Cipro, the patent-protected 
anti-anthrax drug by the German pharmaceutical Bayer, if not override altogether the 
patent for compulsory licensing if the situation could not be solved to their satisfaction. 
Although PhRMA – the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, the 
organization that lobby the government policies on behalf of US private pharmaceutical 
companies’ interests  – opposed the move, the message was already received. To ensure 
public health, as a fundamental human right, the state can override international 
agreements.  
US pharmaceutical companies represent an important constituency of the 
Republicans and President Bush’s White House had every reason to lobby the Congress 
in favor of its policy proposal that favored the pharmaceutical industry’s interest. This 
can be summarized as the protection of the US private sector competitive advantage 
against greater regulatory mechanisms in the developing countries and emerging 
economies, given that the HIV/AIDS market was expending to these regions and the 
production of generics undermined the patent monopoly of US pharmaceutical firms, and 
their control over the pricing of the HAART.  
The controversial selection of Randall Tobias, former chairman and CEO of the 
pharmaceutical firm Eli Lilly & Co., as the first PEPFAR Coordinator in spite of his lack 
of specific experience of AIDS and African politics presents a conflict of interests, as US 
pharmaceutical companies also sought to overturn the Clinton Executive order 13155 and 
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preclude its implementation. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) backed down 
from purchasing generic ARV drugs with American taxpayers monies in the immediate 
aftermath of the establishment of PEPFAR. This reversal from the 2003 State of the 
Union Address – ascertaining that ARV drugs have become cheaper thanks to generics – 
speaks volumes about the Bush administration’s intention. Although the comparatively 
low price of generics drugs was a primary reason for why the policy was created in the 
first place, it was no longer possible to purchase them with PEPFAR money.  
In fact, PEPFAR drugs procurement required that drugs used by the program be 
approved by the FDA and not by the WHO prequalification program. French President 
Jacques Chirac criticized this measure during the IAC as the US blackmailing developing 
countries to barter their right to produce generic HIV drugs for free-trade agreements 
(Lynch 2004). While US private pharmaceutical companies pushed the Bush 
administration to foster a new impetus in enforcing the TRIPS international regime as the 
2004 Botswana meeting shows, the PhRMA also lobbied the WTO to impose limitations 
on compulsory licensing and outlaw parallel importing, pushing for even tougher IPRs 
provisions that would restrict further access to medicines in the developing world.14  
On March 24, 2004, in a joint latter, Ohio Democratic Senator Sherrod Brown and 
California Democratic Representative Barbara Lee urged PEPFAR coordinator 
Ambassador Randall Tobias to comply with international standards and accept generic 
drugs already prequalified under the WHO prequalification standards. Two days later, on 
                                                
14  Orbinski (2008); also the CEO of the generic trade association, Bill Haddad’s Letter of March 
16, 2004 available at: http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/aids/fdc/haddad03162004.html  
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March 26, 2004, California Democratic Representative, Henry Waxman, also wrote 
to President Bush stressing,  
It is no secret that US pharmaceutical companies, which make brand-name drugs, 
do not want funds to flow to generic drug companies in India. These 
pharmaceutical companies are among your strongest political supporters, having 
contributed over $40 million to your political party in the last five years. They 
should not be dictating policy on US efforts to fight HIV/AIDS in Africa and 
elsewhere. 
 
Other leading Senators, including Ted Kennedy (D-MA), John McCain (R-AZ), Russell 
Feingold (D-WIS), Dick Durban (D-IL), Chaffee (R-R.I), Olympia Snow (R-ME) also 
lamented in a letter to President Bush dated March 26, 2004 how delay in disbursing the 
funds to provide low-cost medicines to Africa was having deadly consequences on 
HIV/AIDS patients.15  
 In multiple public statements, President Bush showed his support for the private 
pharmaceutical companies while acknowledging the need to help Africans with 
HIV/AIDS access the ARV treatment. For instance, after he pledged US support to the 
Global Fund on May 11, 2001, he concluded, “we understand the important of innovation 
in creating lifesaving medicines that combat diseases. That’s why we believe the Fund 
[Global] must respect IPRs as an incentive for vital research and development.” On June 
14, 2001, his News Conference with European Union Leaders in Goteborg in Sweden, 
President Bush made it clear to Prime Minister Goran Person about the necessity of going 
ahead with a new round to liberalize trade; to help Africa to lift itself out of poverty with 
trade and open markets. He claimed that we have realized “a clear linkage between 
Uruguay Round and good economic growth in consecutive years.” While he invited 
                                                
15 Other documents can be found at the following source: 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/aids/fdc/senate03262004.pdf  
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European leaders to support the Global Fund, he went on to assert his views on how 
to fight HIV/AIDS. 
We share important challenges, as the Prime Minister mentioned: Fighting 
HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and Tuberculosis in Africa (…) We agree on the need for an 
integrated and comprehensive approach to conform these diseases, particularly in 
Africa, emphasizing in a continuum of treatment and care, and spurring research 
and development (R&D). We support the establishment of a Global Fund to fight 
these diseases. We welcome the steps taken by the pharmaceutical industry to 
make drugs affordable. In the context of the new global fund, we will work with 
the pharmaceutical industry and with affected countries to facilitate the broadest 
possible provision of drugs in an affordable and medically effective manner.” (my 
emphasis). 
 
The prevailing neoliberal market ideology is consonant with President Bush’s business 
background and with the US cultural hegemony that came to monopolize the public space 
of representation on how the HIV/AIDS pandemic should be fought in Africa. While 
academic institutions, foundations, and think tanks have contributed to disseminate the 
idea that the private sector is the ultimate way to go about the provision of the public 
welfare, the belief has become hegemonic that protection of private property and 
investment in research and development are the engine of innovation and progress.  
The neoliberal free market ideology influenced not only public opinion but also 
the policy makers’ perception on the roles of the private and public sectors in the 
production and distribution of public health welfare. This epistemological framework 
bolstered the patent right of US pharmaceutical companies at the expense of African 
governments’ demand to change the rules of the game. This is not new. Throughout 
Africa’s postcolonial history, relations between the developed and developing countries 
have consisted of finding the right balance between Western technological economies 
and African raw material supply economies. One preoccupation of the US after the 
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collapse of Communism and the end of the Cold War has consisted of developing 
strategies to maintain a global leadership and superpower hegemonic status.  
Garten (1992), for instance, noted that the coming world order would consist of 
hegemonic competition among the three most influential nations of the day, namely the 
United States, Japan, and Germany. Ten years later, unlike scholars’ predictions in the 
early 1990s, it is China’s activism in Africa that became a greater challenge to US global 
leadership and strategic access to Africa’s resources.16 However, despite China’s rise to a 
great power status, it is a fact that the US remains the sole superpower in the world to this 
day. While China has achieved prerequisite elements of global power – a sovereign state, 
an global and industrial economy, a nuclear-armed military, a permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council – it is unlikely to play any role in one of the most dominant issues of 
foreign policy in the post-Cold War world such as democratization and the fight against 
global HIV/AIDS pandemic. Some in the West have even proposed a G2 – the United 
States and China – as a new partnership to address the world’s most pressing issues, as 
Minxin Pei argues (Pei 2009).17  
While China’s ideological power and global influence is as yet limited, its 
increasing presence in Africa could be seen as a tacit claim to become a superpower and a 
                                                
16 Scholars thinking within the Western liberal paradigm of foreign aid donation to help improve 
the welfare of developing countries are critical of the Chinese approach to aid activism in Africa, 
which appears poorly organized and to be lacking in transparency (Brautigam 2010). Obviously, 
the literature on China’s involvement in Africa is alarming to the West not only because China’s 
approach defies the existing norms, institutions, and international aid architecture but also 
because it is hard to predict the future of the world order that rests in part on international 
financial institutions should China become the world superpower (Beri 2007; Jacques 2009; Jiang 
2009)   
 
17 http://carnegieendowment.org/2009/12/29/china-s-not-superpower/1rgl (accessed on September 
6, 2014) 
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wish to project its power globally, a challenge to the US hegemony. As Beri 
(2007:300) notes, “The Chinese concern with American hegemony has clearly been 
among the important motivations which led it to forge strategic partnerships with African 
countries.” As the largest developing country, China likes to boast of its symbolic role in 
the South-South cooperation against historical ties between Africa and the West. Yet, in 
its overview of America’s international strategy, the opening chapter of the 2002 
National Security Strategy of the United States recognized this global hegemonic 
superpower status and the US intention to maintain it. As stated in the 2002 National 
Security Strategy of the United States, 
The United States possesses unprecedented—and unequaled—strength and 
influence in the world. Sustained by faith in the principles of liberty, and the value 
of a free society, this position comes with unparalleled responsibilities, 
obligations, and opportunity. The great strength of this nation must be used to 
promote a balance of power that favors freedom. 
 
However, the worrisome question that many have been asking about China’s growing 
power and involvement in Africa consists in predicting whether it will integrate the 
existing international system or transform it to fits its own image. China’s rise poses a 
threat to the existing Western-dominated global system, as Jacques (2009) observes. He 
challenges the prevailing assumption that the international system will remain unchanged 
as China will comply with the existing order by embracing Western values since China’s 
power is primarily economic, and not political or military. These views rely on faulty 
assumptions such as Fukuyama’s convergence theory that the world is converging toward 
Western liberal democracy. As it grows economically – Goldman Sachs predicts that 
China will overtake the US as the world largest economy in 2027 – it will also be as great 
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politically as it will culturally, since China refuses to Westernize. By rejecting 
Western cultural values such as the promotion of Human Rights, embracing democracy, 
or humanitarian intervention, China will reshape the global system to its own liking. 
Besides, the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, and other international institutions that 
define the current global system are undemocratic, dominated by the West and Japan, and 
it is the Chinese view that they should be reformed. Many Third World countries support 
this argument, a perspective that makes the West feel disoriented as it will not dictate the 
measure of everything any longer (language, skin color, furniture, sport, culture, etc.) and 
new values will come into being. 
Other scholars have began to analyze the ways in which the international world 
order is changing given the rise of China to a superpower status and its involvement in 
Africa. Brautigam (2010), for instance, analyzes China’s growing foreign aid donation 
and export credit program in Africa and concludes that China’s understanding of foreign 
aid provision differs from the Western countries’ definition. For its diplomatic, business, 
and development objectives, China does not discriminate recipient countries based on 
political, social, or the level of GDP achievements. This difference heralds an element of 
change in the international aid architecture. Likewise, Jiang (2009) argues that while 
Africans regard China as an opportunity and an alternative to Western neocolonial 
relations, the West shows more and more concern about China’s growing influence in 
Africa. Critics of China’s resource-driven foreign policy in Africa like reminding 
Africans that China is not there to serve local interests, as its extractive behavior props up 
repressive regimes at the expense of individuals. In fact, as the West continues warning 
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Africa to avoid the resource curse given China’s elite-oriented approach that 
overlooks civil society and ordinary people, it challenges China’s superpower leadership 
for disregarding the liberal values such as the protection of human rights, environmental 
rights, social rights, and democracy in its Africa’s policy. However, China considers its 
involvement in Africa and provision of foreign aid to improve the welfare of Africans as 
a win-win development solution (through road and clinics building, telecommunication, 
low or zero-interest loans, etc.18 Obviously, the challenge posed by China’s growing 
involvement in Africa poses a threat to what the US came to take for granted after the end 
of Communism, that Africa which had ceased to be a “chasse gardée” of Western Europe 
and the playground of the Cold War competition would simply align behind the interest 
and preferences of the sole winning superpower.  
Third, the creation of a new federal bilateral structure for the implementation of 
the policy instead of using and strengthening existing bilateral (USAID) or multilateral 
venues (World Health Organization; UNAIDS, and the Global Funds) is very telling. The 
Bush administration downplayed multilateral institutions such as UNAIDS, the World 
Bank, the WHO, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFTM). 
If fighting HIV/AIDS in high prevalence African poorest countries determined the 
                                                
18 To explain China’s behavior in Africa, Jiang (2009) like many others, concludes that the 
domestic context and state identity characteristics, more than any bilateral grand strategy can help 
understand this drive for natural resources (Alden and Hughes 2009). China’s foreign policy 
behavior in Africa is the result of the interplay between China’s domestic context – the demand 
for energy and natural resources to sustain the development model it has adopted – and its non-
interference norm and historical role as a champion of the Third World’s demand for an 
alternative economic world order is a better predictor of China’s relations with African countries. 
However, China’s January 2006 White Paper on African Policy defines the principles upon which 
it builds its bilateral relations with African countries. These include sovereign equality and non-
interference, mutual benefits and friendship, solidarity and international cooperation, common 
win-win development, and sincerity (See also Beri 2007:300).  
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humanitarian drive of PEPFAR, why should it matter which institution, bilateral or 
multilateral, carries out the work as long as the result is the same? Why did PEPFAR 
allocate resources to middle income economies like South Africa whose governments 
could easily provide for their own citizens while countries like Zimbabwe were left out of 
the focus countries? The creation of two lobby groups – the Corporate Council on 
Africa’s Task Force on AIDS and the Coalition for AIDS Relief in Africa – in the 
immediate aftermath of the announcement of PEPFAR to advance the interests of US 
pharmaceutical industries at the Congress level is another bit of proof that economic 
interests and considerations were of major importance in the making of PEPAR. All the 
above factors raise questions about the real motives and intentions of US policy-makers 
in creating this Africa HIV/AIDS policy.  
Multinational corporations (MNCs) have contributed in shaping the US domestic 
society, its democratic arrangements, and its foreign policy. The MNCs influence in 
foreign policy is not new given the existence and operation of such predecessors like the 
Hudson Bay Company and the British East India Company over 300 years ago. For a 
definition of MNCs, Bartholomees, Jr., (2006:5) notes that they constitute a form of 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that  
[E]xecute commercial activities for profit in more than one country. Estimates are 
that the largest 500 MNCs control more than two-thirds of world trade. […] 
Contemporary MNCs such as General Motors or IBM have been able to take 
advantage of advances in technology and communication to become truly global 
in nature, with only a corporate headquarters in a single given country. Production 
no longer has to be located at the headquarters. With their enormous wealth, the 
impact of MNCs on the global economy is immense. Much of this influence 
comes in the arena of international commerce. In addition to being credited as a 
modernizing force in the international system through the establishment of 
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hospitals, schools, and other valuable infrastructure in the Third World, 
MNCs are also charged with exploiting underdeveloped states in their conduct of 
free trade. 
 
Since “Any political system of much size or scope is likely to contain within it a 
population sufficiently diverse to provoke the formation of factions, each pursuing its 
own interest, individuals with similar interests and goals […] have learned that it is 
advantageous to come together and… pool their financial resources and, if available, their 
voting numbers” to influence the government and shape policies to their benefit 
(Davidson 2009: 24-7). To that extent, MNCs have had a significant role in US foreign 
policy by shaping the culture, i.e., beliefs and values from which decision-makers operate 
and by pushing for the institutionalization of norms and arrangements within which 
policy decisions are made. As a result, MNCs have contributed in keeping alive 
American Exceptionalism and the belief in neoliberalism so engrained in the US 
collective thought. Hence, the primacy of the elite’s corporate interests constitutes the 
core of US foreign policy. “All the nations that have exercised the influence upon the 
destinies of the world by conceiving, following up, and executing vast designs – from the 
Romans to the English – have been governed by aristocratic institutions,” he suggested, 
opposing the democratic ideals (Tocqueville 2006:188).  
MNCs embody the idea of a civil society so important for the flourishing of a 
liberal democracy. Initially, corporations were not seen as “part of the society of 
individuals that the US Bill of Rights or its British forbearers were meant to protect” but 
they were understood as “creatures of the state, figments of the legal imagination of the 
public sector” (Rothkopf 2012:182). Today, they have come to play an important role in 
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preserving the belief in private property rights so dear to the American democracy. In 
fact, they have acquired the status of “artificial persons” in the US and are treated as 
individual persons who share the same privilege granted by the First Amendment about 
free speech, Fourth Amendment about privacy, Fifth Amendment about double jeopardy, 
and Fourteenth Amendment about due process. In the eyes of the courts, MNCs are not 
regarded as interest groups but as “artificial individuals.” They enjoy a status halfway 
between the state power and the individual citizens.  
Shortly after MNCs acquired the status of a natural person under the US 
Constitution by the ruling of the Supreme Court in 1886, granting them the same rights 
and protection extended to persons by the Bill of Rights, including the right to free 
speech, and the right to use their wealth to influence the government in their interest. In 
historical perspectives, most presidents and statesmen have alerted the American opinion 
about how corporations aggregate power into the hands of a few private, thus putting the 
welfare of the American democracy in jeopardy. Interestingly, the political and economic 
welfare of the US as well as its military power have grown hand in hand with the MNCs. 
In 1864, President Lincoln already wrote to Col. William F. Elkins,  
I see in the near future a crisis approaching that unnerves me and causes me to 
tremble for the safety of my country… corporations have been enthroned and an 
era of corruption in high places will follow, and the money power of the country 
will endeavor to prolong its reign by working upon the prejudices of the people 
until all wealth is aggregated in a few hands and the Republic is destroyed. 
(quoted by Shah 2002).19  
 
                                                
19 Anup Shah, “The Rise of Corporations,” Global Issues, 2002, available at 
http://www.globalissues.org/issue/50/corporations (consulted December 10, 2013) 
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In the subsequent years, other presidents and statesmen have referred to the conflict 
of interests between the state’s public welfare and the MNCs’ private interests (Rothkopf 
2012:181-2).  
 Testifying to the Congress in 1915, US Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis 
compares MNCs to Frankenstein monsters created by the state, “Through their size, 
corporations… have become an institutions which has brought such a concentration of 
economic power that so-called private corporations are sometimes able to dominate the 
state. Such is the Frankenstein monster which states have created through corporation 
laws” (Davidson 2009:14). Later on, President Franklin Roosevelt lamented the risk that 
corporations posed to the state and how they have come to dominate and control the 
government that it almost looked no longer a democracy but an oligarchy. In his words, 
“The liberty of a democracy is not safe if the people tolerate the growth of private power 
to a point where it becomes stronger than their democratic state itself. That, in its essence, 
is fascism – ownership of government by an individual, by a group” (ibid).  
As recently as 2010, in Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission, the US 
Supreme Court overturned the ban that prevented corporations from using their own 
money to support candidates for public office. Dissent voices like Justice John Paul 
Stevens argued, “The Court’s ruling threatens to undermine the integrity of elected 
institutions around the nation,” (quoted by Krista Gesaman in the Newsweek magazine of 
Jan. 22, 2010). While this landmark case allowing corporations and unions to spend 
limitless amounts of money on presidential and congressional political campaigns may 
set foreign businesses as the real winners, President Obama recognized that the decision 
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gives “a green light to a new stampede of special interest money in our politics.” 
Because corporations are conceptualized as legal ‘persons’ according to the US law, pro-
business lobbies viewed the decision as honoring the First Amendment right to free 
speech. 
Hart (2004:48) contends that although MNCs might fit the definition of an interest 
group, understood as “organized group that promotes a common political or policy goal,” 
they are not just interest groups in the traditional sense. Most interest groups are usually 
voluntary associations of citizens joined together to influence public policy for the 
common good. Unlike them, MNCs are hierarchically organized and can easily overlook 
the pursuit of the common good since their primary goal is seeking to maximize profits. 
Brown (2012:19) concurs with this view and adds the fact that MNCs’ structural capacity 
to organize gives them more political clout and leverage to lobby the government more 
than other interest groups. Not to mention their social capital, intellectual and economic 
resources and the multiple venues through which they can access and influence the 
decision making process.  
The influence of MNCs in foreign policy-making process is unmatched by 
nonbusiness interest groups because they possess tremendous resources and the capacity 
to create, shape, and impact political preferences. As some of them possess resources 
exceeding by far those of many nation states, they are even regarded as full-fledged 
international actors, rivaling the nation state. For instance, they possess resources 
exceeding those of nation states. Should countries and corporations be ranked together, as 
Shah (2002) suggests, 51 of the largest 100 economies of the world are corporations 
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while 49 are countries. With their economic power, corporations are undermining the 
national sovereignty of states and challenging the Westphalian nation-state system, 
weakening sovereignty and traditional borders. Although not all agree with this point, 
some however argue that MNCs should be treated, in their own right, as independent 
international actors (Nicholson 2002). Hence, MNCs cannot be regarded as interest 
groups given that they present significant ontological, structural, and methodological 
differences in the way they organize themselves to influence policy. 
The scholarship on MNCs coming from outside the US prior to the end of the 
Cold War was dominated by the view that described them as neocolonial agents of the 
West for the exploitation of the developing world natural resources. Scholars underscored 
the multiple nationality or cross-border operations as the major characteristic of MNCs, 
which are agents to maximize profit. In the post-Cold War era, a subtle shift has occurred 
due to the dominant belief in neoliberalism and the redefinition of the state’s function in 
international relations. In fact, many concur today that the public power of the state needs 
to be limited in order to allow the private sector to flourish. The current process of 
economic globalization has created “conditions in which the territorially defined logic of 
the Westphalian States system is being sidelined by a global logic of economic 
production and exchange” (Falkner 2008:160). This evolution in international politics 
and the change brought about by the globalization phenomenon have led to focus 
democratic transformations in foreign policy on the role of the civil society, not the state 
per se, in following in the footsteps of the American model. Thus, international regimes 
and the foreign policy are becoming more and more dominated by private 
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nongovernmental organizations in reflection, if not a continuation, of the US 
domestic politics. Indeed, MNCs have had a privileged position granting them both 
access to the government and the power to constrain its regulatory role in favor of the 
free market.  
This has justified the considerable amount of power concentrated into the hands 
of MNCs, giving them political clout and policy influence in American foreign policy 
decision-making process. Also, they have been very instrumental in spreading the very 
rules of neoliberalism in the post-Cold War globalized world (Page and Jacobs 2005). 
The US domestic political model has become, thus, the dominant model in global 
politics, offering MNCs as a factor determining democratic spread and economic growth 
in the developing world. This evolution in international politics and the change brought 
about by the globalization phenomenon caused to focus democratic transformations on 
the role of the civil society, not the state per se, in the image of the US model. 
Consequently, international regimes and foreign policy dominated by private 
nongovernmental organizations are more and more reflecting the US ideals of pluralism 
in its domestic politics.  
Conclusion 
 
The assumption that Africa is neglected in American foreign policy for its 
strategic significance is problematic. Continuity and change in US foreign policy toward 
Africa has obviously fluctuated between greater commitment – when US stakes are high 
and competition with another superpower is available – and retrenchment whenever the 
challenge to US interests is low. Political statements are often a posteriori rationalization 
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or justification to conceal US self-interested motives. While policy-makers’ actions, 
motivations, interests, preferences, influences, and other hidden variables are daunting to 
analyze, it is a good idea to begin by investigating the US domestic social structure, as 
Noam Chomsky (2008:160) contends, when theorizing about US foreign intervention. 
That is, it is crucial to question who are the actors are involved in the agenda setting and 
policy formulation; what are the interests they represent; and what is the domestic source 
of their power.  
Since social science is different from the physical sciences “in that what is 
analyzed possesses agency. Neither description of an act of agency, nor assertion that 
natural law was operative in a particular case of the use of agency, can fully satisfy, for 
we know that agency means the agent could have acted otherwise” (Hudson 2007:7-8). 
For instance, different US administrations could have different policy approaches to the 
same issue affecting Africa. Also, African countries might have possibly developed a 
strategically docile, nonresistant attitude vis-à-vis the US and aligned their interests along 
those of the superpower whenever fitting whereas resistance and confrontation are used 
whenever African stakeholders feel they impact the course of US foreign policy 
implementation.  
To simply assume that distribution of foreign aid or military and diplomatic 
personnel constitutes an objective measurement of any region’s strategic place or 
international significance might miss the point. Although economic and security interests 
constitute the two major poles of US strategic interests, it should be borne in mind that 
economic capabilities are primordial and fungible while, for the same reasons, military 
  
223 
capabilities are ancillary to economic pursuits. That is, the global distribution of US 
foreign policy instruments – both in soft and hard power – does not apply equally to all 
the regions of the world because the US does not encounter an equal degree of 
penetration or resistance with friends or foes. In assessing continuity and change in US 
foreign policy, account must always be taken of the context, historical trajectories, and 
identities of each specific region.  
Finally, if the US taxpayer’s dollar spent in foreign aid serves strategic purposes 
of buying allegiance of the recipient country to American interest, it remains misleading 
to measure a country’s international strategic significance simply by looking at the 
amount of foreign aid allocated. Mathematically, the dollar-value varies across countries 
since not all of the world’s regions are economically on par or expect an equal absolute 
distribution of foreign aid that would ascertain this kind of equality. In fact, political 
rationality is always bounded to relative gains. Assuming an “absolute value” for each 
dollar spent on foreign policy issues, regardless of the regional differences, means 
forgetting one fundamental reality. A dollar’s value is always measured within any given 
social system. In other words, if a dollar could buy one loaf of bread in a European 
country, it would perhaps be worth three loaves of bread in a Middle Eastern country, 
five loaves of bread in an African country, or ten loaves of bread in South East Asia. For 
instance, more US foreign assistance flowed to the newly formed states in Eastern Europe 
after the Cold War, including Russia, as the US government sought to lure them with its 
global benevolent influence. Why should the US continue providing the same amount of 
aid to African countries whose allegiance was inescapable once the Cold War 
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competition was over? Hence, the retrenchment from Africa during the same period 
was only consequential during the 1990s while the resumption of US policy activism 
after terrorist attacks on US interests became a reminder that US involvement in Africa is 
primarily for the protection of US interests.   
It was not a coincidence that the Bush administration avoided going through 
existing bureaucratic structures and staffed his PEPFAR task force with members of his 
White House inner circle administration with close ties to the private sector and business 
expertise. To overcome existing bureaucratic turf war, a multi-agency coordination 
(Department of Defense, Department of State, Health and Human Services, USAID, 
Peace Corps, and Department of Labor) was created under the Office of the Global AIDS 
Coordinator (OGAC) (Table 9). This marked, in a way, the end of big government, both 
at home and abroad, in the management of U.S. foreign aid funds. President Bush created 
a task force team at the White House level in charge of laying the policy groundwork, in 
total secrecy, in order to avoid bureaucratic turf war and move fast – given the emergency 
of the African situation. 
Table 9. PEPFAR Implementing Structure 
 
1. OFFICE OF THE GLOBAL AIDS COORDINATOR (OGAC)  
This is a new structure created to coordinate and harmonize the government 
activities related to HIV/AIDS across different governmental agencies 
2. HORIZONTAL COORDINATION 
(See below Table 10) 
USAID HHS Agencies (NIH, CDC, 
FDA) 
Other federal agencies: 
(DoD, Labor, Peace 
Corps) 
3. INTERGOVERNMENTAL COORDINATION 
US Agency PEPFAR Field Staff (In-country team) 
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4. VERTICAL COORDINATION 
Prime Partners: International NGOs, Universities, private foundations 
Sub-partners: local or community-based organizations 
Programs 
 
The OGAC had a threefold coordination mission:  
(1) A horizontal coordination that refers to PEPFAR interagency structure sought 
to supervise actors across different federal governmental agencies, including the State 
Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); the Health and 
Human Services (HHS) running different programs under the National Institute of Health 
(NIH), the Center of Disease Control and Preventions (CDC); the Department of Defense 
(DoD); the Department of Labor, and the Peace Corps. The mission of OGAC combined 
provision of direction and guidance of individual agency headquartered in the U.S. but 
whose personnel were involved in the work of HIV/AIDS.  
(2) A vertical coordination that refers to the funding supply chain established the 
OGAC to oversee the funding mechanisms through which PEPFAR allocates the funds to 
in-country teams. The supply chain, thus, goes from US Congress and OGAC down to 
local implementing partners in a model termed “networked government” (Kamarck 
2002). The Congress appropriates funds; the US Global Coordinator decides through 
which programs the money is spent across different U.S. governmental agencies; in their 
turn, in-country teams that include the US ambassador, who administers representatives 
from each U.S. government agency working on HIV/AIDS program in focus countries, 
subcontract with prime partners (basically private sector groups that partner directly with 
U.S. government); finally, the prime partners also sublet contracts to Subprime partners 
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or the private sector groups with little contact with U.S. government staff among 
which are the civil society, faith-based, and community organizations that receive funds 
and technical assistance from prime partners.  
(3) An intergovernmental coordination that refers to the ways in which PEPFAR 
engages with partner countries’ governments seeks to harmonize HIV/AIDS programs 
with national policies in host countries that are seen both as prime and sub-partners. This 
is the US government’s commitment to principles of alignment and harmonization with 
national programs, including harmonization with other international partners (Boggiano 
2011). It is at this level that PEPFAR can be seen as a tool of U.S. foreign policy because 
it is used in the foreign aid system to obtain a certain kind of behavior from governments 
where the PEPFAR activities are hosted. 
Table 10. US Federal Agencies Involved in PEPFAR Implementation 
Federal Agency 
 
Program Activities 
State Department 
 
The US Office of the Global AIDS 
Coordinator (OGAC) reports directly to 
the Secretary of State. The State 
Department support for the Office of 
the OGAC includes: 
• Provides human resources services 
• Tracks budgets within its accounting 
system 
• Transfers funds to other implementing 
agencies 
Provides office space, communication 
and information technology services. 
USAID 
 
• Receives overall foreign policy 
guidance from the Secretary of State.  
• Implementation of PEPFAR programs 
extends to nearly 100 non-focus 
countries.  
• Takes a comprehensive and balanced 
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approach to combating the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic and tailors programs, 
activities, and interventions 
appropriately considering the country’s 
context  
• Supports and implements a variety of 
programs in technical areas critical to 
fighting HIV/AIDS in the countries 
USAID operates, which include 
Treatment, Prevention, Care, Research, 
Infrastructure strengthening  
• Funded by PEPFAR, and managed by 
USAID, the Supply Chain Mechanism 
System (SCMS) project has been 
helping host nations increase their 
capacity for delivering essential 
lifesaving HIV/AIDS medicines and 
supplies to people in need of treatment 
and care since 2005 
Integrating gender across HIV/AIDS 
prevention, treatment, and care 
programs with an emphasis on 
transformative interventions is a key 
guiding principle in the HIV/AIDS 
work of SAID in partnership with 
PEPFAR 
Peace Corps • Is involved in the fight against 
HIV/AIDS, implements Emergency 
Plan programs in nine of the 15 
Emergency Plan focus countries – 
Botswana, Guyana, Kenya, 
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.  
 
At least 55 percent of all volunteers 
report being involved in at least one 
HIV/AIDS activity (e.g., awareness, 
prevention, orphans, care, etc.) during 
their service - a significant increase 
from the 25 percent reported in fiscal 
year 2004 (See Global biennial Peace 
Corps volunteer survey, fiscal year 
2006). 
Department of Defense (DoD) • Implements PEPFAR programs by 
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supporting HIV/AIDS prevention, 
treatment, and care, strategic 
information, human capacity 
development, and program and policy 
development in host militaries and 
civilian communities of 73 countries 
around the world.  
• These programs are accomplished 
through direct military-to-military 
assistance, support to nongovernmental 
organizations and universities, and 
collaboration with other US 
Government agencies in each country  
• Members of the defense forces in 13 
PEPFAR focus countries have been the 
recipients of DoD military-specific 
HIV/AIDS prevention programs 
designed to address their unique risk 
factors, in addition to treatment and 
care programs for their personnel 
 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Services Administration (SAMHSA) 
 
• Works domestically through US State 
and community programs to treat 
addiction and dependence, to prevent 
substance abuse, and to provide mental 
health services, including supporting an 
educational and training center network 
that disseminates state-of-the-art 
information and best practices.  
HHS and PEPFAR country teams are 
applying this technical expertise and 
program experience to the program 
areas of drug and alcohol abuse in the 
Emergency Plan. 
Department of Health and Human 
Services 
(HHS) 
 
• Has a long history of HIV/AIDS work 
within the US and internationally  
Implements prevention, treatment, and 
care programs in developing countries 
and conducts HIV/AIDS research 
through. 
Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) Global AIDS Program 
(GAP) 
 
• Works with Ministries of Health and 
other public health partners, through 
the President's Emergency Plan for 
AIDS Relief, to combat HIV/AIDS by 
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strengthening health systems and 
building sustainable, evidence-based 
HIV/AIDS programs in more than 75 
countries in Africa, Asia, Central and 
South America, and the Caribbean  
• GAP has highly trained physicians, 
epidemiologists, public health advisors, 
behavioral scientists, and laboratory 
scientists working in countries around 
the world as part of US government 
teams implementing the Emergency 
Plan. GAP is uniquely positioned to 
coordinate with the CDC's other global 
health programs, such as global disease 
detection, public health training, and 
prevention and control of other 
infectious diseases such as malaria and 
tuberculosis, as well as with CDC's 
domestic HIV/AIDS prevention 
programs in the United States. 
 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
 
• Is the lead Federal agency for 
biomedical research on HIV/AIDS 
• Supports a comprehensive program of 
basic, clinical, and behavioral research 
on HIV infection and its associated 
opportunistic infections, co-infections, 
and malignancies. This research will 
lead to a better understanding of the 
basic biology of HIV/AIDS, the 
development of effective therapies to 
treat it, and the design of better 
interventions to prevent new infections, 
including vaccines and microbicides 
Supports an international research and 
training portfolio that encompasses 
more than 90 countries, through its 27 
Institutes and Centers, including 
coordination and support from the 
Fogarty International Center. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
 
Manages an expedited review process 
to ensure implementers can buy safe 
and effective antiretroviral drugs for the 
Emergency Plan at the lowest possible 
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prices. This process has significantly 
reduced the cost of treatment by 
making the quality generic products 
available for registration and marketing 
in the 15 Emergency Plan focus 
countries. The result is that more 
patients receive treatment at a lower 
cost with high-quality antiretroviral 
drugs 
Health Resources and Services 
Administration (HRSA) Global 
HIV/AIDS Program 
 
Operates its Global HIV/AIDS 
Program through HRSA's HIV/AIDS 
Bureau  
Builds human capacity for scaling up 
care and treatment based on its more 
than 20 years of experience in 
providing quality, comprehensive 
HIV/AIDS care to underserved 
communities  
Global HIV/AIDS strategy focuses on 
health system strengthening and human 
resources for health.  
Implements strategies through activities 
such as twinning, training and technical 
assistance, rapid roll-out of 
antiretroviral drugs, mentoring for 
nursing leadership, and enhancement of 
the continuum of palliative care. 
Office of Global Affairs 
 
Located in the Office of the Secretary; 
it promotes the health of the world’s 
population by advancing the 
Secretary’s and the HHS’ global 
strategies and partnerships, thus serving 
the health of the people of the United 
States.  
Coordinates all of the HHS agencies to 
ensure the Department's resources are 
working effectively and efficiently 
under the leadership of the OGAC. 
Department of Labor 
 
Implements Emergency Plan 
workplace-targeted projects that focus 
on prevention and reduction of 
HIV/AIDS-related stigma and 
discrimination. 
Has programs in over 23 countries and 
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has received PEPFAR funding for 
projects in Guyana, Haiti, India, 
Nigeria, and Vietnam. As of March 
2006, programs that work with the 
International Labor Organization and 
the Academy for Educational 
Development have helped 415 
enterprises adopt policies that promote 
worker retention and access to 
treatment. These programs have 
reached more than 2,500,000 workers 
now covered under protective 
HIV/AIDS workplace policies 
Brings to all these endeavors its unique 
experience in building strategic 
alliances with employers, unions, and 
Ministries of Labor, which are often 
overlooked and difficult to target 
Department of Commerce (DoC) 
 
Has provided and continues to provide 
in-kind support to PEPFAR, aimed at 
furthering private sector engagement 
by fostering public-private 
partnerships. 
The US Census Bureau, within the 
DoC, is also an important partner in the 
Emergency Plan. Activities include 
assisting with data management and 
analysis, survey support, estimating 
infections averted, and supporting 
mapping of country-level activities 
 
The US government federal agencies listed in this table support a range of activities – 
from research to technical assistance and financial support to other nations – to combat 
the global HIV/AIDS pandemic under the supervision of PEPFAR. 
Source: complied from http://www.aids.gov/federal-resources/around-the-
world/pepfar/index.html. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PEPFAR: THE UGANDA CASE STUDY 
 
Introduction 
 
 The PEPFAR policy was implemented through FY 2004-2008 and it was even 
reauthorized for another five years in 2008. As a matter of fact, the disbursement for the 
programs went beyond the initial $15 billion requested by President Bush to reach a total 
of $18.8 billion for the period of 2004-2008 (Dybul 2009:S12). Given that the scope of 
this study is limited to understanding continuity and change in the US HIV/AIDS toward 
Africa during the five first years of the PEPFAR, it is important to also look at how the 
money was distributed and whether the trends it followed is consonant with the goals it 
adopted. Strategically, PEPFAR focused the bulk of its budget to only 15 focus countries. 
They include Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, Haiti, Guyana, and Vietnam 
(Table 11). However, as Lyman and Morrison (2006:65) note, PEPFAR programs “are 
not limited only to the fifteen focus countries; assistance in some form extends to almost 
all affected African countries.” While the focus countries received two-thirds of the 
proposed US $15 billion, the remaining one-third went to support the global fight against 
HIV/AIDS in more than 120 countries worldwide through such multilateral programs like 
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (GFATM) (IOM 2007:25).
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Dybul (2009) explains PEPFAR’s success in achieving the goals it had set for the first 
five years through the willingness of President Bush to implement his new approach to 
foreign aid provision. While Africa remains the world’s poorest continent as it continues 
to trail the other continents on human development indicators such as life expectancy, 
infant mortality, literacy, or the incidence of communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS, 
it was observed that the per capita income in Africa declined by 11 percent in spite of 
massive foreign aid allocation between 1974 and 2003 (Mwenda 2006). However, 
foreign aid advocates continued arguing that the culprit was African leadership and that 
increasing the volume of aid and writing off the sovereign debt of African countries 
would boost the continent’s economic growth and development. Hence, African countries 
were encouraged to adopt a new development framework to replenish the confidence of 
donors while international donors also adopted the “Monterrey Consensus” framework 
that set new criteria for aid allocation. The former created a New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) and the latter agreed on new criteria for international poverty 
reduction and the need to increase foreign aid as essential to achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals. 
Table 11. Funding Trends in PEPFAR Sub-Saharan Africa Focus Countries 
 
Country  Populatio
n w/ HIV/ 
AIDS 
Adult 
HIV 
prevalen
ce (%) 
PEPFA
R 
funding 
($US 
million
s) 
GDP 
per 
capita* 
($US) 
(2004) 
GFAT
M 
Fundin
g ($US 
million
s) 
Total 
Fundin
g 
Amoun
t ($US 
million
s) 
Fundin
g Per 
HIV+ 
Person 
($US) 
Botswan
a 
350,000 37.3 67.4 4,829.
5   
 
18.6 86 246 
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Cote 
d’Ivoire 
570,000 7 63.6 903.
0   
 
19.1 82.7 145 
Ethiopia 1,500,000 4.4 118 136.
8   
 
97.3 215.3 144 
Kenya 1,200,000 6.7 228.6 462.1 39.6 268.2 224 
Mozamb
ique 
1,300,000 12.2 92.1 278.
8   
 
29.7 121.8 94 
Namibia 210,000 21.3 64 3,298.
0   
 
26 90 429 
Nigeria 3,600,000 5.4 179.8 645.9 28.2 208 58 
Rwanda 250,000 5.1 90.6 225.
8   
 
23.3 113.9 456 
South 
Africa 
5,300,000 21.5 221.5 4,892.0 66.1 287.6 54 
Tanzani
a 
1,600,000 8.8 175.5 349.
6   
 
134.9 310.4 194 
Uganda 530,000 4.1 215.1 286.
0   
 
119.3 334.4 631 
Zambia 1,800,000 16.5 196.7 556.7 117.1 313.8 341 
 
Sources: adapted from Patterson (2006:166-167), compiled from WHO (2004), OGAC 
(2004a), UNAIDS (2004b), GFATM (2006a) and World Bank data (2004) 
* The World Bank data are available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?page=2 last consultation June 8, 
2015. 
 
The NEPAD’s conception of development not only places Africa at the apex of 
the global agenda but also integrates economic growth and political democracy, thus 
providing an African platform to engage the international community in a dynamic 
partnership. Its vision focuses on promoting accelerated economic growth and sustainable 
development to eradicate widespread and severe poverty and halt the marginalization of 
the African continent in a globalized world. Besides, it targets at empowering women as 
an important contribution to the labor force to fully participate in the development of the 
African continent. These objectives have been construed around the assumptions that 
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good governance, democracy, human rights and conflict resolution are a prerequisite 
for investment and long-term economic growth. The NEPAD, therefore, appears like an 
institution seeking to comply with donors’ values in order to create incentives for 
increased investment, capital flows and funding, essential to Africa’s economic 
development and conditions for its regional and international partnership.1 
                                                
1 In July 2001, a New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) was adopted in July 2001 
at the Lusaka OAU Summit and received enthusiastic support by Africa’s development external 
partners such as the G7/8 and EU member states. They viewed the initiative as an effort towards 
development by African leaders, for African states, to be implemented by Africans. To 
understand NEPAD’s momentum and the enthusiastic support it received, it is important to 
consider the conditions that favored its creation and the problems it offered to solve. NEPAD 
resulted from the merging of two plans for Africa’s economic regeneration: the Millennium 
Partnership for the African Recovery Program (MAP), and the OMEGA Plan for Africa. The 
former stems from the mandate given to President Mbeki of South Africa and President 
Bouteflika of Algeria during the Organization of Africa’s Unity (OAU) Summit in 1999 to 
engage Africa’s creditors on the total cancellation of external debt. The following year, at the 
Havana, Cuba, the Non-Alignment Movement and the G-77 Summit, Presidents Mbeki of South 
Africa and Obasanjo of Nigeria were mandated to convey concerns of the South to the G-8 and 
the Bretton Woods institutions. Given that these two mandates were similar in focus and 
proposed the cancellation of external debt, the three African Heads of State earnestly engaged the 
G-8 at the July 2000 Summit in Japan to obtain the cancellation of Africa’s external debt.  
In March 2001, at the Organization of African Union (OAU) Summit in Sirte, Libya, Senegal 
President Wade’s proposed OMEGA Plan for Africa evaluated the failures of development in the 
past years. As he observed, “since the 1970s, Africa has gone through economic and social 
difficulties that are gradually edging it out of the mainstream of world affairs.” The Third World 
leaders had already tried to negotiate already in the mid-1970s a New International Economic 
Order, which was met with opposition in the North. The ensuing development programs – such as 
the Lagos Plan of Action (1980-2000) and the Final Act of Lagos (1980); Africa’s Priority 
Program for Economic Recovery (APPER) 1986-1990, which was later converted into the United 
Nations Program of Action for Africa’s Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD) 
(1986); the 1985-1995 Industrial Development Decade for Africa (IDDA), the UN New Agenda 
for the Development of Africa in the 1990s (UN-NADAF, 1991) – failed to yield the expected 
development results (Anyang’ Nyong’o and alii 2002:3). Joined by the President of Egypt, 
Mubarak, five Heads of States including South African Thabo Mbeki, Nigerian Olesegun 
Obasanjo, Algerian Bouteflika and Senegalese Abdoulaye Wade received the mandate to merge 
the MAP and the OMEGA Plan into one comprehensive framework for Africa’s development. 
The NEPAD was thus born as a combination of a new vision for Africa’s development informed 
by the assessment of past failures. Not only that, but the NEPAD also took into account the new 
world order and the globalization of economy as well as past failures and plans for development.  
The NEPAD was designed to address Africa’s development quagmires. Its conception of 
development places Africa at the apex of the global agenda and integrates economic growth and 
political democracy, thus providing an African platform with which to engage the international 
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A response from Western donors came one year later, through the new criteria 
for foreign aid allocation that emerged from the UN meeting on Financing for 
Development International Conference in March 2002. The “Monterrey Consensus,” as it 
came to be known includes partnership with the recipient country or the ownership of the 
programs and proof of good governance, results-based approach and accountability, and a 
multisectoral engagement that avoids a state-oriented development and takes into account 
the private sector and different nongovernmental actors and the civil society. By focusing 
efforts and attention to only 15 focus countries with the highest HIV/AIDS prevalence 
rates, and by devolving responsibility to the recipient country’s ownership of the 
programs, the Monterrey Consensus principles came to be enshrined in the very fabric of 
PEPFAR, according to Mark Dybul (2009).  
In other words, focus on results (2-7-10), strong accountability measures 
(monitoring and evaluation mechanisms), and utilization of the private sector’s expertise 
and services (nongovernmental organization and faith-based organizations) in the 
implementation of PEPFAR account for the success achieved in the first five years of the 
program. Hence, specific countries with the highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rates with the 
lowest economic capabilities were included among the focus countries (See Table 12).  
                                                                                                                                            
community in a dynamic partnership. While the vision consists in promoting accelerated 
economic growth and sustainable development in order to eradicate widespread and severe 
poverty and to halt the marginalization of Africa in a globalized world, its targets also consist in 
empowering women as an important contribution to the labor force that would fully participate in 
the development of the African continent. As is obvious, these objectives have been construed 
around neoliberal assumptions as prerequisites for investment and long-term economic growth. 
The NEPAD, therefore, appears like an institutional framework seeking to comply with donors’ 
values in order to create incentives for increased investment, capital flows and funding, essential 
to Africa’s economic development and conditions for its regional and international partnership. 
  
237 
Table 12. Estimated HIV Prevalence in Major Regions (2001-2005): 
Region Adults  
(15-
49)* 
Million
s 
Numbe
r  
HIV+* 
Million
s 
HIV+  
2001 
 
Perce
nt 
HIV+ 
2001R*
* 
Percent 
HIV+ 
2005**
* 
Percent 
HIV + 
2005R
^ 
Percen
t 
Major 
HIV 
Risk 
Behavio
r Groups 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
291.3 26.0 9.0 7.6 7.2 6.1 Heterose
xual 
Caribbean 17.2 0.4 2.3 2.2 1.6 1.6 Heterose
xual 
South and 
Southeast 
Asia 
1031.5 5.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 FSW & 
IDU 
Latin 
America 
262.2 1.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 MSM & 
IDU 
East Europe 
& Central 
Asia 
209.0 1.0 0.5 0.4 0.9 0.8 IDU 
Western 
countries**
** 
373.5 1.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 MSM & 
IDU 
North Africa 
& Middle-
East 
180.5 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 --- 
East Asia & 
Pacific 
833.1 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 IDU 
Global 
Totals: 
3198.3 37.1 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.0  
*Adapted from the UNAIDS Global report, July 2002. **Adapted from the 
UNAIDS Global report, July 2003. ***Adapted from the UNAIDS Global report, 
December 2005. ****Includes N American countries, Western European 
countries, Australia and New Zealand. ^Adapted from UNAIDS 2006 report on 
the global AIDS epidemic (May 30, 2006) 
 
Source: Chin, James (2007:121) 
 
Other studies and reports by authorized commissions also concluded that as the 
countries hardest hit by HIV/AIDS were also those with the lowest GDP or income per 
capita, it was easy to conclude to a correlation between development and HIV/AIDS. As 
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some argued, “the objective conditions obtaining in Africa in the post-independence 
era showed quite clearly that underdevelopment was a historical phenomenon in which 
Western imperialism stood accused of depleting Africa’s resources and labor (…) Any 
attempts to come to terms with this unequal and structurally under-developing 
relationship call for drastically new arrangements in international relations in which 
Africa needed to recapture her role as a subject and not an object of her own history” 
(Anyang’ Nyong’o and alii 2002:27-28). Dybul (2011) also notes the reaction of “African 
Heads of State, First Ladies, Ministries of health, and local leaders from every sector 
[who] have pointed to PEPFAR as a great life saving measure that helped to usher a new 
era in development.” It had become obvious to the international community that poverty 
exacerbates a country’s efforts to improve the welfare of its citizens, especially with 
regard to the public health and that there was no way the Bush administration could 
tackle the issue of HIV/AIDS in Africa without first addressing the challenges of 
development and poverty posed to the continent (IOM 2007:49). 
PEPFAR focus countries’ selectivity criteria. As it remains true that Africa, 
more than the rest of the world, has suffered the heaviest blow from the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic, how can we explain this epidemiological difference or the African HIV/AIDS 
exceptionalism? The PEPFAR focus countries are said, indeed, to represent more than 
half the world’s HIV prevalence. By the time the program was created in January 2003, 
Africa and the Caribbean accounted for more than 75 percent of the estimated 42 million 
individuals infected with HIV or living with AIDS around the world according to the U.S. 
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Public Law 108-25:7122 (See Table 1). The IOM describes, in its implementation 
Report of PEPFAR, the classification of countries by HIV prevalence rates. “The 
epidemics can be described in terms of geography or subpopulations affected within 
larger populations, and involve different transmission patterns that result from varying 
patters of behaviors conducive to spread of the virus” (IOM 2007:38). This classification 
by HIV prevalence rates at country-level is put in three categories, with numeric 
indicators: low, concentrated, and generalized.  
The “low infection countries” are those countries where little HIV is measured in 
any group, and the surveillance systems focus largely on high-risk behaviors. The 
“concentrated infection countries” are those where HIV prevalence is spread out within 
subpopulations, largely confined to individuals or groups with higher-risk behaviors. 
These groups mostly include sex workers, men having sex with men, and IDUs, although 
the infection is not well established in the general population. “For countries with low-
level or concentrated epidemics, HIV estimates are based on studies among key 
populations who are at higher risk of HIV exposure – such as people who inject drugs, 
sex workers, or men who have sex with men” (UNAIDS 2013:3).3 The “generalized 
infection countries” are those within which HIV infection is firmly established in the 
general population with the prevalence rate over 1 percent in the general population 
(IOM 2007:40). A state is low if the HIV prevalence is smaller than 5 percent in the Key 
populations, which include sex workers, men who have sex with men, and people who 
                                                
2  See the H.R. 1298 United States Leadership Against HV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act 
of 2003, which President Bush signed into law on May 27, 2003. 
 
3http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/en/media/unaids/contentassets/documents/epidemiology
/2013/gr2013/20131118_Methodology.pdf  
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use injecting drugs. It is concentrated if the prevalence is greater than 5 percent 
within the same population. None of the focus countries is characterized by this state of 
low or concentrated infection.  
The poverty theory of Africa’s high HIV prevalence rates insists also on the 
importance of a person’s immune system response to HIV and how malnutrition depletes 
the system, making the person more susceptible to parasitic infections. In Stillwaggon’s 
(2006:7) words, “[t]he conditions of poverty increase HIV susceptibility, not only to 
opportunistic diseases after HIV infection but also to HIV transmission itself, just as they 
increase susceptibility to other infectious diseases.” Besides the poverty argument, others 
have correlated the African high HIV prevalence rates with cultural sexual behavior and 
insist on behavioral changes for spread containment and prevention of new infections. 
Hence, to explain how Africa became the epidemics global epicenter in the first place, 
others regard poverty as the etiological explanation of HIV spread. Stillwaggon (2006:5) 
contends that although the immediate cause of much HIV transmission in sub-Saharan 
Africa and other very poor regions is heterosexual intercourse, “the individual 
transmission and epidemic spread of HIV are not simply mathematical functions of 
sexual behavior.” Poor regions provide a different terrain for the spread of infectious 
diseases as compared to the conditions in industrialized countries. As she notes, 
Durban, South Africa, in 2000 begins with the acknowledgement that HIV 
disproportionately afflicts poor countries. Rarely is that statement accompanied 
by an adequate analysis of how poverty contributes to the spread of AIDS, and 
then only to suggest that poverty can provide the impetus to risky behaviors, 
which is certainly true, but it is only part of the story (idem, 11). 
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Likewise, Whiteside (2006) contends that due to poor healthcare infrastructure as 
well as deficit in nutrients and malnutrition that weaken the body’s immune system, 
poverty is the cause of widespread HIV infections in Africa. It creates a favorable 
biological terrain for infections while depleting the immune responses for lack of proteins, 
iron, vitamin-A, is conducive to conditions of decrease in disease resistance. Thus, the 
HIV/AIDS crisis has come to represent one of the strongest factors of Africa’s 
development, welfare, and poverty given the economic consequences of repeated funerals, 
work absenteeism, and cost of treatment as well as the correlation between AIDS political 
instability and conflicts, and the social effects on orphans and vulnerable children.  
While scholars agree that the most common way of HIV transmission in Africa is 
through heterosexual contacts, they fail to agree on what might explain the widespread 
variation in HIV prevalence within the continent. Arguably, up to 80-90 percent of 
Africa’s HIV infection rates come through heterosexual contacts while only 5-35 percent 
come through mother-to-child transmission infections and 5-10 percent of new infections 
are accounted for by health care procedures such as blood transfusion and medical 
injections. There is thus a deep-seated presumption, almost a myth, about the African 
sexualized society and hypersexual performances, a stereotype that “hijacked the AIDS-
in-Africa discourse” and continues to inform the prevention policies on behavioral 
changes. These general trends, however, do not explain the generalized infection existing 
within particular regions. In fact, there are particularities and variations of HIV 
prevalence across Africa that the cultural behavioral explanation may not explain (IOM 
2007:63). Either way, whether facilitated by economic poverty or sexual cultural 
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behavior, it remains undeniable that sound policies that can defeat the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic in Africa will always have to do with the conditions of Africa’s socioeconomic 
development. 
Many Africans and Africanists have reacted to these views, claiming that colonial 
tropes and postcolonial representations continued to depict Africans as being ruled by 
base sexual instincts. For instance, Paula Treichler (1999) notes that,  
Deeply entrenched institutional agendas and cultural precedents in the First World 
prevent us from hearing the story of AIDS in the Third World as a complex 
narrative… In concrete terms, we need to forsake, at least part of the time, the 
coherent AIDS narrative of the Western professional and technological agencies 
and listen instead to multiple sources about and within the Third World (quoted 
by Downing 2005:23). 
 
This view confronts the outcry against South Africa President Mbeki’s position that 
revoked the established theory of Africans’ promiscuity and unbridled sexual behavior – 
a theory that puts the responsibility of the HIV/AIDS public health crisis in Africa on 
Africans and the HIV, thus diverting the policy attention away from the real issue of 
history, poverty, politics, and economics.4 President Mbeki’s view sought to include 
iatrogenic aspects of HIV infections such as contaminated blood transfusions, unsterile 
medical instruments, malnutrition leading to a natural weak immune system, and the 
social infrastructures that account for Africa’s poverty.  
Hence, the policy advocating the altering of African traditions, sexual behavior, or 
promiscuous lifestyles – as if Africa was that exception with regard to the political and 
                                                
4 President Thabo Mbeki’s “Speech at the Opening Session of the 13th International AIDS 
Conference” on July 9, 2000 argues that the story of HIV and AIDS in Africa concerns not only 
the virus as a causal agent but also should be concerned by other factors including lack of basic 
hygiene, water, food and nourishment, education, and other social determinants. The speech can 
be found at the following link: http://www.dst.uff.br/revista13-1-2001/Cap%204%20-
%20Speech%20of%20the%20president.pdf (last view, July 31, 2015). 
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social economy of sex – to win the war on the HIV/AIDS pandemic was not only 
misguided but also contemptuous. While some leaders situated the discourse on 
HIV/AIDS in Africa in the long line of history of Western representation of Africa as a 
gloomy place where nothing works – a perspective tainted with Eurocentric colonial 
biases, others were keen on acknowledging the HIV/AIDS epidemic and on combatting it 
fiercely. It remains important, therefore, to look at how these two approaches relate to the 
fight on poverty and the history of development policies toward Africa. In other words, it 
is crucial to understand how the US global politics of HIV/AIDS embodied in PEPFAR 
and its focus countries related to the shift in the understanding and the new 
conditionalities of US foreign aid allocation in the Cold War’s aftermath. 
HIV/AIDS and US-Africa development policy. The idea that HIV/AIDS 
prevalence in Africa is an outcome of poverty has its proponents and its detractors. When 
these international financial institutions (IFIs) discussed countries to benefit from this 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative in 1996, Africa alone represented 33 
out of the initial 41 HIPC worldwide. Chege (2001) notes that The Economist of May 13, 
2000 rendered the verdict about Africa as a helpless continent. Central Africa was 
depicted as “the epicenter of gravest inter-state conflict in African history, characterized 
by a series of interlocking wars from the Horn of Africa to Angola.” Yet, the 
humanitarian tragedy behind the battle lines defies description. As a result, the gloomy 
depiction of Africa by the turning of the new Millennium was the argument used by those 
in favor of revamping the foreign aid structure in spite of policy makers’ misgivings 
about aid efficacy. As the infection rates of While HIV/AIDS in 1999 in four key 
  
244 
countries, i.e., Uganda, Rwanda, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, ranged between 10 and 25 
percent of the total adult population, “Poor economic growth rates and anxiety over once-
promising states like Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, and Zimbabwe compound these tragedies” 
(Chege 2001:225). 
In 2001, the WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (CMH) 
concluded that AIDS, Malaria, Tuberculosis and other preventable diseases had severe 
perverse effects on African economies and caused further poverty, although it should be 
recognized that these epidemics were also caused by poverty. Thus, the causation may 
run in both directions (Sachs 2005:197, 204-8; Dietrich 2005:271; Banjo 2010:146). As a 
matter of fact, three-quarters of the 12 African focus countries belong to the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) list of the HIPC. While advocacy groups 
and the global civil society established an inherent correlation between Africa’s poverty 
and the widespread HIV infection as a vicious circle, scholars are not unanimous on this 
correlation between poverty and HIV/AIDS in Africa. Following the strong criticisms 
voices against Western donor countries on foreign aid conditionalities, enforcing the 
World Bank and IMF’s Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in Africa, a global 
movement ensued asking for the cancellation of African countries sovereign debt, it was 
no coincidence that most PEPFAR focus countries were identified among the heavily 
indebted poor countries in Africa. 
As the whole philosophy underlying the foreign aid system was being challenged 
within the US domestic politics and in the global community, a new rationalization was 
needed to justify the continuation of the aid industry. The perverse effects of the foreign 
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aid allocation from the 1960s to the early 2000s, mostly as a function of the structural 
adjustment policies since the 1980s, were obviously in direct relation with the sovereign 
debt incurred by African countries, let alone the persistence of poverty. Given President 
Bush’s conservative outlook, it was clear that foreign aid should not be granted for the 
sake of aid. Rather, in an effort to move away from the Cold War paternalistic approach, 
he thought that aid should be used as an instrument in his transformational diplomacy that 
aimed at incorporating good governance, results delivery, accountability, and partnership 
of African countries. If we look closely at these conditions, it becomes clearer that they 
are no different from the neoliberal SAPs of old that advocated deregulation, free market, 
and the privatization approach. Only the vocabulary was slightly different. As a result, 
PEPFAR was President Bush’s first and best opportunity to implement the Republican’s 
sought-after change in US foreign aid system after the Cold War.  
As noted earlier, the fight against HIV/AIDS in Africa is closely tied to issues of 
Africa’s plight of poverty and lack of development. “The relationship between poverty 
and HIV/AIDS is so blatant although many – the IMF and the World Bank – fail to see it. 
The IMF doesn’t understand the combined ravages of HIV/AIDS and poverty,” 
concludes Lewis (2006:14). Craddock (2010:251) also observes, on the other hand, that 
designating the HIV/AIDS pandemic as a security and development issue at the 
beginning of the new Millennium set the stage for US policy makers to increase financial 
and political attention on regions of Africa heavily affected by the disease. Patterson 
(2006) also concurs that political commitment of donor countries, in the wake of the 
world leaders’ agreement in 2001 through the United Nations Declaration on 
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Commitment on HIV/AIDS, is essential in the fight against the pandemic. Indeed, 
after the lost decade of the 1990s, more and more governmental and nongovernmental 
actors were showing a growing interest in the global HIV/AIDS pandemic.  
In 2000, when the UN Security Council raised the pandemic at the level 
international security threat, other international institutions were paying heed to the 
correlation between poverty and the wide spread HIV prevalence in Africa. At the 
opening of the African Development Forum on leadership and AIDS in December 2000, 
“Dr Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity, opened 
the Forum by saying, ‘There is a dire need to reorient the concept of national security to 
transcend the invasion of borders and threats to government… Our societies, in their 
entirety, have to enter into a combat mode for liberating themselves from the 
[HIV/AIDS] pandemic” (quoted by De Waal 2006:106). The issue of resources was, 
obviously, one of the most challenging problems of poor countries to finance programs 
dealing with HIV/AIDS. The Africa Development Forum called for a new financing for 
HIV/AIDS in Africa, a call that was repeated four months later at the summit of African 
nations on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and other infectious diseases, in Abuja, Nigeria. In 
response to the many calls for a new way of funding for development, debt cancellation, 
and HIV/AIDS in Africa, the World Bank developed its Africa Multi-Sectoral AIDS 
Program (MAP) that was committed to provide long-term support to combat HIV/AIDS 
and mitigate its impacts in as many countries as possible in Africa.5 
                                                
5 Oomman, Nandini, “Overview of the World Bank’s Response to HIV/AIDS Epidemic in Africa 
With a Focus on the Multi-Sectoral HIV/AIDS Program,” (no date), Center for Global 
Development. Available online at: http://www.cgdev.org/page/overview-world-
  
247 
Discussing the reorientation and challenges to foreign policy allocation 
system in the new Millennium, Donald and Keller (2006) identify the crisis in the 
sovereign debt as exacerbating poverty, underdevelopment, and the social conditions of 
the poor including the public health crisis caused by the HIV/AIDS pandemic. On March 
24, 1999, the US Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) had issued a statement 
entitled A Jubilee Call for Debt Forgiveness, calling the American government to make 
sure that resources freed from debt cancellation are used for poverty reduction, economic 
policy reforms, good governance, and mechanisms that ensured accountability and policy 
participation to promote sustainable development of poor countries.6 Summarizing the 
demands of the Jubilee Coalition, which was the international alliance of religious groups 
and other activists who have done such a superb job driving the cancellation of debt with 
regard to the upcoming new Millennium, Stephen Lewis (2006:141) attests that the 
cancellation of agricultural subsidies, which distort the market in disfavor of African 
competitors, as well as the cancellation of Africa’s sovereign debt incurred as a result of 
bad Western policies were high priority on the policy agenda. In fact, the World Trade 
Organization Doha Round in 2001 discussed issues of Intellectual Property Rights and 
agricultural subsidies as the European Union and the US subsidize their farmers to the 
tune of $350 billion a year. Even if trade is presented as the panacea for Africa’s 
development – trade not aid slogan – it is obvious that the international rules already 
                                                                                                                                            
bank%E2%80%99s-response-hivaids-epidemic-africa-focus-multi-country-hivaids-program-map 
Last access, June 11, 2015. 
 
6 Available at http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/debt-relief/jubilee-
debt-forgiveness.cfm. Last accessed on June 8, 2015. 
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favor the developed countries to the disadvantage of African countries. Lewis 
substantiates this argument by showing how Africa’s global trade output declined from 3 
to 1 percent during the years under the Uruguay round.  
As funding the HIV/AIDS programs in the developing before the creation of the 
GFATM in 2002 and PEPFAR in 2003 was a crucial problem, there is no way one could 
talk about issues of funding for international HIV/AIDS programs in Africa without 
touching on questions related to the history of poverty and the evolution of development 
policies to eradicate Africa’s poverty. Historians, economists, philosophers, and social 
scientists have tried to understand the causes of poverty and why it persists in some 
environments and not in others. I limit my overview of their conclusions only to a few 
scholars for the sake of time and space. Thomas Pogge’s (2002) analysis, for instance, 
considers the sophistication of identifying factors of poverty in certain contexts with such 
variables like institutionalized corruption and individual laziness in poor countries as 
fallacious. For this author, the global institutional order is responsible for the persisting 
poverty and impoverishment of some areas of the world. Likewise, Stephen Lewis 
observes that the conclusion of a high UN debate on Africa’s condition is an outcome of 
historical forces. “The problems of Africa are explained, in part, by colonialism, and in 
part by the failings of the African leadership itself” (Lewis 2006:8). The decolonization 
process not only was rushed, leaving Africa in need of expertise, but also the Cold War 
support of despots left Africa trapped in international clientelism. As the Cold War was 
drawing to an end, the IFIs launched the now infamous structural adjustment programs in 
the late eighties and nineties, making foreign aid allocation conditional to embracing 
  
249 
neoliberal policies. As Lewis contends, this Reaganomics expansionism to Africa not 
only reinforced the international patrimonialism but also ended up shredding the social 
sector in order to become eligible for the Bank and the Fund’s loans. The result of the 
SAPs was simply to intensify Africa’s poverty.7  
For Pogge, as well as Lewis, it is fallacious to claim that global structures and 
economic order are benefiting the poor. Instead, they exacerbate poverty while also they 
permit judging the poor harshly because the details and fixtures of this global order are 
fixed in international negotiations in which Western industrialized governments enjoy a 
crushing advantage in bargaining power and expertise (Pogge 2002:20). By the turn of 
the new Millennium, the major three Western development policies in Africa, i.e., foreign 
aid, sovereign debt, and foreign trade, were scrutinized by scholars and activists to show 
how they distorted the very development they claimed to foster. As criticisms debunked 
the shortcomings of these policies, showing how they rather maintained a global order 
status quo that skewed Africa’s welfare, the generosity and good will of Western donors 
was called into question. In fact, the very generosity of aid donors had slowed down 
during the 1990s following the end of the Cold War. As a result, scholars began to 
reexamine the rationale of Western donors’ aid allocation.  
Lancaster defines this rationale during the Cold War as “being principally a tool 
of statecraft, employed to encourage or reward politically desirable behavior on the part 
                                                
7 Michael Kelly observes, however, that none of the criticisms addressed to the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund for their structural adjustment policies is suggesting that these 
institutions maliciously planned to stifle Africa or caused AIDS. Instead, the insinuation is that 
“these policies have contributed significantly to consolidating the pandemic’s foothold in African 
countries.” Such unintended consequence and unforen outcomes inadvertently paved the way for 
conditions that increased the vulnerability of the people to the pandemic that many critics gesture 
towards (Kelly 2010:144). 
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of recipients” (quoted by UNCTAC 2006:5). Studies about the foreign aid allocation 
selectivity criteria in the post-Cold War period showed that economic growth, poverty 
reduction, or the needs of the recipient countries did not constitute a priority for deciding 
on the recipient or the volume of foreign aid. Alesina and Dollar (2000:33) find evidence 
that the pattern of aid giving during and after the Cold War was dictated by political and 
strategic considerations. A friendly regime, whether democratic or not, receives more aid 
than an unfriendly regime with similar needs or even with a greater level of poverty. As 
these authors acknowledge, nonetheless, countries that democratized since the end of the 
Cold War received up to 50 percent increase in aid although cross-country differences, to 
a large but not exclusive extent, are still explained by political factors, including colonial 
ties, alliances, or strategic interests. Another study by Dollar and Levin (2006) concludes 
that multilateral aid tends to follow selective incentives such as country’s institutions and 
policies whereas bilateral aid does not.  
That is, there seems to be no direct correlation between the overall volume of aid 
and the recipient’s achievements in terms of economic growth and social development, 
however, multilateral aid donor institutions favor countries with good institutions and 
policies that become important determinants of aid. Others have also showed that 
political and strategic interests competed with concerns for growth, poverty reduction, 
and other economic objectives in aid allocation, at least until the 1990s. Changes in the 
global economic order after the end of the Cold War, however, removed the geopolitical 
concerns while a new approach to development was included in the selectivity criteria. 
Mostly, this post-Cold War aid allocation approach looked also at private donors and 
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nongovernmental actors for the implementation of programs. This is visible in 
policies such as the MDGs, the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy, and the debt 
relief through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (Claessens, Cassimon, and 
Van Campenhout 2009). 
This brief survey of the foreign aid selectivity literature brings us to cast a fresh 
look at the shift in the US foreign aid allocation to Africa after the 2002 Monterrey 
Consensus Financing for Development. Indeed, it is remarkable that global funds for 
AIDS programs increased from 2 percent to 10 percent of Africa’s official development 
assistance (ODA) (UNAIDS 2004:21; De Waal 2006:114). ODA fixed the amount of 
contribution of the G7 to 0.7% of their GNP. On the other hand, the campaign for debt 
cancellation was tied to the aid allocation regime. While Africa acquired $294 billion of 
debt between 1970 and 2002, the damage done by the debt service is indescribable. 
Former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere is quoted demanding “Must we starve our 
children to pay our debts?” Yet, although Africa serviced back up to $260 billion mostly 
in interest over the same period of time, it still owed $230 billion in debt by 2002. How 
was the debt contracted in the first place? Of course through the allocation of loans to 
African dictators during the Cold War who were maintained in power, for the sake of 
geopolitical struggles between the West and the East, in spite of poor governance, 
accountability, and corruption.  
Another aspect of the criticism of foreign aid flows to Africa comes from 
ActionAid, which claims that 60 percent of ODA should simply be called phantom aid 
since it goes to technical assistance (consultants and expertise from the developed 
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countries), tied aid (purchase of goods and services from the donor country’s own 
firms), and administrative costs (inflated overhead). Jeffrey Sachs (2008:31) also claims, 
authoritatively, that only one-third of the pledged money to aid in the US gets disbursed. 
As it was shaped during the Cold War, foreign assistance could not stir Africa’s 
economic development. As obviously as one Congressional Research Service report puts 
it, “Most foreign aid is used for procurement of US goods and services” although this 
may vary by programs. In FY 2004, for instance, up to 87% of military aid financing was 
spent on procurement of US military equipment and training while the remaining 13% 
were funds allocated to Israel for procurement within that country (Tarnoff and Nowels 
2005:21). PEFAR, which President Bush called a medical Marshall Plan for Africa is no 
exception even though the time and context had changed from the Cold War era. Still, the 
US economic interests remained the same.  
In spite of unanimous recognition of the deleterious impacts of the SAPs on social 
development and economic growth in developing countries, Western developed countries 
responded by reexamining a new framework for the conditions of foreign aid allocation 
to finance development. The understanding that African economic growth depended on 
the cancellation of its foreign debt, a sustainable policy to foster development, became 
evident to many pro-Africa constituencies in the United States. Many analysts and 
advocates for the African cause also linked the fact that HIV prevalence was higher in 
African countries, suggesting there is a correlation between HIV/AIDS and poverty. A 
whole stream of scholarship regards poverty as a crucial factor determining not only the 
HIV high prevalence in Africa but also the donors’ foreign aid allocation preferences. 
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While the AIDS disease exacerbates the crippling of Africa’s development and 
economic growth, the consequences of poverty compound the progression of HIV/AIDS.  
The Human Development Index (HDI) proposes criteria for measuring 
development including the following indicators: health and the longevity of life measured 
in life expectancy at birth; education and knowledge measured as adult literacy rate; and 
decent standard of living measured by log of the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
at purchasing power parity (PPP). While the life expectancy in Africa rose from 36 years 
in the early 1950s to 52 years in the 1990s, it dropped to 46.7 years in 2000 because of 
AIDS (Barnett and Whiteside 2006:24). Referring to the 2004 UNAIDS (2004a:25) 
report, Patterson (2006:7) suggests an even further catastrophic drop below 40 years in 
some countries, including Botswana, Swaziland, Zambia, Malawi, and Zimbabwe. In 
short, AIDS causes poverty not only in that illness and deaths are expensive but also 
because the cost of work absenteeism is high and affect the economic of the family and 
the growth prospects of the country. As the 21 countries with the highest HIV prevalence 
are found in Africa, the uneven HIV infections distribution across different geographic 
locations shows that the epidemic is rather a complex and diverse issue even within the 
continent. Nonetheless, it remains paradoxical that countries with more resources, such as 
South Africa and Botswana that are among the highest GDP per capita in Africa, also 
belong to those with the highest HIV prevalence rates. Actually, 9 of the 12 African focus 
countries figure among the World Bank’s classification of the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC).  
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As a result, allocation of US foreign aid through PEPFAR cannot be 
understood or interpreted in isolation from the evolution of the US foreign aid system. 
When African countries and the international community were looking for new sources 
of funds in early 2000s to defeat the global HIV/AIDS pandemic, President Bush 
announced the creation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) at the 2002 
Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development. Since Africa had received by 2001 
up to $14 billion in foreign aid, yet its economic growth was flat, even worse than in the 
1970s, as President Bush notes. In light of the New Millennium Development Goals, the 
centerpiece of his new approach to economic development were the principles of 
partnership and accountability in which case eligibility criteria were based on lack of 
corruption, market-based economic policies, and investment in health and education. This 
move is the indication that the Bush administration was determined to shift the goals and 
conditions of US foreign aid allocation. Hence, in answer to the question why PEPFAR 
attributed the lion’s share of its budget to a few selected countries, most of which are 
based in sub-Sahara Africa, this chapter reveals the Bush administration’s determination 
to adapt the foreign aid allocation selectivity criteria to its neoliberal worldview. That is, 
the guiding principles used to include some countries and not others among PEPFAR 
beneficiaries remained the administration’s focus on the recipient’s alignment with the 
donor’s preferences.   
The Uganda HIV/AIDS Success Story Showcase 
Uganda has been presented both as an economic success story and a country 
unique on the African continent and in the global efforts to fight the HIV/AIDS pandemic. 
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Many studies mention the Ugandan HIV/AIDS prevalence rate in the early 1990s as 
high as 30 percent, which reportedly dropped to reach as low as 6 percent by 2001. As 
Kuhanen (2008:316) notes, scholars have debated Uganda’s success story. 
As the first country in the world to reverse a generalized HIV epidemic, it has 
become commonplace to praise Uganda as a success story in terms of prevention. 
As the HIV prevalence fell from about 25-30 percent in some of the worst 
affected urban areas to 5-10 percent at most rural and urban surveillance sites by 
2001, academics and specialists working with AIDS in Uganda remained divided 
about what actually worked in Uganda and why.  
 
When the HIV/AIDS epidemic during the 1980s and 1990s posed a general threat to the 
whole of Ugandan society, and when sexual behavior represented a health hazard to the 
military, the workforce, the youth, women’s reproductive health, the decline in HIV 
prevalence rates tends to confirm the success story of Uganda. Two main reasons are 
provided to account for the dramatic change achieved by the Ugandan government: first, 
the political leadership of President Yoweri Museveni in speaking out publically about 
the epidemic; second, Uganda’s prevention policies that underscored abstinence – being 
faithful – or condom use (ABC) model (Patterson 2006).  
Uganda came under the spotlight of international media from the late 1990s 
onwards, “as the first country in sub-Saharan Africa that has managed to reverse a 
generalized HIV epidemic” while the epidemic continued to spread and intensify in the 
early and mid-1990s in Africa and other areas of the world (Kuhanen 2008:301). While 
Uganda’s prevalence rates were reported to be declining, especially starting around 1993, 
the US National Intelligence Council (NIC) reported a new wave of HIV/AIDS pandemic 
spreading in countries of significant strategic importance to the United States such as 
China, Russia, and India.  In fact, Uganda had succeeded in bringing down its HIV 
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prevalence rates from 18.3 percent in rural areas and 30 percent in the towns in 1992 
to roughly 6 percent in 2001. Mortality rates for infants under the age of 5 have fallen 
significantly to 86.1 infant deaths per 1,000 live births in 2013 from 178.0 in 1990 and 
102.1 in 2010. Yet, the life expectancy of Ugandans has gone up to 59 years from 47.5 
years in 1990.8 It remains crucial, however, to put the Ugandan showcase in historic 
context. While other African countries could learn from the Ugandan model, what has 
been lacking to them that only Uganda was able to successfully follow a path that led to 
HIV prevalence decline? How can the Ugandan success story be explained?  
Kuhanen’s (2008) historiography of the epidemic in Uganda constitutes a good 
starting point as an attempt to explain the evolution of HIV/AIDS in Uganda. This study 
maps the scholarly efforts to account for the origins, the spread, and the policy response 
to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Uganda. In 1982, almost as early as the epidemic was 
identified in the United States, HIV/AIDS was first identified in Uganda on the shores of 
Lake Victoria in the Rakai District. Uganda is a landlocked African country that covers 
an area of 236, 036 Square kilometers. It is surrounded on the east by Kenya, on the south 
by Tanzania and Rwanda, on the west by The Democratic Republic of the Congo, and by 
South Sudan on the north. Known in Uganda as the “slim disease,” because those with 
AIDS lost weight considerably, the social and political contexts of the 1980s had 
exacerbated the spread and virulence of HIV/AIDS. By the late 1980s, the disease had 
progressed to other parts of the country, even though it remained initially concentrated in 
urban and semi-urban centers. In fact, the epidemic was mostly concentrated within “the 
populations occupying the major stopping centers for truck drivers along the trans-
                                                
8 http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/uganda/life-expectancy-at-birth, last visit, May 29, 2015. 
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African highway” (Tumushabe 2006:9). Along with the context of war in the 1980s, 
the impacts of social dislocation, political insecurity, and economic crises are cited 
among others factors explaining the widespread reach of the epidemic. These factors 
concurred to make Uganda a friendly location for the spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.  
By 1998, Uganda tallied a total of 1.9 million cases with up to 12 percent of all 
deaths in that same year attributed to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. In 2001, the Ugandan 
Ministry of Health reported that AIDS had taken over malaria as the leading cause of 
death among the population between 12-49 years. Patients with HIV/AIDS-related 
illnesses “hospital bed occupancy” had increased to 70 percent in 2000 from 55 percent 
in 1997 and the Ugandan health care system was strained to a breaking point. As a result, 
more than 800,000 Ugandans had lost their lives to HIV/AIDS by 2002 and almost 2 
million children were left orphans to either one or both parents due to the epidemic 
(McAdam 2003). The devastating consequences of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Uganda 
affected not only the lives of ordinary Ugandans and their communities but also it 
affected such institutions as the military. Hence, Susan Hunter (2003) approached the 
HIV/AIDS problem in Uganda through one of its gravest social and human consequences, 
namely the growing number of orphans. Most scholars writing on the subject in the early 
1990s like Bond and Vincent (1991) consider the socioeconomic and cultural 
infrastructure as the major determinants that can help explain the rapid spread of the 
epidemic in Uganda until 1992. In relation to this view, Kuhanen (2008:310) notes,  
Parts of Uganda that had been badly hit by war and state terror already had 
substantial orphan populations before the outbreak of HIV and AIDS, which then 
caused the numbers of orphans to explode in areas such as Rakai in southern 
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Uganda. [In] the communities struck by AIDS, (…) funeral were held nearly 
every day, weddings had almost ceased, and fertility had declined markedly. 
  
On the other hand, Bond and Vincent (1991) claim that the social context and changing 
economic structure of the late 1980s, such as the warfare, the emergence of a black 
market and informal economy known as “magendo,” and the transnational networks of 
trade and migration between Kampala, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Rwanda, Burundi, and 
Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) constituted the most crucial factors that 
facilitated the transmission of HIV/AIDS in Uganda (Kuhanen 2008:310). Like 
Tumushabe (2006:9), these scholars conclude that the disease developed mostly along the 
axes of truck drivers, military warfare, and sex workers.  
Others have also identified socioeconomic factors behind the spread of HIV/AIDS 
in Uganda. Barnett and Blaikie (1992) in their analysis of the Rakai District attest to that 
the disruption of social structures as a crucial explanation of the spread of HIV/AIDS in 
Uganda. They describe the social context of the disease, which they call the “ecology of 
vulnerability,” which was linked to the advent of modern economy in Uganda. This 
pulled women from their traditional setting and thrust them into a system where they not 
only could not own land but also were compelled to struggle to support themselves and 
their children as they were left vulnerable and thus became prey to sexual exploitation. 
Unlike arguments that correlate high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Africa with lack of 
economic resources or with poverty, Obbo (1993) contends that Africa’s HIV infection is 
associated with wealth, education, and elite status. Accordingly, the African patriarchal 
culture, wherein ideas of masculinity and femininity were bound to sexual desires, paved 
the way in its networking to the diffusion of HIV/AIDS. Analyzing the economy of 
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African sexuality, Obbo demonstrates how men were pushed to show their manhood 
through sexual conquests and prowess while girls and women were expected to keep their 
place by being conquered, subjugated to male domination, submissive and faithful in 
marriage, and guardians of traditional values. In the end, those with power (men and the 
socially well-off), as well as educated women who possessed multiple opportunities for 
sexual adventures in towns and in rural areas, were more exposed to contracting the virus.  
President Museveni was quick to tackle the issue of HIV/AIDS as soon as he took 
power in 1986. He openly recognized the HIV/AIDS problem to the dismay of his peer 
African presidents. In his address at the International Conference on AIDS and STDs in 
Africa (ICASA) in 1995, he explained why he chose to give recognition to the epidemic 
as early as he came to power. First, he suggests that he had been made aware of the 
seriousness of HIV/AIDS by chance. Having sent 60 military men to Cuba for training, 
18 were reported HIV positive – that is, 30 percent of the total contingent. “At that time 
we did not carry out HIV tests because we thought that everybody was all right (…). 
When I went to the Non-Aligned summit in Harare that year [Cuban President] Fidel 
Castro took me aside and said: ‘You know there is a big problem in your country,’ and he 
told me the story” (quoted by Tumushabe 2006:8). In response to that situation, President 
Museveni arguably quarreled with Ugandan doctors and together they came up with a 
strategy to educate the people by openly discussing the HIV/AIDS matter. “You cannot 
leave this kind of problem to the doctors who, in any case, are so few. The political 
leadership must take the leading role in combating this disease” (idem, 9).  
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In October 1986, the administration created the national AIDS Control 
Program (ACP) given the threat posed primary to Museveni’s power base – the military. 
Arguably, “It was perhaps this threat to his power base, more than anything else, that 
provided the overwhelming motive for Museveni’s personal effort.” The mandate of the 
ACP consisted of monitoring the epidemic and establishing safety measures. It organized 
mass education campaigns about HIV/AIDS in which President Museveni participated 
personally to promote abstinence and condom use although no condom distribution 
system was started until 1990. In 1992, the Ugandan parliament mandated the creation of 
the Uganda AIDS Commission (UAC) to harmonize, integrate, and coordinate efforts to 
fight HIV/AIDS. However, this national multisectoral approach to implement guidelines 
and monitor activities on HIV/AIDS in the country was still funded, almost entirely, by 
international donors.  
Parkhust and Lush (2004) have noted the way that HIV prevalence had been 
dropping in Uganda, which can be seen as a direct result of Museveni’s leadership and 
the swift response by the government to address the issue. For his efforts and leadership 
in the fight against HIV/AIDS, President Museveni received international recognition at 
different forums, including the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Coolum, 
Australia, in 2002. As he claimed there, the HIV/AIDS prevalence in Uganda actually 
declined from the high 30 percent to reach 6.1 percent. These pronouncements assumed 
unequivocally that Uganda’s HIV/AIDS prevalence rates were as high as 30 percent in 
the early 1990s and the government succeeded in bringing them down through preventive 
policies. Lack of policy leadership can be a factor compounding the high HIV/AIDS 
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prevalence in Africa. For instance, Dixon et al. (2001:388) underscore the reluctance 
of African governments to plan an overall government response, “combined with the fact 
that fiscal crises and structural adjustment programmes,” which were already having 
adverse consequences on health budgets and the public health in general. Besides, the 
prevailing denial of most African leaders for reasons of national pride, social stigma and 
political interest self-interest allowed the HIV/AIDS epidemic to go rampant in Africa. 
Obviously, “[n]o politician wants to speak frankly about sex or challenge cultural 
patterns” (Patterson 2006:2). Yet, as Behrman (2004:45) points out, “[m]any leaders 
didn’t want to acknowledge the disease for fear it may divert foreign investment, cripple 
the local tourism industry. If their militaries were infected, they didn’t want their 
adversaries to know about it. Some leaders’ denial was even more visceral: they were 
worried that they themselves might be infected and couldn’t come to terms with it.”  
Some among African leaders regarded the Western Africa HIV/AIDS discourse as 
exaggerated and rejected the argument that HIV/AIDS was ravaging entire populations in 
Africa. They claimed this view to stem from the traditional image of Africa in the 
Western mind, an attempt to scapegoat the world’s evils on Africa. As Western scientists 
grandstanding painted “a near apocalyptic depiction of Africa” and inflated HIV/AIDS 
estimates, this planted the seed of “skepticism that would help breed denial among the 
continent’s leaders for the next decade and a half. African denial, in turn, would serve as 
a crutch for U.S. inaction,” as Behrman (2004:16) observes. This Western Afro-
pessimism infuriated African leaders. Among African leaders who denied the reality of 
HIV/AIDS during the 1990s was former Kenyan President, Daniel Arap Moi. In fact, 
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long before what has come to be regarded as President Mbeki’s infamous attitude 
toward HIV/AIDS, President Arap Moi stated that the West’s “African AIDS reports are 
new form of hate campaign” (quoted by Behrman, ibid).9 As Tumushabe (2006:9) puts it,  
“[s]ome of Uganda’s neighboring countries with strong economic and sociopolitical 
constituencies were naturally hesitant, albeit fatally, to acknowledge that their 
populations were dying of the most highly stigmatized human disease in modern times.” 
Yet, the strongest reaction came, of course, from South African president Thabo 
Mbeki who has become in the eyes of the international community the epitome of the 
denialist attitude. In April 2000, after rejecting appeals that the national assembly declare 
the AIDS pandemic a national emergency, he wrote to “then President Clinton and other 
heads of state defending dissident scientists who maintain that AIDS is not caused by 
HIV virus” (Copson 2005:4; Piot 2012:278). President Mbeki questioned both “the 
accuracy of data and the high degree of false positives that came up in HIV tests” and 
whether it was scientifically established that HIV causes AIDS. He argued that the 
“Koch’s postulates have not been fulfilled” in the case of HIV and AIDS. Besides, it has 
not been proven that any one has died from AIDS but rather from opportunistic diseases 
                                                
9 African and Africanist scholars concur that the Western discourse and approach to the complex 
history of HIV/AIDS in Africa obscures the voice of Africans as well as other dimensions 
pertaining to the HIV/AIDS issue such as the spiritual, communal, and sociological dimensions of 
the disease. For instance, Ugandan theologian Emmanuel Katongole (2007:115) affirms that the 
story of HIV and AIDS in Africa reveals serious disorders within “Africa’s modern ways of 
working, playing, and living.” He, too, refers to President Thabo Mbeki’s opening speech at the 
2000 Durban 13th International AIDS Conference (IAC) during which President Mbeki was the 
only one to take seriously the theme of the conference on “Breaking the Silence.” As Mbeki 
argued, “we could not blame everything on a single virus.” Instead, AIDS in Africa and the high 
prevalence of HIV are the outcome of extreme poverty. Obviously, the difference in the 
interpretation of the pandemic between Western and African discourses represents the clash of 
interests and the power differential among HIV/AIDS stakeholders. I shall return to this point in 
my concluding chapter and policy recommendation.  
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such as TB. Finally, after Mbeki discussed the efficacy of AZT and Nevirapin as well 
as the toxicity and side effects of the drugs, he made his point: the real problem is 
Western pharmaceutical companies that are trying to poison Africans (Piot 2012:279-
280). In July 2000, during his speech at the opening of the 13th IAC in Durban, he again 
reiterated the fact that extreme poverty was the biggest killer and the greatest cause of ill-
health in Africa, not AIDS. To be fair, President Mbeki was getting to the bottom of the 
problem and was raising awareness about whether HIV is the sole and only cause of 
AIDS; whether the epidemic should be defined in medical terms alone.10 Obviously, there 
are many co-factors including the context, social environment, and medical infrastructure 
that have been left out in the Western discourse on HIV/AIDS in Africa. Africans feel 
these conditions – sociological and historical – should be factored in if any policy to fight 
HIV/AIDS is to have any relevance and be productive at all (See also Horowitz 1997; 
Stillwaggon 2006; Patterson 2006).  
The variation in infection across the continent, of course, represents the problem 
about generalizing explanatory theories and policy solutions about HIV/AIDS in Africa. 
So let us set aside, at least for the time being, the question of HIV/AIDS prevalence 
statistical distribution across the continent and focus on the Ugandan case study. 
                                                
10 If discussion of the complex reality of HIV/AIDS in Africa is reduced to the sole scientific 
discourse about the virus infection to explain the pathology and etiology of AIDS, African 
thinkers believe there is much that we are losing in the discussion. This narrow focus is a result of 
the development of Western medicine in the 19th century that adopted the germ theory of disease 
beyond the miasma (ecological) and contagion theories that had dominated the field. Louis 
Pasteur’s discovery of the existence of pathogenic organisms gave the contagion theory more 
prominence than the miasma theory. As a result, the triumph of the contagion theory can help 
highlight the domination of virus-contagion approach to AIDS as well as the success of the 
medical and pharmaceutical industry favored by the West over a communitarian and spiritual care 
of the sick in the African context (Katongole 2007:112-114). 
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Tumushabe (2006) remarks the timing of the emergency of this Uganda’s HIV/AIDS 
success story rhetoric in the early 2000s as not being innocent. While President 
Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) – the political wing of his National 
Resistance Army (NRA) – after fighting the Obote government from 1980 to 1986 was 
credited for ousting a dictatorship, stabilizing the southern region of the country as well 
as its economy, Uganda adopted a new nationally accep constitution in 1995. In the 
following two years, presidential, parliamentary, and local government elections were 
successfully held with some degree of credibility. However, at the 2000 Africa 
Development Forum in Addis Ababa, in Ethiopia, President Museveni, it is argued, was 
searching for new international credibility given his regional politics, internal governance, 
and poor economic performance. He thus began presenting the Uganda success story in 
combatting HIV/AIDS, which President Bush echoed in the ensuing years because the 
ABC strategy was appealing to his conservative constituency and because Western 
donors were pressured to demonstrate results lest the money given in foreign aid to 
HIV/AIDS programs was also considered another foreign aid waste. Arguably, “the term 
ABC emerged as a dominant theme to represent the approaches that worked best in 
reducing the prevalence of HIV” in Uganda only around 2002 (Tumushabe 2006:10). 
In his speech at the 2000 Africa Development Forum, President Museveni 
claimed that Uganda had reduced the HIV/AIDS prevalence from 30 percent to 8 percent. 
This dramatic decline was welcomed and greatly applauded by the international 
community in search of a positive story to tell about global efforts in the fight on the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic. In Museveni’s words, 
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Uganda’s estimated prevalence rate reduced from around 30 percent in the 
early 1990s to around 8 percent in the late 1990s: the age of first sex among girls 
increased from 14 to 16 years; and from 14 to 17 among boys between 1995 and 
1998; sex with non-regular partners has also considerably reduced’ and condom 
use increased from 57.6 percent in 1995 to 76 percent in 1998. Next year, we shall 
require 80 million condoms. Most important of all, the stigma attached to people 
living with HIV/AIDS has virtually evaporated. (President Museveni at the 2000 
Africa Development Forum quoted by Tumushabe 2006:7). 
 
Most available literature in Uganda’s fight against HIV/AIDS regards two main factors as 
possible explanations of the Uganda’s success story. First, those who claim that 
behavioral change played a critical role in bringing about the outcome to be explained 
includes changes in individual sexual behavior through sticking to one partner, “zero 
grazing,” delayed commencement of sexual activity, or celibacy. Second, those who are 
critical of the behavioral approach also show skepticism in alleged decline in prevalence 
because, as they argue, the data are insufficient and unrepresentative of the whole of 
Uganda. Prevalence decline may well have been caused by different factors that need to 
be studied. These could include a peak in mortality from AIDS, which might reflect a 
natural course of the epidemic in its mature stages, a significant increase in the use of 
condoms, particularly among groups with high risks such as sex workers and men with 
multiple sexual partners.  
The success story had some implications for both the national government of 
Uganda and the international donor’s community. First, at the national level, it affected 
the ability of the government to minimize global pressure to (i) bring about full 
democratization, (ii) deal with criticisms of economic mismanagement at home and, 
finally, (iii) carry out military actions in the region, especially in eastern regions of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Yet, at the international level, the Uganda’s 
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success story also allowed the government to remain in the good favors of 
international aid donors who needed to showcase that aid worked where there is good 
leadership. “International and bilateral aid agencies that provide large sums of money for 
HIV prevention used Uganda as a example to argue that, with sufficient resources and 
appropriate prevention messages, HIV/AIDS could be controlled.  
Given the domestic and regional political blunders of President Museveni during 
the late 1990s – the country’s image was tarnished by internal and regional political 
instability involving President Museveni’s policies – he created the propaganda of the 
Uganda’s HIV/AIDS success story to gain political dividends and lure international 
donors. Arguably, the government’s careless interpretation of statistics and numbers, and 
the international “representation” of Uganda as a prevention showcase is the evidence 
that President Museveni and his supporters needed to convince donors that their money 
was worthwhile and well spent. President Museveni’s government maintained a 
lackluster attitude to the anti-AIDS struggle during the 1990s in spite of early 
outspokenness about the HIV/AIDS issue. However, he was able to shift rhetoric in the 
early 2000s for several reasons, using HIV/AIDS as a springboard to restore his country’s 
international image.  
Although Museveni’s leadership was appreciated based on his political and 
economic achievements besides his social success in fighting HIV/AIDS, many now 
question these reports and find the Ugandan success stories to be controversial. On the 
political side, the domestic stabilization of the country and the victory over the Lord 
Resistance Army in northern Uganda is regarded as one among Museveni’s many 
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accomplishments. On the economic side, President Museveni was celebrated among 
the “new breed of African leadership” for his liberalization policies to boost Uganda’s 
economic growth due to exports in coffee and fish to the European Union. The focus on 
HIV/AIDS by the year 2000 is justified by the fact that Museveni needed another rhetoric 
to convince his domestic and international constituencies. Critics of the leadership 
argument, nonetheless, contend that administrative issues linked to the hierarchical 
decision-making and bureaucratic complexities as well as the centralization of AIDS 
programs under the Ministry of Health AIDS Program (ACP) had instead negative 
impacts on the fight against HIV/AIDS. This was so because the hierarchical power 
structures, bureaucratic sluggishness, and paralysis in decision-making process, let alone 
the flow of information, hampered the smooth coordination and work of local 
nongovernmental actors. Besides, the problem of corruption and lack of accountability 
had jeopardized the treatment programs (Kasasira 2007). As Tumushabe (2006:6) puts it, 
Thus, by 2000, an AIDS success story in Uganda was crucial to a wide spectrum 
of ‘stakeholders’ who needed to justify further funding of their programs (…). For 
the government, failure to appease donors would lead to economic collapse and 
seriously roll back the national HIV/AIDS programme; there was little else to 
show for the huge donor resources poured into Uganda that an ill-planned and 
poorly executed Universal Primary Education Program, which was also riddled 
with fraud at the school and district tendering levels. 
 
Kuhanen (2008:315) notes that, “[t]he main factor behind Uganda’s success is allegedly 
individual behavioral change, i.e., abstinence from sex and partner reduction, particularly 
among young females, accompanied by increased condom use, all which would indicate 
deliberate avoidance of risky behavior by individuals.” This includes changes in 
individual sexual behavior through sticking to one partner, “zero grazing,” delayed 
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commencement of sexual activity, or celibacy. While lack of knowledge, qualified 
personnel, and healthcare infrastructure and medical supplies made efforts to fight the 
epidemic more difficult in the beginning of HIV/AIDS in Uganda, the bottom line of the 
national AIDS policy affected people and those at risk focused on the provision of health 
education, treatment, and care.  
This thesis, however, has become controversial as some scholars observe the 
lackluster attitude of the Ugandan government to the fight against HIV/AIDS between 
1993 and 2000. Some scholars believe that the role of the government in Uganda has 
been overplayed at the expense of other players such as NGOs in the struggle against 
HIV/AIDS. However, it is still true that the swift response by President Museveni in the 
1980s is regarded as a factor that played a major role in reducing the HIV prevalence in 
Uganda in the late 1990s. How could Museveni’s response to HIV/AIDS play a major 
role in changing attitudes and behaviors in such a short span of time for results to show 
up, given the lag between HIV infection and AIDS manifestation in a person? Besides, 
why did Uganda’s government fight against HIV/AIDS stigma and discrimination when 
President Museveni himself continued to discriminate against HIV/AIDS in politics and 
in the military? For instance, he declared in 2000 that none of the people living with 
HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) should be offered an opportunity to serve in the armed forces 
because it is so frustrating to have officers who die of AIDS, not a bullet. He went as far 
as saying that the army is not a hospital and self-inflicted disease through undisciplined 
sex should not receive ARVs. About his political opponent, a private medical doctor 
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named Kizza Besigye, President Museveni implied during the presidential campaign 
that he was HIV positive and therefore unfit to lead the country.  
While President Museveni and First Lady Janet Museveni used the HIV/AIDS 
issue to advance their political interests, the ABC model they promoted received the 
support of conservative evangelical Christian groups in the US. Through the ABC 
ideology, the Bush administration also found the support to the family values it wanted to 
foster, as seen in the reinstatement of the Mexico City Policy on his very first day in 
office. As President Bush praised the Ugandan ABC model in public and commended 
President Museveni for his leadership in the fight against HIV/AIDS, in private he 
pressed him to explain the role that Uganda played in supplying weapons to militias in 
the DRC wars that had occasioned 2.5 to 3.3 million deaths (Tumushabe 2006:11). 
Andrew Natsios also stresses that President Bush personally pressed President Museveni 
in 2003 to not seek a third term in office and, instead, to democratize his country. 
Criticisms of the ABC programs and the behavioral change approach adopted by the 
Ugandan government also show skepticism about the alleged decline in HIV/AIDS 
prevalence rates as a result of prevention policies. As they argue, the data are insufficient 
and unrepresentative of the whole of Uganda. For instance, de Waal (2006:95) contends 
that the prevailing belief that Uganda was able to reduce its HIV prevalence rates “has 
been more celebrated than analyzed.” While some believe that representations of 
HIV/AIDS in Uganda are variable and unbalanced because most authors have 
approached the issue from different perspectives, sources, and agendas, others claim, 
“Museveni has not been open with the figures. He has overstated the decline in 
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prevalence, claiming in 2000 for example that national prevalence had come down 
from 30 percent in 1991 – a figure that is probably twice as high as the reality” (ibid). 
Not only the statistics used by President Museveni were misleading but also those 
Ugandans who continued burying their relatives refused to buy the government’s 
propaganda rhetoric.  
Besides, it has been argued that Museveni’s inflated statistics was an 
extrapolation from the number of military men he sent to Cuba (a very small and non 
representative sample) to the entire population. The battle over statistical representation 
of HIV/AIDS in Africa raged, in general, in the ensuing years as criticisms erupted in 
2004 about manipulation of data in UN annual reports to steer donors to give more funds 
to HIV/AIDS programs. Arguably, UNAIDS was “cooking up” the HIV infection 
numbers in Africa to stir policy makers to donate more money; such adjusted statistics 
are alarming. Explaining the difference between making up and “cooking up” the 
numbers, Pisani (2008:22) argues, “[T]o find money for other continents, we had to beat 
things up a bit. When a journalist talks about ‘beating it up,’ [he/she] mean[s] making a 
mountain out of a molehill, making a big, interesting, dramatic story out of something 
that may actually be rather mundane. There is a difference between making it up (plain 
old lying) and beating it up.” Schaefer (2010:2) remarks, “In 2007, the UN was forced to 
acknowledge that it had long overestimated both the size and the course of the [AIDS] 
epidemic, which they now believe has been slowing for nearly a decade.” Despite 
statistical adjustments, Africa still leads as the continent with the most HIV/AIDS cases. 
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Botswana and Swaziland HIV estimates are still respectively the highest, at 27% and 
22.2% in 2001 while Lesotho’s adjusted prevalence rates averaged 23.4% (see Table 13).  
Table 13. Africa HIV/AIDS Adjusted Statistical Estimates (2004) 
     Western Africa 
Country Adult 
prevalence 
ages 15–49 
Number of 
people living 
with HIV 
AIDS deaths New HIV 
infections 
Benin 1.7% 66,000 6,400 5,300 
Burkina 
Faso 
2.1% 150,000 15,000 13,000 
Cape 
Verde 
1.0% 2,700 <500 not available 
Côte 
d'Ivoire 
6.2% 560,000 50,000 not available 
Gambia 0.8% 5,700 <500 1,200 
Ghana 2.2% 250,000 18,000 28,000 
Guinea 1.5% 72,000 5,100 not available 
Guinea-
Bissau 
1.4% 9,800 <1,000 1,800 
Liberia 2.5% 39,000 2,500 not available 
Mali 1.6% 110,000 9,700 12,000 
Mauritania 0.6% 10,000 <1,000 not available 
Niger 0.8% 45,000 3,200 6,200 
Nigeria 3.7% 2,500,000 150,000 310,000 
Senegal 0.5% 24,000 1,400 not available 
Sierra 
Leone 
0.9% 21,000 <1,000 4,500 
Togo 4.1% 120,000 8,100 17,000 
     Central Africa 
Country Adult 
prevalence 
ages 15–49 
Number of 
people 
living with HIV 
AIDS deaths New HIV 
infections 
Angola 1.7% 130,000 8,200 20,000 
Cameroon 5.1% 450,000 28,000 57,000 
CAR 8.1% 170,000 16,000 15,000 
Chad 3.7% 170,000 13,000 not available 
Congo 3.8% 74,000 6,900 7,200 
DRC not available not available not available not available 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
2.5% 7,900 <500 not available 
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Gabon 5.2% 35,000 2,100 4,900 
São Tomé 
and 
Principe 
0.9% <1,000 <100 not available 
     Eastern Africa 
Country Adult 
prevalence 
ages 15–49 
Number of 
people living 
with HIV 
AIDS deaths New HIV 
infections 
Burundi 3.5% 130,000 13,000 6,900 
Comoros <0.1% <100 <100 not available 
Kenya 8.5% 1,600,000 130,000 140,000 
Madagascar 0.3% 22,000 1,500 not available 
Mauritius 0.9% 6,600 <500 not available 
Mayotte not available not available not available not available 
Réunion not available not available not available not available 
Rwanda 4.1% 220,000 21,000 19,000 
Seychelles not available not available not available not available 
South 
Sudan 
not available not available not available not available 
Tanzania 7.2% 1,400,000 130,000 140,000 
Uganda 6.9% 990,000 100,000 99,000 
     Southern Africa 
Country Adult 
prevalence 
ages 15–49 
Number of 
people 
living with 
HIV 
AIDS deaths New HIV  
infections 
Botswana 27.0% 270,000 18,000 27,000 
Lesotho 23.4% 250,000 15,000 26,000 
Malawi 13.8% 860,000 63,000 100,000 
Mozambique 9.7% 850,000 46,000 140,000 
Namibia 15.5% 160,000 8,600 23,000 
South Africa 15.9% 4,400,000 210,000 610,000 
Swaziland 22.2% 120,000 6,700 19,000 
Zambia 14.4% 860,000 72,000 110,000 
Zimbabwe 25.0% 1,800,000 150,000 140,000 
 
(Source: compiled from UNAIDS Report on the Global AIDS Epidemics 2012)  
 
An epidemiologist and policy maker at the World Health Organization, James 
Chin (2007:95) also contends, HIV numbers in Africa are “estimated and projected via 
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the use of models since death reporting in most developing countries is grossly 
inaccurate and incomplete.” As far as sub-Saharan Africa is concerned, he notes, “In 
2001, UNAIDS estimated that this region had the highest mean HIV prevalence rate (9 
percent), with 16 of the 44 countries in this region having an estimated prevalence of 
more than 10 percent. Two countries (Botswana and Zimbabwe) had estimated HIV 
prevalence rates of over 35 percent” Chin (2007:121) (Table 14). Although in subsequent 
debates on Africa’s HIV prevalence rates, the UN acknowledged that the estimates were 
inflated. Furthermore, he remarks, “the initial 2001 HIV prevalence estimates for SSA 
countries were overestimated on average by 50 percent.” By 2003, UNAIDS revised its 
data lowering the prevalence rates from 9 percent in 2001 to 7.6 percent (or 22 million 
infected people instead of 26 million in 2001) (Chin 2007:122).  
As far as Ugandan HIV/AIDS statistics are concerned, a gap in the information 
reflecting a selection bias in the representation of HIV/AIDS has been observed. Indeed, 
scholars have underscored the fact that most data collection came from antenatal 
surveillance sites where only pregnant women would attend. Since most women are not 
constantly or consistently going to seek antenatal services, it is obvious that the sampling 
selection will be biased given that the phenomenon is being measured in only at risk 
group. There is likelihood of decline in prevalence from the early 1990s. All three 
separate sources of data reporting a decline in seroprevalence observed that the group 
between 13-19 year-olds was the most affected. These sources included Mulago Hospital, 
6 antenatal sentinel sites, and two major long-term community-based research projects in 
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rural South districts of Uganda. Allen challenges the feasibility of using the antenatal 
surveillance data to detect national HIV prevalence rates.  
Table 14.  Estimated Number of People Living With HIV/AIDS in the African “AIDS-
Belt” Countries (End of 2001) 
  Total Adults and 
Children  
Total Women (15-
49)  
Adults (15-49) rate 
(%)  
Global Total 40 million 18.5 million 1.2 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
28.5 million 15 million 9.0 
Djibouti  - - - 
Ethiopia  2.1 million 1.1 million 6.4 
Uganda  600,000 280,000 5.0 
Kenya  2.5 million 1.4 million 15.0 
Tanzania  1.5 million 750,000 7.8 
Rwanda  500,000 250,000 8.9 
Burundi  390,000 190,000 8.3 
Mozambique  1.1 million 630,000 13.0 
Malawi  850,000 440,000 15.0 
Zambia  1.2 million 590,000 21.5 
Zimbabwe  2.3 million 1.2 million 33.7 
Namibia  230,000 110,000 22.5 
Botswana  330,000 170,000 38.8 
Swaziland  170,000 89,000 33.4 
Lesotho  360,000 180,000 31.0 
South Africa  5.0 million 2.7 million 20.1 
 
(Source: UNAIDS, Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic: July 2002.) 
 
As USAID researchers sought to understand why Uganda and not other countries 
was able to achieve this success, they concluded that the government’s assumed use of 
the approach of abstinence, being faithful and condom use (ABC) approach as a 
combination reduced the HIV prevalence while other countries relied heavily on 
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condoms only (Epstein 2005).11 Today, the country’s HIV prevalence rate is s at 6 
percent, with a distribution of 8 percent for women and 5 percent for men. The Uganda 
success story has become a commonplace in debates on the fight against HIV/AIDS as 
scholars and policy makers sought to explain the determinants of this decline. The 
epidemic continued to spread and intensify in other parts of Africa and the rest of the 
world while Uganda became an illustration that with sufficient resources, political 
leadership, and sound policies, HIV/AIDS could be controlled. However, behavioral 
studies indicate that there was no significant reduction of sexual partners for either men 
or women; a threefold increase in condom use among men and women between 13-19 in 
urban settings and 20-29 in rural settings; a significant rise in the age at first sexual 
intercourse and age at marriage. The Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2005) organization 
claims that the AB as a political tool for Museveni and his wife. In its report on the 
HIV/AIDS progress in Uganda, “The Less they know, the Better: Abstinence-Only 
HIV/AIDS Programs in Uganda,” HRW argues that ABC was a USAID-marketed 
strategy to advocate the religious and moral views of the American Christian right.  
The heart of the debate, however, was the question of whether a medical solution 
for Africa, in terms of access of the poor to expensive treatment and the sustainability of 
drug innovation through financing of the research and development industry, was 
                                                
11 This point will be discuss at length in subsequent sections of this chapter. Suffice it to say here 
that the ABC model that means to explain the Uganda success story has come under harsh 
criticism by many scholars who claim the ideology of the American evangelical Christian Right 
was too pervasive in Uganda HIV/AIDS policy for political and economic reasons. “From 2004 
Museveni and his wife, in line with their US Right-wing Republican friends, led a crusade against 
condom use at national and global levels” Tumushabe (2006:11). And also Epstein (2005) 
available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2005/apr/28/god-and-the-fight-against-
aids/. Last view July 2, 2015. 
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achievable. While African nationalists interpreted the Western attitude toward 
HIV/AIDS in Africa as a disguised form of colonialism, a distortion of international 
economic order, the Western solution to address the African HIV/AIDS public health 
crisis was confined to promoting an image of leaders who aligned with the prevention 
approach that most Western policy makers favored and fostered in Africa. Indeed, all 
these historical, moral, political, economic, and societal factors are operative in the 
spread of HIV in Africa and the policy to address the public health crisis. 
By the late 1990s President Museveni faced both the domestic and the regional 
political issues that eroded the reputation he enjoyed and the political capital he had been 
accumulating since in the early 1990s. On the domestic plane, corruption and cronyism 
led to mismanagement of foreign aid and the money received from the international 
financial institutions to support Uganda’s liberalization. In fact, Museveni had begun the 
process of liberalization as early as he got to power in the mid-1980s. After 15 years of 
civil war under presidents Idi Amin (1971-1979) and Milton Obote (1979-1985), 
Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) seized power in 1986. The following year, 
he began to get rid of Uganda’s Marxist ideological past, an attitude that led to an 
agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and bolstered the internal 
legitimacy of his military government. As one scholar remarks, this rehabilitation enabled 
“Western donors bankrolled Uganda’s rehabilitation programmes to the tune of 
US$ 2.017 billion; an average of US$ 600 million per year in order for the government to 
deliver basic social services (Tumushabe 2006:4). As a result, Uganda’s embrace of the 
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World Bank and IMF’s conditionalities, otherwise known as structural adjustment 
programs, exonerated the country from other pressures.  
Yet, as it will become clear in the ensuing lines, Uganda is the proof that there is 
no evidence that a positive correlation exists between increased foreign aid and debt 
forgiveness on the one hand, and poverty reduction and economic growth on the other. In 
fact, another aspect of Uganda’s domestic politics concerns the poor achievements of 
Museveni’s political and economic development during the 1990s. Although observers 
labeled Uganda an economic success story during this same period of time, it is obvious 
that the Ugandan image was invented. For instance, the Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index ranked Uganda the 11th most corrupt country in the world in 
2000, and the 3rd most corrupt country in the world only one year later in 2001. In 1995, a 
new Constitution was completed and elections were held the following year. After two 
terms in office, the presidential 2-term limit was removed from the constitution in 2005 
and the number of districts increased from 56 to 76, thus allowing Museveni a lifeline to 
continue as president.  
The political patronage was accompanied by an economic crisis as exports in 
coffee declined and the European Union banned the fish exports for one year. The overall 
Uganda’s exports dwindled from $639 million in 1996 to $463 million in 1999. It is little 
wonder that the country’s economic prospects were not encouraging following years of 
corruption, political patronage, public mismanagement, and indebtedness. Apparently, 
the privatization policies of the 1990s and the SAPs in Uganda had yielded the opposite 
effects. By 1998, Uganda’s foreign debt was $3.2 billion and the government tendencies 
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to big spending on military expenditures and the war involvement in eastern regions 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo entailed a growing deficit in the government’s 
budget. As Tumushabe (2006:4) notes, 
Uganda, the much-touted economic miracle of the 1990s, was identified in 2001 
by the World Bank as one of the poorest countries in the world (…). Average per 
capita income in 2003 was estimated at $259, life expectancy at birth dropped 
from 47 years in 1990 to 43 years in 2001, and the population with access to clean 
water remained a miserable 52 percent in 2000. 
 
In spite of Museveni’s reprehensible regional behavior characterized by greed, violence, 
plunder and the destabilization of the Congo, Uganda was still presented as a good 
student of the World Bank and the IMF. The world celebrated the World Bank’s and the 
IMF’s program for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries that was unveiled in 1996. Uganda 
was among the first beneficiaries of the World Bank’s massive debt relief programs 
through both the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) in 1998 and the HIPC 
Enhanced Initiative in 2000. When it first qualified as a beneficiary of the HIPC in 1998, 
the sovereign debt of the country amounted to a total of $3.2 billion. The total debt 
cancellation under both programs was nearly two-thirds of the total amount, that is, 
US$ 2 billion. The World Bank argued that “Uganda deserved debt relief because 
government had created a good policy environment through macroeconomic policy 
reforms that led to impressive and sustained economic growth rates for over a decade” 
(Mwenda 2005:4). While Uganda’s debt from 1962 to 1998 grew to reach a total of $3.2 
billion, after the cancellation of the debt under the pretext that it was unsustainable and 
would affect the future of the country’s economic growth, paradoxically, in the five years 
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following the debt cancellation of $2 billion, Uganda’s debt rose again to $4.9 billion. 
As Mwenda (2005:5) contends,  
Uganda did not accumulate that debt under the brutal regime of Idi Amin. On the 
contrary, over 90 percent of Uganda’s debt was incurred during the 
implementation of the World Banks – and IMF-sponsored economic reform 
policies of stabilization and structural adjustment, beginning in 1981. If those 
policies had worked as their advocates argued, Uganda should have been able to 
pay its way out of debt. 
 
Unfortunately, Uganda indulged in mismanagement, throwing money at political elite 
and the military. For instance, President Museveni bought himself a new private jet that 
cost in public money up to US$ 35 million.12 Besides, he involved his military men in 
Sudan and the Congo wars, adventures that implied high cost of military expenditure. 
While the defense spending rose from 12.5 percent in 1997 to 19 percent in 1999, there 
was a 23 percent cuts from other ministries in 2003 in order to increase the military 
budgets. By 2005, Uganda military budget had reached $200 million from $110 million 
in 2000 (Mwenda 2005). It is precisely at this moment that President Museveni 
championed his leadership in the fight against HIV/AIDS, when he knew he might face 
international isolation. This was a new approach to donors in the aftermath of poor 
economic and political performance in liberalizing Uganda.  
 The World Bank, the IMF, and international donors have presented Uganda as an 
economic success story. In its 2004 publication, Uganda: From Conflict to Sustainable 
Growth and Deep Reductions in Poverty, the World Bank remarks that Uganda’s 
economic performance since 1987 has been impressive. Not only was the country able to 
                                                
12 Phillips, Jeff, “IMF Settles Uganda Plane Row,” BBC Online, May 2, 2000 available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/732971.stm last view, July 2, 2015. 
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reduce the proportion of people living in absolute poverty from 56 percent to 35 
percent between 1992 and 2000 but it also sustained an economic growth averaging 6 
percent and maintained an inflation rate in single digits. The slowdown in Uganda’s 
economic growth for the last 15 years (1987-2002) is blamed on poor weather, as the 
poverty rates increased to 38 percent in 2002-2003. However, as Mwenda (2005) 
contends, Uganda has depended on foreign aid for nearly 50 percent of its budget. If 
development has to be measured by indicators such as literacy and public health, 
Uganda’s free primary, free basic health care, as well as infrastructure rehabilitation and 
maintenance are mostly financed by foreign aid monies. Given these guarantees of 
foreign aid inflows in Uganda, the country has not been keen on implementing sound 
policies such as good taxation system, fight against corruption and political patronage, 
and democratic reforms.13 The Public Expenditure Review by the Ministry of Finance in 
2002 showed that Museveni’s costs of political patronage raised by 16 percent between 
1998 and 2002.  
In conclusion, scholars remark that the Ugandan success story was distorted to 
produce political and economic dividends to different actors and stakeholders involved in 
the HIV/AIDS industry (Tumushabe 2006; Human Rights Watch 2005; Kuhanen 2008). 
When Western donors were looking for results and accountability of their capitals 
invested in foreign aid, a good amount of which was spent on technical advisors, endless 
                                                
13 Mwenda (2005:6) remarks that foreign aid to Uganda acts as a subsidy for government 
corruption and incompetence. Uganda spent $200 million or 11 percent of its annual budget in 
2004 on the military, of which $40 million was lost in corruption. In fact, the army payroll 
includes thousands of “ghost soldiers.” While foreign aid has served as short-term humanitarian 
relief, in the long run, it harms prospects of accountability, democratization, and the 
strengthening of good governance and sound institutions. In short, foreign aid impedes the 
emergence of a mutually beneficial relationship between government and citizens.  
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seminars, and the purchasing of vehicles, the Ugandan government seized the 
opportunity to present its success story. Besides, at the moment when the Bush 
administration needed international support for its coalition of the willing to attack Iraq 
and carry out its war business in the aftermath of 9/11 terrorist attacks, the reported 
Ugandan success story provided the conservative right wing in the US supported by 
evangelical Christians with the opportunity to showcase President Bush’s humanitarian 
face. As a matter of fact, Uganda was keen on promoting prevention policies but reluctant 
to implement access to ARV treatment, for instance. This was the HIV/AIDS foreign 
policy approach toward Africa favored by the Bush administration in its early days. For 
instance, when the Global Fund offered a three-year grant of US$ 52 million to the 
Ugandan government, the Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development 
(MFPED) refused to lift the budgetary ceiling of the Ministry of Health form US$ 107 for 
fiscal year 2002/03. The argument for this refusal was to control government expenditure 
so as to stabilize the national economy, discourage consumerism, and reduce dependence 
on donors. Nonetheless, the government appropriated 23 percent of all ministerial 
budgets for the Ministry of Defense in its alleged unending war against the Lord 
Resistance Army in the North (Tumushabe 2006:20).
 
  282 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Introduction 
 The main goal of this dissertation was primarily to make sense of the creation of 
PEPFAR, a global public health welfare policy, under a conservative administration 
seeking to help cope with the scourges of the pandemic experienced by those Africans 
infected and/or affected by HIV/AIDS. This concern simply stands in contradiction with 
the assumption of neglect and indifference that characterizes US-Africa relations. 
Besides, as a humanitarian claim, it does not cohere with the policy timing and earlier 
assertions of President Bush with regard to his Africa foreign policy agenda. While 
PEPFAR seems to (1) depart from the general patterns of US foreign policy toward 
Africa and (2) deviate from the legacy of the legacy of the Clinton administration’s 
global HIV/AIDS policy as embodied in Executive Order 13155, it appears important to 
understand the rationale behind this policy in order to explain continuity and change in 
US HIV/AIDS foreign policy toward Africa. To my eye, it made very little sense that the 
Bush realist administration that started by downplaying the significance of Africa in the 
hierarchy of US foreign policy; and which criticized the humanitarianism of the previous 
administration should adopt a welfare foreign policy in contradiction with and at the
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expense of fundamental conservative beliefs and the tradition of US-Africa foreign 
policy. I adopted a theoretical framework that allowed organizing the overwhelming 
information about HIV/AIDS, the multiplicity of actors involved in the policy decision-
making process, their interests, and the structures and institutions that constrained or 
enabled the emergence of a comprehensive policy framework. While I was drawn 
initially toward the US pharmaceutical business power and contribution in the making of 
PEPFAR, the progression of this research brought me to understand not only the 
importance of other nonbusiness actors in US domestic pluralist environment but also the 
role of dominant ideas and beliefs in the policy making process. Hence, the privatization 
theory of the public health and social welfare as a strategy of the Bush conservative 
administration was able to bring under a single analytical framework the constructivist 
role of presidential beliefs (Bush’s compassionate conservatism doctrine), the pluralist 
nature of US domestic politics (religious faith-based groups, pharmaceutical companies, 
think tanks, university networks, private individuals), and the global environment 
(international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, developing countries’ 
governments and the rise of China as a global player) within which US global leadership 
collided with competing claims on international trade agreements and the role of the state 
in the provision of a solution to the HIV/AIDS global crisis.  
As different communities clashed over different interests, meanings, and 
representations of HIV/AIDS, the framing of the issue that came to dominate the official 
US rhetoric sought to blend both private incentives and expertise in a public-private 
partnership model. For some, science and innovation in medical technology is sacrosanct 
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and needs to be protected. For others, the moral and humanitarian imperative trumps 
every other consideration and compels the government to act. Yet for others, private 
initiatives and commercial interests are more important as they foster real democratic 
societies, “prise en charge” of the public welfare by the civil society, and economic 
growth and development. By overlooking the existing patterns of neglect and indifference 
in US foreign policy toward Africa, this research sought to uncover the real determinants 
of US behavior in Africa. Is it the nature of the situation as classical theories contend? If 
so, how is the nature of the situation defined and whose definition prevails and why? Was 
the creation of PEPFAR guided by altruistic motives or realist calculations? These 
hermeneutical questions allowed me to dig deep into the documentary evidence to 
understand the formation of the preferred official framework as a strategy to implement 
the neoliberal welfare agenda. That is, while the Bush administration sought to bring the 
private sector back into the implementation of the social welfare provision, President 
Bush was eager to concomitantly carry out his agenda to reform the US foreign aid 
system as well as the role of the government in social welfare provision. PEPFAR’s 
rationale was, thus, to integrate and accommodate the different claims by different 
interest groups about the HIV/AIDS pandemic; that is, all aspects including 
humanitarian, moral, social, political, and economic were considered by the Bush 
administration in order to leave a conservative imprint on the US HIV/AIDS global 
foreign policy.  
To reach this conclusion, I used the process tracing method in a qualitative single 
case study approach. As stated earlier in this dissertation, the choice of this methodology 
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was to help address aspects of multiple causality, equifinality and endogeneity, in 
causal relationships leading to PEPFAR. Indeed, a combination of different independent 
variables concurred to cause variation in the US HIV/AIDS foreign policy toward Africa 
under the Bush administration as during the previous administrations (George & 
McKeown 1985; Mahoney & Terrie 2008). Besides, since it is difficult to rerun history to 
verify the direction of causation beyond simple correlations, a close examination of 
archival documents, analysis of official policy documents, including the transcripts of 
hearings in Senate and House of Representatives Committees and Subcommittees, as well 
as other documents in the media and the scholarship were confronted and complemented 
by interviews with policy makers. These sources permitted to see whether my initial 
theory was solid to explain the causal process and test my hypotheses. Since much was 
left out by pursuing my initial theory that the Bush administration policy preference was 
favoring the US private pharmaceutical companies against the demand of African 
countries to overlook the international trade agreement and the TRIPS regime, I had to 
revise my approach to integrate other aspects of PEPFAR including noncommercial 
interests.  
The rationale in undertaking this study was owing to the fact that HIV/AIDS is 
seen as one of the most serious threats to global collective security, Africa’s economic 
development, and the human rights and because PEPFAR has been acclaimed as one of 
the few foreign policy successes of the controversial Bush presidency. Yet, these 
interpretations seem not to be accepted unanimously within the African community. 
Some disagree, in fact, with the idea that HIV/AIDS is decimating Africa, or affecting the 
  
286 
continent for reasons of cultural behavior or level of poverty. Others reject the claim 
that PEPFAR is the best policy alternative grounded in humanitarian motive (Katongole 
2007; Kelly 2010). While HIV/AIDS incontestably constitutes an impediment to the 
flourishing of human capabilities, individual freedom, and the pursuit of happiness, how 
can Africa’s voice be heard in the competition for power, knowledge, and the control of 
resources?  Applying the privatization theory has allowed bringing and organizing all 
these claims, the various sources of influence as well as the different independent 
variables including presidential preferences, bureaucratic reform, international regimes, 
and global economic trade competition under a single framework. 
Research Findings 
Even as a political scientist, I admit that I came to this research with personal 
biases. Actually, I was wary of the altruism rhetoric in US foreign policy. As an African 
and as a citizen of the Democratic Republic of Congo, the pattern of selective and limited 
engagement, and the fact that Africa had lost its strategic significance in US foreign 
policy led most US policy makers to advocate throughout the 1990s for the suppression 
of US foreign aid (Kraxberger 2005; Schraeder 2011). As a result, the first post-Cold War 
decade was characterized by further US retrenchment from Africa that lasted well into 
the first two years of the Bush Administration. Hence, this analysis of the PEPFAR 
creation brings a good addition to the existing literature on US foreign policy toward 
Africa. Not only does the study confirms existing patterns of neglect and indifference 
with selective engagement at specific moments in history but also it shows that classical 
theories of foreign policy decision-making – the rational actor model, the bureaucratic 
  
287 
politics, and the pluralism model – need to be integrated to provide a fuller picture of 
the different sources of influence onto the policy making process. Integrating elements 
from cognitive psychology can make a significant difference in understanding, for 
instance, the personal beliefs of the president, bureaucratic pulling and hauling dynamics, 
as well as the hermeneutical process in the definition of the situation.  
In other words, the process of decision-making and the policy outcome consist of 
many “worlds” colliding and many actors acting simultaneously to contribute to the 
framing of the issue and the shaping of the response they want to see adopted. Hence, that 
the policy outcome of US-Africa foreign policy decision-making process has been 
determined by the interplay between the nature of events happening on the ground and 
the part of decision-making establishment involved in the decision making process needs 
to put the emphasis on the hermeneutical side of deciding on the nature of events. Given 
that social reality and political phenomena are social constructed, this study has insisted 
on the role of human consciousness in interpreting the facts. Actually, the complex nature 
of the HIV/AIDS phenomenon and the variety of actors involved in trying to stir the 
policy direction, let alone the path-dependency in sheer succession of events and 
occurrences leading to the policy choices adopted by the government, demanded that I 
opt for a multi-level theory capable of bringing the analysis into a single framework and 
articulating in one stream the different sources of influence on the policy making process.  
Given the multiplicity of claims, voices, and interests in pressuring the 
government to act, this study finds that the Bush administration’s framing of HIV/AIDS 
was a calculated attempt to rally opposing voices under one accepted framework. 
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Although many frameworks were possible, such as the one binding HIV/AIDS to US 
security in the September 2002 National Security Strategy document, or the one relating 
HIV/AIDS to Africa’s development and using the Marshall Plan analogy, President Bush 
chose to use the “humanitarian framework” that is more accep to either side of the 
political divide and can rally the public opinion without contest. As such, this study 
entails obvious theoretical and policy relevance to the literature on US foreign policy 
toward Africa and the literature on HIV/AIDS pandemic. Against the prevailing 
assumption that neglect and indifference of Africa in US foreign policy result from a lack 
of strategic significance, the study is in line with those scholars who contend that US 
engagement in Africa is rather selective and does not follow a “grand scheme” in an 
unequivocal way. Like Western (2002) who contests the arguments that the “CNN effect” 
and moral outrage of President G.W.H Bush pushed to engage American troops in such 
countries as Somalia where there are no US strategic interests involved, this study is in 
consonance with the argument that opportunism and political calculations has guided the 
US intervention in Africa through selective engagement (Keller 2006:4; Iyob and Keller 
2005:101). In fact, US intervention in Africa results from the political interplay of 
competing foreign policy elites with different normative beliefs about when and where to 
intervene; competing interests in the domestic and international arenas, and the 
cumulative pressure on the administration to act. Indeed, as Rothchild and Keller (2006) 
observe, change in US foreign policy toward Africa often shifts in client but not in 
purpose. 
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I chose the neoliberal framework and the privatization theory to explain 
President Bush’s policy preference of the welfare provision. This framework permits 
organizing the different actors and their interests around the individual, national and 
international levels of analysis. As Sayer (1992:50) remarks, a theory is used in at least 3 
senses: first, as an ordering-framework or a set of background assumptions; second, as a 
conceptualization in which to theorize means to prescribe a particular way of thinking 
about the world; and third, as a hypothesis, an explanation, or a tested proposition. Since 
facts or numbers do not speak for themselves, a framework is needed to establish a 
relationship between empirical observation and theoretical conceptualization (Burnham 
2008:3). Because a theory is always for someone and always for some purpose, as Cox 
(1996:87) famously puts it, my choice of the privatization theory is obvious as it puts an 
emphasis on President Bush’s domestic and foreign policy agenda with regard to the 
production and distribution of social goods and public welfare. Indeed, the privatization 
theory has allowed organizing the different key variables, from personal presidential 
beliefs and ideology to bureaucratic politics to the international environment, and their 
roles in the framing of the issue and the development of policy alternatives. 
This study regards the core assumption in foreign policy analysis (FPA) of the 
“interpretation of the situation” as an exercise in hermeneutics. The hermeneutic, that is 
the interpretation of any given datum, in this case is concerned with the framing of the 
HIV/AIDS global issue in conjunction with the social condition of Africans affected by 
the pandemic. The representation prevailing among senior officials of the Bush 
administration is not of an objective reality but rather the outcome of a bounded 
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rationality. In other words, the nature of the situation (whether defined as a routine, a 
crisis, or an extended crisis situation) is but only one profile of a multifaceted social 
reality whose interpretation is a function of entrenched interests and the observer’s 
forestructure. The “datum” of interest, in this hermeneutical approach, results rather from 
the entanglement of those involved in the measurement activity than from representing an 
objective reality (Heelan 1997; 2004; Kuhn 1962:4). By this, I mean simply to say that a 
policy response such as PEPFAR to any given situation like the way in which HIV/AIDS 
affects Africa’s condition and prospects results from the preferred interpretation that 
policy-makers apply to it. For instance, the Bush administration preferred the 
“humanitarian” framework to the security framework or the trade and economic 
framework for several reasons. First, a humanitarian framework is a rallying cry beyond 
political partisanship. Second, it allows for diverting attention away from the business 
friendly policy he proposed. And third, it allowed him to pursue his structural and 
bureaucratic reform agenda without rising suspicion.  
In the case of HIV/AIDS in Africa, the privatization framework brings to the 
forefront the continuous influence of private US pharmaceutical companies in attempting 
to control the policy image and the policy venue, consequently, in stirring the policy 
alternative in addressing the public health problem at stake. Indeed, PEPFAR policy 
solution reflects the competing claims – a scientific solution that requires investment 
incentives in research and development and the protection of the intellectual property 
regime and the trade agreements to assure the feasibility of this solution; a moral solution 
that promotes Christian evangelical values of abstinence and sexual behavior conversion; 
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and humanitarian solution that include the care of innocent victims such as the 
orphans and other vulnerable children in the programs – to frame the HIV/AIDS issue. 
Yet, the dominant framework favored by the Bush administration, a humanitarian 
emergency situation, can accommodate all these claims without exacerbating antagonism. 
Thus, the reading and interpretation of the HIV/AIDS global public health crisis by US 
policy makers in the Bush administration followed a neoliberal market-oriented approach 
to propose alternative solutions to the provision of the welfare favored by a state-centric 
approach. As a private and market-oriented policy has become the official US position in 
the post-Cold War context of economic globalization, this neoliberal privatization 
approach to the provision of public health and welfare subsumes different theories that 
focus either on individual beliefs or on structural organizations of the state. The 
privatization theory includes the pursuit of self-interest political interests measured by the 
political dividends for the incumbent, focus on the moral leadership in the pursuit of 
other foreign policy goals, concern for the spread of liberal values of economic trade, the 
involvement of charity and nongovernmental organizations and public-private partnership 
in the procurement of welfare, and the accommodation of different interest groups that 
compete to control the policy images.  
The privatization theory has its own inherent shortcomings. The meaning of 
privatization, for instance, may differ depending on historical experience and institutional 
contexts. In developing countries, interpreted through colonial and postcolonial lenses, 
privatization may be seen as an act of betrayal, the political elites selling out the 
country’s national strategic assets to a small class of a powerful interest group for the 
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sake of immediate financial rewards. Besides, it is important to understand the 
distinction between the load-shedding approach of the Reagan era and the empowerment 
of intermediary institutions of the Bush administration. In either model, the African 
experience has been that of disempowering the government, which gets disengaged from 
its social responsibility. As a matter of fact, even when the load-shedding of contracting 
out had allowed African government to spare some extra public money, the general 
perception of privatization has negative feelings attached to it because, in historical 
perspectives, the spared funds were allocated either to service back the sovereign debt 
under the structural adjustment programs or simply disappeared into the pockets of all too 
powerful dictators, due to lack of democratic control and accountability. Hence, instead 
of empowering the civil society, privatization may produce unintended consequences in 
Africa, which is the undermining of the social contract.  
Of course, neoliberalism is an umbrella theory that provides a general conceptual 
framework to encompass beliefs, institutions, and practices of the production and 
distribution of goods and services in the era of globalization. At the level of beliefs, I 
analyzed presidential compassionate conservatism doctrine as a driving and organizing 
concept behind President Bush’s social welfare action. At the level of institutions, I 
analyzed the evolution of IP regime and the TRIPS Agreement and how they affected the 
developing countries’ claim to access the anti-AIDS treatment therapy. And at the level 
of practices, I recognized the death of the welfare state that used to enact social policies 
and provide help to the poor for the sake of social welfare and the common good. Hence, 
the scourges of HIV/AIDS in Africa presented both African governments and the 
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international community with multifaceted challenges given that the pandemic 
embodied serious impediments to individual, national, and international community life, 
liberty, productive capacity and the pursuit of happiness. As a social, economic, political, 
and moral issue, the HIV/AIDS pandemic will continues to be an area deserving of policy 
attention and unequivocal political commitment regardless of political partisanship and 
beyond religious ideologies. HIV/AIDS is simply a human problem.  
Scholars of foreign policy analysis emphasize that positivist theories that look for 
regularities or take the nature of situation for granted may forget the dynamic process of 
foreign policy decision-making process (Burnham et al. 2008). My theoretical approach 
contends that privatization of the public health and the social welfare provision, as a 
result of the implementation practice of neoliberal policies, was deeply engrained in 
presidential beliefs and his doctrine of compassionate conservatism. As Hilger (2013) 
argues, neoliberal policies have had a real effect on the way social life is structured, how 
citizens think and problematize their existence, and how the welfare state, which 
according to conservative thinking “reduces the poor from citizens to clients,” should be 
supplanted by the promotion of freedom and self-reliance and (Weiss 2001:36). Besides, 
the neoliberal approach – understood mental dispositions, social policy practices, and 
institutional implementation – factors in the sought-after reforms of the foreign aid 
system and its bureaucratic structure by Republicans in the aftermaths of the end of the 
Cold War. Their goal is to reduce the role of the government in welfare provision while 
increasing the responsibility of the private sector in both the production and the 
distribution of public welfare. Finally, as practice, neoliberalism also sees to it that the 
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market-oriented welfare provision is promoted and implemented. Since all of the 
above are alive in this Bush administration’s US HIV/AIDS foreign policy toward Africa, 
I argue that while PEPFAR reflects personal values and beliefs of President Bush in 
addressing the HIV/AIDS social problems in Africa, it is a policy that was devised to be 
the conservative model of public-private partnership in the provision of welfare and 
public health.  
To understand why PEPFAR deviates from existing policy tradition of policy 
neglect and indifference, this dissertation integrated various independent variables 
including the personal beliefs of the President, the domestic and bureaucratic politics, and 
the international lobbying, and the global context of the HIV/AIDS crisis in Africa. The 
interplay between these domestic and international variables, and the pluralism of the US 
domestic politics, as well as the global expectations about the US behavior given its 
superpower leadership position all concurred to determine the policy-making process 
leading to the creation of PEPFAR. I reached the conclusion that the neoliberal 
privatization framework organizes and better explains the Bush administration policy 
choice, the decision-making process, and the policy substance of PEPFAR. Neoliberalism 
as a conceptual framework offers a multilevel and multicausal explanation while it 
organizes in a more coherent way the messy reality of policy process and the complex 
reality of HIV/AIDS welfare provision in the African context. As a result, the rationale 
behind the creation of PEPFAR, obviously, was to devise a conciliatory policy that would 
accommodate different stakeholders in the domestic and international communities, with 
  
295 
competing moral perspectives and material interests, in addressing the US HIV/AIDS 
global health crisis.  
If intentionality matters, as a motivation of human action, it is clear that PEPFAR 
did not ensue from pure altruistic motives; it did not mark any substantial departure from 
existing patterns of neglect and indifference in US foreign policy toward Africa. Instead, 
it followed and calibrated the Bush administration’s policy preferences to the dynamic of 
both the domestic and international politics. PEPFAR confirms what Schraeder (1994) 
says about the substance of the policy outcome: that it has been determined by the 
interaction between the nature of events on the ground – routine, crisis, or extended crisis 
– and the part of the bureaucratic policy establishment (president, federal bureaus, or the 
Congress) involved in the policy-making process. Because the president accords some 
sporadic attention to Africa, especially when a crisis erupts, and because Republicans 
sought to reform the USAID bureaucracy since the end of the Cold War, then the 
tendency to relegate the responsibility for overseeing US Africa policies to those national 
security bureaucracies shifted to the President and his minions in the case of HIV/AIDS 
foreign policy. Of course, Congress was to play a role in the policy development as it 
usually gets dragged into the policy making process by interest groups and the public 
opinion when the crisis situation perdures.  
Many competing interests over the issue of HIV/AIDS in Africa involved federal 
agencies, pharmaceutical companies, churches and other FBOs, universities, think tanks 
and foundations, international organizations, as well as powerful individuals such as 
Bono and Bill Gates. Hence, to explain the inception of PEPFAR, I chose to adopt a 
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multicausal theoretical approach that integrates the variety of stakeholders involved in 
the business of HIV/AIDS. Indeed, the PEPFAR policy approach coheres with the 
neoliberal model of welfare provision. Hence, the assumption that self-interested 
individuals are better performers is overly simplistic. Not only do some politicians act on 
the basis of national interest, but also individuals can be altruistic as part of self-interest, 
not to mention the fact that not all governments are poor performers. In advanced 
democracies, there are mechanisms of check and balance and voters are capable of acting 
on the basis of their collective interest to vote out leaders who failed to be accoun for 
their actions. The faith that privatization theorists give to the market is blind to the fact 
that markets are not always capable of optimal performance due to imperfect information, 
externalities, and increasing returns to scale. Finally, the possibility to exploit 
monopolistic powers by private owners can also legitimize the need to create public 
ownership.   
My primary assumption that private US pharmaceutical companies wield 
tremendous power and have exerted a determining influence on the continuity and change 
of US HIV/AIDS foreign policy toward Africa remains valid. Saying this does not 
invalidate the fact that other actors – both in domestic as well as international structures 
like governmental agencies or nongovernmental organizations – also played an important 
role in shaping the direction and the outcome of US HIV/AIDS foreign policy toward 
Africa under the Bush administration. While nonbusiness interest groups succeeded in 
snatching the monopoly control over the definition of the HIV/AIDS crisis in Africa 
away from pharmaceutical companies, it remains certain that US pharmaceutical 
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companies who received the lion’s share of the PEPFAR funds – up to 55 percent of 
the total budget – were the major player and influence on the Bush administration in 
matters of health welfare provision and the adopted privatization approach. Yet, it has 
proved useful to expand the hermeneutical framework beyond commercial and trade 
interests as it appears that US strategic interests that are sometimes interpreted narrowly 
in material sense also encompass the moral prestige that the US enjoys as a global leader 
on the world stage.  
Actually, my primary hunch was to dismiss the hegemonic view that Africa – in 
comparison with other regions – is lacking in strategic significance for the US national 
interests (Pham 2005; Schraeder 2006). This well-entrenched and undisputed assumption 
among Africanist scholars is simply inherited from tradition and fails to see the dynamics 
in world relations as new actors rise to superpower status. While it is conventional to treat 
Africa as a monolithic bloc and accept the view that it constitutes the backwater in the 
global hierarchy of US foreign policy, it is believed that this lack of strategic interests 
explains the relegation of the continent to the backburner of US foreign policy agenda; it 
is simply another way of saying US interests in Africa are rather s and secure (Kitchen 
1983; Jackson 1984; Banjo 2010). Removed from the presidential attention, Africa 
remains the province of bureaucratic routines unless some kind of crisis erupts to pull the 
President in the foreign policy-making process or, in case the crisis drags out, Congress 
also becomes directly involved (Schraeder 1994a; Clark 1998; Cohen 2000). As Pham 
(2005:19) explains, “Most foreign policy realists wrote the continent off as little more 
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than a source of trouble, albeit one that could be safely ignored because it rarely if 
ever impinged on America’s strategic national interest.”  
Realist thinkers such as Hans Morgenthau (1972:389) contend that the US “has 
pursued a consistent foreign policy” throughout history. Even a former liberal politician 
like former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (1998: 50) corroborates this view when 
she claims that the goals of [U.S. foreign policy] have not changed for more than 200 
years. Summarizing them, she declares that they have always aimed at “ensuring the 
continued security, prosperity, and freedom of our people.” While they are the same as 
those that the US pursues in other parts of the world, the new world order since the end of 
the Cold War has altered the perception of the US global leadership and mission in the 
world. When these US interests, both material and moral, are not threatened there is no 
reason for the US foreign policy to change. Africa has had significant strategic interest to 
the US throughout even though the US, until the end of the Cold War, deferred Africa’s 
responsibility to its European allies. As I have shown above, this deference was strategic 
in support of Europe along with the Marshall Plan aid. If the absence of vital interests did 
not allow the US to be adept at forming a coherent African policy after the end of the 
Cold War, as many contend, has the perception of US interests in Africa changed over 
time; and if so, under what conditions? If they do not change, can the variation and 
selective engagement in US HIV/AIDS foreign policy toward Africa be explained only in 
terms of the change in the global environment? Are US interests in Africa immutable? 
The lack of consensus “within the policy-making establishment over Africa’s 
importance to U.S. national security interests” has bolstered the marginalization of the 
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African region, which is left at “the bottom of foreign policy concerns” (Schraeder 
1994:2-3; Moss 1995:195). The persistence of Africa’s neglect with some degree of 
variation – regardless of which president occupies the White House or what is his party 
affiliation – is the result of the ingrained perception that Africa’s strategic worth is 
nothing to the vital interests of the United States. While these vital interests remain yet to 
be explained, the history of the U.S. relations toward Africa is marked by the persistence 
of neglect and indifference, which reached the lowest point in history in the mid-1990s.  
Since it apparently represents neither a military threat nor an economic power to 
challenge US vital interests, Africa might remain the stepchild of US foreign policy, at 
least in the perception of some. Yet, even when lacking in the military capabilities and 
the political will to challenge US, the rise of a competing superpower, as was the case 
with the USSR during the Cold War and might be with China today, capable of 
challenging the US hegemonic interests has always led to adaption and readjustment of 
the US presence in Africa. For instance, the terrorist attacks on US Embassies in Kenya 
and Tanzania in 1998, the rise of terrorism in Africa, or the foreign aid activism of China 
in Africa may compel the US to quit its neglect and indifference to protect its leadership 
position on the continent. As Schraeder (2001:404-406) rightly observes, the new 
competitive international environment after the collapse of communism exacerbated the 
divergent economic self-interests between the US and its European allies while most US 
Ambassadors now serve as advocates for US business. Indeed, competition and equality 
between all actors, even former allies, has become the guiding principle in the 
international environment. Hence, the challenge posed to the neoliberal global economic 
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order enshrined in such trade regimes and treaties like the TRIPS may be sufficient to 
call for a readjustment of US policy attitude and cause the government to be more 
involved in Africa to secure its liberal values and privileged position. 
Since poverty was not a new factor between the moment President Bush came to 
power in 2001 and the moment he enacted PEPFAR in 2003, it cannot be the variable 
that determined the timing of this policy. Hence, the need to provide an explanation for 
what happened during the interim period to impact the change in the Bush 
administration’s HIV/AIDS policy attitude toward Africa. Aware that cultural patterns 
shape perceptions, choices, and expectations, I began by looking at how the Bush 
administration defined the situation of Africa, reducing the HIV/AIDS problem to 
essentialist characteristics such as stereotypes about Africa’s chronic poverty, deficiency 
in the sexual moral character of Africans, or simply treating the problem as an “abstract” 
with poverty being a mere lack of material capabilities. Such an approach, of course, 
discards the role of history and institutions as having any role to play both in shaping the 
current situation and in understanding why HIV/AIDS has come to stand at the heart of 
all of Africa’s social problems. This dissertation sought exactly that. To show that the 
African condition is not “sui generis” but is a result of multiple interactions between 
different actors, their interests, the institutions they have set, and the conditions they have 
created leading to the acceptance of the global capitalism paradigm within which we 
think, work, play, and make meaning of our lives. The privatization of welfare provision 
and the policy choice of the Bush conservative administration, I contend, makes it easy to 
put the blame on Africans for any condition that besieges their lives, such as HIV/AIDS.  
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The chapter on the history of US HIV/AIDS in previous administrations also 
reveals a pattern of neglect and indifference based on engrained stereotypes and images 
of Africa in most Western minds. The change inaugurated in the Bush administration 
policy approach in 2003 did not seek to break with either the tradition of neglect and 
indifference or the stereotypes of Africa in US foreign policy. Instead, it was simply an 
expedient accommodation of the new global environment; that is, the development of the 
crisis in HIV/AIDS pandemic, the pressure from domestic and international civil society, 
and the rise of China’s activism in Africa as a potential source of foreign aid money. The 
provision of foreign aid at this specific point in time, especially knowing that the crisis in 
the HIV/AIDS global health community had already reached a critical mass prior to the 
Bush election in 2000, did not come as a change of heart for considering the scourges of 
poverty and HIV/AIDS in a new light. Instead, the response followed a pattern of 
behavior that reminds us that US foreign aid to Africa is always motivated by multiple 
factors among which how the situation at stake is interpreted; it may affect one of the 
vital interests of the US on the continent or the presence and involvement of another 
superpower that might defy or challenge these US interests. As I have shown above, US 
interests are defined not only in material terms but also in moral terms, such as the global 
leadership status it enjoyed since the end of the Cold War. With this in mind, it was easy 
to understand why Congress lent support, in a bipartisan way, to this policy when trends 
in its post-Cold War approach to the provision of foreign aid to Africa advocated the 
reduction or even the suppression of it for lack of geostrategic interests.  
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While I embarked on this study with the hope of debunking the myth of 
altruism in US HIV/AIDS foreign aid toward Africa, especially by a conservative 
administration, it should be noted that although the religious right was truly animated by 
humanitarian purpose in its lobbying of the President, different interest groups had 
different goals. The role of private US pharmaceutical companies in the making of 
PEPFAR remains crucial, however. It did not begin with PEPFAR. Actually, even 
President Clinton and his administration were pro-privatization and supported the private 
US pharmaceutical companies prior to the issuance of Executive Order 13155. The policy 
change even under a Democratic President was a matter of political expedience for the 
Democrats, not an act of charity toward Africa, especially on the eve of the 2000 
presidential elections, cycles, which are very important in US domestic politics. The 
Clinton administration needed to retreat from its staunch neoliberal preferences for the 
TRIPS regime and the support of US private pharmaceutical companies in response to 
domestic and international pressure.  
In the ensuing years, PEPFAR became President Bush’s best opportunity to 
overturn the Clinton administration’s state-oriented welfare provision embedded in 
Executive Order 13155 and implement his conservative approach to the public health 
welfare provision through the continuation of the privatization policy. At the international 
level, there was a tug of war between governments of the developing countries and the 
US government’s support of the private US pharmaceutical companies on the issue of 
production and access to anti-HIV/AIDS drugs treatment. This war continued well into 
the years of the Bush White House tenure. As discontent grew about US foreign policy 
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and as Africanist scholars disparaged the foreign aid regime toward the end of the 
Clinton two-terms administration, the Bush administration saw this as a chance to enact 
changes and implement its policy perspective. PEPFAR was enacted in the wake of the 
9/11 terrorist attacks as the implantation of the Bush’s Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC). This approach to foreign aid provision embodied the US attempt to 
reform the foreign aid system, which President Bush denigrated often as a legacy of the 
Cold War era and an instrument of neocolonial paternalism, and to harmonize the 
bureaucratic structure of the government after the Cold War, dictated by the need to 
comply with the new global world order.  
The success of the PEPFAR initiative, acclaimed as one of the few positive 
legacies of the controversial Bush presidency, has been justified on the basis of President 
Bush’s persistent application of the “Monterrey Consensus” framework, which focuses 
on neoliberalism pursuit of privatization, partnership understood as a greater involvement 
of the private sector in the public sphere, coordination between public agencies and 
private organizations in implementing foreign aid for development, and accountability 
which stands for results delivery in the sense of the business management model (Dybul 
2009; Stein 2008; Moss 2009; Hindman and Schroedel 2011). PEPFAR accommodated 
the interests of US pharmaceutical companies in their push for more privatization of the 
welfare system and for a market-oriented solution to public problems. However, it also 
brought back in other actors of the private sector such as private volunteers, 
philanthropists, NGOs, and FBOs to address the multifaceted issue of HIV/AIDS. As the 
pandemic came to present challenges to the security of nations, their economic growth, 
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the global governance, the moral leadership, and individual human rights, HIV/AIDS 
became the true gauge of the benefits of globalizations and a globalized economy justice 
(De Cock et al. 2002, De Waal 2003).  
Hence, PEPFAR resulted from a coincidence of multiple influences including the 
President’s ideological beliefs in compassionate conservatism, the pluralist nature of US 
domestic politics, the bureaucratic organizational culture which President Bush sought to 
reform, the changing global environment with a mounting expression of discontent with 
US superpower through terrorist attacks and the increasing presence of China in Africa 
that challenged the status quo. PEPFAR did not reinvent the wheel of the US HIV/AIDS 
foreign policy. Instead, it built on accumulated knowledge and expertise with existing 
biases and stereotypes vis-à-vis Africa, but also possessed the goal of introducing 
structural changes in US foreign aid system. My primary hunch that PEPFAR was the 
opportunity for the Republicans in the White House to repeal the legacy of the Clinton 
Democratic administration embodied in Executive Order 13155 finds support even 
though I had to enlarge my understanding of the sources of influence. From ideology 
(Democrat vs. Republican welfare model), to interests (moral, economic, political), to 
organization (private model of welfare procurement), PEPFAR shows that the President 
is not the only policy making unit acting or speaking on behalf of the government; nor 
was the private US pharmaceutical companies the only interest group with access to the 
President. Instead, the privatization theory applies to the definition of presidential beliefs 
and preferences, the pursuit of bureaucratic reforms and a redefinition of the role of the 
government in welfare provision, and the pluralistic competition of the domestic politics.  
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In this study, I have looked at continuity and change in US foreign policy 
toward Africa: this is a case study of US HIV/AIDS foreign policy toward that country. 
To understand and explain the puzzle that the President Emergency Plan for HIV/AIDS 
Relief poses to scholars of International Relations – that is, the timing of the policy 
creation in the aftermaths of 9/11 when the prospects of increasing foreign aid to Africa 
were simply unlikely, the pattern of neglect and indifference that characterized different 
administrations prior to the Bush administration, the impending war in Iraq, and the 2002 
economic recession that would compel the policy makers to spend sparingly taxpayers’ 
money – I analyse the domestic and international contexts as well as the prevailing 
beliefs in the Bush administration. President Bush surprised the world by creating a 
policy that allocated $15 billion to combat HIV/AIDS in Africa. While altruism alone or 
even realist arguments are insufficient in explaining fully the creation of PEPFAR, I 
suggest that the convergence of different interests and the need to accommodate them led 
the Bush administration to create PEPFAR.  
Given President Bush’s “neoliberal presidential beliefs” embedded in his 
“compassionate conservatism doctrine, the pluralism of US domestic politics and the 
agenda to reform the foreign aid structure, and more importantly, given the thrust of 
Conservatives to protect the interest of US pharmaceutical companies in a globalized 
economy, were determining in the change in US HIV/AIDS foreign policy toward Africa. 
Actually, US pharmaceutical companies were crucial determinants of the global health 
crisis and in the making of the neoliberal solution precluding the resurgence of the 
welfare state in public health provision. It is only when noneconomic interest groups and 
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other nongovernmental actors challenged the monopoly they wielded in the definition 
of the situation that the US government was able to reconsider its HIV/AIDS foreign 
policy toward Africa and to become more inclusive and more comprehensive of the 
consequences of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa.  
Thus, one important finding of this research is that PEPFAR was the outcome not 
only of the influence of powerful US private pharmaceutical companies on the policy 
making process of the government but also of the multiple sources of influence coming 
from different stakeholders including FBOs, NGOs, think tanks, or private individuals 
both in the domestic and international political environments. While President Bush’s 
personal beliefs and his compassionate conservatism doctrine, at the individual level, 
sought for ways to conjoin the liberal value of public welfare provision with conservative 
emphasis on private initiatives in dealing with social issues, President Bush was able to 
galvanize bipartisan support on HIV/AIDS, a subject matter that cuts across political, 
religious, or social polarization. Nonetheless, it is the schooling of President Bush at 
Harvard Business School that was of significant consequence on his decision making 
process, as President Bush put it in his memoir. “I came away with a better understanding 
of management, particularly the importance of setting clear goals for an organization, 
delegating tasks, and holding people to account. I also gained the confidence to pursue 
my entrepreneurial urge” (Bush 2010:22).  
Besides the individual level of analysis, and the influence from Bush’s business 
mindset, the bureaucratic and institutional sources of influence on the HIV/AIDS foreign 
policy making process at the national level included the bureaucratic competition and the 
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federal agencies’ infighting to control the policy implementation. Not only the pulling 
and hauling between executive and legislative branches sought to leave an ideological 
mark on the policy between Democrats and Republicans but also the State Department 
and the Health and Human Services and the Defense or Labor Departments involved in 
steering the policy played a determining role in shaping the PEPFAR outcome. As 
Andrew Natsios confided to me during my interview with him, for instance, different 
federal departments fought to control the HIV/AIDS money in spite of their lack of 
expertise in development overseas (on December 5, 2012). As he put it,  
I don’t want to go in the political intrigues (…) there was a fight between the 
State Department and the HHS. Secretary of HHS, Tommy Thompson wanted to 
get HHS into doing health in the developing world. I am not gonna question what 
his motivation was but I said, ‘that is what we [USAID] do. A third of our budget 
is health. And it is not just one disease but a lot of it… So there was a fight over 
turf. Who would dominate this. At some point Colin Powell had to intervene and 
said ‘no no no, we’re not gonna run this through HHS but through State 
Department and AID.” Natsios recognizes that the USAID was not involved in 
the drafting of the policy until very late because of this battle over turf. “And so, I 
told HHS it’s none of their business, their focus should be on domestic health in 
the US, not on international, we don’t need any help in this area. AID has 
hundreds officers with PhDs, they are epidemiologists… I think 300 people have 
Masters degree in public health… but, I guess that’s Washington politics. 
 
Eventually, after bureaucratic infightings for control over PEPFAR money, the US 
Global AIDS Coordinator was to be located in the State Department (Lancaster 2008:24). 
Yet, the domestic politics also contributed to the development of the policy as expressed 
through lobbying and advocacy by competing interest groups (Yale Students Association, 
ACT-UP, Churches, Universities, and pharmaceutical companies). Among different 
interest groups, the US government often aligns its policy preferences with those of the 
business interest group (Schraeder 2000; Jacobs and Page 2005; Brown 2012). They 
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wield more power and had a significant impact on the decision making process to 
define US policy outcome or to switch official US policy attitude with regard to 
HIV/AIDS in Africa. As a result, no one interest group could have shaped the US 
HIV/AIDS foreign policy as comprehensively as PEPFAR appears to have done unless 
changes advocated by other stakeholders – with social, moral, financial, and political 
interests – also entered the game to twist the Bush administration’s arm on the issue of 
public health affecting the lives of millions of people in Africa. 
This leads us to consider the influence at the international level. Schraeder (1993) 
has rightly identified the levels of external (other powers) involvement in the situation 
affecting Africa among the important variables determining the US foreign policy toward 
Africa. With regard to the HIV/AIDS global issue, the involvement of the emerging 
economies such as Brazil, South Africa, India, and Thailand was an important factor in 
the US decision-making process. These countries not only tried to impact the whole 
global IPRs regime or to change the TRIPS Agreement to fit their own public health 
interest but also represented an important market with technological capabilities to 
manufacture generic drugs and a growing middle class capable of purchasing goods and 
services. Yet, one individual country such as Uganda was instrumental in influencing the 
“abstinence until marriage” proviso in the prevention policy. Uganda’s First Lady Janet 
Museveni, for instance, made a trip to Washington D.C. to deliver a formal letter to 
Republican lawmakers in Congress “stating that abstinence was key to Uganda’s success. 
Her involvement helped secure the $1 billion abstinence earmark that appears in the final 
bill” (Epstein 2005; Tumushabe 2006). Besides these countries, different UN agencies 
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and other international organizations (IOs) including the UNAIDS, WHO and the 
newly created Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) were 
involved in high profile lobbying to engage the US pharmaceutical companies to reduce 
the price of the anti-AIDS drugs. Also, the WTO adoption of the Doha Declaration in 
November 2001 that affirmed the sovereign right of African governments to take 
measures to protect the public health of their citizens was a determining moment in the 
international tug of war between, on the one hand, the developing countries and 
pharmaceutical companies generic producers and, on the other hand, the US government 
supporting the US R&D-oriented pharmaceutical companies (’t Hoen 2003 and 2009). 
Yet, some international nongovernmental organizations, more specifically the MSF and 
the TAC challenged the monopoly of US political and economic approaches to the global 
issue of HIV/AIDS.1  
My choice of using a neoliberal framework and the privatization theory has come 
as a tradeoff – to be more encompassing as the PEPFAR policy itself – to include not 
only economic aspects but also social and political in the explanation of the Bush 
administration’s policy outcome. In applying the neoliberal privatization theory, this 
study demonstrates how PEPFAR was a deliberate choice to implement a series of 
measures and policies with regard to the new direction that the Bush administration 
wanted to give to the development of Africa and the foreign aid allocation structure. 
Neoliberalism, in this sense, different from the theory of neoliberal institutionalism, 
allowed highlighting of the role of the government and the private actors in welfare 
provision. Among these private actors, the pharmaceutical industry, but also the faith-
                                                
1 Cf. supra, Chapter 4, note 28. 
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based organizations, think tanks, and individuals competed with one another to steer 
the definition of the situation and the policy preference of the US government. In the end, 
the Bush administration perceived that change to the IP regime and TRIPS Agreement, 
which makes the foundation of international economic relations and guarantees the 
stability of the post-Cold War neoliberal world order, posed a threat to the global status 
of the US superpower as well as to its economic welfare and supremacy.  
Brown (2012) has made a significant contribution by studying the role of interest 
groups, think tanks, and lobbyists during the transition period – that is, the time between 
Election Day and Inauguration Day – between two administrations. Existing studies on 
interest groups focused on strategies detached from time (i.e., Hula 1999), coalition 
activities Hojnacki 1997), or the so-called ‘outside strategies’ to influence public opinion 
(Kollman 1998), Brown closes this theoretical gap by focusing on the transition period 
and shows how the business interest group has provided new presidents with policy ideas, 
staff, and people appointed to the administration (Schlesinger 1965; Meese 1992; Blasko 
2004; Brown 2012). Since guaranteeing private US pharmaceutical companies 
technological leadership, ensuring continuous investment flows in R&D for innovation 
(incentive theory), and maintaining the US competitive advantage in trade only reflect the 
neoliberal American ideals and go hand in hand with the promotion of democracy and the 
protection of private property, it is logical to deduce that the Bush policy preference 
derives from the business interest. However, the international human rights advocates 
presented the problem of HIV/AIDS under new lights to challenge the business 
framework and monopolistic economic interpretation of the situation. Their efficacy in 
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changing the framework showed that HIV/AIDS was not only an economic issue but 
a moral and political problem as well. They challenged continued colonial tropes of 
relating to Africans almost as lesser human beings, excluded from the benefits of 
scientific progress based on their social and historical conditions.  
The privatization theory shows, in fact, the thrust of the Bush administration to 
shrink the power of the government in the provision of welfare. That is, both in the US 
and abroad, neoconservatives sought to decrease the power of the state and to increase 
the role and visibility of private actors in their approach to welfare manufacturing. Hence, 
the bureaucratic reforms advocated by most Republicans found their echo and were 
implemented through PEPFAR. No longer USAID alone, but the coordination of 
different bureaucratic agencies should intervene on this issue that is complex and 
encompassing. At the same time, the reforms will allow partnership between public and 
private while also relying on different sources of financing. Bono. Bill Gates. The 
earmarking of the policy at the Congressional level is an expression of domestic power 
politics: different constituencies with different emphases: treatment (Pharmaceutical 
companies), prevention (evangelical Christians), and care (FBOs). 
The devastating effect of HIV/AIDS in Africa predicted since the early 1990s, 
Dietrich (2005:271) observes, “is now being seen in falling life expectancies, increasing 
numbers of orphans, and terrible tolls on households, learning, teaching, health systems, 
agriculture and business sectors across the board.” HIV/AIDS impacts on public health, 
political stability, the state capabilities and the prospects for development cannot be 
overstated. The pandemic constitutes one of the greatest moral, social, political, 
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economic, and scientific challenges of our time. Given these political, ethical, and 
epistemological dimensions pertaining to HIV/AIDS, a better understanding of the Bush 
policy to address the complex phenomenon of HIV/AIDS and public health crisis in 
Africa is in order.  
The process tracing method followed by this study allowed identifying key events 
that contributed to the timing, and attitudinal change of the Bush administration as far as 
the HIV/AIDS pandemic global crisis was concerned. The development of generic drugs 
from India, Brazil, Thailand or South Africa paired with other international events such 
as the September 11 terrorist attacks; the Doha Conference on the TRIPS and Public 
Health; the creation of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, and 
the Monterrey Conference on financing for development were all ingredients that allowed 
the Bush administration to develop its own comprehensive policy approach. While the 
key decision making unit shifted to the White House – and its Task Force on HIV/AIDS 
– thus removing the policy making process from the hands of staunch bureaucrats, 
Congress was able to earmark the appropriations and thus left its own mark on the policy 
outcome. While President Bush chose to frame the issue in humanitarian terms to show 
the urgency of an emergency situation faced by African HIV/AIDS patients, this situation 
did not become so urgent in his first or second year in office, but only in his third year. 
Thus, the move was to have some political dividends for a president in search of 
international legitimacy for his intervention in Iraq.  
Finally, it appears that the primary beneficiaries of the PEPFAR policy are 
Americans themselves. As MSF director described the context by the turning of the new 
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Millennium, HIV/AIDS embodied a situation of injustice outside the context of war, 
as 99 percent of the people with access to the life-saving ARV drugs lived in Europe and 
North America while only less than 1 percent of all ARV drugs were sold in Africa in 
spite of the continent’s greater need for treatment given that millions of people dying of 
the HIV/AIDS pandemic every year (Orbinski 2008:353). If 11 cents only out of every 
dollar reached Africa, as … argues, then US taxpayers monies was meant to fund 
American organizations and firms. PEPFAR Prime partners are American universities, 
federal agencies, Embassies, pharmaceutical companies before getting to reach the non-
American labor force and NGOs (Lewis 2006; Orbinski 2008). 
Unlike the African governments that saw the problem through a neocolonial 
lenses and interpreted it as a power control, and unlike the global civil society that framed 
the issue as a question of global social justice and human rights, different actors framed 
the HIV/AIDS issue differently for different purposes. The policy image that prevailed, 
however, was the neoliberal that emphasized the role and responsibility of individuals 
and the contribution of the private sector – charities, families, churches, etc. – in dealing 
with the disease and caring for those affected by it. Hence, the role of the private sector in 
the provision of welfare was far better than the old way of government handing over big 
checks without any control or change of character. The role of the government is to 
support these private initiatives and actors by creating the institutional framework that 
will allow the interaction among these different actors.  
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Policy Recommendations 
As for the practical policy relevance, this study surveyed the debate on the 
correlations between the HIV/AIDS high prevalence rates in Africa and the different 
arguments on sexual behavior and cultural changes for prevention, access to antiretroviral 
drugs for treatment, and the challenge that the obsolete medical infrastructure continues 
to pose in the fight against the spread of the pandemic. The problem of HIV/AIDS, 
indeed, is a multifaceted one that needs an integrated solution and PEPFAR has 
attempted to provide this. However, African voices that diverge from Western 
epistemological and hermeneutical frameworks seem to be excluded from the policy 
making process. Why has this been the case? 
This study claims that the voices by African experts and from within the African 
cultures need to be heard and must inform US policy makers in Washington DC on 
matters related to the relationship between the African context of economic, social, 
development, and public welfare, on the one hand and HIV/AIDS on the other. Downing 
(2005:12) raises an important question about “why is it so difficult for the West to hear 
African voices?” He goes on to advance the perception and concern that dominant 
Western interpretation about HIV/AIDS in Africa is not only an economic problem but 
also one that reproduces and prolongs neocolonial representations, practices and social 
politics. In fact, some policy makers in the US with connections (whether cultural, 
political, or economic) with the dominant biomedical industry, refer often to Africa’s 
chronic condition of poverty; they have a completely different understanding of poverty 
from the way in which Africans see and interpret their condition. In Western minds, 
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poverty is often reducible to the deprivation of material capabilities while, in the 
minds of African and Africanist scholars and practitioners, poverty is understood in 
anthropological terms as the deprivation of basic human capabilities.
2
 It is unfortunate 
that the voices from Africa have been received in the West, as always, with a good dose 
of suspicion. While Thabo Mbeki’s controversial stance on AIDS as a disease of poverty 
has been decried and condemned in the West, for instance, instead of rousing attention to 
the role of poverty in creating favorable conditions for AIDS, African voices continue 
denouncing the epistemological ethnocentrism of the West as the “biomedical model” 
which remains the dominant framework through which knowledge and understanding of 
HIV/AIDS in Africa is disseminated (Downing 2005:13-15). The power of the Western 
ideological neoliberal framework is also the power to constrain thought. For instance, in 
an interview shortly before flying to Washington D.C. where former President of Zambia, 
Kenneth Kaunda, was invited by President George W. Bush at the PEPFAR signing 
ceremony, he defended Mbeki’s position, saying, “I think that comment [of Mbeki] has 
been deliberately misunderstood – I shouldn’t say deliberately, I withdraw ‘deliberately – 
has been misunderstood” (quoted in Downing 2005:22). 
                                                
2 Sen’s discussion of Development as Freedom (New York: Anchor Books, 1999) provides a 
useful framework of interpreting poverty beyond the utilitarian materialistic and liberal 
individualistic understandings. His “capabilities” approach regards poverty as deprivation of the 
substantive freedoms, which combine both social welfare and personal freedoms. In the same 
way, I believe that the actual conditions of life in Africa, and the opportunities opened to one 
person, cohere in her “capabilities” endowment. HIV/AIDS, in many respects, attacks and 
depletes not only the immune system of the person but also his social endowment. Unlike the 
principle of maximization of social goods proposed by the different welfare provisions in the 
West, either the utilitarian or the liberal approaches that focus on the possession of basics rights, 
liberties and opportunities, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect, African voices 
have been calling for an even more holistic approach that centers on the social empowerment and 
human fulfillment of the person. 
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An important insight from within Africa remarks that there is lack of evidence 
in justifying the correlation between national poverty of African countries and their rates 
of HIV/AIDS prevalence. As Kelly (2010: 109) contends, countries with high HIV/AIDS 
prevalence rates are not necessarily the ones with the lowest GDP or the ones with a high 
percentage of people living below the internationally accepted poverty line of less than 
$1.25 a day. For instance, Nigeria and Zambia have similar poverty rates of 65-70 
percent of people living below the poverty line; yet Nigeria’s HIV prevalence is only a 
quarter of that in Zambia. Namibia may have a high GDP than that of Ethiopia, yet its 
HIV/AIDS prevalence rate is greater than Ethiopia’s. Such countries like Comoros, 
Madagascar, and Ethiopia do not measure up to the high HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in 
richer South Africa, Nigeria, Botswana or Namibia. Hence, as Barnett and Whiteside 
(2006) remark, economic growth alone is not enough and needs to be accompanied by 
social development and justice. While a reevaluation of the role that both state and non-
state actors ought to play in the production and provision of public goods are required, 
especially in Africa with regard to the challenges posed by HIV/AIDS and poverty, 
African voices strongly emphasize the necessary link between HIV/AIDS and the 
practice of social justice. Biomedical or cultural solutions are not encompassing enough 
to address the multiple levels of the challenge posed by HIV/AIDS.  
For instance, the African Catholic Church through the voice of its Synod of 
Bishops advances the view that AIDS “is not to be looked at as either a medical 
pharmaceutical problem or solely as an issue of a change in human behavior. It is really 
an issue of integral development and justice, which requires a holistic approach and 
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response” (quoted in Kelly 2010:251). The HIV/AIDS global crisis will continue to 
pose a threat to social cohesion, national sovereignty, human rights of people, and the 
global collective action unless the aspect of social justice is joined with the cultural and 
biomedical pursuits. Focus on human rights and social justice can allow for a significant 
advancement in the suspicion nurtured by diverging interests of Westerns and Africans in 
a common issue such as HIV/AIDS and public health. Indeed, African voices stress the 
need to dismantle the unjust structures that permit the flourishing of injustice, of which 
HIV/AIDS is but one facet. These structures are endogenous as well as exogenous. The 
former include aspects of poverty that relate to income inequality, cultural norms of 
gender discrimination translating power imbalance between men and women, and the 
stigmatization and other forms of social discriminations against PLWHAs. The latter 
includes the global exploitative economic regimes and practices that have maintained 
Africa in a minority position in terms of knowledge, technology, and dependency on the 
West. 
A cosmopolitan welfare ethics in the age of HIV/AIDS is not about the 
distribution of ARVs drugs alone. It should concern respect for the voices from within 
Africa, not only for political elites who might be pursuing different goals and interests, 
but also for scholars and the civil society who might be easily overlooked in the US 
policy-making process. Health is indeed a growing concern in foreign policy and US 
foreign policy-makers should only pay attention to this issue only in times of crisis. The 
globalization phenomenon and its corollaries – increased movement of people and goods 
across borders, bioterrorism and an epidemiologically interdependent world, trade 
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agreements and treaties, transfer of knowledge and technology to spread development 
– compel foreign policy decision-makers to take the relationship between global health 
and foreign policy seriously. Public health is something that needs to be integrated into 
everyday policy practices and should not be treated at specific critical historical junctures 
as HIV/AIDS has been. Actually, public health has now become integral to national 
security, economic development, political stability, and human and public welfare.  
There are remaining questions that further research could address. How has the 
crisis in HIV/AIDS public health affected the possibility for strengthening the 
democratization process in Africa, especially if trust in the capabilities of the state and in 
their own governments is reduced and citizens tend to overlook them to search for help 
abroad? Are African leaders accountable to their citizens if donors are the ones to provide 
the means for social cohesion, or have the power to control, reward or punish good and 
bad performers? Does the HIV/AIDS experience in Africa call for a different approach to 
the welfare provision model beyond the limits of neoliberalism, one that does not 
undermine the legitimacy of elected leaders or the state as a source of identity?
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Judith Bale,  
 
Board Director for Global Health, Institute of 
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Erica Barks-Ruggles,  International Affairs Fellow, Brookings Institute 
David E. Bell, Professor Emeritus of Population Sciences and 
International Health, Harvard University 
Kenneth W. Bernard,  Special Adviser for International Health Affairs 
to the Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs, National Security Council 
David E. Bloom,  Professor of Economics and Demography, 
Harvard University School of Public Health 
Stephen B. Blount,  Director, Office of Global Health, Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention 
Thomas Bombelles,  Director, International Government Relations, 
Merck and Company, Inc. 
A. David Brandling 
Bennett 
Deputy Director, Pan-American Health 
Organization 
Kenneth C. Brill,  Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Oceans, 
International Environmental and Scientific 
Affairs, Department of State 
Gro Harlem Brundtland,  Director-General, World Health Organization 
Lincoln C. Chen,  Executive Vice President for Program Strategies, 
Rockefeller Foundation 
Richard N. Cooper,  Maurits C. Boas Professor of International 
Economics, Harvard University 
Susan Crowley,  Director of International Organization Relations, 
Merck and Company, Inc. 
Louis J. Currat,  Executive Secretary, The Global Forum for 
Health Research 
Nils Daulaire President and CEO, Global Health Council 
Randolph P. Eddy III Senior Policy Advisor to the U.S. Permanent 
Representative, U.S. Mission to the United 
Nations 
Laura L. Efros Senior Advisor for International Health Strategy, 
Office of Science Technology and Policy 
Timothy G. Evans Team Director, Health Sciences Division, 
Rockefeller Foundation 
Richard G. Feachem Director, Institute for Global Health, University 
of California, San Francisco 
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William H. Foege Distinguished Professor of International Health, 
Rollins School of Public Health, Emory 
University, and Senior Medical Advisor, Bill and 
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